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2.
THE ABSTRACT
Tliis Thesis aspires to examine and review the 
recent authoritative analyses of the legal aspects of 
constitutional breakdown in the Commonwealth, with 
particular reference to Nigeria and Southern Rhodesia.
This work,concerned as it is with legal issues, does not 
examine the political aspects of constitutional breakdowns. 
Adherence to the title of this Thesis has thus required 
tlie exclusion therein of important political events like 
the Nigerian Civil War (19^7™1970) and the Pearce Report 
(1972), CMND* ^964, on opinion in So^^thern Rhodesia.
The Thesis commences with an outline of ICelsen's 
Theory of Legal Norms because controversy has centred on 
his concept of the Grundnorra in relation to the change of 
government. This is followed in Chapter 2 by the back­
ground to the breakdown in Nigeria as well as the breakdown 
itself. The reaction of the Nigerian Judiciary is examined 
in Chapter 3> and Chapter 4 offers a Critique of this 
reaction.
Southern Rhodesia is introduced in Chapter 5 with 
a.background to the breakdown in 1 9 6 5* Chapter 6 presents 
a conspectus of the breakdown with mention of the measures 
adopted by the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia 
Governments, respectively, to assert their attitudes towards 
U.D.I. The different responses of the Judiciaries in 
Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom are the subject- 
matter of Chapter 7» On this subject-ma.f~.ter Chapter 8 
attempts a Critique. The Critiques in Chapters 4 and 8 
are specifically directed to Nigeria and Southern Rhodesia, 
respectively•
The Critique in Chapter 9 - the Concluding Critique - 
concentrates on the nature of legal orders in general; 
this Critique suggests a basis of legal analysis, which, 
it is hoped, avoids some of the confusion and complexity 
which have been precipitated by judicial and academic 
opinion.
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5.
PART X
INTRODUCTION : THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
CHAPTER 1 
KELSEN1S THEORY OF LEGAL NORMS
It is pertinent to have the question answered: why 
is Kelsen accorded such importance in an examination of 
constitutional breakdowns? The answer is that Kelsen*s 
Theory of Legal Norms is concerned with the functioning of 
an entire legal order and not with particular rules of law* 
¥here particular legal provisions are no longer of conclusive 
authority, as where the very structure of the legal system, 
its very existence, is challenged, that is, where there is 
a constitutional breakdown, a theory of law is required that 
is designed to resolve the legal confusion in just such a 
situation by offering an analysis of the very structure of 
law in society. ¥here a legal order is impugned as a 
whole, the outcome is best decided after an examination of 
the legal order in terms of its wholeness or entirety. Such 
an approach is precisely that offered by Kelsen, and this no 
doubt accounts for the distinction his Theory of Legal Norms 
enjoys of being the only legal philosophy assimilated in 
its entirety by at least two courts in the Commonwealth 
(Pakistan and Uganda in 1958 and 1p66 respectively: but the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan, after tlie latter* s withdrawal from 
the Commonwealth in 1971 > In 1972 overruled its decision in 
1958).
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But bearing in mind that Kelsen is only a jurist, 
it may be asked why the court in Pakistan in 195® did not 
appeal to judicial precedent, but instead chose to turn to 
Kelsen? The answer is that until the decision in that 
case, there was no judicial pronouncement on such revo­
lutionary situations* Failing judicial precedent, the 
court in Pakistan in 1958 gratefully accepted, or at least 
purported to accept, the rationalisation of legal orders so 
providentially presented by Kelsen.
The pui’pose of Kelsen1 s Theory of Legal Norms when 
seen in its Municipal context is the definition of a 
structure in National legal orders by reference to which 
structure law may be identified. The structure is given 
the form of a hierarchy of legal rules. Rules that belong 
to this hierarchy are laws 5 rules which do not are not.
This system is designed to settle the confused disputes 
relating to the issue of what is and what is not law. The 
author*s approach is aimed specifically at dispensing with 
all elements of justice, morality and divinity because, he 
claims, such elements have been unwarrantedly permitted to 
encrust, and hence to confuse, the issue of whether certain 
rules qualify as law. In fine , the desideratum of clarity 
through simplicity is what Kelsen promises to satisfy.
To Kelsen the structure of laws in a country is 
explained in terms of a hierarchy of legal norms, each norm 
deriving its validity from one pi’ior to itself until the 
stage is reached when an absolutely prior, or the ultimate, 
norm logically terminates the process to form the complete
legal order. He defines a legal norm as being a 
proposition which postulates that upon the fulfilment of 
stated conditions, specified consequences ought to ensue 
therefrom or to attach thereto. Every- law is a norm 
although in order to be such the particular law is not 
required to be expressed in the form of a norm, but only 
has to be explicable as such. When the legislator provides 
that a thief "will be" punished, that provision is a norm, 
and although it is not expressed in the form of a consequence 
attaching to a condition, this is the way the statement is 
to be explained. The statement, notwithstanding the phrase
"will be", is not a mere prediction made by the legislator.
1
This is liow Kelsen puts its
In particular, the general norms must be norms 
in which a certain sanction is made dependent 
upon certain conditions, this dependence being 
expressed by the concept of 1 ought *• This does 
not mean that the law-making organs necessarily 
have to give the norms the form of such 
hypothetical 1 ought* statements. The different 
elements of a norm may be contained in very 
different products of the law-making procedure, 
and they may be linguistically expressed in 
very different ways. When the legislator 
forbids theft, he may, for instance, first define 
the concept of theft in a number of sentences 
which form an article of a statute, and they 
stipulate the sanction in another sentence, which 
may be part of another article of the same 
statute or even part of an entirely different 
statute. Often the latter sentence does not 
have the linguistic form of an imperative or an 
* ought* sentence but the form of a prediction 
of a future event. The legislator frequently 
makes use of the future tense, saying that a thief 
*will be* punished in such and such a way. He
1. General Theory of Law and State: by Hans Kelsen,
translated by Anders Wedberg (1945): Reissued (1961) 
by Russell and Russell (New York): at p.45.
then presupposes that the question as to who 
is a thief has been answered somewhere else, 
in the same or in some other statute. The 
phrase ,will be punished* does not imply the 
prediction of a future event - the legislator 
is no prophet - but an * imperative* or a 
* command*, these terms taken in a figurative 
sense. What the norm-creating authority means 
is that the sanction 'ought* to be executed 
against the thief, when the conditions of the 
sanction are fulfilled.
Kelsen then moves on to point up the distinction
between laws and a theory of law. Laws are prescriptive
whereas a theory of law is descriptive: the norms prescribe
what ought to be or not to be done; a theory about them
describes what they do and what they are, it describes their
authority to prescribe, but it cannot itself prescribe*
?This is how Kelsen makes the distinction:
It is the task of the science of law to represent 
the law of a community, i.e. the material produced 
by the legal authority in the law-making procedure, 
in the form of statements to the effect that *if 
such and such conditions are fulfilled, then such 
and such a sanction shall follow.* These 
statements,by means of which the science of law 
represents law, must not be confused with the 
norms created by the law-making authorities. 3 
It is preferable not to call these statements 
norms, but legal rules. The legal norms enacted 
by the law creating authorities are prescriptive; 
the rules of law formulated by the science of law 
are descriptive. It is of importance that the 
term 'legal rule* or 'rule of law* be employed 
here in a descriptive sensed 5
2. Kelsen, op.cit., p.4,5. 
3* My own underlining.
4. My own underlining.
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Kelsen then compares and then distinguishes the 
sciences of law and nature. They both involve hypothetical 
judgements that attach certain consequences to certain 
conditions. In the law of nature, however, the condition 
in the judgment is the cause, the consequence the effect.
The law of nature is the law of causality. It therefore 
differs from the legal rule in its manner of connecting the 
condition with the consequence. The law of nature provides 
that if A is B is or will be, whereas the legal rule 
postulates that if A is, B ought to be. The mode of 
description pertaining to the former thus relates to 
causality, that pertaining to the latter relates to 
no rma t ivi ty•
Because a norm in legal theory only provides for 
what ought to happen as distinct from what does happen, 
exceptions to it are not created by the fact that what it 
says ought to occur does not actually take place. The 
norm is not perforated if a thief is not brought to justice, 
because it merely says that he ought to, not will be, brought 
to justice. The law of nature, on the other hand, is not 
inexorable and in response to a refractory phenomenon of 
nature has to accept the letter's status as constituting 
an exception to it or to amend itself so as to incorporate 
the phenomenon.
The legal norm is valid irrespective of moral 
content.^  This has logically to be the position because
5* Kelsen, p. 46.
6. Kelsen, p* 48.
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there is no objective criterion, or rather no universally 
accepted lodestone, for morality. What in a certain 
situation is considered just by one individual may appear 
unjust to another. Even different norms sharing the same 
hierarchy may embody moral precepts not only different from, 
but incompatible with, one another. If laws could be 
vitiated by inconsistency with views on morality, then 
every man would be a law unto himself. A norm, on the 
other hand, can be verified objectively by asking whether 
it belongs to a legal order which on the whole corresponds 
to political reality.
Having propounded the nature of a legal norm
7Kelsen proceeds to describe his hierarchy of norms. The 
pyramidal disposition of the norms is essential to organise 
all the multifarious norms which will otherwise be in 
disarray. The reason for the validity of a norm is 
always another norm prior to it in authority. The reason 
why the subsequent norm requires its validity to be sus­
tained by a prior norm is that the subsequent norm is not 
self-evident, and therefore cannot but thrive umbilieally 
on the prior norm. The statement “If a man kills without 
provocation he shall be hanged”, is not self-evident in 
that the question may be raised as to why a man who does 
so ought to be so executed. It may then be discovered that 
this norm is derived from the following norm “Parliament 
shall have power to make laws, disobedience to which shall 
not be permitted.”
7• Kelsen, p. 111.
The basic norm is then explained. This is the 
norm from which all other norms of the legal order derive 
their validity. No norm can be valid if its existence 
cannot be traced in terms of progressive priority to the 
basic norm. Since the basic norm is definitively ultimate 
it would be illogical to expect it to be able to point to 
further authority. But if it cannot justify its existence 
with prior authority how does it explain itself? The 
answer, we are told, has nothing to do with the idea of 
derivation: the basic norm sustains itself. It is an
entity of presupposition. If the hierarchy of laws, of
i £
which iti the ultimate, is effective, £s when assessed as a 
whole, then the basic norm is what it is because it happens 
to be what it is, the fount of a functioning legal order.
It functions because it is functioning. The only pertinent 
question that can be raised in relation to it is whether 
it functions and not how it has come to function. If it 
functions, it i_s; if it does not function, it is not.
ICelsen is meticulous in his emphasis that the basic 
norm is not in any way affected by its constituent or 
constituents. These constituents enjoy by themselves no 
inherent paramountcy. Because no constituent enjoys 
intrinsic supremacy the identity of constituents cannot 
matter in the least. If God is regarded as the supreme 
legislator then God is the basic norms if God is not so 
treated then He is not the basic norm. God is not the 
basic norm because lie is God: He can be the basic norm
12.
only by virtue of1 His being treated as such. Thus it is 
the treatment of, or attitude towards, Him that is the 
crux of the matter, not His being He.
The basic norm, in Kelsen1s own words, is explained
thus
The derivation of the norms of a legal order 
from the basic norm of that order is performed 
by showing that the particular norms have been 
created in accordance with the basic norm. To 
the question why a certain act of coercion - 
e.g., that fact that one individual deprived 
another individual of his freedom by putting him 
in jail - is a legal act, the answer iss because 
it has been prescribed by an individual norm, 
a judicial decision. To the question why this 
individual norm is valid as part of a definite 
legal order, the answer is: because it has been 
created in conformity with a criminal statute.
This statute, finally, receives its validity 
from the constitution, since it has been estab- 
lished by the competent organ in the way the 
constitution prescribes.
If we ask why the constitution is valid, perhaps 
we come upon an older constitution. Ultimately 
we reach some constitution that is the first 
historically and that was laid down by an 
individual usurper or by some kind of assembly.
The validity of this first constitution is the 
last ©supposition, the final postulate, upon 
which the validity of all the norms of our legal 
order depends. It is postulated that one ought 
to behave as the individual, or the individuals, 
who laid down the first constitution have ordained. 
This is the basic norm of the legal order under 
consideration. The document which embodies the 
fix*st constitution is a real constitution, a 
binding norm, only on the condition that the basic 
norm is presupposed to, be valid. Only upon this 
presupposition are the declarations of those to 
whom the constitution confers norm-ex'*eating power 
binding norms. It is this pi'esupposition that 
enables us to distinguish between individuals who 
are legal authorities and other individuals xtfhom 
we do not regard as such, between acts of human 
beings which create legal norms and acts which have
8. Kelsen, p. 115.
13*
no such effect. All these legal norms belong 
to one and the same legal order because their 
validity can be traced back - directly or 
indirectly - to the first constitution. That 
the first constitution is a binding legal norm 
is presupposed, and the formulation of the 
presupposition is the basic norm of this legal 
order. The basic norm of a religious norm 
system says that one ought to behave as God and 
the authorities constituted by Him command. 
Similarly, the basic norm of a legal order
prescribes that one ought to behave as the
•fathers' of the constitution and the individuals 
- directly or indirectly ~ authorized (delegated) 
by the constitution on command. Expressed in 
the form of a legal norm: coercive acts ought to
be carried out only under the conditions and in
the way determined by the 'fathers' of the 
constitution or the organs delegated by them.
This is, schematically formulated, the basic norm 
of the legal order of a single state, the basic 
norm of a national legal order.
Kelsen continues by describing the function of the 
basic normj^
That a norm of the kind just mentioned is the 
basic norm of the national legal order does not 
imply that it is impossible to go beyond that 
norm. Certainly one may ask why one has to 
respect the first constitution as a binding norm. 
The answer might be that the fathers of the first 
constitution were empowered by God. The 
characteristic of so-called legal positivism is, 
however, that it dispenses with any such religious 
justification of the legal order. The ultimate 
hypothesis of positivism is the norm authorizing 
the historically first legislator. The whole 
function of this basic norm is to confer law- 
creating power on the act of the first legislator 
and on all the other acts based on the first act. 
To interpret these acts of human beings as legal 
acts and their px'oducts as binding norms, and 
that means to interpx*et the empirical material 
which presents itself as law as such, is possible 
only on the condition that the basic norm is 
presupposed as a valid norm. The basic norm is 
only the necessary presupposition of any 
positivistic interpretation of the legal material.
9* Kelsen, p. 116.
The basic norm is not created in a legal 
procedure by a law-creating organ. It is 
not - as a positive legal norm is ~ valid 
because it is created in a certain way by 
a> legal act, but it is valid because it is 
presupposed to be valid; and it is presupposed 
to be valid because without this presupposition 
no human act could be interpreted as a legal, 
especially as a norm-creating, act.
Kelsen says that a basic norm is not eternal.
This is because the legal order of* which it is the summit
can be overthrown. When a legal order is thus supplanted
a new order with its own basic norm emerges. The overthrow
cannot be scrutinised in terms of* legal rules enshrined in
the old order because a scrutiny of such a nature would
imply that the new grundnorm had to have legal validity -
an implication that would contradict what has already been
posited of the grundnorm, namely, that it is because it is
and not because it is permitted or authorised. But how is
an overthrow to be defined? This happens when the
hierarchy of norms ceases to reflect political reality.
Kelsen is of opinion that after an overthrow such 
legal rules as are allowed to operate despite their having 
been embodied in the norms of the old order do so because 
of their being freshly incorporated into the norms of the 
new order, and not because the norms of the old order have 
paradoxically survived.
Kelsen*s view of the emergence of a new legal order
10is best described in his own wordss
The validity of legal norms may be limited in 
time, and it is important to notice that the 
end as well as the beginning of this validity
1i0. Kelsen, p. 117.
is determined only by the order to which they 
belong# They remain valid as long as they 
have not been invalidated in the way which the 
legal order itself determines. This is the 
principle of legitimacy*
This principle, however, holds only under certain 
conditions. Xt fails to hold in the case of a 
revolution, this word understood in the most 
general sense, so that it also covers the so-called 
coups d1etat* A revolution, in this wide sense, 
occurs whenever the legal order of a community is 
nullified and replaced by a new order in an 
illegitimate way, that is in a way not prescribed 
by the first order itself. It is in this context 
irrelevant whether or not this replacement is 
effected through a violent uprising against those 
individuals who so far have been the 1legitimate* 
organs competent to create and ascend the legal 
order# It is equally irrelevant whether the 
replacement is effected through a movement 
emanating from the mass of the people, or through 
action from those in government positions# Prom 
a juristic point of view, the decisive criterion 
of a revolution is that the order in force is 
overthrown and replaced by a new order in a way 
which the former had not itself anticipated.
Usually, the new men whom a revolution bx’ings to 
power annul only the constitution and certain laws 
of paramount political significance, putting other 
norms in their place. A great part of the old 
legal order * remains * valid also within the frame 
of the new order• But the phrase * they remain
valid *, does not give an adequate description of the 
phenomenon• It is only the contents of these 
norms that remain the same, not the reason of their 
validity. They are no longer valid by virtue of 
having been created in the way the old constitution 
prescribed. That constitution is no longer in 
force; it is replaced by a new constitution which 
is not the result of a constitutional alteration 
of the former• If laws which were introduced under 
the old constitution * continue to be valid* under 
the new constitution, this is possible only because 
validity has expressly or tacitly been vested in 
them by the new constitution# The phenomenon is a 
case of reception (similar to the reception of Roman 
law). The new order *receives *, i»e•, adopts, norms 
from the old order; this means that the new order 
gives validity to (puts into force) norms which have 
the same content as norms of the old order.
*Reception* is an abbreviated procedure of law— 
creation# The laws which, in the ordinary inaccurat 
parlance, continue to be valid are, from a juristic
16.
viewpoint, new laws whose import coincides 
with that of the old laws. .V^ They are not 
identical with the old laws, because the 
reason for their validity is different. The 
reason for their validity is the new, not the 
old, constitution, and between the two continuity 
holds neither from the point of view of the one 
nor from that of the other. Thus, it is never 
the constitution merely but always the entire 
legal order that is changed by a revolution.
This shows that all norms of the old order have 
been deprived of their validity by revolution 
and not according to the principle of legitimacy 
and they have been so deprived not only de facto 
but also de jure. No jurist would maintain that 
even after a successful revolution the old consti­
tution and the laws based thereupon remain in 
force, on the ground that they have not been 
nullified in a manner anticipated by the old order 
itself. Every jurist will presume that the old 
order - to which no political reality any longer 
corresponds - has ceased to be valid, and that 
all norms, which are valid within the new order, 
receive their validity exclusively from the new 
constitution. It follows that, from this juristic 
point of view, the norms of the old order can no 
longer be recognised as valid norms•
Kelsen proceeds to expound the predicament of those 
who contemplate revolutions• When a rebellion begins, and 
before it receives the accolade of success, those who parti­
cipate in it have broken the legal rules contained in tlie 
norms of the legal order at whose overthrow the rebellion is 
aimed. At this stage what is being done is clearly unlawful, 
and if the rebellion is crushed the law, as contained in the 
norms of that legal order whose overthrow has not been 
accomplished, will take its course. If, however, the 
rebellion succeeds, the old order is superseded and whatever 
legal rules of the old order the new order desires important 
to incorporate, it can safely be assumed that those rules
11. Kelsen, p. 118.
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which had operated against the new rulers when they had 
been mere rebels will not be sustained by such incorporation. 
By such means are successful rebels protected from the
initial illegality that stigmatizes incipient insurgency.
12Kelsen takes us through the process most eloquently:
Xt is just the phenomenon of revolution which 
clearly shows the significance of the basic 
norm. Suppose that a group of individuals 
attempt to seize power by force, in order to 
remove the legitimate government in a hitherto 
monarchic State, and to introduce a republican 
form of government. If they succeed, if the 
old order ceases, and the new order begins to 
be efficacious, because the individuals whose 
behaviour the new order regulates actually 
behave, by and large, in conformity with the 
new order, then this order is considered as a 
valid order. It is now according to this new 
order that the actual behaviour of individuals 
is interpreted as legal or illegal. But this 
means that a new basic norm is presupposed.
Xt is no longer the norm according to which the 
monarchic constitution is valid, but a norm 
endowing the revolutionary government with legal 
authority. If the revolutionaries fail, if 
the order they have tried to establish remains 
inefficacious then, on the other hand, their 
undertaking is interpreted, not as a legal, a 
law-creating act, as the establishment of a 
constitution, but as an illegal act, as the 
crime of treason, and this according to the old 
monarchic constitution and its specific basic 
norm.
In his discussion of legal orders Kelsen points to 
the important difference between the relationship of the 
basic norm to its subordinate norms and that between the 
efficacy of the legal order and its norms. The subordinate 
norms are valid only by reason of their being traceable to 
the basic norm. They are valid because the basic norm says
12. Kelsen, p. 118.
so. But it would be incorrect to say that the norms of
a legal order are valid because the efficacy of that order
says so. The efficacy of the legal order is not the
reason for the validity of the norms found in it: the
efficacy is merely a condition precedent to the validity
of the norms and not a constituent element in that validity.
This is made evident in one of the most important passages 
13in his works
If tire attempt to make explicit the presupposition 
on which these juristic considerations rest, we 
find that the norms of the old order are regarded 
as devoid of validity because the old constitution 
and, therefore, the legal norms based on this 
because the actual behaviour of men does no 
longer conform to this old legal order. Every 
single norm loses its validity when the total 
legal order to which it belongs loses its 
efficacy as a whole. The efficacy of the entire 
legal order is a necessary condition for the 
validity of every single norm of the order. A 
condition sine qua non, but not a condition per 
quam. The efficacy of the total legal order is 
a condition, not the reason for the validity of 
its constituent norms. These norms are valid 
not because the total order is efficacious, but 
because they are created in a constitutional way. 
They are valid, however, only on the condition 
that the total order is efficacious? they cease 
to be valid, not only when they are annulled in a 
constitutional way, but also when the total order 
ceases to be efficacious. It cannot be maintained 
that, legally, men have to behave in conformity 
with a certain norm, if the total legal order, of 
which that norm is an integral part, has lost its 
efficacy. The principle of legitimacy is 
restricted by the principle of effectiveness.
13* Kelsen, p. 119*
The Judicial Response to Kelson*s Theory
Kelsen1s Theory has been purportedly applied in
two judicial decisions in the Commonwealth. The first
was in Pakistan in 1958; the second followed eight years
later in Uganda. Although Kelsen has been canvassed in
14other constitutional litigation in the Commonwealth , only 
in Pakistan and Uganda have the courts expressly relied on 
the Theory of Norms to support their conclusions.
It may at first appear anomalous that the judiciary 
should embody as the basis of their ratio decidendi a 
legal theory propounded by a jurist, instead of resorting 
to the usual foundations of precedent and enacted law. The 
explanation is twofold. First, in the case of Pakistan 
in 1958 there was no previous judicial decision to which 
the judges could turn to sustain their conclusion. It is
true that the revolution in Pakistan was not the first of 
its kind in the Commonwealth (there was tlie Glorious Revo­
lution of 1688) but it was unprecedented in the sense that 
its effectiveness was impugned before the courts. The
second reason for the court1s unusual approach was that
precisely because the contention centred on whether the old
legal order had or had not been displaced the validity of 
the alternative conclusions open to the court could not have 
been rested on any law of the old or new legal order, since
14 . ( i ) MADS IMBAMUTO v . LARDNER- BURKE s 
G.D.: 19^6 R.L.R. 756;
A.D.s 1£68 (2) S.A. 284, 457;
P.O.: Zl96£/ (1) A.C. 645.
(ii) 1AKANMI AND OLA v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE WESTERN 
STATE OF NIGERIaT 24th APRIL. 1970 (Unreported)V 
sc. 58/69.
such a step would he tantamount to postulating that A was 
supreme only because A claimed to be supreme. A criterion 
exclusive of any provided by A and B could alone have been 
applied to decide the conflict. Such a criterion not 
having been obtainable either through precedent or enacted 
law, had to be discovered among one of the legal theories 
propounded by jurists of acknowledged eminence. But among 
these theories none but that of Kelsen was close enough to 
be applied with a degree of plausibility. One could reply 
to the possible objection that in Uganda the court could 
have rested its case exclusively on the precedent set in 
Pakistan, by saying that since that precedent itself was 
founded exclusively on Kelsen the Ugandan court was right 
to have had direct recourse to the jurist. The Ugandan 
court did refer to the decision in Pakistan but the 
reference was by way of illustration only. The court did 
not say that because the court in Pakistan had said that 
Kelsen applied, that decision was decisive by way of 
precedent. Rather the Ugandan court opined that Kelsen*s 
Theory applied because it was obviously applicable and not 
only because it had been applied before. Xn short, the 
Ugandan court would not have been deterred even if a revo­
lutionary situation had not arisen in Pakistan in 1958.
Having attempted an analysis of the probable motives 
that actuated the respective courts to do what they have done, 
we shall now assess the legal import of the situation in 1958 
in Pakistan, which was treated by the court there as a 
revolutionary situation.
The first Constitution of Pakistan was enacted 
in March, 1956. This Constitution was purportedly 
annulled hy the President in a Proclamation in October,
1958. The President, who held office under the 1956 
Constitution, dismissed the Central Cabinet and the 
Provincial Cabinets. He also dissolved the National 
Assembly together with both the Provincial Assemblies. 
Martial law was declared throughout the country and the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army was appointed by 
the President as Chief Martial Law Administrator.
Shortly afterwards (three days after the annulment of the 
1956 Constitution) the President (it is intriguing that 
he should still have regarded himself as President even 
after purporting to annul that Constitution under which 
he held office) purported to promulgate the Laws 
(Continuance in Force) Order which, except for the 1956 
Constitution itself, revived all the laws in existence 
before the annulment of the 1956 Constitution.
The validity of the act of annulment by the 
President cam© up for adjudication before the Supreme Court 
of Pakistan by way of a criminal appeal• We are not 
concerned with the details of the criminal law. Suffice 
it to say that the validity of the new legal order had to 
be decided before the criminal appeal could be settled.
The Chief Justice quoted Kelsen but he also para­
phrased the jurist. After this exercise the Chief Justice
said very briefly that Kelsen*s Theory applied because
15the revolution was efficacious. In his most important
passage the Chief Justice said* ^
It sometimes happens, however, that a Consti­
tution and the National legal order under it 
is disrupted by an abrupt political change not 
within the contemplation of the Constitution,
Any such change is called a revolution, and
its legal effect is not only the destruction
of the existing Constitution but also the
validity of the national legal order
For the purposes of the doctrine here explained
a change is, in law, a revolution if it annuls
the Constitution and the annulment is effective.,..
Thus the essential condition to determine whether
a Constitution has been annulled is the efficacy
of the change•
The Laws (Continuance in Force) Order was thus 
adjudged to be the new Pakistani Grundnorm. It is not 
proposed at this stage to discuss the question of whether 
Kelsen*s Theory was correctly applied or whether situations 
such as that just examined can ever be resolved by recourse 
to it •
The revolutionary situation in Uganda in 1966 (as 
distinct from that in 1971) will now be discussed. Uganda 
became independent in 1962 and the Constitution by which 
it was governed was unchallenged from that date until 
February, 19 6 6 , when the Prime Minister purported to suspend 
it. Events from February to April ended with the purported 
annulment of the 1962 Constitution by the National Assembly 
in April. By resolution the National Assembly approved 
and promulgated what purported to be a new Constitution,
15• The state v. Posso (1958)
Pakistan Supreme Court Reports, p.180, at p.186.
16• Dosso s pp. 18^-185*
the 1966 Constitution. It is important to notice that 
the change constituted a breach of legal continuity in 
that the 1966 Constitution is NOT introduced in accordance 
with the provisions of the 1962 Constitution, The issue 
of whether the 1966 Constitution was valid was brought 
before the High Court of Uganda when the latter was asked 
to decide whether a person had been properly detained when 
the powers of detention were derived from Emergency 
Regulations made under the 1966 Constitution.
The Chief Justice of Uganda founded his conclusion
on Kelsen*s Theory of the Grundnorm. His Lordship agreed
17with the Attorney-General that a legal order can be 
overthrown by an abrupt and fundamental political change
which that legal order does not contemplate. The change
must be fundamental in the sense that the entire old 
legal order has to be destroyed except what the new legal 
order chooses to preserve and that such laws as survive
do so as laws of the new legal order. The new legal order
must also be effective before it can be recognised as such.
One difference between the judgments of the two 
courts is that the Uganda High Court regarded Kelsen*s 
Theory as embodying a principle of international law 
whereas the Supreme Court of Pakistan was silent as to 
whether Kelsen*s Theory was meant for international or 
national law. The Chief Justice of Uganda does not explain 
how a municipal court, such as his own, can find the
17* Uganda v. Comr. of Prisons, ex parte Matovu
( 1 9 6 6 ) E.A. p. 5 1 4 , at pp. 53 4 - 5 3 5 *
jurisdiction to make a ruling of international law, as 
distinct from a ruling of national law regarding an 
international issue. It is suggested that if Kelsen* s 
Theory is applicable to such situations by municipal 
courts the latter should treat the Theory as embodying 
a principle of national law.
That the learned Chief Justice of Uganda had
presumed to make a pronouncement on international law is
18made manifest in this short extract from his judgment:
The Constitution had extra legal origin and 
therefore created a new legal order. Although 
the product of a revolution, the Constitution 
is none-the-less valid because in international 
law 1-9 revolutions and coups d'etat are the 
recognised methods of changing governments and 
constitutions in sovereign states.
His Lordship withholds from us the explanation as 
to why a rule of international law (assuming that there is 
such a rule) is to be, without more, incorporated into the 
rules of a municipal legal order; or, alternatively how 
his court could have obtained the competence to apply a 
rule of international law when dealing with litigation 
concerning the domestic municipal law.
As stated earlier, in 1972 the Supreme Court of
Pakistan overruled its own decision in 1958 (State v. Dosso)
It did so in Asmw Jilani v. The Government of the Punjab 
20and Another. Although this case will not be examined
until later, it is proposed to mention here that it refused
18. ex parte Matovu, p. 537*
19• My own emphasis.
20. P.C.D. 1972. S.C. 139.
to apply or adopt Kelsen* s Theory of Legal Norms because 
it maintained that the Theory was merely a juristic
21proposition which was not intended for use by judges*
The Theory, being descriptive only, could not, the court 
maintained, bind judges in the administration of law and 
justice.
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON KELSEN *S THEORY OF THE GRXJNDNOHM.
Kelsen* s Theory has been criticized but it is
submitted that the criticisms of his theory do not vitiate
the logic that informs his structure of norms. Kelsen,
as we have seen, set out to propound a thesis of law
whereby laws can be identified without recourse to issues
of justice and morality which in his view serve only to
confuse the process of identification. That was why he
called his theory the Pure Theory of Law. Professor 
22Friedmann , however, asserts that his (i.e. Kelsen’s) 
theory does not enjoy the purity from extraneous consider­
ations that its author claims for it. Professor Friedmann 
fastens on Kelsen*s definition of the grundnorm as the peak
of a structure of norms which taken as a whole is efficacious,
23and critically inquires;
21. P.C.D. 1972. S.C. 139, at 179.
22. Legal Theory (fifth edition) by ¥. Friedmann, 
published by Stevens (1 9 6 7).
23. Friedmanns p. 2 8 5 •
How can the minimum of effectiveness be proved 
except by an inquiry into political and social 
facts? And this implies the necessity of a 
further political choice; Does the obedience 
of the majority, of an enlightened minority or 
sheer physical force decide? Whatever the 
answer, purity here ceases.
The short answer to Professor Friedmann's trilemma 
is that whoever can enforce his will, the mode or instru­
mentality chosen to accomplish this being a distinct and 
irrelevant matter, will be supreme. If a majority of the 
people desire A and in fact executes it despite, or in the 
absence of, opposition from other quarters then the will 
of the majoi’ity will prevail. If an enlightened minority 
can cajole their way to power, then their will is surely 
supreme. Again, there is no reason why a minimum of 
effectiveness cannot come from sheer physical force. Xt 
is the fact of efficacy that matters, not the means em­
ployed to achieve it. When Professor Friedmann says
"Whatever the answer, ....... " he means only whatever
criteria, whether or not these be within the range of his 
suggested alternatives, are chosen to identify the efficacy 
of which Kelsen speaks, Kelsen*s Theory becomes impure
thereat. But, of course, "Whatever the answer,......."
does not include an answer which undermines the presuppos­
ition of his question that the answer, whatever it is, has 
to be an answer identifying the critei’ia used to identify 
the minimum of effectiveness. What Professor Friedmann 
considers to be the possible alternative constituents of the 
identified attribute or quality are in fact only the means
of identification for the attribute or quality in question. 
The fact that Grundnorm A is effective because it is not 
opposed and that it is not opposed because those who do 
not oppose it forbear from doing so on the ground that it 
is morally meritorious, does not mean that moral merit 
enters into the definition of the grundnorm, since it is 
its efficacy, not how that efficacy has been achieved, that 
validates a legal order. Does A have support is surely 
distinct from why A has that support. Professor Friedmann's 
alternatives are seen by him to be constituents of the 
Grundnorm, and thus to deprive the latter of its purity.
But if his alternatives are seen to have their relevance 
to the identification of the Grundnorm in their effect, 
and not their respective essences, it will be realized that 
because their essences are not involved in the phenomenon 
of identification, such essences are not in a position to 
affect the Grundnorm*s purity. Assuming that a particular 
Grundnorm is able to exact conformity to its dictates 
because the majority of citizens obey it, this does not 
mean that such majority is the Grundnorm or that the 
Grundnorm is made up of such majority's obedience to it. 
Efficacy is the indispensable condition precedent to the 
existence of a Grundnorm, The fact that such efficacy 
has been brought about by, or is constituted of, one or 
more of Professor Friedmann's alternatives does not mean 
that the Grundnorm is not pure. Even if such efficacy is 
not only a condition precedent to, but is a constituent 
of, a Grundnorm, the latter still retains its purity because
the efficacy is the effect, not the essences, of his 
alternatives. And further, even if Professor Friedmann 
were to contend that the essences of his alternatives 
necessarily included their effects, this inclusion could 
only cover such effects as were necessarily constitutive 
of their respective essences* Now, it cannot be asserted 
that efficacy is a necessary effect of, and hence a 
constituent of, any of his alternatives. I-Ience his 
alternatives do not in any way affect the essence of a 
Grundnorm, and thus cannot deprive the latter of its 
absolute purity and freedom from non-normative phenomena.
However, let us assume that Kelsen*s theory is 
impure. Does this assumed impurity vitiate his description 
of the hierarchy of norms? No. The lack of absolute 
purity in his legal pyramid does not demonstrate the 
illogicality of the pyramidal structure which his theory 
constructs. The structure is there to assist the identi­
fication enjoyed by different legal rules within a system. 
Whatever impurity may mean it does not destroy the function 
the structure has been designed to fulfil.
Let us now move on to another point. The courts, 
in applying Kelsen*s theory assume that the theory is pre­
scriptive. How can they cite him if his theory is there 
only to describe? However, this distinction may not be 
as important as it appears. Consider this statement; an 
Act of Parliament is (shall be) an instrument expressed to 
be such, which instrument has been approved by the Crown, 
the House of Lords and the House of Commons, such that the
approval of the last two bodies shall be (is) expressed 
in the manner provided by their respective Standing Orders 
relating to such matter, and such that the approval of 
the Crown shall be (is) expressed through the Royal Assent, 
An instrument so processed is an Act of Parliament, Does 
it matter whether the phrase "shall be" or the word "is" 
is used? In short, does it matter whether the statement 
is prescriptive or descriptive? It is submitted that it 
matters not.
It therefore does not matter whether Kelsen*s 
Theory is interpreted to say "if such happens, then such 
shall be regarded as a revolution"or "if such happens, then 
such is a revolution". In either case, a revolution has 
been effected.
The last point it is proposed to make is that 
Kelsen*s Theory does not purport to guide the legislator 
as to what legal rules to enact. If a legislator wants 
to create a body of desirable legal rules Kelsen is not 
someone who can help him. It can be said of his theory 
that it is too limited in scope and that therefore as a 
theory of law it is inadequate, but it cannot be said that, 
within the scope it prescribes for itself, it is incorrect. 
However, although its correctness may be unimpeachable; 
nevertheless its purported applications in the context of 
constitutional breakdowns do not invariably partake of 
this unimpeachability. This will be examined in subsequent 
chapters.
PART XX
CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN IN NIGERIA
CHAPTER 2 
THE BACKGROUND AND THE BREAKDOWN
•j
(l) The Background
Nigeria achieved her independence from the United
Kingdom on October 1, 1$60. It then had a federal
structure of government with the pre-independence fabric
2of three regional governments , each enjoying a considerable
measure of autonomy. The Federal Constitution at 
3independence contained two legislative lists: the Exclusive 
List and the Concurrent List. The Federal Government could 
legislate on matters enumerated on either list, anti, 
additionally^— on'--ma-tters-I-e-£-t—Mx-res'idne^ The Regions were
1* See Nigeria: Crisis and beyond, by John Oyinbo: 
(London: Charles Knight and Co#, Ltd., 1971)J 
Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria, by A*H#M. ICirk- 
Greene: (London: 0#U#P#, 1971); Nigerian Politics 
and Military Rule: Prelude to the Civil War, 
edited by S.IC# Pan ter-Brick: (London: The At hi one 
Press, 1970)*
See further The Barrel of a Gun - Political Power 
in Africa and the Coup, by Ruth First: (London: 
Penguin Books, 1969 ) •
Of background interest is Nigerian Government and 
Politics, by J#P* Mackintosh: (London: Alien and 
Unwin Ltd., 19 6 6 ) .
2# The Federation was divided into FOUR regions in 1962 
by dividing one of the existing regions (The Western 
Region) into two regions (The Western and the Mid- 
Western Regions).
3# Three years later (October 1, 1 9 6 3) Nigeria became 
a Republic and ceased to be a dominion.
to legislate on the matters set out in the Concurrent 
List and those left in residue. Thus the Federation 
and the Regions had legislative authority concurrently 
over the Concurrent List, and—maJ^ ers—on~-neirtHer~lirsir~— 
the—resstdue. However, where Federal and Regional legis­
lation conflicted in the concurrent field, Federal laws 
were to prevail and the Regional laws were void to the 
extent of their inconsistency with the Federal legislation.
The Federal structure was so balanced that the
Northern Region (the remainder being the Western and
Eastern Regions) was able to enjoy a seemingly permanent
hegemony in that it had an absolute majority of seats in
the Federal House of Representatives (the other House
being the Senate which, in common with most other Second
Chambers, was politically ineffective) over the other
Regions combined. This division of seats stemmed from
the fact that the seats were allocated on the basis of
population in which the Northern Region enjoyed a px'eponder-
k
ance. These are the figures of the 1952-3 Census:
(1) The Northern Region : 16,835,582
(2) The Eastern Region : 7*215>25.1
(3) The Western Region : 6,085,065
(4) The Federal Territory of Lagos: 267>4-07
TOTAL : 30,403,305
4. Mackintosh, op.cit., p. 547*
This Census is distinguished by two important 
characteristics. It was the last census before 
independence and it is the most recent census 
that is undisputed. The censuses in 19 6 2 - 3 and 
1963-4 were bitterly disputed at the time and have 
yet to be accepted. The seats in the House of 
Representatives at independence were distributed 
in accordance with the statistics in the 1 9 5 2 - 3  
Census•
Of the 312 seats in the House of Representatives 
at independence, the Northern Region was given 1?4; the 
Eastern Region 73; the Western Region 62; and the 
Federal Territory of Lagos, 3*
Political manoeuvre both before and after inde­
pendence thus consisted of attempts to accomplish the 
creation of coalitions of political parties designed to 
ensure that the successful coalition should yield a 
permanent majority of seats in the Federal Parliament 
required for the indefinite control of the government of 
the country. These coalitions each endeavoured to render 
the quinquennial federal general elections (of which since 
independence there has been only one) into pious rituals, 
the results of wliich would be foreordained. At independ­
ence Nigeria had three main political parties, each of 
which was regionally based. The Northern Peoples1 Congress 
(N.P.C.) had its stronghold in the Northern Region; the 
Action Group (A.G.) derived its support from the electorate 
of the Western Region; and the National Council of Nigerian 
Citizens (N.C.N.C.) held sway in the Eastern Region.
On the third anniversary of Nigeria's independence 
the country became a republic, replacing its Governor- 
General with a President. This change did not alter the 
structure of power viewed either politically or legally.
The net result appears to have been the substitution of the 
President for the Queen as Head of State.
In view of* the later role of4 the Federal Cabinet 
in the constitutional upheaval in January, 1966, it is 
proposed to offer a short survey of the Cabinet as well 
as of the special powers vested in Parliament fox1 use in 
national emergencies#
(i) The Federal Cabinet
The function of the Federal Cabinet, described in 
the Republican Constitution of 1963 as the Council of 
Ministers, was to exercise the executive power of the 
federal government, sometimes directly, and on other 
occasions through the President who was obliged to execute 
such "advice” as the Council of Ministers saw fit to tender 
to him. The Council comprised the Prime Minister and such 
Ministers in the Federal Government as the President acting 
on the advice of the Prime Minister, chose to appoint. A 
person ceased to be a member of tlie Council $>f he was no 
longer a Minister in the Federal Government or if the Prime 
Minister should advise the President to dismiss him. Port­
folios were to be distributed by the President acting on 
the Prime Minister*s advice. The Prime Minister was to be 
appointed from the House of Representatives (the Lower and 
more powerful House, the other being the Senate) by the 
President, who must be satisfied that such person was 
"likely to command the support of the majority of the members
5* 1963 Republican Constitutions S.'s. 84, 8 5 , 8 7 , 88,
89, 90, 91, 92.
3k
of the House".^ The Executive Powers of* the Federation
(i.e. of* the Federal government) were important, and the
7two sections defining them will be quoted in Full,
84. - (1) The executive authority oF the 
Federation shall be vested in the President 
and, subject to the provisions oF this 
Constitution, may be exercised by him either 
directly or through officers subordinate to 
him.
(2) Nothing in this section shall 
prevent Parliament From conferring functions 
on persons or authorities other than the 
President•
8 5 • The executive authority of the Federation 
shall extend to the execution and maintenance 
of this Constitution  ^and to all matters with 
respect to which Parliament has For the time 
being power to make laws•
Another important provision pertaining to the
Council of Ministers was the power of the President to
appoint some other member of the Council of Ministers to
perform the Functions of the Prime Minister when the latter
9was unable to act• S . 9 2 reads
6. S.87 of the 1963 Constitution.
7. Ss.84 and 85 of the 1963 Constitution.
8. The underlining is mine. Does the word "maintenance"
imply that the President or Acting President was 
empowered to take whatever measures he thought were 
necessary For the preservation of the Constitution?
Such measures would, of course, have had to be taken 
on the advice of his Council of Ministers, in view
of S . 89 which enjoined that this was to be the case.
XF "maintenance" had the meaning suggested, this would 
mean that the Council of Ministers could have advised 
the President or Acting President to resort to measures 
not otherwise authorised by the Constitution. That 
power would have been extensive.
9• S,92 of the 1963 Constitution.
92. ~ (1) Whenever the Prime Minister is 
absent from Nigeria or is for any other 
reason unable to perform the functions 
conferred upon him by this Constitution, the 
President may authorise some other member 
of the Council of Ministers of the Federation 
to perform those functions (other than the 
functions conferred by this section) and that 
member may perform those functions until his 
authority is revoked by the President•
(2) The powers of the President under 
this section shall be exercised by him in 
accordance with the advice of the Prime 
Minister:
Provided that if the President considers 
that it is impracticable to obtain the advice 
of the Prime Minister owing to his absence or 
illness he may exercise those powers without 
that advice# 10
(ii) The Emergency Powers of the 
Federal Parliament * 11
The powers of Parliament in an emergency were 
12defined in S.7° thus:
70* « (1) Parliament may at any time make such 
laws for Nigeria or any part thereof with 
respect to matters not included in the Legis­
lative Lists as may appear to Parliament to be 
necessary or expedient for the purpose of 
maintaining or securing peace, order and good 
government during any period of emergency.
10. My own underlining.
The proviso will prove important when we come to 
consider the abduction and subsequent murder of 
the Prime Minister in January, 19 6 6 , and the 
meeting of the Council of Ministers to decide the 
future of the country. The power vested in the 
President was exercisable by the Acting President 
in the case of the former's absence or incapacity. 
S.39 of the 1963 Constitution.
11. S.70 of the 1963 Constitution.
12. S.70 of the 1963 Constitution.
36.
(2 ) Any provision of* law enacted in 
pursuance of this section shall have effect 
only during a period of emergency:
Provided that the termination of a 
period of emergency shall not affect the 
operation of such a provision of law during 
that period, the validity of any action taken 
thereunder during that period, any penalty 
or punishment incurred in respect of any 
contravention thereof or failure to comply 
therewith during that xoeriod or any 
proceeding or remedy in respect of any such 
penalty or punishment.
(3) In this section 1period of emergency* 
means any period during which -
1 3(a) the Federation is at warj J
(b) there is in force a resolution 
passed by each House of Parliament declaring 
that a state of public emergency exists; or
(c) there is in force a resolution of 
each House of Parliament supported by the 
votes of not less than two-thirds of all the 
members of the House declaring that democratic 
institutions in Nigeria are threatened by 
subversion.
(*> A resolution passed by a House of 
Parliament for the purposes of this section 
shall remain in force for twelve months or 
such shorter period as may be specified therein:
Provided that such resolution may be 
revoked at any time for a further period not 
exceeding twelve months by resolution passed 
in like manner.
(Hi) The Political Crisis of 1965
Since our chief concern is the fundamental consti­
tutional significance of the coup in January, 1966 and no 
more, it is not proposed to delve into the strife of parties, 
the quarrels of tribes (or races) or the mass killings 
resulting therefrom, excepting such events and occurrences
1 3• Gan this expression be extended to include 
military coups and civil wars?
as are strictly necessary for an examination of the legal 
issues (other aspects of the crisis - fascinating and 
momentous as these undoubtedly are - must regrettably be 
omitted) born of the upheaval in January, 1966.
The federal election in December, 1964, confirmed
and continued the government of the federation in the
hands of the Northern Peoples1 Congress. The government
of the federation was strictly a coalition government but
it was clear that the Northern Peoples1 Congress effectively
controlled the affairs of the Federation, in that that
party had a majority of seats in the House of Representatives.
The result of tXiis election was disputed with spiralling
bitterness. Recipx^ocal allegations of intimidation and
fraud in the conduct of the election were hurled at each
other with escalating vehemence by the antagonists. This
unabated virulence was accentuated by the victory in the
Western Region election in October, 1965> of that party 
15xn the Region which had seceded from the Action Group to 
form a coalition with the Northern Peoples1 Congress: this 
coalition was known as the N.N.A, (the Nigerian National 
Alliance). The victory was castigated by the opposing 
coalition (u.G.P.A* - the United Peoples Grand Alliance) as 
one brought about by blatant intimidation through undisguised 
thuggery. This stricture provoked the expected strain of
14. Xn 1963 the Western Region had been divided into two 
Regions: the Western Region and the Mid-West Region, 
the latter being located between the former and the 
Eastern Region.
15* The Nigerian National Democratic^Party (N.N.D.P.),
formerly the U.P.P. (the United People*s Party). This 
party was led by Chief Akintela Whereas the Action 
Group was headed by Alhaji Adegbenro.
political recrimination which continued into the New 
Year (1966). It was in the first month of this year 
that the military in Nigeria threw itself into the fray 
by attempting to cut the Gordian Knot of party vituper­
ation. It is the legal effect of this coup, however, 
not the political motivations behind it, that concerns us.
(2) The Military Coup of January 1966
The day of the coup was January 15» 1966. In the
early Iiours of the morning a Major Nzeogwu launched an
attack on the house of the Premier of the Northern Premier
in ICaduna. The defence of the Premier1 s Lodge was
inadequate and the Premier was shot dead. Later the
Regional Governor was detained and the two highest ranking
army officers in Kaduna were killed. When morning came
Kaduna was firmly under the control of the rebels. In the
afternoon (at one o1 clock) Major Nzeogwu spoke on the
radio and purported to declare martial law in the Region
17and dissolve the Regional Government. 1 Part of the speech 
reads s ^
16. Capital of the Northern Region.
17* Oyinbo, op.cit., p.40.
18. Kirk-Greene, op.cit, (vol. 1), Doc. No. 2,
p. 1 2 5.
Xn the name of the Supreme Council of the 
Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces 1 
declare martial law over the Northern 
Provinces of Nigeria. The Constitution 
is suspended and the Regional Government and 
elected assembly are hereby dissolved. All 
political, cultural, tribal and trade union 
activities together with all demonstrations 
and unauthorised gatherings, excluding 
religious worship, are banned until further 
notice.
The aim of the Revolutionary Council is to 
establish a strong, united and prosperous 
nation, free from corruption and internal 
strife. Our method of achieving this is 
strictly military, but we Ixave no doubt that, 
every Nigerian will give us maximum co­
operation by assisting the regime and not, 
repeat not, disturbing the peace during the 
slight changes that are taking place. X am 
to assure all foreigners living and working 
in this part of Nigeria that their rights 
will continue to be respected# All treaty 
obligations previously entered into with any 
foreign nations will be respected, and w© 
hope that such nations will respect our 
country* s territorial integrity and will 
avoid taking sides with enemies of the revo­
lution and enemies of the people.
My dear countrymen, you will hear and probably 
see a lot being done by certain bodies charged 
by the Supreme Council with the duties of 
national integration, supreme justice, general 
security, and properties recovery. As an 
interim measure all Permanent Secretaries, 
Corporation Chairmen, and similar Heads of 
Departments are allowed to make decisions 
until the new organs are functioning, so long 
as such decisions are not, repeat not, contrary 
to the aims and wishes of tlie Supreme Council •
No Minister or Parliamentary Secretary possesses 
administrative or other forms of control over 
any Ministry even if they are not, repeat not, 
considered too dangerous to be arrested. ....
My dear countrymen, no citizen should have any­
thing to fear as long as that citizen is law 
abiding and if that citizen has religiously 
obeyed the major laws of the country and those 
set down in every heart and conscience since 
1 October, 1960* Our enemies are the political
profiteers, swindlers, the men in the high 
and low places that seek bribes and demand 
ten per cent, those that seek to keep the 
country divided permanently so that they 
can remain in office as Ministers and VIPs 
of waste, the tribalists, the nepotists, 
those that make the country look big for 
nothing before international circles, those 
tliat have corrupted our society and put the 
Nigerian political calendar back by their 
words and deeds.
Before offering any comment on this broadcast, it 
is important to note what was happening that same day
19(January 15? 1966) in the rest of Nigeria. Xn Lagos , 
the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and the 
Minister of Finance, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, were kid­
napped, and they were both killed later in the day.
Several senior army officers in Lagos were also assassinated 
that day. Xt is reputed that the G.O.C. of the Nigerian 
Army escaped death because a Lieut-Col. Pan, who was one 
of the senior army officers killed, had warned him of the 
danger only shortly before his (Pan1s) death. Xt is said 
by the G.O.C. himself (Major-General Xronsi) that upon
being warned he fled to Ikeja barracks and organised the
20loyal troops for a counter-offensive. After this, the
precise concatenation of events in Lagos that day is not 
clear. What is clear is that by evening Lagos was firmly 
tinder the control of General Ironsi.
Having seen what occurred in Kaduna and Lagos we 
will now proceed to the events at Ibadan, capital of Western
19• Oyinbo, op.cit., pp. 39-42. 
20. Ibid.,
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Nigeria, Chief1 Akintola, Premier of that Region, was 
killed by the rebels assigned to cover that area of the 
rebellion. But the soldiers there, unlike those in 
Kaduna, did not acquire control of the city - the reasons 
for this omission are not evident. Instead they drove to 
Lagos (perhaps to make sure that the rebellion had Lagos 
securely under its wing, despite the fact, as we have seen, 
that they already had a detachment of troops there). On 
arrival they found that the city was under the control, 
not of their collaborators there, hut of General Xronsi.
Xn Enugu, capital of Eastern Nigeria, there were 
no assassinations or arrests. In fact, in the morning 
(January 15» 1966) the Governor and Premier had bade farewell 
to the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. In the 
afternoon the Governor and the Solicitor-General attended a 
Boy Scout rally at Enugu Stadium. However, although there 
was calm the troops had in fact since dawn surrounded that 
sector of the city where the Regional Ministers had their 
residences.
In Benin, the capital of Mid-West Nigeria, there 
was, as in Enugu, no murder or arrest. In the morning 
troops had arrived there as in Enugu but they took no action. 
These troops were subsequently withdrawn, but their with­
drawal was ordered by General Irons!, not by the rebels.
Thus the picture that emerges is that except for 
the North, the rebels were either routed or were the victims 
of vacillation, and upon the surrender of authority to Lt.-Col. 
Hassan Katsina - appointed Military Governor of the North by
General Irons! - by Major Nzeogwu, the inchoate rebellion 
was completely crushed*
However, let us revert to the speech made by 
Major Nzeogwu over Radio ICaduna on January 15» 1966. It 
is noticed that although he had effective control only 
over Northern Nigeria he spoke of the Supreme Council of 
the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces, thus implying 
that that Council was to govern Nigeria as a whole. Some­
what incongruously, he suspended only the Constitution of 
the Northern Region. By implication he preserved intact 
the remaining three regional constitutions as well as the 
federal constitution. Again, why was martial law only 
declared over Northern Nigeria? It is no answer to say 
that this was because he controlled only Northern Nigeria 
because phrases like “every Nigerian** and "our country* s 
territorial integrity" as well as "the duties of national 
integration" suggest powerfully that he spoke as if he 
possessed the authority to govern, even if he had not the 
power to enforce his words in relation to, the whole of 
Nigeria. He clearly purported to introduce a new legal 
order in Nigeria because although Xae permitted the Permanent 
Heads of the Civil Service as well as the Chairman of Public 
Corporations to make decisions that would not have contra­
dicted the wishes of the Supreme Council, he stressed that 
the authority exercised over these men by their political 
superiors (i.e* Ministers and their Parliamentary Secretaries) 
was to be abrogated forthwith. The Civil Service was thus 
to have a new master - the Supreme Council. The context
4 3 *
in which, the Civil Service is mentioned suggests that he 
was referring to the Civil Service at both federal and 
regional levels. This makes his selective suspension of 
the Northern Region*s Constitution even more mystifying.
Another feature that is seen in his speech is the 
gravamen of corruption and gross inefficiency he so 
passionately felt against the politicians. The coup was 
proclaimed as the precursor to a massive purge of all 
corrupt and inefficient elements that were guilty of having 
'•put the Nigerian political calendar back". Clean and 
efficient administration was to be the hallmark of the new 
legal order. He gave, however, no indication as to whether 
the federal structure was an item of the wastage which he 
so fiercely condemned. We do not intend to go deeper into 
his statement since he never actually had the chance to 
govern Nigeria. It would be more meaningful to discuss 
the Irons! regime; Major Nzeogwu had control of the North 
for less than forty-eight hours.
Clearly federal government could not have continued
to function as it had done before the convulsive occurrences
of January 15* General Ironsi had warned the remaining
federal Ministers that the loyalty of the army could not be
assured if the federal ministers decided to retain the
21authority they had up till then exercised. Also, owing
to the absence of a quorum, the Deputy Speaker (the Speaker 
himself having been absent) had on that turbulent day
21, Kirk—Greene, op.cit,, vol. 1, p.3 6 .
adjourned the House of Representatives. The latter event 
precluded the passing of emergency legislation in terms of 
S.70 of the 1963 Republican Constitution because emergency 
measures, according to that Constitution, had to have the 
legislative approval of Parliament• The federal executive 
had no independent emergency powers.
Xt is significant that the remaining federal
ministers had to meet at Police Headquarters to dismiss the
situation, with General Xronsi presumably in attendance.
This unedifying gathering at Lagos hardly evokes the
impression of a functioning Council of Ministers in effective
and cool deliberation, a picture of constitutional
immaculacy which subsequently both the Acting President and
General Irons! endeavoured to portray in their effort to
assert the legality of the purported transfer of power to
the military which followed this hectic consultation. This
consultation (popularly termed a Cabinet meeting) was chaired
by the most senior federal Minister remaining, Alhaji zanna
22Bukar Dipcharima. But beyond the fact that he did not
take the chair as Prime Minister of the Federation it is 
not known in exactly what capacity he had assumed the 
authority to preside. It is evident that although he might 
have been acceptable to the remaining federal ministers as 
ad hoc chairman of the meeting because of his seniority 
among them, this de facto acquiescence occupies no obvious 
constitutional niche. General Ironsi, then still only G.O.C. 
of the Nigerian Army, had requested if not requisitioned this
22. Kirk-Greene, op.cit., vol.l, p.3 6 .
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gathering of4 Ministers to appoint a Deputy Prime Minister
who would then, so the General thought, have the authority
to issue orders to (as distinct from transf erx*ing the
\ 23totality of the powers of the federation to) the army.
The Ministers were unable to agree on who such a person 
should be. This failure to elect someone to give orders 
to the army resulted in General Irons!* s demand that 
authority should then be vested in the armed forces with 
him as Supreme Commanders someone had to control the 
situation, and if the civilian government were unable to 
produce such a person the military authority should 
logically take over from the indecisive Ministers.
On January 16, one day after the rebellion, the 
Acting President (President Azikwe was away in the United
?4Itingdom) broadcast the following message to the nations''
I have tonight been advised by the Council of 
Ministers that they had come to the unanimous 
decision voluntarily to hand over the adminis­
tration of the country to the Armed Forces of 
the Republic with immediate effect.
All Ministers are assured of their personal 
safety by the new administration. 1 will now 
call upon the General Officer Commanding, 
Major-General Aguiyi Irons!, to make a statement 
to the nation on the policy of the new adminis­
tration.
It is my fervent hope that the new administration 
will ensure the peace and stability of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria and that all citizens 
will give them their full co-operation.
23• Kirk-Greene; p.36.
24. Government Notice No, 1 4 7 /1 9 6 6
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The Acting President thus purported to transfer 
the administration of the country to the Armed Forces.
It should not go unnoticed that the federal cabinet (even 
assuming that the group of Ministers had validly acted as 
such) was only the executive authority of government at the 
federal level, and could not also transfer the legislative 
authority of the Federal Parliament as well as the executive 
and legislative authority possessed by all the four Regions 
to the Armed Forces. It is not clear whether or not the 
phrase “the administration of the country'1 was wide enough 
to embrace the Federal and Regional judicial power. Primai 
facie the phrase should be attributed this inclusive import 
because the administration of a country must mean the control 
of all its institutions, the exclusion from which of the 
judiciary would appear anomalous. All this, of course, 
assumes the legal efficacy of the transfer, an issue that 
will be scrutinised in the next chapter.
That the transfer was not a halcyon affair is 
betrayed by the fact that the Acting President felt it 
necessary in his broadcast to assure the Ministers of the 
defunct regime that they need not fear for their personal 
safety. There was therefore more than a hint that the 
Ministers1 purported transfer had not been made as volun­
tarily as the Acting President had maintained in his speech.
Major-General Irons! spoke to the nation immediately
p K
after the Acting President j
2 5 . Government Notice No• 148/1966: Kirk-Greene j 
Doc.No•4, Vol.1•
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The Govermient of* the Federation having ceased to 
function, the Nigerian armed Forces have been 
invited to form an Interim Military Government 
for the purposes of maintaining law and order, 
and of maintaining essential services*
This invitation has been accepted, and I, General 
J .T.U• Aguiyi-Ironsi, the General Officer 
Commanding the Nigerian Army, have been formally 
invested with authority as Head of the Federation 
Military Government, and Supreme Commander of the 
Nigerian Armed Forces.
The General then proceeded to give general directions
as to the government of the countrys
SUSPENSION OF CERTAIN PARTS OF THE CONSTITUTION
The Federation Military Government hereby decrees!
a:. the suspension of the provisions of the 
Constitution of the Federation relating to the 
office of President, the establishment of 
Parliament, and of the office of Prime Minister;
b . the suspension of the provisions of the 
Constitutions of the Regions relating to the 
establishment of the offices of Regional 
Governors, Regional Premiers and Executive 
Councils, and Regional Legislatures•
APPOINTMENT OF REGIONAL MTXITARY GOVERNORS
The Federation Military Government further decrees:
a. that there shall be appointed a Military 
Governor in each Region of the Federation, who 
shall be directly responsible to the Federation 
Military Government for the good government of 
the Region;
b . the appointment as Adviser to the Military 
Governor of the Region, of the last person to 
hold the office of Governor of the Region under 
the suspended provisions of the constitution.
THE JUDICIARY. TUB CIVIL SERVICE AND THE POLICE
The Federation Military Government further decrees:
a. that the Chief Justice and all other holders 
of judicial appointments within the Federation 
shall continue in their appointments, and that 
the judiciary generally shall continue to function 
under their existing statutes;
b• that all holders of appointments in the 
Civil Service of the Federation and of the 
Regions slaall continue to hold their appoint­
ments and to carry out their duties in the 
normal way, and that similarly the Nigeria 
Police Force and the Nigeria Special Constabulary 
shall continue to exercise their functions in 
the normal way;
c. that all Local Government Police Forces 
and Native authority Police Forces shall be 
placed under the overall command of the 
Inspector-General,
INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY
The Federation Military Government announces, in 
connection with the internal affairs of the 
Federation:
a* that it is determined to suppress the current 
disorder in the Tiv area of the Northern Region;
b. that it will declare Martial Law in any area 
of the Federation in which disturbances continue;
o• that it is its intention to maintain law and 
order in the Federation until such time as a new 
Constitution for the Federation, prepared in 
accordance with the wishes of the people, is 
brought into being.
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY
The Federation Military Government announces, in 
connection with the external affairs of the 
country s
a. that it is desirous of maintaining the 
existing diplomatic relations with other States; 
and
b. that it is its intention to honour all treaty 
obligations and all financial agreements and 
obligations entered into by the previous Government.
CITIZENS TO CO-OPERATE
The Federation Military Government calls upon 
all citizens of the Federation to extend their 
full co-operation to the Government in the urgent 
task of restoring law and order in the present 
crisis, and to continue in their normal 
occupations•
It should be immediately noticed that although 
General Ironsi suspended the organs which under the 1963 
Constitution had exercised legislative and executive 
authority at both federal and regional levels, he 
specifically confirmed the hierarchy of the courts as well 
as the incumbents of that constitutional institution.
We shall examine in the next chapter the question whether 
or not this part of the statement of General Ironsi was 
prescriptive or merely descriptive of the constitutional 
position. If it was prescriptive then the judiciary 
functioned only because General Ironsi empowered it to 
function and therefore not only the legislative and 
executive, but also the judicial, powers of government were 
vested in the Military Government which could then manipulate 
any of these powers in any manner it thought best. However, 
if the part of the statement relating to the judiciary was 
merely descriptive then the judiciary functioned not be­
cause it was authorised by the Military to do so, but be­
cause the accession of the Military did not involve the 
transfer of the judicial power to the armed forces. The 
fact that General Ironsi had expressed in the speech of 
accession that the judiciary was to continue, was to give 
rise four years later (April, 1970) to litigation in the
Supreme Court of Nigeria concerning the source of the
26authority that the judiciary was exercising.
26. Lakanmi and Ola v. A.G. for the Western State 
(April, 1970); see below, chapter 3 .
(3) Military Government
At this point it is proposed to describe the type
of4 government which superseded the legislative and
executive organs of4 the country at both federal and
regional levels. The new structure at the federal level
(assuming that the federal nature of the Nigerian body
politic survived the accession of the military) will be
considered first. The Federal Cabinet and Parliament were
replaced by the Federal Executive Council and the Supreme
27Military Council. But whereas the Federal Cabinet had
independent executive authority under the 1 Constitution
the Federal Executive Council of the Military Government
enjoys only delegated executive authority because the
original executive authority vests in the Head of the
28Federal Military Government. But again the executive
authority vested in the Head of the Federal Military 
Government comprises the sum total of executive authority 
in the country, as distinct from that enjoyed by the 
Federal Cabinet which did not extend beyond federal matters 
as defined in the Constitution. Such executive authority 
as a Military Governor exercises over his Region is dele­
gated to him by the Head of the Federal Military Government 
previously the extent of executive authority of a Regional
government was defined in the Constitution, and exercised
29as original authority. '
27• Decree No• 1, 1966, S.8.
28• Decree No. 1, 1 9 6 6, S•7•
29. S. 7(3), Decree No. 1, 1 9 6 6.
The Supreme Military Council, though it is
defined in terms of personnel rather than in terms of the
30authority it is competent to exercise , is that limb of 
the Federal Military Government that possesses the legis­
lative authority to make any law whatsoever relating to
the peace, order and good government of Nigeria or any 
31part thereof. 1 The Federal Military Government is
nowhere defined and it must therefore be presumed to
consist of the Head of the Federal Military Government
(defined as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of
32 \the Federal Republic of Nigeria ), and the Supreme Mili­
tary Council. It is interesting to note that the 
personnel in the Supreme Military Council and the Federal 
Executive Council, as these are defined in Decree No. 1, 
1966, are identical except that the four military governors 
are the only members of the Supreme Military Council who
are not also members of the Federal Executive Council, and
that the only members of the latter who are not members of 
the former are the Inspector-General and Deputy Inspector-
O O
General of the Nigeria Police.
We will now assess the structure of government 
in the four Regions. (The discussion is based on the 
position on January 17, 1966> when Decree No. 1, which 
established the structure of the Military Government, came
30. S. 8 (2 ), Decree No. 1, 19 6 6.
31. S. 3(1), Decree No. 1, 19 6 6.
32. S. 16, Decree No. 1, 1 9 6 6*
33. S. 8(2), Decree No. 1, 19 6 6.
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into effect.) The Legislative authority of the Military 
Governor in a Region (this office has never been legis­
latively defined) is covered in B. 3(2) and (3) of Decree 
No.1, 1966 which reads
S. 3(2) The Military Governor of a Region -
(a) shall not have power to make laws with 
respect to any matter included in the Exclusive 
Legislative List3^ -$ and
(b) except with the prior consent of the 
Federal Military Government, shall not make 
any law with respect to any matter included 
in the Concurrent Legislative List. 35
S. 3(3) Subject to subsection (z) above and to
the Constitution of the Federation36, the 
Military Governor of a Region shall have power 
to make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of that Region.
The laws which the Military Governor of a Region
is permitted to make cannot, however, prevail over an Act
of Parliament made before January 16, 19 6 6 , or a decree of
the Federal Military Government made then or thereafter,
and such laws made by the Military Governor of a Region
shall be void to the extent of any inconsistency with the
37superior laws.^ 1
3^* i.e. the Exclusive Legislative List in the 1963 
Federal Constitution.
35* i.e. the Concurrent Legislative List in the 1963 
Federal Constitution.
3 6 . i.e. the 1963 Federal Constitution which made Nigeria 
a Republic.
37. S. 3(4), Decree No. 1, 1 9 6 6.
The executive authority of a Military Governor
is delegated, not original. This is because the executive
authority of the entire Nigerian body politic vests in the
38Plead of the Federal Military Government^ and the executive
authority that a Military Governor exercise© is only that
which has been delegated to him by the Head of the Federal
39Military Government , such authority being revocable by
4othe latter in his absolute discretion. However, a
Military Governor is deemed, as from January 17 > 1966, to
have been delegated the executive authority possessed by
his Region immediately before January 16 , 1 $>66, but this
deeming provision does not impair the right of the Head of
4 1the Military Government to vary or revoke such authority.
We shall now examine the manner in which the 
legislative authority of the Military Government is exercised. 
This matter is prescribed by Decree No. 1, 19 6 6 , which 
provides as follows. The Federal Military Government * s 
power to legislate is to be expressed through Decrees 
signed by the Head of the Federal Military Government.
IjlO
S. 4(1) of the Decree states:
The power of the Federal Military Government 
to make laws shall be exercised by means of 
Decrees signed by the Head of the Federal 
Military Government•
3B. S. 7(1) and (2 ), Decree No. 1, 1 9 6 6.
39. S. 7(3), Decree No. 1, 1 9 6 6.
40. S. 7(5), Decree No. 1, 1 9 6 6.
41. S. 7(4), Decree No. 1, 1 9 6 6.
42. S. 4(1), Decree No. 1, 1966.
43A decree means an instrument ** made by the 
Federal Military Government and expressed to be, or to be
44made as, a decree. S. 16 of Decree No. 1 prescribes!
Xn this Decree, and in any other law ~
’Decree' means an instrument made by the 
Federal Military Government and expressed 
to be, or to be made as, a decree; .......
The validity of a Decree is not to be questioned
by any court of law in Nigeria. S. 6 of Decree No, 1 
4*5asserts; ^
No question as to the validity of this or 
any other Decree or of any Edict shall be 
entertained by any court of law in Nigeria.
The Federal Military Government has purported to 
ensure the supremacy of its decrees by purporting to 
amend S. 1 of the 1963 Constitution so that, after this 
"amendment", the section is made to abrogate its former
46prerogative of paramountcy in these words;
This Constitution shall have the force of 
law throughout Nigeria and, if any other 
law (including the Constitution of a Region) 
is inconsistent with this Constitution this 
Constitution shall prevail and the other 
law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, 
be void. Provided that this Constitution 
shall not prevail over a decree, and nothing 
in this Constitution shall render any provision 
of a Decree void to any extent whatsoever. 47
43, The word is not defined in the Decx’ee •
44. S. 16, Decree No, 1, 1966*
45* S. 6, Decree No. 1, 19 6 6.
46. Schedule 2, read with S. 1(2), Decree No. 1, 1 9 6 6,
"amending" S. 1 of the 1963 Constitution.
47* My own emphasis.
The legislative power vested in a Military
Governor (the office is inexplicably nowhere defined) is
to be exercised by means of Edicts signed by him.
S. 4(2) of Decree No* 1 provides!
The power of the Military Governor of a Region 
to make laws shall be exercised by means of 
Edicts signed by him*
An Edict is defined by S. 16 of Decree No* 1 as 
49follows!
In this Decree, and in any other law -
............  50’Edict1 means an instrument made by the
Military Governor of a Region and expressed
to be, or made as, an edict; ...... .
The validity of an Edict is not to be impugnable
51in any court of law in Nigeria.
In the context of legislative power it is dis­
tinctly discernible that whereas the legislative authority
5?in a Region is vested in its Military Governor, legislative
authority in respect of the whole country is not vested in
the Head of the Federal Military Government but in the
53Federal Military Government itself , showing that the Head 
of the Military Government does not possess an independent 
legislative authority, although he is apparently allowed to
48* S. 4(2), Decree No• 1, 19 6 6•
49* S. 16, Decree No• 1, 1966.
50* This word is not defined in the Decree.
51• S. 6 of Decree No* 1, 19 6 6 •
52• S. 4(2) of Decree No* 1, 19 6 6 , begins: "The power of
the Military Governor of a Region to make laws ".
(The underlining is mine•)
53• S. 4(1) of Decree No. 1, 19 6 6, begins: "The power of
the Federal Military Government to make laws •♦*.".
(The underlining is mine.)
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exercise"*^ that authority on the Military Government * s 
behalf. The Decree itself is obmutesoent on the circum­
stances in which, and the procedure subject to which, he 
can exercise the legislative power on behalf of the 
Military Government by signing the instrument of Decree.
The definitive Decree (i.e. Decree No. 1, 1966) would 
apparently allow tlie Head of the Military Government to 
issue decrees as he chooses, including a decree abolishing 
Decree No. 1 itself and making himself an absolute authority*
Another noteworthy feature is that Decree No * 1, 
1966, the first legislative measure of the Federal 
Military Government, was enacted with retroactive effect: 
it was not signed until March k, 1966 but it toolc effect 
as from January 1 7> 1 9 6 6.
A difficult question is whether or not the 
government of Nigeria has been able to retain its federal 
structure after the coup of January 15? 19 6 6 • Prima 
facie it would seem that that event has transformed the 
country into a unitary state, because the centre has been 
invested, in terms of Decree No• 1, 19 6 6 , with absolute 
legislative and executive authority. Such authority as the 
Regions exercise is strictly subordinate: their legislative 
authority can be overriden by the Centre, and their 
executive authority is delegated from, and revocable by, the 
Centre. No composite territorial entity can qualify to 
be a federation unless its constituent units enjoy some
54. S. 4(1) of Decree No* 1, 19 6 6, continues: n...shall 
be ©zeroised by means of Decrees signed by the Head 
of the Federal Military Government". (My own 
underlining*)
measure of independent and invidable authority, as 
distinct from being allowed autonomy that is revocable 
by the Centre.
In defining a federal structure Professor K.C.
Wheare in his classic work says:^
Federal government exists .... when the powers
of government for a community are divided 
substantially according to the principle that 
there is a single independent authority for 
the whole area in respect of some matters and 
that there are independent regional authorities 
for other matters, each set of authorities 
being co-ordinate with and not subordinate to 
the others within its own prescribed sphere. 56
It is proposed to make one final point on the 
constitutional changes px-ecipitated by the accession of 
the military in Nigeria. The suspension of certain parts 
of both the Federal and the Regional Constitutions announced 
in Major-General Ironsi*s speech of accession was confirmed 
by Decree No. 1, 19 6 6 • The sections of these consti­
tutions not suspended have been allowed to continue to
have effect subject, of course, to necessary modifications
/ N 57(into the minutiae of which it is not proposed to delve)•
These remaining px’ovisions, however, are expressed to be
subject to the authority of Decrees though not so subject
to Edicts. It is thus evident that from the viewpoint of
the military all the five constitutions are subservient to
its administration. The constitutions are treated as being
of service in that they provide a malleable framework of law,
55• Federal Government; by K,C. Wheare; O.U.P. 1963 
(fourth edition); p.35*
56. The underlining is mine.
57. S. 1(2), S. 2(2), Decree No. 1, 1966.
with malleable as the operative word. In the next
chapter we shall see how the Supreme Court was to dispute
58this cavalier posture four years later.
(4 ) Events Precipitating the Coup of July, 1966
What was to happen to Nigeria now that the
Military had taken over the administration of the country?
Did the Military desire tight central control or were the
regional Military governors to have their share of authority
increased? An indication of what was to happen can be
seen in a broadcast to the nation made by General Ironsi
in the month of the coup (the broadcast was made on
January 28, 19 6 6 ). Part of what he had to tell the nation 
59was this:
  .All Nigerians want an end to Regionalism.
Tribal loyalties and activities which promote 
tribal consciousness and sectional interests 
must give way to the urgent task of national 
reconstruction. The Federal Military Government 
will preserve Nigeria as one stx'ong nation. We 
shall give firm, honest and disciplined leadership.
This was a clear caveat to those who favoured the 
augmentation of regional authority to desist from their 
efforts. The view may be ventured that the General was 
perhaps being unconsciously Procrustean in that instead of 
attempting to reconcile regional differences he was simply
58• Lakanmi and Ola v. The Attorney-General for the 
Western State"~T1970"J* ~
59* Kirk-Greene, Vol. 1, Doc• 16, p. 15 4 .
declaring that he proposed to ignore them. In view of*
the state of the country before the coup, it does not 
require imagination to surmise that the speech must have 
left some of its listeners not a little disconcerted.
60On February 21, 19 6 6 , at a Press Conference
the General reiterated;
On the question of the political future of 
the country, the experiences and mistakes 
of the previous Governments in the Federation 
have clearly indicated that far-reaching 
constitutional reforms are badly needed for 
peaceful and orderly progress towards the 
realisation of our objectives. I have already 
touched on some of the major issues involved 
in my recent broadcast to the nation. It has 
become apparent to all Nigerians that rigid 
adherence to *Regionalism' was the bane of the 
last regime and one of the main factors which 
contributed to its downfall. No doubt, the 
country would welcome a clean break with the 
deficiencies of the system of Government to 
which the country had been subjected in the 
recent past. A solution suitable to our 
national needs must be found. The existing 
boundaries of Governmental control will need 
to be re-adjusted to make for less cumbersome 
administration.
Earlier in the month, on February 12, 1966, the
61General had set up the Nwolcedi Commission to devise an 
administrative structure for a united Nigeria and to 
consider the merits of unifying the five public services 
(or the Federal Government and the four Regions).
In March, 19 6 6 , General Ironsi set up a Consti-
62tutlonal Review Group to examine, inter alia, the merits
60. Kirk-Greene, Vol. 1, Doc. 17, p. 1 3 5, at p. 1 5 7,
61. Kirlc-Greene, Vol. 1, p. 4 3 .
62. Kirk-Greene, Vol. 1, p*158, Doc. 18.
and demerits of unitary and federal forms of government
for Nigeria.
On May 2k, 19 6 6 , General Ironsi made a very 
important broadcast over the national radio. As this 
speech was to cause rioting in the Northern Region, it
63is proposed to quote parts of it. The General saxdi
6kXt is now three months since the Government 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was handed 
over to the Armed Forces. Now that peace has 
been restored in the troubled areas it is time 
that the Military Government indicates clearly 
what it proposes to accomplish before relin­
quishing power. The removal of one of the 
obstacles on the way is provided for in the 
Constitution (Suspension and Modification) 
Decree (No# 5 ) 1966^ -5 which was promulgated by 
me today and comes into effect at once*
The provisions of the Decree are intended to 
remove the last vestiges of the intense 
regionalism of the recent past, and to produce 
that cohesion in the governmental structure 
which is so necessary in achieving, and 
maintaining the paramount objective of the 
National Military Government, and indeed of 
every true Nigerian, namely, national unity.
The highlights of this Decree are as follows:
The former regions are abolished, and Nigeria 
grouped into a number of territorial areas 
called provinces *..•••••
Nigeria ceases to be what has been described 
as a federation. It now becomes simply the 
Republic of Nigeria.
The former Federal Military Government and the 
Central Executive Council^ become respectively 
the National Military Government and the 
Executive Council. All the Military Governors 
are members of the Executive Council.
63* Kirk-Greene, Yol. 1, Doc. 26, p. 174. 
6k, Fotir months ? (Jan.-May, 1 9 6 6).
6 5 * Decree No, 34, 1966•
66. The Federal Executive Council?
61.
A Military Governor is assigned to a group 
oT provinces over which and subject to the 
direction and control of the Head of the 
National Military Government, he shall 
exercise executive power. In order to avoid 
any major dislocation of the present adminis­
trative machinery, the grouping or the provinces 
has been made to coincide with the rormer 
regional boundaries. This is entirely a 
transitional measure and must be understood 
as such. The present grouping or provinces is 
without prejudice to the Constitutional and 
Administrative arrangements to be embodied in 
the New Constitution in accordance with the 
wishes or the people or Nlgeria*67
The National Military Government assumes the 
exercise or all legislative powers throughout 
the Republic subject to such delegations ^  to 
Military Governors as are considered necessary 
Tor purposes or erricient administration.
69This Decree also banned political organisations
and all political activities (whether these be party
political or tribal political). A number or people in
the Northern Region saw this move as uniting Nigeria under
Ibo (the tribe or race to which General Ironsi belonged)
domination. On May 29, 1966, rive days arter General
Ironsi*s broadcast, there was rioting in certain areas
or the Northern Region, rorcing the Military Governor or
the Northern Group or Provinces (the Northern Region) to
address the people there through Kaduna Home Service.
Part or the speech, made by Lieut.-Col. Hassan Katsina on
the evening or the day or the outbreaks or violence, reads 
70thus:
67* The underlining is my own*
6 8 . The underlining is my own*
69* Decree No. 3k, 1 9 6 6.
70. Kirk-Greene, Vol. , Doc. 27, P# 177, at p. 178.
I...... want to remind you, fellow citizens,
that the Supreme Commander has made it 
perfectly clear that the measures introduced 
are interim and temporary until civilian 
administration is once again restored. ¥e in 
the Army have got a unified command and it is 
the method we are vised to. We believe that, 
if we are to carry on this holding operation 
until the return of civilian rule, we have got 
to work with the method we are used to# 71
The Supreme Commander has said that this is an 
interim arrangement merely for the army to 
work under methods it is used to. The permanent 
arrangements for the Government of Nigeria 
cannot he made without the fullest consultations 
with the people. As you all know, the Government 
has appointed a number of study groups to make 
recommendations on various aspects of government. 
These study groups are still working and our 
decisions on the future of the government and 
its institutions will depend on the recommendations 
of these bodies if they are found to be 
acceptable to the people. Xtfe will not for one 
moment impose a permanent system which is not 
acceptable to the majority of the people#
But tiie riots did not subside. The next day 
(May 30) the Military Governor of the North ordered troops 
into Kaduna with instructions to shoot rioters on sight, ^  
Calm was partially restored on 31, May. But the calm was 
not only incomplete but uncertain.
On July 13> 1966, General Ironsi announced that
the four Military governors were to hold office on a ro- 
73tating basis. Subsequent to this announcement General
Ironsi went on a tour of the country. On July 28, 1 9 6 6, 
he addressed the National Conference of Traditional Rulers 
at Ibadan. This was the day before the July coup (July 29).
71. The underlining is my own.
72• ICirk-Greene, Vol. 1 , p# 49* 
73* Kirk-Greene, Vol. 1, p. 5 2 •
I-Iis decision to rotate the Governors was generally welcome 
in the South but treated with suspicion in the North.
(5) The Coup of July, 1966^
On the night of July 28, 1966, the Head of the
Federal Military Government was the guest of the Military
Governor of the Western Group of Provinces, Lt•-Col. Fajuyi*
7 “5The coup began in Abeokuta when certain Northern soldiers
76shot and killed three of their Xbo officers. The mutiny
(for at that stage it could only have been such) spread to 
the barracks at Ibadan and thence to those at Ike ja (the 
battalion for Lagos). The latter seized Ikeja airport. 
General Ironsi's bodyguard had been removed by midnight.
The mutinous troops surrounded Government Lodge that night. 
The next morning (July 29) they were led by a Major Danjuma 
to arrest (or kidnap - depending on whether the mutiny had 
by tXien matured into a coup) General Ironsi and Lt .-Col•
Fajuyi. The detained leaders were led into waiting 
police vehicles• (in the evening there was the killing 
of Ibo officers in the Northern Region and the Eastern 
Region by their non-Ibo subordinates. The Federal Govern­
ment which succeeded the Ironsi regime did not order an
investigation into these events and there is therefore no
77authoritative account of what actually happened. ) We will
lk. Ruth First, op.cit•, pp. 313-322*
75* A town in the Western Region.
7 6 . First, p. 315*
77• First, p. 3160
6k.
not concern ourselves with the cloak-and-dagger melodrama 
that followed the abduction of General Ironsi (whose subse­
quent assassination that day was not to be officially 
announced until January 1 9 6 7) • Suffice it to note that 
Lt .-Col. Gowon, Chief-of-Staff of the Nigerian Army, was 
purportedly made the new Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces by a majority decision of those members of the
78Supreme Military Council who had survived the coup. Lt.- 
Col. Ojukwu, Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, was not 
among the approving majority! in fact it is agreed that as 
to the new appointment he was not even consulted. The 
Eastern Governor was punctilious in his refusal, then as 
well as subsequently, to acknowledge Lt,-Col. Gowon as 
Nigeria's new Head of the Military Government.
In his speech of accession, Lt.-Col. Gowon, like
Major-General Ironsi before him, was eager to give the
impression of legal continuity. He certainly did not
regard his succession to General Ironsi as constituting
the introduction of a new political order. That continuity
was the theme of his administration is apparent from the
79following extract from his speech!
...I have been brought to the position today of 
having to shoulder the great responsibilities of 
this country and the armed forces with the 
consent of the majority of the members of the 
Supreme Military Council as a result of the 
unfortunate incident that occurred on the early 
morning of 29th July 1966.
78. First, op.cit., p. 320.
79* Kirk-Greene, p. 196, Doc. 37*
It is clear that he regarded himself as being 
elected by that authority - the Supreme Military Council - 
which had ruled Nigeria continuously from January, 1966. 
Furthermore, he did not treat the abduction of General 
Ironsi as having in any manner affected the authority of 
the existing organs of government. What happened on that 
momentous day was deliberately not described as a coup*
He also agreed with what General Ironsi had main- 
tained when he had been given the reins of supreme 
authority, that the Military administration that emerged 
in January was not a revolutionary government. Lt.-Col. 
Gowon continued!
....I would like to recall to you the sad and
unfortunate incidents of 15th January 1 9 6 6....
a group of officers decided to overthrow the 
legal government of the day; but their efforts 
were thwarted by the inscrutable discipline 
and loyalty of the great majority of the Army 
and the other members of the armed forces and 
the police. The Army was called upon to take 
up the reins of government until such time that 
law and order had been restored.
If both General Ironsi and Lt.-Col. Gowon were 
right about continuity (the issue is to be taken up in 
the next chapter) then the cataclysmic events in January 
and July were not revolutionary in character•
One inescapable point is that whereas General Ironsi 
had in January treated the mutineers as rebels and had 
specifically referred to them as such, Lt.-Col, Gowon in 
August had merely spoken of killing and kidnapping by 
certain soldiers, having studiously fought shy of the word 
"mutineers". Lt•-Col• Gowon did not regard what happened in
July as an attempted rebellion. As far as lie was con­
cerned his legal position would not have been any
different had General Ironsi been killed in an earthquake
or had simply disappeared without trace.
The events on July 29, 1966 were, however, seen 
very differently from the stance of the Military Governor 
of Eastern Nigeria. He regarded the events from the 
inception of the mutiny to the purported appointment of 
Lt.-Col. Gowon as a rebellion. He regarded the subsequent 
restoration of order by Lt.-Col• Gowon as a ceasefire 
agreement dictated by the rebels He treated Lt.-Col.
Gowon*s speech of accession earlier on that same day 
(August 1, 1 9 6 6) as merely an announcement that the country 
was then sufficiently calm for immediate negotiations to 
allox\r the people of Nigeria to determine the form of their 
future association.
One of the most important acts of the new Supreme 
Commander (his position will for the moment be assumed) was 
to repeal Decree No. 3^» 1966, which had made Nigeria a 
unitary state. The "federal" structure as defined in 
Decree No, 1, 1966 (which we have already examined in some 
detail) was restored. The enabling and repealing Decree 
itfas Decree No. 59, 1 9 6 6.
80. Kirk-Gi’eene, Vol. 1, Doc. 3 8 , p. 1 9 8.
6?.
(6 ) The Meeting at Aburi in Ghana from January k to
The dissension between the Eastern Region and the 
rest of* Nigeria persisted. In January, through the good 
officesof the government of Ghana, the members of the 
Nigerian Supreme Military Council (of which the membership 
of the Eastern Governor was not disputed by anyone) met at 
Aburi to discuss the deteriorating situation and to resolve 
the issue of leadership. It is only on the latter that 
we propose to concentrate because it concerns the question 
of legal authority in the government of Nigeria. Unfortu­
nately the problem over who should govern Nigeria as Supreme
Commander was not resolved. The failure is apparent from
81the Minutes of the Meeting, the relevant section of which
, 82reads s
The question of the non-recognition by the East 
of Lt.-Col. Gowon as Supreme Commander and Head 
of the Federal Military Government was also 
exhaustively discussed. Lt.-Col. 0jukwu based 
his objection on the fact, inter alia, that no 
one can properly assume the position of Supreme 
Commander until the whereabouts of the former 
Supreme Commander, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi, 
was known• He therefore asked that the country 
be informed of the whereabouts of the Major- 
General and added that in his view, it was 
impossible, in the present circumstances, for any 
one person to assume any effective central 
command of the Nigerian Army*
Regarding the future of the Federal Military Govern- 
83ment, the Minutes read; ^
81. Kirk-Greene, Col. 1, Doc. 80, p. 315
82. Kirk-Greene, p. 3 1 7.
8 3 • Kirk-Greene, p. 318.
.....  Members agreed that the legislative and
executive authority of the Federal Military 
Government should remain in the Supreme Military 
Council to which any decision affecting the 
whole country shall be referred for determination 
provided that where it is not possible for a 
meeting to be held the matter requiring determin­
ation must be referred to Military Governors for 
their comment and concurrence•
The last sentence in the quotation above is
ambiguous. Does "for their...... ...concurrence” simply
mean that this was to ascertain whether or not the Military 
Governors agreed, or is it meant to confer on each of the 
Military Governors a veto power over matters of national 
concern?
In favour of the first interpretation is the point 
that this reference of matters to absent Military Governors 
was to make sure that on all issues of national import their 
views should not be ignored through their merely being 
absent. Also, the Minutes stated that authority was to 
REMAIN in the Supreme Military Council• Since right up to 
the time of the Aburi Accord such authority did not require 
the unanimous assent of the Council * s members for its 
exercise, the case for the practice of majority rule per­
sisting into the proposed national structure of government 
is strengthened. However, it must be remembered that the
Governor of the Eastern Region was anxious that his Region 
should not be dominated by the rest of the country, and 
this fact argues in favour of a veto power being meant to 
be conferred on the Military Governors•
We are aware that we have only touched on one of 
the many aspects of the discussion at Aburi, but from the 
point of view of ascertaining the source of legal authority 
in Nigeria the aspect touched on is the only relevant one 
that can be found in that military confabulation#
(7) The Civil War - July, 1967 to January, 1970
After the meeting at Aburi, the two factions found 
themselves in profound disagreement over what they had 
thought they had agreed to# There was a mounting proba­
bility that the Eastern Region would attempt to secede. On 
March 191 1967» Lt#~Col. Gowon passed Decree No# 8 (1967) f 
This Decree was claimed by the Supreme Commander as having 
decentralized Nigeria in comparison with the position 
established by Decree No# 1, 1 9 6 6. Whether or not there 
was such decentralization, the fact remains that this 
measure did not appease the Military Governor of the Eastern 
Region. The details of the Decree need not detain us 
because although it gave more power to the Regions it did 
not alter the fact that the Centre was supreme in that it 
could revoke whatever authority the Regions had.
On May 27, 1 9 6 7» Lt•-Col# Gowon promulgated Decree 
No. 14, 1 9 6 7> dividing Nigeria1s four Regions into twelve 
states, each to be governed by a Military Governor. On the 
same day the decentralization introduced by Decree No# 8 
(1 9 6 7) was repealed by Decree No• 13 (19 6 7 ) thus restoring 
the position established by Decree No. 1, 1 9 6 6•
Three days later (May 30, 196?) the Eastern Region
of Nigeria purported to secede from the rest of the country•
Civil War did not commence forthwith. Xt began on July 6 ,
841967 and did not end until January 15 > 1970. The cata­
clysm precipitated by the Civil War and the ineffable 
suffering consequent thereon transcend the minute compass of 
purely legal issues. Xn the next chapter we shall be 
principally concerned with the legal implications of the 
coups in January and July, 1 9 6 6.
84. Kirk-Greene, Vol. 2, Doc. No. 227, p# 457*
? 1 .
CHAPTER 3 
THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Since the Nigerian Constitution of 19^3 made no 
provision for the assumption of power by a military 
government, it is hardly surprising that the military 
government*s source of authority should be challenged. We 
have noted that upon the disruption of civilian government 
in consequence of the assassination of ministerial and 
military dignitaries, a group of Ministers in the Council 
of Ministers assembled at the Police Headquarters in Lagos, 
and endeavoured to concert measures to resolve the resulting 
crisis of authority. This cadre of Ministers had purported 
to meet as the Council of Ministers. In pursuance of this 
purported capacity they then proceeded to remit not only 
the authority of the Council of Ministers, but the powers 
of government, in their totality at both the federal and 
regional levels, to an administration of military men re­
ferred to as the Federal Military Government, with the former 
General Officer Commanding in the Array being appointed not 
only as Head of the Federal Military Government but also as 
Supreme Commander of Nigeria*s Armed Forces.
Addressing himself to this situation, Professor
•j
T.O. Elias has offered us this critiques
1. (1971) The Nigerian Law Journal p.129, at p.13 0 . (Prof.
Elias was appointed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Nigeria in April 1972.)
As early as 1967 Prof. Elias had maintained that the 
Military Government in Nigeria was the unquestioned 
successor to the civilian government under the 19^3
/continued..•
7 2.
 at the fateful meeting between the
soldiers and certain Federal Ministers on 
the night of January 16, 1 9 6 6, the latter 
were told that it had been decided that the 
military must take over the reins of govern­
ment, and they were assured of their personal 
safety in returning to their homes in due 
course. The hurriedly summoned group of 
Ministers did not constitute the Cabinet in 
the absence of either the Prime Minister or 
an acting Prime Minister, who alone could 
then have convened a valid Cabinet meeting.
But, even if there had been a duly appointed 
Head of Government, neither he nor the 
Cabinet could have lawfully transferred power 
to the military or to anyone else, since there 
was (and there is still) no provision for any 
transfer of power under the Constitution of 
1 9 6 3* At such a point where a duly elected 
government decides to give up, there must be 
an appeal to the electorate.
Professor T.O. Elias believes that the supreme law 
in Nigeria is Decree No. 1, 19 6 6. He is unshalceably 
convinced that the military in Nigeria are in no way sub­
ordinate to the 1963 Constitution from which, as Professor 
Elias contends in the passage immediately above, they did 
not derive the authority they came to wield. Speaking of 
the military takeover in January, 1 9 6 6, Professor Elias 
asserts
Footnote 1 continued.•.
Constitution. He was clearly of the opinion that the 
Military Government was supreme and not subject to the 
1963 Constitution. See NIGERIA: by T.O. Elias: London 
(1 9 6 7): Chapter 24, especially p. 457* Furthermore, 
Professor Elias was Attorney-General under both the 
civil and military governments, and must have assisted 
in the drafting of the military decrees.
2 . Elias, op.cit., pp. 1 2 9-1 3 0,
The basic constitutional instrument of the 
military regime is and remains the Constitution 
(Suspension and Modification) Decree No* 1 
1966 made by the Military Government which, in 
reaffirming the Constitution of 1963> provides 
that it must 'not prevail over a Decree * or 
'render any provision of a Decree void to any 
extent whatsoever *, and that no court of law 
can entertain any question as to the validity 
of any Decree or Edict. The Federal Military 
Government, once in power by the coup of 
January 15 > 1 9 6 6» could have done any one of 
three thingss (i) set aside the Constitution 
of 1963 entirely and replace it by another;
Sii) amend it to suit the new situation; or iii) rule without any Constitution whatsoever* In the event, it chose (ii)•
3
The Lakanmi case
We have had the learned comments of Professor Elias; 
we shall now compare them with the views of the Supreme 
Court**of Nigeria which wiwi expressed in Lakanmi and Ola v*
The Attorney-General (West)•
We have noted that a Military Governor could legis~ 
late by means of edicts. In pursuance of this power the 
Military Governor of the Western State promulgated in April 
1967 9 Edict No• 5 of that year. This Edict provided for 
the investigation of the assets of Public Officers and other 
persons• Prior to this Edict, however, the Federal Military 
Government had in June, 1 9 6 6, enacted a Decree for the 
investigation of the assets of Public Officers (Decree No•5 1,
3. 1970 S.C* 58/69. The case is unreported and the
quotations from it are taken f rom  a copy of the 
transcript of the judgment, which was delivered in 
April, 1970.
4. Since Professor Elias is now the Chief Justice of Nigeria 
it is interesting to speculate on whether or not the 
views of the Supreme Court have now changed.
74.
19 6 6). The two enactments conflicted in their terms.
The appellants before the Supreme Court had therefore 
initially appeared before the High Court (West) to contend 
that Edict Wo. 5 was inoperative because its terms were 
incongruent with those embodied in a decree.
The appellants before the Supreme Court were 
appealing against the decision of the Western State Court 
of Appeal which had affirmed the decision of the High Court
K
which had dismissed their appeal against the Order made 
against them by the Tribunal of Inquiry established under 
the authority of S.3 of Edict No. 5? 19^71 of the Western 
State.
TXie High Court had dismissed their appeal against 
the Order of the Tribunal of Inquiry because S.21 of Edict 
No. 5 (1967 - West) had provided against judicial review 
of orders made by the Tribunal in question.
The Western State Court of Appeal had in its turn 
dismissed the appeal from the High Court because Decree No.
4-5 (enacted in August 1 9 6 8), passed after the appeal to the 
Western Court of Appeal was lodged but before the hearing, 
had under S.2 precluded judicial review of certain matters, 
one of which was the abatement of the appeal filed by the 
appellants in the Western State Court of Appeal• That Decree 
had also affirmed the validity of the Order made against the 
appellants•
5• The Order impounded their property until the Military 
Governor of the Western State slaould otherwise direct.
75.
In the Supreme Court the appellants sought to 
Impugn the exclusionary provision in Decree No* 45 on the 
ground that it infringed the judicial power, in addition 
to their objection that the Order of the Tribunal of 
Inquiry violated their right to property under S. 31 of the 
Republican Federal Constitution of 19^3*
Now, whether or not there was a judicial power to 
infringe and whether or not the 19^3 Fedei’al Constitution 
could nullify an Order affirmed by a Decree, depended on 
the status of the Federal Military Government.
The Court was of opinion that to determine the 
status of the Federal Military Government it "must of 
necessity examine the events in the country as from January 
1$66 and how the Federal Military Government came into 
being.
The Court synopsised the submission of counsel for
ry
the respondent in the following words s
In his argument before us, the learned 
Attorney-General for the Western State, on 
behalf of the respondents, said what took 
place in January 1966 was revolution and 
the Federal Military Government is a revo­
lutionary Government which seized power on 
the 15th January, 19 6 6 . It accordingly has 
an unfettered right from the start to rule 
by force and by means of decrees and there­
fore nothing in the Republican Constitution 
of 1963 can be implied into the new mode of
6* Supreme Court, p. 16. (Unless otherwise indicated the 
pages in the footnotes refer to those in the judgment 
of the Supreme Court in the Takanmi decision.)
7. P.16.
76.
ruling the country: that section 3 0 ) °£
Decree No* 1 of 1966 gave the Federal 
Military Government unlimited power of 
legislation on any subject either by Decree 
or by part of the Constitution which has not 
been abrogated; that the doctrine of necessity 
which was propounded by counsel for defence, 
and about which we will say more later, does 
not apply. Further, that section 6 of Decree
No. 1 of 1966 .....must be construed literally
and should not be construed to doubt the 
validity of a decree as this Court has inter­
preted an Edict in the case of Adamolekun v .
The Council of the University of Ibadan,
S .6". 3 7 8 / 1 9 6 6 decided on 7th Augus t, 1 9 6 7; 
and that that interpretation can only be limited 
to an Edict. In short, the submission is that 
there is nothing in the Constitution which can 
* make a decree void. He further submitted that 
once a document purporting to be a decree is 
signed by the Head of the Federal Military 
Government, it cannot be challenged and no 
court has any jurisdiction to adjudicate on 
its validity. The order of 31st August, 1967 
by the Chairman of the Assets Tribunal, he sub­
mitted, was validly made since Decree No. 45 of 
1968 made on the 28th August 1968 has validated 
everything done under it.
The Court next turned to the submission of counsel
9
for the appellants and synopsised it thus:
Chief Williams, learned counsel for the 
appellants, submitted that the Federal Military 
Government is not a revolutionary Government 
hut a constitutional interim government, which 
came into being by the wishes of the representa­
tives of the people, and whose object is to 
uphold the Constitution, excepting so far as it 
had to derogate from it under the doctrine of 
necessity whereby it was granted power• That 
thus the Federal Military Government assumes the 
continued existence of the Constitution and in 
its Decree No• 1 of 1966 ...... impliedly
provided for a separation of powers between the 
legislature, the executive and tlie judiciary as 
did the Constitution of Nigeria; that this must 
be perpetuated unless necessity otherwise arose
8 . S . 6 reads: HNo question as to the validity of this or
any otlier Decree or of any Edict shall be entertained by 
any court of law in Nigeria•
9. p. 17.
compelling it under section 3 of Decree 
No* 1 of 1966 to make laws by Decree * for 
the peace, order and good government of 
Nigeria on any matter whatsoever• 1 This 
power, it was submitted, must not be read 
as an unfettered power to legislate to 
amend the Constitution save in so far as 
properly justified by the doctrine of 
necessity*
In regard to section 6 of Decree No* 1 of 
1966 and the Adamolelnm case (supra),
Chief Williams submitted that section 6 
of Decree No. 1 has to be read down as this 
court put it in Adamolekun1s case to only 
not being able to challenge the legislative 
authority of a decree; that is, not to 
challenge the right of the Federal Military 
Government to make a law by way of a decree 
signed by the Head of the Federal Military 
Government as provided by section 4 and 5 
of Decree No. 1 of 19 6 6. Further, that a 
decree prevails over the Constitution only 
to the extent that the decree, if otherwise 
properly made, could amend the constitution.
Finally, that the order Exhibit 1B 1 made on 
31st August, 1967 by the Chairman of the 
Assets Tribunal was not validly made, since 
Decree No* 45 of 1968 which sought to validate 
it (and thus implied that it was otherwise 
invalid) was a legislative act which impinged 
upon the sphere of the judiciary and to that 
extent invalid as an executive interference 
into the sphere of the judiciary.
The Court, speaking through Ademola C.J.N., said 
that to facilitate comprehension of the doctrine of 
necessity it was essential to step into history. It pointed 
out that the Republican Constitution of 1963 had made pro­
vision for a President of the Republic (S.34) $ a bi-cameral 
legislature (S.4l ), an executive, known as the Council of 
Ministers (SS. 84, 8 7 , etc.,) and a Judiciary "vested with 
full judicial powers" (Chapter 3 ). It said that all these
provisions were in operation until 15th January, 1 9 6 6, "when
78.
a section of the army x*ebelled in different parts of the 
10country"• The evidence was that two regional premiers
had been killed and that the Prime Minister of the Feder­
ation and one of his Ministers had been abducted to an 
unknown destination; some senior members of the army had 
died by assassination. Their lordships considered such
occurrences as "unprecedented", the upshot of which was
11"serious constitutional upheaval". The events which
succeeded the initial military maelstrom were treated by 
the court as the successful effort of the head of the 
army to suppress the rebellion or quell the insurgency.
This, with respect, is not the only interpretation of 
which the confused concatenation of circumstances is 
susceptible; the action of General Ironsi could be inter­
preted as a move the nature of which somewhat qualifies 
the constitutional rectitude with which the Supreme Court 
had endowed it, because the General * s manoeuvre could have 
been merely a successful attempt to take over the rebellion 
initiated by his subordinates, even if the initial onset 
had not been instigated by him. Also, far from arresting 
the rebels, his moves might have resulted in the overthrow 
of an incipient rebel regime only to replace the latter by 
a rebellious regime of his own. The constitutional 
chiaroscuro is indistinct because the actual intention of 
General Ironsi is yet, and is likely to remain, unknown•
The facts do not speak for themselves. The Court then
1 0. p. 18.
1 1. p. 18.
7 9.
proceeded to emphasise the constitutional chaos by noting
that the Minister who had previously acted for the Prime
12Minister and “who was apparently next to him*' was not 
in the country. The President of the Republic was also 
absent from Nigeria, although his absence was not, legally, 
a source of confusion because there was an Acting 
President. The Court then went on:
It appeared however that the Council of 
Ministers met without the Prime Minister 
and decided to hand over tire Administration 
of the country to the Armed Forces before 
the situation got worsened.
The crucial passage above will be discussed later•
The text of the Acting President!s speech then
13appeared in the judgment:
Full Text of His Excellency The Acting 
Presidents Speech.
I have tonight been advised by the Council of 
Ministers that tliey had come to the unanimous 
decision voluntarily to hand over the adminis­
tration of the country to the Armed Forces of 
the Republic with immediate effect. All 
Ministers are assured of their personal safety 
by the New Administration. I will now call 
upon the General Officer Commanding, Major- 
General Aguiyi-Ironsi, to make a statement to 
the nation on the policy of the New Administration. 
It is my fervent hope that the New Administration 
will ensure the peace and stability of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria and that all citizens 
will give them their full co-operation.
1 2. p. 18.
13. P. 18.
80 „
The speech of4 General Ironsi, reproduced here 
just as it was partly recited by the court, was
14similarly broadcast 011 the same days
The Government of* the Federation of* Nigeria 
having ceased to function, The Nigerian Armed 
Forces have been invited to form an interim 
Military Government for the purposes of 
maintaining law and order and of maintaining 
essential services.
2. This invitation has been accepted and I, 
General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, the General 
Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army, have 
been formally invested with authority as Head 
of the Federation Military Government, and 
Supreme Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces.
Suspension of certain parts of the Constitution. 
The Federation Military Government hereby decrees.
(a) The suspension of the provisions of the 
Constitution of the Federation relating to 
the office of President, the establishment of 
Parliament, and of the office of Prime 
Minister 5
(b) The stispension of the provisions of the 
constitutions of the Regions relating to the 
establishment of the offices of Regional 
Governors, Regional Premiers and Executive 
Councils, and Regional Legislatures.
The court, immediately after the quotation above,
15
saids
It is to be noted from the Government Notice 
(No. 148) set out above that the invitation to 
the Armed Forces, which was duly accepted, was 
to form an interim Military Government, and it 
was made clear that only certain sections of the 
Constitution would be suspended. It was evident 
that the Government thus formed is an interim 
government which would uphold the Constitution 
of Nigeria and would only suspend certain sections 
as the necessity arises.
14. p. 1.9 ,
1-5. P* 2 0 .
Though fuller comment is to come later, it is 
proposed to make a few immediate remarks on the passage 
just quoted. Xt is true that Government Notice No. 148,
1966 (General Ironsi's Speech), referred to the invitation 
of the civil administration as one to form a Military 
Government that was to be only interim in nature. But 
the actual invitation itself, embodied in the statement 
of the Acting President (Government Notice No. l4'7, 1 9 6 6),
spoke of the Military Government as the New Administration 
and avoided all mention of the word interim. It is sub­
mitted that where the language of tiae invitation is free 
of a restriction which a mere reference to the said 
invitation contains, the invitation does not only by that 
circumstance suffer from the circumscription contained in 
that reference to it.
The court also thought it pertinent to recall that 
the Military Government had indicated that only certain 
provisions of the Constitution would be suspended. It is 
suggested that what is crucial to the status of the 
Military Government is not what parts of the Constitution 
"would be" suspended, but what parts of it "could be" 
suspended. The Court apparently failed to distinguish 
between the power exercised and the power exercisable.
It was precipitate of it to regard the former as definitively 
circumscriptive of the latter.
The Court also emphasised that the Military Govexm- 
ment "would only" suspend certain sections "as the necessity
arises”. The language of their Lordships appears to 
suggest that it was the prerogative of the new regime 
to decide when it was necessary, and what sections of 
the Constitution it was necessary to suspend. Had the 
phrase been "could only” instead of "would only" the 
former might be construed as representing the court * s 
view that circumstances of necessity alone could empower 
the regime to suspend the Constitution. In preferring 
the phrase "would only" the court was inconsistent with 
its attitude that the Military Government was not paramount. 
That phrase appeared to recognise an absolute discretion 
in the Militai’y Government to decide what measures were 
necessary.
16The Court continueds
At this stage it is incumbent on us to clear 
one point. It must be accepted that the 
Council of Ministers validly met at the time.
The Acting President accepted that they met 
and they gave him an assessment of the 
situation. In our view, the Council of 
Ministers could validly meet in the absence 
of the Prime Minister, since the evidence 
available at the time was that the Prime 
Minister was alive but circumstances made it 
impossible for him to be present. If he 
had been killed or he was dead at the time, 
the situation might have been different.
Exception is not taken to the Court1s view that the 
Council of Ministers could validly meet in the absence of 
the Prime Minister. The point at issue, however, is 
whether the Council could have been convened by someone 
who had not been appointed Acting Prime Minister by the
Acting President, barring the possibility of a retroactive
and/or implicit appointment. The Court is surely right
in maintaining that the Prime Minister was in law only
absent because then as now there is no evidence to support
the fact that he was dead at the time the Council was
purportedly convened. If at the time the Acting President
had exercised the President1s power to appoint an Acting
Prime Minister, no doubt could have been raised as to the
17validity of the meeting of the Council. Doubts have
arisen, however, because it is hot evident whether or not 
the Acting President had made such an appointment. There 
was certainly no express appointment. Could there have 
been an implied appointment at the time of the Council*s 
meeting in that the meeting had a Chairman (a senior 
Federal Minister) whose position was acquiesced in by the 
Acting President who was himself present, although, 
apparently not wishing to exceed his constitutional 
authority, he did not preside? Could it not have been 
the case that, there being no provision in the 1963 Consti­
tution positing otherwise, the appointment of an Acting
17. S. 39 of the 1963 Constitution invests the President's 
powers in an Acting President in the absence or 
incapacity or the vacancy of the office of the former.
S. 92 empowers the President to appoint an Acting Prime 
Minister where the Prime Minister is absent or 
incapacitated. Such appointment is to be on the advice 
of the Prime Minister. But the proviso to the latter 
requirement (s. 9 2 ( 2 ) ) prescribess
"Provided that if the President considers that it 
is impracticable to obtain the advice of the 
Prime Minister owing to his absence or illness 
he may exercise those powers without that advice".
The underlining is mine.
Prime Minister in an unprecedented situation could have 
been, and was, effected by the mere acquiescence of the 
person qualified to make the appointment? Even supposing 
the Acting President had not made an appointment by 
acquiescence at the time of the meeting, could he not 
have made the appointment retroactively and by unavoidable 
implication when in his broadcast to the nation he spoke 
of his having been advised by the Council of Ministers?
This surely presupposes that there liras such a Council to 
advise him at the time. Can his statement then be 
inferential of his there and then having impliedly and 
retroactively authorised, to the time of the meeting, the 
Chairman of that meeting to be Acting Prime Minister?
No other interpretation of his conduct is consistent with 
his having spoken of the Council having convened. S. 92 
is silent as to whether the authorisation it permits has 
to be either express or prospective. It is submitted that 
in the absence of an express restriction to that effect and 
of circumstances which could be construed to create such 
a limitation, S. 92 should not be treated as only 
permissive of its operating prospectively after express 
authorisation. Whether, however, the validity of the 
Council's session has any bearing on the constitutionality 
of the surrender of civilian power to the military power, 
is anothex* matt ex' which will be examined later.
The Court then proceeded, after its aside, with the 
theme of the dispute, i.e. the existence or non-existence of 
such a concept in legal theory as a doctrine of necessity,
85-
18and its applicability to Nigeria:
It is apt to point out, however, that the 
learned Attorney-General does not accept the 
doctrine of zaecessity, nor does he seek to 
argue whether or not necessity has been shown 
in this case. He bases his case on the fact 
that necessity, or rather the doctrine of 
necessity, does not arise for our consideration.
We understand him to say that questions of 
necessity only arise with Colonial Governments. 
Indeed, as we stated eai'lier, what happened in 
Nigeria in January 1966, in the siibmission of 
the learned Attorney-General, was a revolution.
Xt should be noted that the passage quoted suggests 
that both the Court and tlae Attorney-General assumed that 
there is only one species of revolution in law. It will 
be argued later that there may be a distinction between a 
revolution that does not call in aid the doctrine of state 
necessity, assuming there is such a doctrine; and a 
revolution that does. The usefulness of recognising 
such a doctrine will also later be canvassed.
1 9The Court went on:
It is no gainsay that what happened in Nigeria 
in January 1$66 is unprecedented in history.
Never before, as far as we are aware, has a 
civilian government invited an army take-over 
or the armed forces to form an interim 
Government. We disagree with, the learned 
Attorney—General that these events in January 
1966 are tantamount to a revolution. As Chief 
Williams for the appellant puts it, quoting 
from the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, a revolution 
occurs when there is an overthrow of an estab­
lished government by those who were previously 
subject to it or *where there is a possible 
substitution of a new ruler or form of government1• 
These from the facts, did not take place in 
Nigeria in 1966, as the situation to which we 
have previously referred - a rebellion by some
18. p. 20.
19 * p. 20,
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members of the Armed Forces - caused the 
Acting President, with the advice of the 
Council of Ministers in the absence of 
the Prime Minister, to hand over power to 
the Armed Forces. We venture to put the 
attitude of the Acting President and the 
Council of Ministers to the head of the 
Army thus - your men have started a 
rebellion, which we fear may spread; you 
have the means to deal with them. We leave 
it to you to deal with them and after this, 
return the administrative power of the 
Government to us.
The last two sentences quoted have been described
by a learned commentator as 11A most graphic and near-
20ludicrous illustration11. 0jo proceeds thus:
Surely, the normal and logical inference from 
the above statements £~ i •e., the two sentences 
m e n t i o n e d 7  is that although the Federal 
Government ceased to function at the time and 
it had therefore found it necessary to call 
for a provisional interim military government, 
yet, when it thinks it can function again it 
will then relieve the provisional interim 
government of its offices and take over the 
realm of government. Aside from the fiction 
of power transfer, is it realistic to talk of 
*returning the administrative power of the 
Government to "us"?* Who are these *us * ? 
Assuming that the Military Government comes to 
an end, can the old Ministers and other 
functionaries gather together again and claim 
as of right to return to power, without more? 
Although the use of the word 1us * by the Supreme 
Court will suggest this, yet one can say, 
without any fear of contradiction, that, unless 
words have lost their meanings, the Supreme 
Court will not be prepared to press this to its 
logical conclusion. 1 Government in exile1 may 
be a familiar concept but the theory of a 
*Government in abeyance1 is new learning, parti­
cularly wlien the 1 Government1 which purported to 
hand over power had * ceased' to function.
20. Abiola Ojo, 1971, I.C.L.Q., p. 117, at p. 128.
8?.
The scorn that cascades from 0jo * s strictures is 
not wholly deserved. Ojo objects to the view that the 
Military Administration was interim, yet in his speech 
of accession to power General Ironsi used that very word 
to qualify the nature of his government. Ojo uses the 
phrase "provisional interim" in representing the Court's 
view of the Military Government. That phrase was never 
used by the Court, and indeed it is not immediately 
obvious how, in this context, the word "provisional" could 
add to "interim"• Mr. Ojo castigates the ambiguity 
introduced by the Court's use of the word "us". Xt is by 
no means absurd to treat that word as referring to whoever 
at a particular time should be found to be representing 
the civilian power• At the time of the ceremony of 
transfer, the "us" should refer to the soi-disant Council 
of Ministers who were the most plausible representatives 
of the civilian power• But it may be asked who is to 
represent the civilian power if the military ever relin­
quishes its possession of power• Representatives of the 
civilian power can always be ascertained by the Iiolding 
of a referendum in which tlie people are aslced to choose 
one of several proposed constitutions, following which the 
system of selection enjoined by tlie chosen constitution 
will be implemented. The language of tlie Supreme Court 
does not lead inexorably to its belief in tlie feasibility 
of a "Government in abeyance", despite Ojo's statement that 
it does.
88.
The difficulty in the statement of the Court 
lampooned by Mr. Ojo concerns rather the issue of who is 
to decide tlie moment when the military regime has com- 
pieted its task and ought to return its power to the 
civilians. The logic of law and the reality of power 
are very likely to point in different directions. The 
law may suggest that the courts, vested as they are with 
the ultimate power to decide questions of law, should be 
entrusted with deciding when the operation of the doctrine 
of necessity expires. The military government might say 
that because they would be more conversant with the facts, 
they, and not the judges, would be more qualified to 
decide. Xn the end the power of the Military is diffi­
cult to resist.
After thus insisting that what took place in 
Nigeria in January, 19 6 6, was not a revolution the Court 
ventured to cite a few examples of revolutionary govern­
ments, with a view to distinguishing them from the case
in hand. The Court dealt with the overthrow of the 1962
21Constitution of Uganda in these words;
•••• we would like to refer to the case of 
Uganda v. Commissioner of Prisons (1966)
E.A» E*R. 5l4, where there were no pretensions 
on the part of the Prime Minister who 
abolished the Constitution of the country in 
the National Assembly and substituted a new 
one, which installed him as Executive President 
with power to appoint a Vice-President contrary 
to the Coxastitution of the country - actions 
whicXi could only appropriately be described in 
law as a revolution.
21. p. 27.
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Read sceptically, this passage could he regarded 
as an encouragement to covert revolutionaries in that it 
appears to put a premium on pretensions. The position 
would have been indistinguishable from that of4 Nigeria 
had Dr. Obote, in his capacity of Prime Minister, handed 
over power to himself, in his new capacity of President 
of the Republic of Uganda. The crucial point to note is 
that botli procedures would have been contrary to their 
respective constitutions. The fact that one was more 
overtly so is surely not material.
The Court also quoted, from the judgment of the
Ugandan Supreme Court, a description by the latter of tlie
22revolutionary situation in Pakistan in 195®:
 that the President*s proclamation of
October 7th, 1958, by which the Constitution 
of 1956 was annulled and martial law was 
proclaimed constituted an * abrupt political 
change1 not within the contemplation of the 
said Constitution, i.e. a revolution. A 
victorious revolution is an internationally 
recognised legal method of changing a 
constitution. Such a revolution constitutes 
a new law creating fact. Laws which derive 
from the 1 old order1 may remain valid under 
the 'new order1 * only because validity has
expressly or tacitly been vested in the same, 
not the reason of validity*. Further no 
jurist would maintain that even after a 
successful revolution, the old constitution 
and the law based thereupon remain in force, 
on the ground that they have not been multi- 
fied by the old order itself.
The Nigerian Supreme Court thus treated the Pakistani case
in 1958 (State v» Dosso) and the Ugandan decision in 19 6 6,
as identical in legal doctrine, the Court in Uganda having
22. p. 21.
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cited the decision in Pakistan as an authority, and the 
Nigerian Supreme Court having concurred in both of* them#
The learned Attorney-General of* Western Nigeria
had sought to assimilate the position in Nigeria to those
23in Pakistan and Uganda. He drew attention to the Tact
that both the legislative and executive in Nigeria had 
been abrogated by the Military Government, and the judiciary 
was not left untouched in that a new code Tor tlie appoint­
ment of* judges had been introduced. To the assertion 
that many of the provisions of the 19^3 Constitution were 
still in operation, learned counsel riposted that such 
provisions as had not suffered supersession remained only 
because the military government did not decree their 
abrogations the point was that the 1963 Constitution had 
survived only by the grace of the Military Government. The 
Court continued its summary of the Attorney-General1s 
submission thus t
The learned Attorney-General argues further 
that there is no provision in the 1963 
Constitution enabling the Acting President, 
in the absence of the Prime Minister, even 
with the advice of other Ministers, of the 
Council of Ministers, to hand over the 
administration of the country to the Armed 
Forces of the Republic• What happened, he 
said, was that the Government * having ceased 
to function* agreed to abdicate its powers 
and that therefore there was a revolution.
The Supreme Court attempted to reply with its version
24of the doctrine of necessitys
23. p. 21. 
24• p. 22.
¥e think it is wrong to expect that consti­
tutions must make provisions for all 
emergencies. No constitution can anticipate 
all the different forms of phenomena which 
may beset a nation. Further, the executive 
authority of the Federation is vested in the 
President by section 84 of the Constitution 
and we think in a case of emergency he has 
power to exercise it in the best interest 
/subjectively to be ascertained by him?7 
the country, acting under the doctrine of 
necessity. Moreover, it must be remembered 
that it is not a case of seizing of power by 
the section of the Armed Forces which started 
a rebellion. The rebellion has been quelled, 
the insurgents did not seize power nor was it 
handed over to them. But the state of affairs 
in Pakistan to which The State v. Dosso (supra) 
refers is different. In Pakistan the President 
had issued a proclamation annulling the existing 
Constitution. There was a disruption of the 
Constitution and tlie national legal order by 
an abrupt political change not contemplated by 
the Constitution• Such a change is a revolution.
It is not difficult to adopt the court * s own language 
to the Nigerian position in January, 19 6 6. The words "an 
abrupt political change not contemplated by the Constitution" 
used by the court in relation to the position in Pakistan 
were equally apposite to that in Nigeria. Again, the 
court itself had been constrained to concede earlier that 
"it is wrong to expect that constitutions must make pro­
visions for all emergencies• No constitution can anticipate
all the different forms of phenomena which may beset a 
25nation". Thus the Nigerian Supreme Court betrays its
bewilderment by simultaneously asserting that a political 
change not contemplated by a pre-existing constitution is a
revolution when it happens in Pakistan but that such a change 
is not a revolution when it happens in NigeriaI
It will be recalled that the Court said that the 
executive authority of the Federation was vested in the 
President who in an emergency had power to exercise it in 
the best interest of the country, acting under the doc­
trine of necessity. It is astonishing for the Court to 
regard tine purported transfer of the totality of the 
Federation's powers to tlie Military Government as an 
executive acts if such an act could be classified at all 
it would surely have been described as legislative. Again, 
why did the Court have to rely on S# 84 (the section which 
vests the formal executive authority in the President) if 
it was of opinion that the President had acted under the 
doctrine of necessity? The only relevance of S#84 would 
have been to indicate that because the President wielded 
executive authority he was the person most appropriate as 
the organ for the exercise of exceptional power under tlie 
doctrine of necessity. It is disingenuous of the Court 
to suggest that the doctrine only extended the scope of 
S.84, as distinct from having totally superseded it. 
Assuming the transfer to have been valid, S*84 guided, 
but it did not govern, the doctrine of necessity.
The Court concluded its summary of the Attorney-
General* s submission on the basis of power of the military
government thus
The submissions by the learned Attorney-General 
leave no room for the doctrine of necessity•
He argued that as there was a revolution in the 
country in 1966, it is not permissible to read 
into the actions of the Federal Military Government
any fetter arising out of tlie Republican 
Constitution of 1963 and tlie Government could 
legislate as it thought fit and could 
sussessed and modify portions of that Consti­
tution as it thought fit; that section 3(1) 
of Decree No* 1 of 1966 should be given its 
plain meaning and nothing should be read into 
it; that also the proviso to section 1 of the 
Constitution should be given its literal 
meaning and that it puts no limitation on the 
power of a decree and in effect a decree auto­
matically prevails over the Constitution 
whether or not it is specifically or impliedly 
inconsistent with it.
Before we enter into the compact but intricate 
submission of the Attorney-General, it behoves us to ask 
ourselves what a decree is? Is it a law or enactment 
made by the military government, or is it simply an instru­
ment made by the military government and only expressed 
to be a decree? If it be the former then the courts 
could examine a decree in the sense that they would be 
entitled to verify that it is a law or enactment made by 
the Military Government, that it is formally as well as 
substantively a decree.
If a decree be the latter (i.e. if it be merely
as it is defined in S. 16 of Decree No. 1) then once the
coux'ts find that an instrument has been (1) made by the
Military Government and (2 ) merely expressed to be a
a
decree, they must pronounce it to be^valid decree. What 
S. 16 declares is that a decree is nothing more than an 
instrument which proclaims itself to be a decree, which 
instrument has been signed by the Head of the Federal 
Military Government. They cannot inquire into how it was 
made, notwithstanding the presence of fraud or duress, or 
whetlier it stood on a proper foundation of power, i.e.
whether it was made within a proper ambit of power.
Thus, a decree as defined in S. 16 has only to be formally 
valid! substantive validity would indeed not be a
constituent of its nature. Such must be the outcome if
S. 16, and thus Decree No. 1 itself, is treated as valid.
The Supreme Court did not advert to S. 16 of 
Decree No. 1 when claiming the right to question the 
substantive content of a decree. Does this inadvertence 
render the judgment per incuriam? Xt cannot be that 
the Court treated the whole of Decree No• 1 as void; it
took great care merely to limit the ambit of S. 3(1)
thereof. It thus only restricted the area of substantive 
power of the Military Government. Had it also wished to 
limit the formal or procedural power of the Military Govern­
ment it could have impugned S. 16 of the same decree.
27Now, if one combines the unquestioned S. 16 with the
28equally unquestioned proviso to S. 1 of the 1963 Consti­
tution, which proviso was inserted by S. 1(2), Decree No• 1, 
1966 one gets to a position wherein if something called a 
decree, which trader S. 16 is all that a decree is, is 
inconsistent with the Constitution, the Constitution* s own 
proviso would operate to abrogate such provisions as con­
tained in the Constitution, save the proviso itself, as are 
inconsistent with the decree aforesaid. In fine, this
2 7 . Part of S. 16, Decree No. 1, 1 9 6 6, reads:
"In this Decree, and in any other law decree1 means 
an instrument made by the Federal Military Government 
and expressed to be, or to be made as, a decree".
(The underlining is mine.) ---------
28. "Provided that this constitution shall not prevail over 
a decree, and nothing in this constitution shall render 
any provision of a decree void to any extent whatsoever" 
(the underlining is mine.)
combination, insofar as it relates to the efficacy of 
decrees to override provisions in the Constitution, 
renders S. 3(1) partially otiose. This means that even 
if S. 3(1) had not conferred on the Federal Military 
Government Supreme Substantive legislative authority, the 
1963 constitution could still have been overriden by that 
constitution*s own subservient proviso which stipulated 
that its contents were not to prevail over a decree, which 
in terms of S. 16 of Decree No. 1, 19 6 6 , is simply an 
instrument satisfying certain formalities• Also, by a 
combination of S. 16 and S. 6f$^no decree can be 
questioned for lack of area of power. This renders S. 3(1) 
completely otiose. The area of power is not relevant 
because a decree is simply an instrument made by the 
Military Government and which has to be merely expressed 
as a decree. This view obtains even granting the judiciary 
the power to examine an instrument to ascertain whether or 
not it constitutes a decree: this is due to the narrowness 
with which 8. 16 defines a decree• The courts are incom­
petent to question a decree in relation to a basis of power 
not because they lack the power to review this relationship 
but because a basis of power is not an integral part of a 
decree. It is submitted that the definition of a decree 
contained in S. 16 of decree No• 1 (1 9 6 6) is defective in 
that only its identification and not its legal nature is 
expressed. It is suggested that a decree should be defined 
thus •
A decree is a law made under the legislative 
authority of the Federal Military Government, 
which authority shall be expressed through an 
instrument declaring itself a decree, which 
instrument shall require for its validity the 
signature of the Head of the Federal Military 
Government•
The suggested definition, unlike tlxat in S. 16 of 
Decree No. 1 (1 9 6 6), embodies both the substantive and 
formal aspects of a decree. A decree as defined by S. 16 
does not require a source of authority, or, at least 
appears not to have such a requirement.
A difficulty encountered is Decree No. 1 itself, 
which purports to define its own essence as restrictively 
as it has defined that of subsequent decrees. In 
ascertaining the scope and meaning of the latter one can 
always turn to the former, but to ascertain the efficacy 
of Decree No. 11s definition of itself one is unable to 
resort to a prior enactment from which the decree derives 
its authority. One therefore cannot without more 
accept Decree No• 1f s definition of itself as conclusive.
In order for that Decree to be efficacious one must dis­
cover its source of authority. At present we are not so 
much concerned with the identity of the source itself as 
with the necessity for that decree to have such a source. 
This necessity decisively distinguishes Decree No• 1 from 
subsequent decrees because the latter are constitutively 
more restricted since their essence as defined in S. 16 is 
identified with a formal act that does not reveal its 
source of authority. But S. 16 * s definition of Decree No.
97 *
itself1 cannot logically be acceded to, because it is 
circuitous of1 Decree Ho* 1 to define its own essence*
The Attorney-General’s submission, summarised
earlier, will be discussed after the content of the judgment
has been presented. Since we are at this juncture
primarily concerned with what was said, rather than the
correctness of what was said, by the parties and court,
we will now quote the court1s reply to the Attorney-
29General1s submissions
As we stated earlier in this judgment, the 
learned Attorney-General does not accept 
the presumption of necessity. We have 
earlier on pointed out that in our view the 
Federal Military Government is not a revo­
lutionary Government. It made it clear 
before assuming power that the Constitution 
of the country still remains in force, 
except in certain sections which are suspended.
¥e have tried to show that the country is 
governed by the Constitution and Decrees 
which, from time to time, are enacted when 
the necessity arises and are then supreme 
when they are in conflict with the Consti­
tution. It is clear that the Federal Military 
Government decided to govern the country by 
means of the Constitution and Decrees. The 
necessity must arise before a decree is 
passed ousting any portion of tlie Constitution.
In effect, the Constitution still remains 
the law of the country and all laws are 
subject to the Constitution excepting so 
far as by necessity the Constitution is 
amended by a Decree. This does not mean 
that the Constitution of the country ceases 
to have effect as a superior norm.
(By thus speaking of the Constitution only as a superior, and
che
not as a supreme, norm does the court imply that ^ Nigerian 
body politic acknowledges an authority transcendent of the 
Constitution? If so, what is the identity of this consti­
tutional entity?)
29. p. 2k.
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From the Facts of the taking’ over, as we 
have pointed out, the Federal Military 
Government is an interim Government of 
necessity concerned in the political cauldron 
of its inception as a means of dealing 
effectively with the situation which has 
arisen, and its main object is to protect 
lives and property and maintain law and order.
To sustain its thesis the Court quotes from passages 
in two judgments before, as the pillar of its authority, 
discussing the case in Cyprus, Attorney-General for the 
Republic v. Mustapha Xbrahim of Kyrenia (1 964) 3 Supreme 
Court of Cyprus 1. Their lordships of the Nigerian 
Supreme Court introduced their confidence in a doctrine 
of necessity by turning to a paragraph by Willes J. in
(18?1) 6 L.R. Q.B. 1, at p. 16, wlxich
reads s30
This perilous duty, shared by the Governor with 
all the Queen1s subjects, whether civil or 
military, is in an especial degree incumbent 
upon him as being entrusted with the powers of 
government for preserving the lives and property 
of the people and the authority of the Crownj 
and if such duty exist as to tumultous assemblies 
of a dangerous character, the duty and responsi­
bility in case of open rebellion are heightened 
by force of arms and a state of war against the 
Crown established for time. To act under such 
circumstances within the precise limits of the 
law of ordinary peace is a difficult and may be 
an impossible task, and to hesitate or temporize 
may entail disastx*ous consequences.
The Court then had recourse to a dictum from the
dissenting opinion of Lord Pearce in Madzimbanuto v »
Lardner-Burke /19697 (1 )A.C. 645 at p. 740s
The principle of necessity or implied mandate is 
for the preservation of the citizen, for keeping 
law and order, rebus sic stantibus, regardless of 
whose fault it is that the crisis has been created 
or persists.
30. p. 25.
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The Court described the case of Mustapha Ibrahim
31thus s
In that case, owing' to the immutable nature 
of the constitution of* Cyprus and the 
political secession of the Turkish members 
of* the judiciary and of* the legislature, the 
courts and the parliament were unable to 
function. The Greek members of* Parliament 
took upon themselves to pass a 1law1 providing 
for a new Supreme Court with no racial quorum, 
such as had been provided by the Constitution.
The new Court, staffed by Greek judges only, was 
set in motion and started to function. It was 
contended that the 1law *, being uncons titutional, 
was a nullity; but all the three judges held 
that the * law * should be read into the Consti­
tution, by applying the doctrine of necessity, 
and that the new Court was duly constituted.
We quote a portion of the judgment of Josephides,
J• where he said as follows
•Faced with the non-functioning of the two 
superior courts of the land, and the partial 
breakdown of the District Courts, the Government 
had to choose between two alternative, viz. 
either to comply with the strict letter of the 
constitution (the relevant articles being 
unalterable under any condition), that is, cross 
its arms and do nothing but witness the complete 
paralysis of the judicial power, wliich is one of 
the three pillars of the State (vide Prof. Alessi, 
ubi supra, at pages 218-9); or to deviate from 
the letter of the constitution, which had been 
rendered inoperative, by the force of events 
(which situation could not be foreseen by the 
framers of the constitution), in order to do 
what was imperatively and inevitably necessary 
to save the judicial power temporarily until 
return to normal conditions so that the whole 
State structure may not crumble down. I have 
no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that 
in these exceptional circumstances it was the 
duty of the Government through its legislative 
organ, to take all measures whi ch were absolutely 
necessary and indispensable for the normal and 
unobstructed administration of justice. I agree 
with the submission of respondent's counsel that 
the measures taken should be for the duration of 
the necessity and no more. This is also conceded 
by the learned Attorney-General of the Republic.
31* p. 25,
100.
The question now arises? Did the legislature 
do wliat was absolutely necessary in the circuras- 
tances or did it exceed it? 1
By recognising the fact that there is a doctrine 
of necessity we do not alter the law, but apply 
it to facts as they do exist. We are unable to 
find that the facts of cases cited to us by the 
learned Attorney-General do fit in with the events 
which took place in this country in January 19 6 6j 
but they are basically cases of revolution.
As yet, it is not proposed to comment on the 
elaborate arguments made by the Court and both counsel on 
the status of the Military Government• Such comment will 
follow only after the presentation of the court's and 
counsel's views on the judicial power in Nigeria at the 
time of the judgment.
32Adverting to Decree No. 45» 19 6 8, the Court said
The questions we ask ourselves are, was the 
passing of this decree a performance of 
legislative function as envisaged by section 
3 (1 ) of Decree No• 1 of 1 9 6 6? and does it go 
beyond the requirements or demands of the 
necessity of the case?
The juxtaposition of the txiro questions appears to 
suggest that the second question need only be answered if 
the answer to the first is in the Affirmative. This is 
questionable. Is the court saying that even if Decree No* 
45 had been passed in response to, and only to the extent 
of, the demands of the necessity of the situation, it 
could still have been avoided merely because S. 3 (1) of 
Decree No. 1 did not have it within its contemplation?
The remarkable conclusion would then be forced of the court
32. p. 27-
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maintaining that S. 3(1) of Decree No# 1 was paramount 
over the dictates of the doctrine of necessity# Xt is 
suggested, however, that in placing the questions in the 
order that it did, the court was only committing an 
inadvertent volte-face * The only question which the 
court could ask without seeming to undermine its own thesis 
was whether the Decree embodied provisions which exceeded 
the requirements demanded by the circumstances of 
necessity.
Xt may be argued that the juxtaposition of the two 
questions by the court is not illogical, on the basis 
that the court having declared that the Military Government 
on the date of its accession had not been vested with the 
judicial power because that Government had only claimed 
legislative supremacy as defined in S# 3(1) of Decree No# 1, 
1966, it was only logical that the court should have 
vitiated as ultra vires any purported extension of the 
Federal Military Government's authority# The court's 
attitude is valid only 011 the assumption that the dictates
a
of the doctrine of necessity were distilled and « J~ul4 
in Decree No. 1: an assumption which would serve to
preclude the Military Government from laying claim to that 
species of authority (the judicial power) which it had 
neglected to claim for itself when it acquired the legis­
lative and the executive authority in the country# This 
assumption, if it is not rejected, would deprive the 
doctrine of necessity of its essence, which is, or should 
logically be, the uncontrolled, indeed uncontrollable,
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responsiveness to the imperatives of circumstances, 
namely, that that which conduces to or preserves the 
welfare of the state not only can, but also must, be done. 
Since the doctrine of necessity is activated solely to 
secure the salvation of the state, it is illogical to 
restrict it in any form or manner because this would mean 
that the rules of restriction transcend tire imperative 
of national salvation. It is suggested that the court, 
having pronounced that Decree No# 1, 1 9 6 6, was valid 
only because the doctrine of necessity so required, could 
not, without the risk of inconsistency, seek to restrict 
the doctrine of necessity with a law created by, and hence 
subject to alteration, by, the doctrine of necessity itself. 
There is no tiling in that doctrine capable of suggesting 
that a legislative instrument, if found to be necessary 
by whatever is the adjudicating body, is debarred from 
operating in an area of law which in normal conditions would 
be a matter for the judiciary. It is therefore incorrect 
of the court to insist that a decree is to be des®r ed 
validity unless, in addition to its being necessary in the 
circumstances, it is also within S. 3(1) of Decree No• 1, 
1966* It may be objected in the court's favour that what 
is not within S. 3(1) is not a decree and therefore cannot 
be enforced. There are two answers to this defence of 
the court's position# First, a decree, as we have found 
occasion to notice, is not an instrument either defined by, 
or required to comply with, S. 3(1). A decree is defined 
in S. 16 (which does not contain any reference to S. 3(1) )
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and is removed from challenge to its authority from the 
courts by S. 6. The court is e s f r o m  questioning 
the prohibition expressed in 8® 6 because it appears in 
the same decree as S* 3(1) the validity of which the court 
necessarily accepted when it required decrees to comply 
with it. If the court thus submitted to S. 3(l)» surely 
it also could not impugn S. 6 because the two sections are 
integral to Decree No# 1, 1966, and must therefore stand 
or fall together#
Second, even if subsequent decrees were required 
by Decree No# 1 to comply with S. 3(1) this fact would not 
prove fatal to such subsequent decrees which ignore this 
requirement, because Decree No# 1, being a creature of 
the doctrine of necessity, is itself subject to variation 
or even repeal by the latter. Therefore, if a measure 
of the Military Government is necessary in the sense that 
it satisfies the doctrine of necessity, it is not required, 
in addition to this, to comply also with S. 3 (1 ) > and the 
court's opinion that both requirements are necessary to 
the validity of a decree is, it is suggested, erroneous#
It is true that the doctrine can strike down a purported 
legislative measure notwithstanding its compliance with 
S. 3(1) because the doctrine is superior to S. 3 (1)5 but 
the converse does not hold. To content otherwise is to 
exalt creature above creator* S. 3 (1) exists as a mani­
festation of the doctrine of necessity and cannot prevail 
against a subsequent manifestation of the latter if such 
subsequent manifestation should prove to be inconsistent 
with its terms.
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It is perhaps appropriate to close this point 
with a repeated quotation of S. 3 (1 ) > which provides?
The Federal Military Government shall have 
power to make laws for the peace, order 
and good government of Nigeria or any part 
thereof with respect to any matter whatsoever*
There is no reason why the doctrine of necessity 
should not he competent to extend the above quotation 
to reads
The Federal Military Government shall have 
power to make laws (and shall also be 
invested with the judicial power of the 
state) for .............. .............
There is also no reason why an alteration of S. 3(1) 
has to be express. A subsequent decree inconsistent with 
Decree No# 1, 1966, surely overrides the latter*
Chief Williams, counsel for the appellants, had 
argued that the effect of Decree No, 45 was usurpation of
33judicial power as it purported to deprive the appellants 
of their properties by a legislative act which failed to 
make provision for compensation, thus contravening S. 31 
of the Constitution which made the payment of compensation 
compulsory. It is true that S. 31(3)(b) had excepted 
from the right to compensation a forfeiture resulting from 
a breach of the law, but, submitted Chief Williams, that 
exception was expressed to apply only to a General law 
providing for such forfeiture, and did not cover a law of 
forfeiture made ad hominem. Implicit in his submission 
is the point that the circumstances of necessity not 
requiring the supersession of S• 31 of the 1963 Constitution,
33* P. 27. ~
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that provision must apply to the case in hand to nullify 
the impugned decree.
The court thought that the best way to treat Chief
Williams1 argument was to point to an admission which the
Attorney-General was supposed to have made that the
separation of powers had survived the accession of the
34Military Government. With the greatest respect, it
must be doubted whether the learned Attorney-General did 
in fact make so broad a concession which would have des­
troyed his case. If there was still a separation of 
powers, as distinct from the very different concept of the 
courts being permitted by the Military Government to con­
tinue tXieir functions, the Supreme Court could simply 
point to S. 31 of the 1963 Constitution and say that 
because Decree No. 45 did not conform to it and that since 
the decree was thus a usurpation of the judicial power, 
it was void as infringing the doctrine of the separation 
of powers as embodied in that Constitution. The Attorney- 
General could not, therefore, have made the drastic 
concession claimed by the court.
The court then went on to point out that the 1963 
Constitution of Nigeria "clearly follows" the model of the 
American Constitution because in the distribution of 
powers the Nigerian courts "are vested with the exclusive 
right to determine justiciable controversies between citizens 
and between citizens and the State".
3 4 . p. 2 7 .
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The court then quoted from Black J. In Lovell v. 
United States (19^6) 66 Supreme Court Reports 1073 at 
p. 1079, thus?35
Those who wrote our Constitution well knew 
the danger inherent in special legislative 
acts which take away the life, liberty, or 
property of particular named persons, 
because the legislature thinks them guilty 
of conduct which deserves punishment• They 
intended to safeguard the people of this 
country from punishment without trial by 
duly constituted courts.
The court followed this up by stressing that the 
purpose of a written Constitution was to define, so as to 
circumscribe, the powers of the legislature, leaving the 
remainder to the courts. One must presume that the 
executive has been omitted otherwise than advisedly.
Describing the series of decrees purporting to
36affect the case before the court, their Lordship observed:
These enactments are directed against certain 
named individuals with the aim of punishing 
them or depriving them of their properties.
These individuals were not being dealt with 
as general members of the public for whom laws 
are passed generally.
The substance of the court * s gravamen against the 
Military Government is therefore that the decrees in question 
were enacted ad hominem and that this was an intrusion on 
the judicial power in circumstances where the doctrine of 
necessity could not be invoked, such intrusion not having 
been found to be necessary for the peace, order and good 
government of Nigeria•
35- P. 28. 
36. p. 29.
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The court thought that as regards the facts 
before them the decision of Liyanage v. The Queen (1967)
1 A.C. 259 was a case in point. Xt therefore cited 
with approval an extract from the judgment of Lord Pearce, 
at p* 289s
In so far as any Act passed without recourse 
to section 29(4) of the Constitution purports 
to usurp or infringe the judicial power it
is Ultra Vires  ........  It goes without
saying that the legislature must legislate, 
for the generality of its subjects, by the 
creation of crimes and penalties or by enacting 
rules relating to evidence. But the Acts 
of 1962 had no such general intention. They 
were clearly aimed at particularly known indi­
viduals who had been named..... That the
alterations in the law were not intended for 
the generality of the citizens or designed as 
any improvement of the General law is shown by 
the fact that the effect of these alterations 
was to be limited to the participants in the 
January coup and that, after these had been 
dealt with by the judges, the law should revert 
to its normal state.... The first Act was 
wholly bad in that it was a special direction 
to the Judiciary as to the trial of particular 
prisoners who were identifiable and charged 
with particular offences on a particular
occasion.........  As had been indicated
already, legislation ad hominem which is thus 
directed to the course of particular proceed­
ings may not always amount to an interference 
with the functions of the judiciary• But in 
the present case their Lordships have no doubt 
that there was such interference; that it was 
not only likely but the intended effect of the 
impugned enactment; and that is fatal to their 
validity.
The court continued its quotation from Lord Pearce
by adverting to what his Lordship said at p. 291s
One might fairly apply to these Acts the words 
of Chase, J., in the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Calder v. Bull (1799) 3 Dallas 
386 s
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1Blackstone in his Commentaries said -
'Therefore a particular Act of the legislature 
to confiscate the goods of Titius or to attaint 
him of high treason, does not enter into the 
idea of a municipal lawj for the operation of 
this act is spent on Titius only and has no 
relation to the community in generals it is 
rather a sentence than a law*'
If such Acts as these were valid the judicial 
power could be wholly absorbed by the legis­
lature and taken out of the hands of the 
judges. It is appreciated that the legislature 
had no such general intention. It was beset1 by -* 
a grave situation and it took grave measure to 
deal with it, thinking, one must presume, that 
it had the power to do so and was acting rightly. 
But that consideration is irrelevant, and gives 
no validity to acts which infringed the Consti­
tution. What is done once, if it be allowed, 
may be done again and in a lesser crisis and 
less serious judicial power may be eroded. Such 
an erosion is contrary to the clear intention 
of the Constitution. In their Lordships' view 
the Acts were ultra vires and invalid.
The Nigeria Supreme Court, even after such an
37extensive quotation, was, however, prepared to concedes
We are not unmindful of the fact, that not all 
enactments of this nature are judicial legis­
lation...... every case must depend upon the
facts surrounding it.
Having thus found that the Military Government had
encroached upon the judicial power the Court proceeded to
ask whether such encroachment was made in circumstances
sufficiently imperative to have it justified under the
doctrine of necessity. Their Lordships thought not
We must once again point out that those who 
took over the Government of this country in 
1966 never for a moment intended to rule but 
by the Constitution. They did, in fact,
37. P. 31.
38. p. 32.
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recognise the separation of powers and 
never intended an intrusion on the 
judiciary. Section 3(1) of the Decree 
No. 1, 1966 does not envisage performance 
of legislative functions as a weapon for 
exercise of judicial powers, nor was it 
intended that the Federal Military Govern­
ment should, in its power to enact Decrees, 
exceed the requirements or demands of the 
necessity of the case. In the present 
case we are satisfied that Decree No. 45 
did go beyond the necessity of the occasion.
Be it clearly noticed that their Lordships in that 
decisively important paragraph have refrained from, either 
inadvertently or advisedly, enlightening us as to how they 
came to be "satisfied" that the decree went beyond the 
demands of necessity. It is true that tlie Attorney- 
General had not been concerned to show that circumstances 
of necessity existed, for throughout the case he had con­
sistently refused recognition to the doctrine, but in a 
decision so monumental in its impact, their Lordships 
could at least have adumbrated on tlie reason for their 
thinking that the decree was unnecessary to the peace,
order and good government of Nigeria. When the Attorney-
39 / \General cited the amendment to S. 33(10) of the Western
Nigerian Constitution ( (Constitution of Western Nigeria
(Amendment) Law 1 9 6 3) ) as an example of a retroactive
validation which did not encroach on the judicial power
despite the Regional Legislature's reversing a judicial
decision (Adegbenx^o v. Akintola)^, the court rightly
39. P. 33.
40. £ “1963J7 A.C. 614.
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riposted that that enactment had never been tested before 
tlie courts: no doubt it was not clear whether the
"Governor" who had assented to the amendment was in fact 
the lawful Governor; if not, then the amendment could 
not have been an amendment in terms of the Region's 
Constitution. Xt is interesting to speculate on whether 
in that case the doctrine of necessity could have been 
invoked to remedy the contemplated constitutional irregularity.
We shall now quote the concluding portion of theix*
4lLordships1 decisions
At the passing of Decree No. 37 of 1968, the 
present case was pending in the Western State 
Court of Appeal. Although the Decree repealed 
Edict No. 5 of 1967 and purported to withdraw 
the Constitutional rights to challenge by way 
of action and prerogative writs in any Court 
of law provided in Chapter III of the Consti­
tution, dealing with Fundamental Human Rights, 
the Decree refrained from touching the order 
made against the appellant. It would appear 
that more thoughts were given to this enactment 
and Decree No. 43 of 1968 followed. But Decree 
No. 45 of 1968 is the pith and meat of the 
matter. It validated everything that was wrong 
or wrongly done, referred specifically to the 
names of the appellants in its schedule, without 
defining anew 'public officer'. Validated orders 
made against the 2nd appellant who according to 
section 13(1 ) of Decree No, 37 of 19 6 8 , could 
not by any stretch of imagination be considered 
a public officer. In an attempt to crown the 
efficacy of the Decree, it purported to abate 
all actions and appeals pending before any court• 
In short, it stops the pending appeal of the 
appellants in the Western State Court of Axupeal.
We have come to the conclusion that this Decree 
is nothing short of legislative judgment, an 
exercise of judicial power• It is in our view 
ultra vires and invalid.
Tfe are in no doubt that the object of the Federal 
Military Government, when it engaged in this 
exercise, is to clean up a section of the society 
which had engaged itself in corrupt practices -
41. p. 34.
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these vampires in the society whose occu­
pation was to enrich themselves at the 
expense of the country. But if, in this 
pursuit, the Government, however well-meaning, 
fell into the error of passing legislation 
which specifically in effdot, passed judgment 
and inflicted punishment or in other words 
eroded to (sic) the jurisdiction of the courts, 
in a manner that the dignity and freedom of 
the individual, once assured, are taken away, 
the courts must intervene. Every case, we 
reiterate, must be considered on its own 
facts and the materials placed before us in 
this matter lead to no other conclusion than 
that the provisions in the Decree No. 45 of 
1968 are such as are not reasonably necessary 
to achieve the purpose which the Federal 
Military Government set out to fulfil.
Again, we are not told why the Decree was not necessary in
the circumstances. Their Lordships continueds
This appeal will therefore be allowed and 
both Edict No. 5 of 1967 and the Decree No.
45 of 1968 are declared ultra vires; they 
ax1© null and void.
Now, we recorded during argument before us, 
that counsel on either side, if this case 
were to be sent back to the Western State 
Court of Appeal to hear the arguments on the 
issue before the High Court, would have nothing 
more to add to their arguments and submissions 
before us. No useful purpose will be served 
therefore in sending the case back. We have 
already pointed out that we cannot support the 
judgment of the learned judge of the Higli Court 
and also that the preliminary obj ection to the 
jurisdiction of the Western State Court of 
Appeal was wrongly upheld.
It follows that the order dated 3”ist day of 
August, 1967 made by the Assets Tribunal and
whi ch was admitted in evidence as Exhibit 'B1 
in the certiorari proceedings must be quashed, 
and is hereby quashed.
Thus the Supreme Court, exerting all the majesty 
of the judicial power of reviex*, pronounced the Federal 
Military Government to be subordinate in authority to the
1963 Constitution, except on matters where the doctrine 
of state necessity required that Constitution to be 
amended or suspended in certain of its sections.
Would the Military Government abide by this 
decision, which has so openly disputed the absolute 
supremacy which Decree No, 1, 19 6 6, claims that Government 
possesses? Even if the judgment were not to be 
explicitly disavowed by the Military Government, has it 
been correctly decided? Xt is proposed to answer these 
questions in the next Chapter,
CHAPTER 4
A CRXTXQXJE OF THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
In the light of Lakamni1 s case we will examine 
the status and nature of the Federal Military Government 
of Nigeria.
If what had occurred in January, 1966, was a 
revolution then the 1963 Constitution was overthrown, and 
such of its provisions as have been preserved are 
preserved only through their being accepted by, and their 
consequently deriving authority from, the new legal order.
If the 1963 Constitution was destroyed there could not 
have been a Council of Ministers as known to that Consti­
tution. So, there would have been no such Council even 
had the letter of the Constitution been observed in 
summoning the individuals who had formerly held federal 
Ministerial posts. The "Acting President" would not have been 
the Acting President and Major-General Ironsi would not 
have been the Major-General Ironsi of the Republican 
Government, The Acting President must and could only
have been such under a new legal order and Ironsi could 
only have had his rank conferred (not retained for him) 
by a fresh legal order• All offices of Government were 
not continued but created by the new legal order• Because 
of the possibility of a revolution creating in law, by 
retaining in fact, some laws of the former legal order it
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is difficult to concur in the view of a learned authors
In the view of the present writer, the crux 
of the case is whether or not the events 
whicli toolt place in Nigeria on January 15 >
1966, could be said to be a revolution or a 
mere Constitutional emergency.1 In the former, 
all laws emanating from the Government would 
not be subject to judicial review because the 
old order under the 19^3 Constitution would 
have yielded to the new legal order: if the
latter, however, the provision of the old 
Constitution will apply and the Supreme Court 
would be able to consider1 the Constitutionality 
of any law made by the Federal Military Govern­
ment •
Both alternatives so strictly defined, are wrong.
If the new order in fact retains and in law creates the 
judiciary then the power of judicial review can be exercised 
notwithstanding the revolution. This assumes that the 
new order, though brought about by the Military, was one 
in which the Military acted as catalyst and then became 
a constituent of that order which its catalytic action had 
created.
But even if the old order remains in virtue of the 
doctrine of necessity it need not be that the judicial 
power is preserved because the doctrine of necessity may 
direct its abatement.
Now, was there a revolution in Nigeria? Kelsen, 
it will be recalled, speaks of the efficacy of the legal 
order as a whole. Did the abrogation of the federal and 
state executives and legislatures constitute the deprivation 
of such efficacy to the order established by the 1963 Consti­
tution? It is submitted that it did. The I963
1. Ojo, 1971 I.C.L.Q. 117, at 118.
Constitution was constituted of three organs: the legis­
lature, the judiciary and the executive* Two of these 
were made moribund - the third by itself cannot sustain 
the efficacy of the order as a whole. Therefore, if 
Kelsen1s theory of legal orders is accepted, the events of 
January, 1966, in Nigeria can be taken to have effected a 
revolution.
The conclusion reached in the preceding paragraph 
assumes that the Military Government did what it did on a 
basis exclusively constituted of force. Xf the basis 
upon which the Military Government rested its decisions 
was other than that of naked force or of the threat of 
such force, a different conclusion should not be ruled out. 
The crucial question now arises which power sanctioned the 
abrogation of the legislatures and executives. The 
Attorney-General of the Western State had maintained that 
these bodies had been superseded by the Military Government 
by virtue of its own power. The appellants sought to 
attribute this to the operation of the doctrine of necessity. 
First, let us consider the argument of the Attorney-General. 
It will be recalled that General Ironsi spoke of the 
Nigerian Armed Forces having been “invited" to assume power. 
This is not revolutionary language. Head in conjunction 
with the Acting President's speech the invitation alluded 
to by the General must refer to the invitation of the 
Federal Cabinet, assuming the parties were right in that at 
that time there was still such an entity. Also the General
spoke of an interim government• He also specified that
it was "for the purposes of maintaining law and order and 
of maintaining essential services"• The language just 
quoted is connotative of an ephemeral existence because a 
fresh supplanting legal order cannot have such a circum­
scribed, if not skeletal, catalogue of functions• It is 
also the language reminiscent of emergency provisions in 
written constitutions, and emergencies are a phenomenon 
of transient nature. General Ironsi spoke of having been 
"formally invited" and this suggests that he acknowledged 
a superior authority because if he had been a law unto 
himself such a procedure would have been otiose.
But language and forms cannot prevail if the sub­
stance of the power is revolutionary. There is little 
doubt that the civil authorities did what they did because 
they were coerced by the Military power• The presence of 
such a threat was evinced by the abduction or assassination 
of several Ministers• No one would suggest that the 
civil authorities were in a position to refuse the investi­
ture for which the General had asked• If the General had 
merely wanted to round up the rebels was there any need to 
abrogate the legislature and executives of five constitutions ? 
Surely the defeat of the rebels was only a Military operation 
not requiring the mammoth powers that the General claimed 
for himself. Though there is no conclusive evidence of
this, it is not unlikely that the General wrenched the 
rebellion from his subordinate majors and completed it 
himself• To allay opposition it was natural for him to
attempt to the best of his ability to give a display of 
constitutional punctilio• The fact that there was no 
law, person or institution at that moment that could 
effectively contradict the wishes of the General demons­
trates that as far as iDower goes he was a law unto himself.
But granting that there was a revolution, might 
not the revolution have been legal in the sense that it 
came about as a result of the doctrine of necessity?
This doctrine, it is submitted, is a genus that has three 
possible species. The classification is tentative since 
there has never been and may never be an exhaustive and 
universally accepted exposition of the doctrine. Necessity 
may operate to overthrow the constitution; it may merely 
change without crushing the legal order by making the 
grundnorra composite instead of monistic; it may be an 
implied integral part of the constitution in which case 
the abrogation or suspension of the express provisions 
would not logically be a detraction from the constitution 
but merely a substitution by the constitution itself of 
its implied provisions for its express terms: the consti­
tution thus remains intact, the change having been effected 
by itself and on its own authority. Although the courts 
have only expounded the last, it is in fact the least 
plausible of the three, as it is proposed to show.
One may well ask what the distinction is between 
a revolution effected by force, though not necessarily 
violence, and one effected by the doctrine of necessity.
A revolutionary regime of the first type owes its efficacy
to power and is thus limited only by the limits of power•
A revolution created by the doctrine of necessity is 
correspondingly limited to the dictates flowing from 
circumstances of necessity. The latter regime exists, 
ex hypothesi, only so long as it is necessary for it to 
exist (the difficult question being who is to decide the 
period of the continuum of necessity). Though the conse­
quences of the two conditions are clear, the conditions 
themselves are not susceptible of easy identification. 
Classification must take as its guide the degree to which 
constitutional elements have been overthrown. A complete 
or nearly total overthrow of all semblance of consti­
tutionality compels the conclusion that the revolution is 
one based on naked power. But where institutions 
embodying the rule of law remain although the source of 
their authority is changed the revolution is less funda­
mental and may be regarded as one born of necessity. This 
distinction would have been rejected by Kelsen to whom 
all revolutions had the same results in law. He would 
draw no distinction between a revolution that introduced 
a regime that was prima facie permanent and one which 
introduces only a caretaker government which is merely the 
precursor of a more permanent one. Kelsen* s theory, 
though indispensable to a comprehension of the phenomenon 
of revolution, is inadequate in the sense that it sometimes 
divorces drastically the situation in fact from the 
position in law. Xt is proposed to concur in his defin­
ition of what a revolution is but his genus of revolution 
might arguably be divided into more than one species, i.e.
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into that which introduces an absolute regime of 
indefinite duration and that which merely creates one 
of limited powers and limited duration. Let us examine 
the 1688 Revolution of the United Kingdom in relation to 
the two types of revolution discussed above. The import 
of that event was canvassed by the Federal Court of 
Pakistan in Special Reference No. 1, 1955. Discussing the 
restoration of Charles XI and the abdication (if such it 
was) of James II, the Chief Justice of Pakistan observed:
Chitty in the 1820 Edition of his book, 
prerogatives of the Crown, states at p. 6 8 ,
* that the King is the first person in the 
nation..... being superior to both Houses 
in dignity and the only branch of Legislature 
that has a separate existence, and is capable 
of performing any Act at a time when the 
Parliament is not in being'.
At the same page referring to two memorable 
instances in which Parliament had assembled 
in an illegal manner, i.e. without the 
authority of the King, the reference being to 
the Parliament which restored Charles II and 
the Parliament of 1688 which disposed of the 
British Crown to William XIX, that learned 
author says, * that in both these instances the
necessity of the case rendered it necessary 
for the Parliament to meet as they did, there 
being no King to call them together and 
necessity supersedes all law.
It is thus clear that Chitty regarded the law of 
necessity as linking and legitimising events which would 
otherwise have severed all ties with their respective 
preceding legal orders and which would have been illegal 
under those orders•
2. (1955) (1) F.C.R. 439, p. 498.
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The view of Chitty is however not the only
authoritative one. There is also the opinion of
Maitland which was also quoted by the Chief Justice of
3
Pakistan. It reads as follows %
Now certainly it was very difficult for any 
lawyer to argue that tliere had not been a 
revolution. These who conducted the revo­
lution sought, and we may well say were wise 
in seeking, to make the revolution look as 
small as possible, to make it as like a legal 
proceeding as by any stretch of ingenuity it 
could be made. But to make it out to be a 
perfectly legal act seems impossible. Had it 
failed, those who attempted it would have 
suffered as traitors, and I do not think that 
any lawyer can maintain that their execution 
would have been unlawful. The convention hit 
upon the word * abdicated* as expressing 
James*s action, and, according to the estab­
lished legal reckoning, lie abdicated on 11th 
December, 1688, the day on which he dropped 
the great seal into the Thames. From that 
day until the day when William and Mary 
accepted the Crown, 13 February, 1689* there 
was no ICing of England. Possibly the convention 
would better have expressed the truth, if, like 
the parliament of Scotland, it had boldly said 
that James had forfeited the crown. But put it 
either way, it is difficult for a lawyer to 
regard the convention Parliament as a lawfully 
constituted assembly. By whom was it summoned? 
Not by a King of England, but by a Prince of 
Orange. Even if we go back three centuries we 
find no precedent. The Parliaments of 1327 and 
1399 were summoned by writs in the King1s name 
under the great seal. Grant that Parliament 
may depose King, James was not deposed by 
parliament; grant that parliament may elect a 
King, William and Mary were not elected by 
parliament. If when the convention met it was 
no parliament, its own act could not turn it 
into a parliament. The act which declares it to 
be a parliament depends for its validity of the 
Assent of William and Mary. The validity of 
that assent depends of their being King and Queen; 
but how do they come to be King and Queen?
3. (1955) (1) F.C.R. 439, p. h99.
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Maitland therefore clearly treated tlie event of 
1688 as a revolution, ridiculing the effort undertaken 
to give it a semblance of constitutional continuity. 
Adverting to the opinion of Chitty, the Chief Justice of 
Pakistan concluded:
As a matter of strict law the Convention 
Parliament not having been summoned by the 
King was not a lawful Parliament, with the 
result that William was not a king and that 
being so, the act of settlement which regu­
lated the succession to the throne was not 
a valid piece of legislation and none of the 
sovereigns who succeeded to the throne under 
the Act of Settlement was a legal sovereign 
and none of the laws to which they gave 
assent was a valid law. The only ground on 
which all that was illegal can be held to 
have been legal was, as Chitty observes, the 
necessity of the situation.
Xt is incongruous that the Chief Justice should cite 
two contrary opinions, i.e. those of Chitty and Maitland, 
and rely on Chitty to the exclusion of Maitland without 
explaining why he decided to choose one in preference to 
the other. Perhaps his reliance on Maitland, unlike his 
express adoption of Chitty1s opinion, was implied and 
limited to the extent that Maitland had demonstrated the 
impossibility of reconciling the procedural attempts to 
obtain the mark of constitutionality? with legality in 
terms of the ordinary law of the land; and that when the 
ordinary law had been exposed by Maitland to be inadequate 
in the circumstances, an extraordinary law, the law of 
necessity, was the only law that could conceivably be 
invoked to legitimise the succession of William and Mary.
(1955) (1) F.C.R. 4 3 9, p. 500.
Of course, the Chief Justice had either overlooked or 
decided against the possibility of William and Mary 
being made sovereigns under the auspices of a new legal 
order. The Chief Justice might have confused as being 
identical the terms "legality" and "legal continuity": 
the former can exist even if the latter is broken. This 
appreciation of the distinction is fundamental to the 
understanding that it is not in the least necessary to 
sustain a legal order in perpetuity, just for the sake 
of making matters legal within a territory. No legal 
order has an imprescriptible right to be eternal. If 
legality is to be identified with legal continuity then 
revolutions can never be legitimised. The proposition 
has only to be stated to be seen to be absurd.
However, assuming that Chitty is right, the 
necessity of which he spoke might not be coincident with 
that expounded by the Chief Justice. Chitty merely 
asserted that Parliament in 1689 could meet although it 
was not summoned by the lawful king. He did NOT say 
that this meant that the old order had survived. Therefore 
Chitty*s necessity could have been a doctrine which 
legitimised a revolution, this doctrine having operated 
outside the old order (and not implied in it), and 
operating as a separate source of authority after the old 
order*s demise. It was suggested earlier in this dis­
cussion that a revolution made efficacious by the doctrine 
of necessityf as distinct from one so rendered by naked 
power, confers on the new regime limited powers and
limits its duration. The Convention of January 22, 1689» 
summoned by William, then still Prince of Orange, was a 
constituent of just such a regime - the other constituent 
being William, Prince of Orange. The Convention then 
offered the Crown jointly to William and Mary who accepted 
it and the Convention then x’©solved itself into the 
Convention Parliament. This Parliament lasted only one 
year (1689-16 9 0) before it was dissolved by William and 
Mary. The Convention and the Convention Parliament were 
thus temporary instruments of the doctrine of necessity 
which subsisted between the order under James IT and that 
under William and Mary. The regime of William and Mary 
began with their first Parliament which met on March 22, 
1690 (as distinct from the Convention Parliament)• With 
the commencement of theix* first Parliament the doctrine 
of necessity expired because that Parliament was not an 
interim legal entity and its functions were not simply to 
adjust matters so as to make way for the establishment of 
a new order. The second Parliament (the first, however, 
to be summoned by the writs of William and Mary), was, 
together with William and Mary, a new legal order because 
that Parliament commenced by declaring by statute that 
William and Mary were King and Queen and that the statutes 
made by the Convention Parliament were to be valid as fi’om 
the date of their enactment• Had the new order begjm with 
the Convention Parliament, in which case the latter would 
not have been merely precursory and temporary, such a 
declaration would have been meaningless. The efficacy of
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the declaration was not challenged effectively and 
therefore that legal order's validity was thus presupposed 
in accordance with Kelsen's theory of the grundnorm, The 
1688 Revolution, if it had come about by the doctrine of 
necessity, illustrated, and could only illustrate, one 
species of that doctrine, i*e. that the doctrine operates 
from without, and does not operate from within, a legal 
order. The basis for suggesting that the doctrine of 
necessity operates from without is that no legal order 
would contemplate, and this is especially true of one 
constituted in a written document, its own contradiction 
by mere implication of law, which implication springs from 
the fact that the known laws of the order have to be 
contravened temporally, so that the order could survive.
The point we propose to make is that it is not open to 
invent a law to contradict known laws merely because the 
latter prove incompetent to govern events which have 
arisen. The solution of the problems created by a crisis 
of this nature should lie in the introduction of a new 
order which would avoid the obvious artificiality involved 
in implying new laws to sustain the old order. The new 
legal order, however, as has been observed, is transient 
and exists only so long as it is necessary for it to exist*
The second species of the doctrine (in the absence 
of decisive authority only tentatively so classified) also 
points its being extraneous to the old order but equally 
fundamentally asserts that it does not completely overthrow 
the old grundnorm but merely demotes the latter into a
constituent of* the new one* The new grundnorm is 
composite, not monistic, its two constituents being the 
old order or, more accurately, the legal entity of which 
the old order was exclusively constituted, and the doctrine 
of necessity* The two constituents are sovereign in 
their own spheres although such laws as the doctrine of 
necessity shall require, if they should conflict with 
those emanating from the other constituent sovereign, 
prevail over the latter. This must not be understood as 
according predominance in the partnership to the doctrine 
of necessity because the latter is not free to detract 
from, add to or amend its co»constituent or its laws unless 
and until there shall exist circumstances of necessity 
demanding such detraction, addition or amendment. The 
decision in I^akanmit if it is correct, can be relied upon 
to support this species of the doctrine, excepting that 
part of the decision which, incongruously, treats the 
doctrine as being implied in the 1963 constitution, i.e. 
the old order. Xn Lakanmi, Ademola C*J., said:^
Section 3(1) of the Decree No• 1 of 1966 
A does not envisage performance of legislative 
functions as a weapon for exercise of 
judicial powers, nor was it intended that 
the Federal Military Government should, in 
its power to enaict Decrees, exceed the 
requirements or demands of the necessity 
of the case.
The passage indicates that the Chief Justice thought 
that the doctrine of necessity, whose instrument the 
Military Government was, was not paramount because that
3* Supreme Court, p.33*
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doctrine required for its operation the existence of 
circumstances of necessity; whatever such, circumstances 
required could be done, whatever they did not require 
could not. Such being the position, reasoned his Lord­
ship, it would be fallacious to regard the Federal 
Military Government as a law unto itself.
The third species of the doctrine, the kind most 
favoured by judicial authority, is that rule in accordance 
with the dictates of necessity when the known or expressed 
laws of a constitution can no longex* cope with a situation, 
is ineradicably implied in, or the substratum of, every 
constitution. The purpose of this rule is that consti­
tutions will thus be able to respond to unforeseeable 
situations without having to be broken for want of remedies
thus in Special Reference No. 1 of 1955> the Chief Justice
6of Pakistan observes;
The Governor-General claims in the Proclamation 
that he has acted in the performance of a duty 
which devolves on him as Head of the State to 
prevent the State from disruption, and the pre­
liminary question that has to be considered is 
whether when we speak of rights and duties in 
the matter of preservation of States or their 
creation, foundation and dissolution, we are 
still in the field of law or in a region out of 
bounds to lawyers and courts. Having anxiously 
reflected over this problem I have come to the 
conclusion that the situation presented by the 
Reference is governed by rules which are part 
of the common law of all civilized States and 
which every written Constitution of a civilized 
people takes for granted#
6. (1955) (1) F.C.R. p. 439 , at p. 494.
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7He proceeds!
The best statement of the reason underlying the 
law of necessity is to be found in Cromwell's 
famous utterance* 'Xf nothing should be done 
but what is according to law, the throat of the 
nation might be cut while we send for someone to 
make a law1. Broom at p. 1 of the 10th Edition 
of his legal Maxims says that the phrase 
salus populi supreme lex is based on the implied 
agreement of every member of society that his own 
individual welfare shall, in cases of necessity, 
yield to that of the communityj and that his 
property, liberty, and life shall, under certain 
circumstances, be placed in jeopardy or even 
sacrificed for the public good.
Also, in Mustapha Ibrahim v. A.G. for the Republic,
8Josephides, J• said:
Faced with the non-functioning of the two superior 
courts of the land and the partial breakdown of 
the District Courts, the Government had to choose 
between two alternatives, viz. either to comply 
with the strict letter of the constitution (the 
relevant articles being unalterable under any 
condition), that is, cross its arms and do no thing 
but witness the complete paralysis of the judicial 
power, which is one of the three pillars of the 
State (vide Professor Alessi, ubi supra, at pages 
218—9) 5 or to deviate from the letter of the 
constitution, whicli had been rendered inoperative 
by the force of events (which situation could not 
be foreseen by the famous of the constitution), 
in order to do what was imperatively and inevitably 
necessary to save the judicial power temporarily 
until return to normal conditions so that the 
whole State structure may not crumble down. X have 
no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that 
in these exceptional circumstances it was the duty 
of the Government through its legislative organ, 
to take all measures which were absolutely necessary 
and indispensable for the normal and unobstructed 
administration of justice• X agree with the sub­
mission of respondent's counsel that the measures 
taken should be for the duration of the necessity 
and no more•
7. 1955 (1) F.C.R. 439, p. 495.
8 , 1964 Cyprus Law Reports, p.195, at pp. 267-268.
Xn passing, it may be queried whether the doctrine of 
necessity, in any form, contemplates in a country a con- 
dition of endemic turmoil, in view of the language 
connoting ephemerality almost invariably used in relation 
to laws associated with such a doctrine?
Also, do written constitutions which presuppose 
turmoil, for which they either expressly or impliedly 
make provision, to be a transient, if recurrent, phenomenon, 
become unsuited to, or inappropriate for states subject 
to conditions of perennial upheavals ? One should be 
able to see in a written constitution the reflection of 
the laws by which the state concerned is ordinarily governed, 
but if the state is ceaselessly riven with chaos and the 
written provisions are thus placed in almost perpetual 
abeyance, the purpose of a written constitution is 
difficult to comprehend.
But let us now revert to the main theme. It may
well be asked what practical differences exist between
9the species of the doctrine of necessity where it merely 
demotes the old order into a constituent of the new 
grundnorm, and that species of the doctrine which implies 
itself into an existing order so that even the contra­
diction or violation of that order's express provisions 
does not detract from that order's authority because the
9• It need hardly be said that the various suggested 
species of the doctrine are necessarily exclusive 
of one another, and thus can never operate 
concurrently on any one situation.
detraction from the authority of the express provisions 
is made by the authority of the order's own implied 
authority, i.e. by the doctrine of necessity. The dis­
tinction between the two species must lie in tlie fact 
that in the case where the doctrine of necessity merely 
demotes the entity or phenomenon that hitherto exclusively 
comprised the old grundnorm into being only a constituent 
of the new grundnorm, that demoted entity CANNOT again 
exclusively comprise the grundnorm once the doctrine of 
necessity expires upon the restoration of stable government 
But where the doctrine is not a phenomenon that joins a 
grundnorm by entering as an extraneous element, but is 
something inhering in a grundnorm all the time such that 
it prevails over the grundnorm's express provisions because 
and only because, it is itself an implied provision of 
the grundnorm, and it is only activated when the express 
provisions prove inadequate, do these supplanted express 
provisions revive when stability is restored such that 
they lose their inadequacy, and the doctrine loses its 
function as an alternative pattern of rules? Does the 
doctrine have to make provision for the revival of the 
superseded express terms in the grundnorm before that 
doctrine departs? Or is there another intrinsic 
implication in all apparently exhaustively written consti­
tutions to the effect that their express provisions are 
automatically to revive once the doctrine of necessity 
lapses? If all grundnorms are presumed to do their ut­
most to preserve themselves, is it not logical that they
should he taken to imply that their express provisions 
are to revive immediately upon the termination, through 
the restoration of stability, of the operation of the 
doctrine of necessity? Let us examine this with refer­
ence to the Nigerian situation. In that species of the 
doctrine of necessity where it joins a grundnorm from the 
outside and thus shares authority with the old grundnorm 
in the new constituent grundnorm, the 1963 Constitution 
would be demoted from its former exclusiveness of authority, 
but would that Constitution ascend to its former exclusive­
ness once the circumstances of necessity (e.g. political 
instability), on which alone the doctrine of necessity 
could operate, disappear? If Ademola, C.J.N., is correct 
in stating that the 1963 Constitution is only amendable 
"as the necessity arises", and that such provisions, e.g. 
those relating to the five legislatures and executives 
Linder the 1963 Constitution, are only "suspended", then 
once the constitutional emergency lapses through the 
emergence of constitutional stability, the 1963 Constitution 
will be restored, like a legal phoenix, to its former 
exclusive paramountcy, owing to the demise of its 
"partner" in power. But Ademola, C.J.N., is surely wrong. 
The 1963 Constitution has had its provisions overridden 
by an extraneous authority, i.e. the doctrine of necessity. 
The 1963 Constitution does not have the authority to 
revive that which an extraneous authority has put to death. 
The result is that the doctrine of necessity, in the case 
where it is not implicit in, but is extraneous to, a consti­
tution, does not enable that constitution to revive upon
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the doctrine's departure. That constitution, in this 
instance the 1963 Constitution, having most of its 
provisions abrogated, and being unable to revive them 
after the doctrine of necessity departs and leaves a 
vacuum, is necessarily destroyed upon the doctrine's de­
parture# The solution to this contingency lies in the 
doctrine's abdicating its authority, as well as that of 
the provisions of the 1963 Constitution that have not 
been overridden to a new constitution, but the latter, by 
definition, will not be the 1963 Constitution.
But is the result the same with that species of
the doctrine where it does not exist as an extraneous
phenomenon asserting itself into the participation of
IOauthority with a formerly exclusive grundnorm , but where, 
in contradistinction, it exists implicitly in a grundnorm. 
In this case, would the express provisions of the 1963 
Constitution, now superseded by its own implicit provision, 
i.e. the doctrine of necessity, when that implicit pro­
vision ceases to operate owing to the expiration of the 
constitutional emergency? It is submitted that in this 
species of the doctrine of necessity the express provisions 
of the 1963 Constitution do revive, because they have NOT 
been overridden by an extraneous authority but by a pro­
vision implicit in the 1963 Constitution itself. What the 
1963 Constitution has the power to abrogate, it has the 
power to revive. That Constitution's authority has not
10. i.e. when it is INTRINSIC, as distinct from 
when it is EXTRANEOUS.
been called in question by the operation of this species 
of the doctrine of necessity because the latter, being 
nothing more than an implied provision of that Consti­
tution, cannot by the mere fact of its existence and 
operation affect that Constitution's authority, because, 
ex hypothesi, that Constitution is merely exercising its 
alternative, implied pattern of rules. When the latter 
are no longer necessary, they can be put in constitutional 
cold storage, and the Constitution can activate its 
express provisions again, or such of these as have been 
overridden by the doctrine of necessity in its operation. 
However, it must be conceded that authority in this field 
being exiguous, there is no precedent to illustrate the 
revival of overridden express provisions (except in cases 
where these are overridden by other express provisions in 
the same constitution, e.g. an express emergency power, 
with which we are not concerned) upon the cessation of the 
operation of the doctrine of necessity. We await events
and the judicial response to them.
WAS THE SUPREME COURT COMPETENT TO ADJUDICATE IN 
THE LAXCANMI DECISION?
It is now proposed to digress from the field of 
substantive laws of revolution and necessity onto the 
question of the competence of municipal courts of law to 
adjudicate upon the constitutional expedients created from 
such legal upheavals•
First, let us advert to the case of revolutions 
as they are understood by Kelsen, When a legal order is
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overthrown the cataclysm should displace the judiciary 
that existed as part of the old order: one cannot des­
troy the whole without destroying the constituents of 
that whole. If so, that same judiciary cannot survive 
into the new legal order, let alone be competent to 
decide upon the validity of that new order. But even 
if, through some twist of logic, the old judiciary sur­
vives into the new legal order, can it, as part of this 
new order, meaningfully sit in judgment on tlae validity 
of this order? Can a constituent confer validity on 
the whole? If the judiciary is validly part of the 
new legal order then this presupposes a valid legal order 
of which it could be a part, in which event the judiciary 
will not be in a position to pronounce on the validity 
of that phenomenon without whose existence it, the 
judiciary, would not have any existence at allj and that 
phenomenon with whose existence any pronouncement of the 
judiciary affirming the same Ttfould be unavoidably otiose.
It is suggested that a municipal court cannot logically 
pronounce on the validity of a legal order because it is 
never detachable from, but always part of, a municipal 
legal order, which order should be a matter for presuppos­
ition rather than pronouncement.
Much the same point was made by the Attorney-General
for Uganda in the case of Uganda v. Commissioner of Prisons f
11ex parte Matovu. The Chief Justice of Uganda, in
11. (1966) E,A. 514.
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regard to the point made by the Attorney-General,
12paraphrased it thuss
The learned Attorney-General then submitted 
that, although he would concede to the court 
as a Court of* Record the right to raise any 
question relevant to the issues in controversy 
between the parties, he felt that in the 
matter of the kind under enquiry, the court 
was not competent to enquire into the validity 
of the Constitution on three grounds, namely;
1. That since the issues framed and 
referred to the court and the 
application and the affidavits filed 
by the applicant were based on the 
validity of the Constitution, it was 
not competent for the court to go 
behind those issues and the application, 
the validity of the Constitution not 
being one such issue; 13
2* That as judge© of the High Court of 
Uganda, the court was precluded from 
enquiring into the legal validity of 
the Constitution by reason of their 
judicial oath; and
3. That the court had no jurisdiction to 
enquire into the validity of the 
Constitution because the making of a 
Constitution is a political act and 
outside the scop© of the functions of 
the court•
3(a). Alternatively, counsel also submitted 
tliat the court was bound to declare the 
Constitution valid, if it should undertake 
to enquire into its validity, because the 
Constitution was the product of a 
successful revolution.
But even if it were possible to reason on the 
assumption that it was not illogical for a Municipal court 
to pronounce on the validity of Municipal legal orders, the
12. (1966) ID.A. 51^, P. 527.
1 3* 'fhe underlining is mine.
further Issue arises whether the judiciary, being only 
one arm of government, should be placed in the ascendant 
by its being treated as competent to decide on the 
efficacy of the entire edifice of government. Xt is not 
easy to accept the suggestion that no revolution can be 
efficacious unless it receives the approval of that handful 
of men who at the crucial moment happens to constitute the 
court seised of the issue relating to the efficacy of 
the legal order. To acquiesce in the idea would be 
tantamount to saying that no legal order could be supplanted 
unless the supersession was one to which the judiciary 
would subscribe by way of a favourable decision. Accept­
ance of this status for the judiciary would also result 
in it being possible for the judiciary together with only 
one other arm of government to combine in effecting a 
revolution without the concurrence of the third. The 
judiciary would thus enjoy a constitutional elevation 
from which the other two arms of government are excluded.
It is more plausible to regard a revolution as efficacious 
if the organisers are strong enough to impose their dic­
tates and it is irrelevant which organ of government insti­
gates it or even if the revolution stems otherwise than 
from an organ of government. Very often this is the 
case and the opinion of the judiciary in purported confirm­
ation of a revolution, though imparting a semblance of 
legality, does not contribute to the efficacy of a legal 
order.
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Is the judiciary an appropriate arbiter in 
assessing the validity of actions taken by the executive 
or legislature in situations where the constitution is 
not overthrown but sustained by that notion of the doc­
trine of necessity most favoured by judges? (incident­
ally the partiality of the judiciary to a non-revolutionary 
concept of the doctrine of necessity may be suspected to 
stem from their desire to avoid involving their own status 
in the broils of constitutionality. Their own standing 
can still, however, be brought in issue where their 
identity is questioned, e.g. in Cyprus.) Are judges 
the best informed of people? Do they have easy access 
to facts without which their views of the situation to 
which the measures taken must be related would be incom­
plete? Besides even if the possession of vital information 
were not denied to the judiciary, the judicial process 
does not conduce to the expedition which emergencies 
usually require. The constant challenge to executive 
or legislative measures would hinder the steps essential 
to the restoration of normality or at least to the main­
tenance of law and order. The doctrine of necessity 
ordains all that is necessary and the broadness of this 
dictate would be lost sight of were it not to be regarded 
as inclusive of the possibility that it may be necessary 
to pass unnecessary measures if to do so would ensure the 
implementation of necessary measures. In fine, all 
executive or legislative measures born of an emergency 
should be presumed valid simply because the detection of 
non-essential provisions is not worth the delay thus
caused to essential provisions. Xn fact, violence 
would foe done to the doctrine if essential measures were 
exposed to the delay consequent upon judicial scrutiny.
It is necessary for necessary measures to foe free from 
unnecessary delay, even if the swiftness of legislation 
this involves may result in the passing of a host of 
unnecessary measures. That this is so can be illustrated. 
Let it be assumed that only twenty out of one hundred 
measures are necessary. Judicial review would strike 
down eighty. But the time involved in this detection 
would militate against speed when speed would be required 
to prevent chaos. It would therefore he better to dis­
pense with judicial review to allow all the one hundred 
measures to go through and thus ensure the early and 
effective operation of the twenty necessary measures, 
than to involve them all in litigation and delay the 
operation of the twenty necessary measures which would 
then have to undergo judicial scrutiny and obtain judicial 
approval. The period of the delay involved in judicial 
review argues against the retention of an independent 
judicial power in situations which are desperate enough 
to summon the doctrine of necessity. Furthermore, there 
is nothing known of the doctrine which excludes its 
operation from suspending the judiciary's own power of 
review. In Lakanmi the Supreme Court maintained that 
the right of the judiciary to review legislation had not 
been affected by the accession of the Military Government• 
Their Lordships apparently thought it too apodeictic a
point to require elaboration: we are thus deliberately 
left unenlightened as to why the Military Government1 a 
exclusion of judicial review of its decrees was thought 
unnecessary and therefore failed to qualify for validity 
under the doctrine. This judicial omission appears 
more pointedly intriguing in view of the court's readi­
ness to concede, albeit only impliedly, the necessity 
for the supersession of the federal and state legis­
latures and executives. It is true that the judiciary 
has to decide whether or not the doctrine of state 
necessity can be invoked by those who wield the executive 
function which is by its nature expeditious in operation. 
But once the judiciary has decided that the doctrine 
should be invoked, thereat its function in this respect 
expires. The invocation of the doctrine is a confession 
of threatened or actual instability: once instability is 
acknowledged it is perilous to concede to the judiciary 
an absolute right of veto on all acts of government, as 
will necessarily be the case if the judiciary can strike 
down any instrument of government for being "unnecessary”.
Another point that arises out of Lakanmi is that 
the coup in July did not affect the nature of the legal 
order, according to the court, though the point is only 
made sub silentio. This inference has been drawn because 
although the Decree No. 45 was passed after the July coup 
the court discussed the said decree exclusively with 
reference to the constitutional changes precipitated by the
January coup. The vital question should therefore he 
asked, whether the coup in July was rightly treated as 
of no constitutional significance* The question is 
vital because on it centres the resolution of the issue 
of whether in May, 1967* Eastern Nigeria had seceded 
from or had merely refused to accede to the rest of 
Nigeria. If the July coup had split Nigeria into two 
distinct legal orders, then the territory known as 
Eastern Nigeria cannot be regarded as having subsequently 
seceded from Nigeria: secession on the relevant date
could only be plausible if the July coup had not affected 
the territorial integrity of Nigeria*
Let us assess the case for the continued terri­
torial integrity of Nigeria notwithstanding the coup of 
July, 1 9 6 6. The paramount governing body in Nigeria 
since the coup in January has been the Supreme Military 
Council. The coup in July had resulted in the death 
of two members of that Council, viz., the Chairman,
General Irons! and the Governor of the Western Group of 
Provinces, Lt.-Col* Fajuyi. The two deaths could not 
have destroyed the Council. The Council was not dissolved 
merely because its Chairman and another member died - 
whatever might have been the cause of their deaths. If 
the Council could be so liquidated it would mean that 
the paramount governing body of Nigeria was absurdly 
fragile in that its existence was to be collateral with 
the lives of two men (ironsi and Fajuyi). There is 
nothing in Decree No, 1, 19 6 6, which defined the Supreme
Military Council, to suggest that any of its members 
were legally indispensable to the viability of the 
Council. It is true that the new Chairman of the 
Council (assuming its continued existence) was not 
unanimously voted in by its remaining members, but 
Decree No. 1 does not even allude to the procedure for 
the election of a new Chairman (or to the possibility 
of the first Chairman being replaced). There is there­
fore nothing to suggest that the election of a new 
Chairman had to be on a unanimous vote of the members. 
Bearing this in mind, the conclusion is reached tliat 
Lt.-Col• Gowon1s election was not irregular. That being 
so, illegality lay on the head of those who refused to 
acknowledge his accession and proceeded to defy the 
authority of that body of which Lt,-Col• Gowon was 
Chairman. The nature of the Council, as defined in 
Decree No. 1, had not changed. In his assumption of
14office on August 1, 19 6 6 , Lt .-Col. Gowon said:
I have been brought to the position today of 
having to shoulder the great responsibilities 
of this country and the armed forces with the 
consent of the majority of the members of the 
Supreme Military Council as a result of the 
unfortunate incident that occurred* on the early
morning of 29th July 1966........... .....
I intend to continue the policy laid down in 
the statement by the Supreme Commander on 16th 
January 1966 published on 26th January 1966.
Clearly, Lt.-Col, Gowon did not hold himself out 
as or even encourage the belief that he was, the acme of
14. Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria (vol. 1) by A.H.M. 
Kirk-Greene, Doc. No. 371 P* 196,
a new constitutional structure, He regarded himself' 
as the successor to General Ironsi, a succession to 
which no obstruction in law can be found.
However, Lt.-Col. Gowon1s speech was not treated 
by the Governor of the Eastern Group of Provinces, Lt.- 
Col. 0jukwu, as a speech of accession. On the same 
day as the new Chairman broadcast his speech, Lt.-Col.
15Ojukwu made a broadcast from Enugu, part of which reads s
I have further conveyed to the Chief of 
Staff Supreme Headquarters, my fellow 
Military Governors and the Chief of Staff 
Army Headquarters, my tinderstanding that 
the only intention of the announcement 
made by the Chief of Staff Army Headquarters 
today16 is the restoration of peace in 
the country whilst immediate negotiations 
are begun to allow the people of Nigeria 
to determine the form of their future 
association.
From this it is evident that the Eastern Governor 
no longer regarded the relationship between the centre 
and the groups of provinces as not having been changed by 
the July coup but that it had become a kind of loose 
association the nature of which was yet to be decided 
through negotiation.
He also challenged the propriety of Lt.-Col.
Gowon1s assumption of office, in the same speech:
.......  the Chief of Staff, Supreme Head­
quarters , Brigadier Ogundipe as the
next most senior officer, in the absence of
15• Kirk-Greene, Doc• 3 8 , pp. 198-199•
16. Lt.-Col• Gowon * s speech of accession.
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the Supreme Commander, should have 
assumed command of the Army*••••••
To the assertion just quoted it may he retorted 
that the Supreme Military Council would have been within 
its rights had it seen fit to appoint even a sergeant as 
Supreme Commander.
Another difficulty that emerges from the subsequent 
recriminations between the Centre and the Eastern Region 
is the nature of the objection which Lt.-Col. Ojukwu 
raised against his antagonists at the Centre. Did he 
object to the authority of the Supreme Military Council 
as such or only to the validity of Lt.-Col. Gowon's 
position as Chairman? That the gravamen was founded on
the latter is manifest from what he said to Lt•Col• Gowon
17 18on the first day of the Aburi discussionss
How can you ride above people1s heads and 
sit in Lagos merely because you are at the 
Head of a Group who have their fingers 
poised on the trigger? If you do it you 
remain forever a living example of that 
indiscipline which we want to get rid of 
because tomorrow a Corporal will think 
because he has his finger on the trigger 
he could just take over the company the 
company Commanding the company and so on.
I knew then that we were heading for some­
thing terrible• Despite that and by force 
of circumstances as we did talk on the 
telephone I think twice, you brought up 
the question of Supreme Command and I made 
quite plain my objections, but despite 
those objections you announced yourself as 
the Supreme Commander• Now, Supreme 
Commander by virtue of the fact that you 
head or that you are acceptable to people 
who had mutinied against their Commander, 
kidnapped him and taken him away? By virtue
17* This was a meeting of Nigeria's military leaders in
Ghana in their effort to resolve the crisis precipi­
tated by the coup in July, 19 6 6 •
16. Kirk-Greene, Doc. 81, p. 321, at pp. 324-325*
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of tlie support of Officers and men who had 
in the dead of niglit murdered their brother 
officers, by virtue of the fact that you 
stood at the head of a group who had turned 
their brother officers from the Eastern 
Region out of the barracks which they shared? 
Our people came home, there are circumstances 
which even make the return more tragic* 
Immediately after I had the opportunity to 
speak to you again, I said on that occasion 
that there had been too much killing in 
Nigeria and it was my sincere hope that we 
can stop these killings. I said then, and 
have continued to say that in the interest of 
peace I would co-operate with you to stop the 
killing but I would not recognise.
I would not recognise because I said we have 
a Supreme Commander who is missing. I would 
not recognise and to underline the validity 
of that claim of mine you appointed another 
Officer, be he senior to you, Acting Governor 
in the West, presumably acting for the Governor 
who was then abducted and that 1 saw no reason 
why your position would not then be acting.
From there I think we started parting our ways 
because it was clear that the hold on Lagos 
was by fox^ ce of conquest. Now, these things do 
happen in the world, we are all Military 
Officers. If an Officer is dead..... we drop 
the national flag on him, we give him due 
honours and that is all. The next person steps 
in. Bo, the actual fact in itself is a small 
thing with Military men but hierarchy, order 
is very important, discipline are sine qua non 
for any organisation which prides itself for 
being called an Army. So, the mutiny had 
occurred, the mutineers seemed in control of 
the North, the West, Lagos• By international 
standards when that does happen then a de 
facto situation is created immediately where 
whoever is in a position gets a de facto 
recognition himself in a position over the 
area he controls. In this situation, Nigeria 
resolved itself into three areas• The Lagos, 
West and North group, the Mid-West, the East. 
What should have been done is for us to get 
round to discuss the future, how to carry on 
in the absence of our Supreme Commander.
From the extract quoted it is obvious that Lt.- 
Col. Ojukwu was adamant in his assertion that Lt.-Col. 
Gowon was neither the Supreme Commander nor Chairman of 
the Supreme Military Council. However, by speaking of 
General Ironsi as their Supreme Commander, Lt.-Col.
Ojukwu unavoidably acknowledged the continued existence 
of the Supreme Military Council. When Lt.-Col. Ojukwu 
spoke of the July coup as having divided the Army 
Command into three areas of control it was a soldier1s 
way of stating that since the Supreme Military Council 
had been suspended pending the election of a new Chairman, 
who would also be Supreme Commander, the supreme command 
of the army was in abeyance and therefore the only form 
of control conceivable was that of de facto command.
Also evident from the extract quoted is his desire to 
resolve this de facto impasse into a de jure hierarchy 
of command through the negotiations at Aburi.
That the East had not seceded from Nigeria is
19clear from the following exchanges
Lt.-Col* Hassan (Governor of the North), speaking
to Lt.—Col. Ojukwus
......you command the East, if you want to
come into Nigeria come into Nigeria and that 
is that.
To which Lt.-Col. Ojukwu replied tersely:
I am not out.
If Lt.-Col. Ojukwu did not regard the East as 
having seceded from Nigeria consequent on the July coup,
19* Kirk-Greene, Doc. 81, p. 321, at p. 327.
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then his opposition to the dictates of the Supreme 
Military Council was illegal, an illegality avoidable 
only on the ground of secession# This is so because 
of the combined effect of his double admission (extracted 
inforentially) that the Supreme Military Council (as 
distinct from the Cowon regime - a distinction he im­
plicitly draws) which governed the whole of Nigeria was 
still existing and that the East was still part of 
Nigeria in the sense that it had not seceded, though 
not in the sense that the East was still as closely 
associated with the centre as it had been before the coup 
in July. Even if General Irons! was alive at the time, 
Lt.-Col. Gowon was acknowledged as the new Supreme 
Commander, the appointment would not have been vitiated
thereby because a decision of the Supreme Military Council
20did not require the Concurrence of the Supreme Commander. 
Decree No. 1 does not say that the incumbent of the 
Chairmanship of the Council has to be expressly displaced 
before his successor can be appointed. The Council * s 
appointment of a successor automatically removes the 
former incumbent, otherwise the absurd conclusion will be 
forced of the Chairman being only removable with his own 
consent•
20, S. 8(4) Decree No. 1966 s
Each of the Councils established by this section 
may regulate its own procedure and, subject to its 
rules of procedure, may act notwithstanding any 
vacancy in its memberships or the absence of any 
member•
The Councils mentioned are the Supreme Military 
Council and tiie Supreme Military Council and the 
Federal Executive Council •
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Although the fact must not be lost sight of
that Lt.-Col* Ojukwu liad advocated a loose confederation 
21at Aburi , that fact cannot vitiate the paramountcy of 
the Supreme Military Council that assembled at Aburi 
because by the very act of submitting his proposal to 
and urging its acceptance by the Council Lt.-Col. Ojukwu 
implicitly conceded the Council's right to alter the form 
or structure of Government in Nigeria, a right that would 
not have been the Council's to possess and exercise if it 
had not been the paramount authority in Nigeria.
The conclusion is therefore arrived at of the 
illegality, in terms of the authority of the Supreme 
Military Council of which Lt.-Col* Ojukwu was a member, 
of the act of secession which Lt.-Col. Ojukwu on behalf 
of Eastern Nigeria, committed on May 30, 1967*
APPENDIX
The Supreme Military Council purported to reverse 
the Lakanmi decision by passing Decree No. 28, 1 9 7 0. This 
decree is otiose irrespective of whether that decision is 
right or wrong. If it is right then obviously Decree No•
28 can have no validity because the rightness of that 
decision means precisely that Decree No. 28 is not entitled 
to claim that the court is not right. If the decision 
has been wrongly arrived at, then the decree serves no 
purpose because it merely repeats what Decree No• 1, 1 9 6 6,
21. Kirk-Greene, Doc. 81, p. 321, at pp. 33^-335•
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had already claimed .for the Federal Military Government •
This Decree, its logical superfluity notwithstanding,
must be treated as important because two learned authors
22have felt able to acquiesce in its claims• Mr. Ojo
expresses his satisfaction with the conclusiveness of
23the Decree, thus:
Happily, the present writer is saved the 
bother of writing a conclusion to this 
brief review. As legitimately expected, 
the Federal Military Government, whose 
legislative competence or rather (as some 
would say) whose legality has been 
challenged by the Supreme Court pronounce- 
ment, reasserted itself by restating what 
in our view is obvious, that is, its right 
to unfettered and unlimited legislative 
competence.
It is to be noticed that the entire process of 
assertion by Decree No. 28, 1970, is founded on the 
belief that that Decree has the authority to assert what 
it asserts. The Decree is plainly circuitous in that 
it can only have the authority to assert what it asserts 
if what it asserts is efficacious in law and what it 
asserts can only be so efficacious if it has the authority 
so to assert. The Decree cannot overturn the court1s 
decision if the court is right in its opinion that 
judicial power of review exists in Nigeria. But if the 
court's conclusion is wrong, it can only be so as being
22. See Abiola Ojo? (1971) I.C.E.Q. 117, p. 13^. Also, 
T.O. Elias; (1971) The Nigerian Daw Journal 129, 
pp. 140-131.
23. Ojo, op.cit., 134.
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contrary to Decree No. 1, 1966, and to Decree No. 28, 
1 9 7 0, because the latter does not lay a larger claim 
to authority than the former has already done.
To illustrate the circuity of Decree No. 28, 1970,
24the latter will be quoted in full. Xt reads:
WHEREAS the military revolution which took 
place on January 15, 1966, and which was 
followed by another on July 29, 1966, 
effectively abrogated the whole pre-existing 
legal order in Nigeria except what has been 
preserved under the Constitution (Suspension 
and Modification) Decree 1966 ( 1 9 6 6 No. 1):
AND WHEREAS each military revolution involved 
an abrupt political change which was not 
within tlie contemplation of the Constitution 
of the Federation 1963 (hereafter referred 
to as 'the Constitution of 19631)s
AND WHEREAS by the Constitution (Suspension 
and Modification) Decree (1966 No, 1) there 
was established a new government known as 
the 'Federal Military Government' with 
absolute powers to make laws for the peace, 
order and good government of Nigeria or any 
part thereof with respect to any matter 
whatsoever and, in exercise of the said 
powers, the said Federal Military Government 
permitted certain provisions of the said 
Constitution of 1963 to remain in operation 
as supplementary to the said Decrees
AND WHEREAS by section 6 of the said Consti­
tution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 
1966, no question as to the validity of any 
Decree or any Edict (in so far as by section 
3(4) thereof the provisions of the Edict are 
not inconsistent with the provisions of a 
Decree) shall be entertained by any court of 
law in Nigeria:1 25
24, Decree No. 28, 1970.
25* Since Decree No. 1, 19 6 6 , has already made an
identical assertion, is not Decree No. 28, 1970, 
guilty of repetition? Xf the Supreme Court could 
ignore Decree No. 1, 1966, surely the same treatment 
might await Decree No. 28, 1970. Authority is not 
the child of Repetition.
1^9-
AND WHEREAS by Schedule 2 of* the said 
Constitution (Suspension and Modification) 
Decree 1966 the provisions of a Decree 
shall prevail over those of the unsuppressed 
provisions of the said Constitution of 1963s
NOW THEREFORE THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
hereby decrees as follows
1# - (1 ) The preamble hereto is hereby 
affirmed and declared as forming part of 
this Decree,
(2 ) It is hereby declared also that -
(a) for the efficacy and stability of 
the government of the Federation; and
(b) with a view to assuring the 
effective maintenance of the territorial 
integrity of Nigeria and the peace, order 
and good government of the Federation,
any decision, whether made before or 
after the commencement of this Decree, by 
any court of law in the exercise or purported 
exercise of any powers under the Constitution 
or any enactment or law of the Federation 
or of any State which has purported to declare 
or shall hereafter purport to declare the 
invalidity of any Decree or of any Edict (in 
so far as the provisions of the Edict are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of a Decree) 
or the incompetence of any of the governments 
in the Federation to make the same is or shall 
be null and void and of no effect whatsoever 
as from the date of the making thereof# 26
26, If there is no authority on the part of the Federal 
Military Government to enact this provision, such 
authority cannot be acquired by a provision 
purporting to assert possession of this authority. 
Furthermore, the Preamble to the Decree is no less 
an exercise in fatuity. If the coups in January 
and July, 19 6 6 , were not revolutions in law, how 
could a mere assertion in a Decree make them so?
The assertion is only valid if what the Preamble 
states is correct but the Preamble (even as part of 
the Decree) cannot of itself invest its own 
assertion with correctness•
(3) In this Decree -
(a) 1 decision' includes judgment, decree 
or order of any court of law, and
(b) the reference to any Decree or Edict 
includes a reference to any instrument 
made by or under such Decree or Edict.
2* This Decree may be cited as the Federal 
Military Government (Supremacy and 
Enforcement of Powers) Decree 1970 and 
shall apply throughout the Federation.
MADE at Lagos, this 9th day of May, 1970.
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PART XII
CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA
CHAPTER 5 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
A. THE 1923 CONSTITUTION
Soutliern Rhodesia was annexed as a British Colony
on July 30, 1923. A constitution was provided Tor it by
Letters Patent in the same year* The constitution* s
preamble gave a succinct recitation of events leading to
the establishment of "Responsible Government" in Southern
1
Rhodesia. The preamble read as follows?
Whereas by the Southern Rhodesia Order in 
Council, I8 9 8 , as added to, altered or 
amended by divers further Orders in Council, 
provision was made for the administration 
of the government of certain territories 
of Africa under ©ur protection and known as 
Southern Rhodesias
And whea’eas by an Order in Our Privy Council 
bearing date the 30th day of July, 1923? 
and known as the Southern Rhodesia (Annex­
ation) Order in Council, 1923* it is 
provided that the territories within the 
limits of the Southern Rhodesia Order in 
Council, 1898, and known as Southern Rhodesia, 
shall, from and after the coming into oper­
ation of the said Order, be annexed to and 
form part of Our Dominions, and shall be  ^
known as the Colony of Southern Rhodesia s
1. Letters Patent (Southern Rhodesia Constitution),
given on August 25> 1923 J published October 1, 1923*
2, My own underlining.
And whereas We are minded to provide for 
the establishment of Responsible Government, 
subject to certain limitations hereinafter 
set forth, in Our said Colony?....
This constittition granted to the colony a Legis- 
3lative Assembly* This Assembly was constituted of
4thirty members, all of whom xvere elected. The general 
power of the Legislative (i.e. the Legislative Assembly
G£
and the Governor) was expressed in the following manners
It shall be lawful for Us and Our successors, 
by and with the advice and consent of the 
Legislature,® subject to the provisions of 
these Our Letters Patent, to make all Laws, 
to be entitled * Acts *, which shall be required 
for the peace, order and good government of 
the Colonys....
The legislature was empowered to amend most of the 
constitutional provisions; however, the power of amendment 
could only be exercised by it if a two-thirds majority vote
j
of all the members of the Legislative Assembly was obtained.
The authority to amend the 1923 Constitution was denied to
Sthe Legislature in respect of those sections relating to 
the Governor * s right to reserve Bills, to Native Adminis­
tration, and to the salary of the Governor•
3» S. 3 of the 1923 Constitution.
4, S. 3 of the 1923 Constitution.
5• S. 26(l) of the 1923 Constitution.
6. The correct terminology would have been
"Legislative Assembly" because the Sovereign was 
part of the "Legislature" itself.
7. Second proviso to S. 26(2) of the Southern Rhodesia 
Constitution.
8. S. 26(2) of the 1923 Constitution.
Notwithstanding any power that the Legislative
Assembly might have, the Governor was empowered, if* he
should receive Royal Instructions directing him to do so,
to reserve for the consideration of the Crown any Bill
whatsoever with which the Legislative Assembly might 
9present him* Even where the Crown did not instruct the 
Governor to reserve a Bill, he was enjoined by the Consti­
tution to reserve Bills which discriminated against the 
10natives as well as those which, when enacted, would have
11the effect of amending the Constitution. There were
also minor items of legislation where reservation was
12mandatory on the Governor. The Crown had an absolute
power to disallow, within one year of the Governor1s 
13 1 hassent , any law enacted in the Colony.
This state of affairs persisted until 1953 when
Southern Rhodesia became a constituent Territory of the
"1Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Xt is not proposed
9* S. 28, 1923 Constitution.
10. S. 28(a), 1923 Constitution.
11. S. 28(b), 1923 Constitution*
12. S. 18(d), (e), 1923 Constitution.
13* This would exclude those Bills reserved, and assented, 
to by the Crown.
14. S. 31, 1923 Constitution.
15* The Federation was created under the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Constitution) Order in 
Council (1953)5 S. 1 1953, No. 1199. The Order in 
Council was made under the Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
(Federation) Act, 19531 1 & 2 Eliz. IX, c. 30.
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to comment on the Federation because tbere was no change 
by this act in the status of4 Southern Rhodesia in relation 
to the United Kingdom. The Federation was dissolved in 
December, 19^3» and the territory of1 Southern Rhodesia 
reverted to the status in the constitutional spectrum it 
had enjoyed before joining the Federation. One important
difference was that Southern Rhodesia*s status, in relation 
to the United Kingdom, had in the meantime been enhanced 
by the 1961 Constitution which came into effect towards 
the end of 1$62, although the territory remained essentially 
a self“governing colony.
B * the 1961 CONSTITUTION
(i) GENERAL
The Constitutional status enjoyed by Southern
Rhodesia since 1923 was described in CMND. 1399 (Southern
Rhodesia Constitutions Part I - Summary of Proposed Changes
1 9 6 1) at page 3 as follows?
The Constitution of 1923 conferred responsible 
government on Southern Rhodesia. Since then 
it has become an established convention for 
Parliament at Westminster, not to legislate for 
Southern Rhodesia on matters within the competence 
of the Legislature Assembly of Southern Rhodesia, 
except with the agreement of the Southern Rhodesia 
Government•
16. The Federation was dissolved by The Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Dissolution) Order in Council 
(1 9 6 3)? S. 1 19 6 3 ? No. 2 0 8 5. The Order in Council 
was made under the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act (1 9 6 3): 
11 & 12 Eli-s. IX? c. 34.
17. S. 1 1961, No. 2314.
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In 1959. the Southern Rhodesia Government 
proposed to the United Kingdom Government 
that the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 
should he revised, with a view to trans­
ferring to Southern Rhodesia the exercise 
of the powers vested in the United Kingdom 
Government•
The proposed new Constitution, which is 
based on the conclusions of the Conference, 
will reproduce many of the provisions of 
the existing Constitution. It will eliminate 
all the reserved powers at present vested in 
the Government of the United Kingdom, save 
for certain matters set out in paragraph 50 ;
and it will confer upon Southern Rhodesia wide 
powers for the amendment of her own Constitution. 
It will also contain a number of important 
additional features, such as a Declaration 
of Rights and the creation of a Constitutional 
Council, designed to give confidence to all 
the people of Southern Rhodesia that their 
legitimate interests will be safeguarded.
Certain points merit observation. The statement 
spoke of responsible government having been granted in 1923 
and of a convention not to legislate on matters within the 
competence of the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly 
"since then”. There is no quarrel with "then” being
18. Paragraph 50 reads:
"Under the new proposals, Southern Rhodesia will be 
free to make amendments to any sections of the 
Constitution without reference to the United Kingdom, 
with the exception of amendments which would affect:
(a) the position of the Sovereign and the Governor;
(b) the right of the United Kingdom Government to 
safeguard the position regarding:
(i) international obligations;
(ii) undertakings given by the government of 
Southern! Rhodesia in respect of loans 
under the Colonial Stock Acts."
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identified with 19^3• But what does "since 1923" mean?
The word "since" in that phrase is obviously used as a 
preposition, but the Oxford English Dictionary gives two 
meanings for that preposition:
1. Even or continuously from (a specified 
time, etc.) till now.
2. During the period between (a specified 
time) and now; at some time subsequent 
to or after.
It is thus seen that if the first meaning is used 
the convention was established in 1923. If the second 
meaning was what the United Kingdom had in mind then the 
convention developed some time between 1923 and the date 
of the statement (viz. 1 9 6 1). If the convention was 
created with imminent propinquity to 1961 the status of 
Southern Rhodesia before the 1961 donstitution would of 
course not measure to the elevation which it would claim 
had the convention been established from 1923* One is left 
to speculate on whether the equivocality of expression was 
due to inadvertence. If the United Kingdom Government 
had desired to express that the convention dated from 1923 
it could have employed the unmistakable "It then became an 
established convention" instead of the ambiguous "Since 
then it has become an established convention". It is 
however incontestable that whichever meaning be ascribed to 
"since then" no United Kingdom Government had mentioned the 
existence of such a convention prior to 19 6 1. The concept 
of constitutional conventions was by no means embryonic or 
arcane in 1923 and it is intriguing why, if it had been
established in 1 9 2 3> it was never officially acknowledged 
until thirty-eight years after its creation, not forgetting 
its crucial significance in regard to the territory’s 
status along the spectrum that spans the stages of consti­
tutional metamorphosis.
Another point that attracts attention is that al­
though the British Parliament is not to trench upon the 
competence of the legislative Assembly except with consent, 
the consent necessary is not required of the Assembly but 
of tlae Government. This confers on the Government a 
right to surrender the exclusive competence of the Assembly - 
assuming the efficacy of the convention.
A minor observation to be made is that "the compe­
tence of the Legislative Assembly” should have read ”the 
competence of the Legislature" because the Legislative 
Assembly, of itself, has no power to legislate.
Attention is drawn to another passage in the state­
ment s
Xn 1959» the Southern Rhodesia Government 
proposed to the United Kingdom Government 
that the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 
should be revised, with a view to trans­
ferring to Southern Rhodesia the exercise 
of the powers vested in the United Kingdom 
Government• 19
This expression of the request suggests that Southern 
Rhodesia either desired independence under a new constitution
19. CMND* 1399, p. 3.
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or that it desired at least the granting of a constitution 
capable of providing a basis for a future independence 
constitution. Any suggestion that seeks to refute Southern 
Rhodesia’s wishing to associate independence with the pro­
posed new constitution, cannot survive the unambiguous 
terms on which the new constitution was requested, namely, 
that the request was made "with a view to transferring to 
Southern Rhodesia the exercise of the powers vested in the 
United Kingdom Government." Xf the Southern Rhodesia 
Government had desired a status for Southern Rhodesia less 
than that of an independent or imminently independent state 
it would not have initiated the negotiation on the under­
standing that it was with a view to the transmission of 
plenary authority to the territory. This must also have 
meant that Southern Rhodesia would withdraw from the Central 
African Federation since the possession of exclusive plenary 
powers would have been incompatible with its then status 
as a region in the federation. The White Paper (CMND•1399) 
is made ambiguous by an unwarranted omission regarding the 
Southern Rhodesia Government’s view that the new consti­
tution should embody a translation of governing authority. 
The United Kingdom Government did not indicate in the White 
Paper whether or not the Sotithern Rhodesia Government ’ s 
view was acceptable• The transfer in the Southern 
Rhodesia Government’s view, as stated by the United Kingdom 
Government, related to "the powers vested in the United 
Kingdom Government," The powers requested to be trans­
mitted were specified by the definitive article "the" and
were not made subject to any exceptions. The powers in
Tact granted were qualified with United Kingdom reserve
authority and the right of disallowance to certain minor
20categories of legislation. Because of the difference
between the unqualified nature of the request and the 
qualified granting of the request it is difficult to dis­
cover whether the United Kingdom Government shared the 
desire that the constitution granted should be the basis 
of the independence constitution. Can this discrepancy 
between the powers requested and the powers granted be 
taken as indicative of the United Kingdom Government's 
dissent from the view that the constitution granted was 
given on the undex* standing that it should form the found­
ation for an independence constitution to come in the near 
future?
That the United Kingdom Government had no intention 
of granting the 1961 constitution on the understanding that 
it was to constitute the basis for the independence of 
Southern Rhodesia, was made clear in the House of Commons, 
although not in the form of a refutation, by the Secretary 
of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Duncan Sandys, on 
November 1,5, 1963.. Mr. Sandys had s a i d 1
20. S. 1 No. 2314 (196i)s ss. 111 and 3 2 .
21. Hansard, House of Commons, Vol. 684, col. 5 8 5 • It is 
regretted that in the period 1961-1 9 6 2, no indication 
was given as to whether or not the 1961 Constitution 
was to be granted as the basis for a future independence 
constitution. In retrospect the silence, though perhaps 
not inadvertent, has proved inconvenient in the ascertain­
ment of the United Kingdom Government1s intention at the 
time.
We have made it clear that we are prepared 
to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia 
in the same circumstances*^ as we have 
granted it to other British territories•
Xn particular, we look for a widening of 
the franchise !^T~so^  as to give greater repre­
sentation to the Africans who constitute nine- 
tenths of the population, hut have less than 
a quarter of the seats in Parliament.
A related issue, touched on earlier, is the 
convention of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
Southern Rhodesia which, though conceded by the United 
Kingdom to exist, has not been particularly well defined 
by the latter both as regards its scope and the time of 
its recognition. It is a pity that even the spokesmen 
for the Government of the day in the two Houses of Parlia­
ment have not achieved any measure of consistency on this 
matter• On November 8, 19 6 1, a spokesman for the 
Government, Mr. Braine, speaking of the prospect of amend­
ing or replacing the 1961 Constitution (referred to by the
24spokesman as "a new Constitution"), stated s
If after a new Constitution were granted it 
was desired to amend it in a way not 
authorised by the Order in Council, a further 
Act of our Parliament would be necessary. 
There would, of course, be no question of 
the British Government asking Parliament to 
legislate in a situation like that without 
the agreement of the Southern Rhodesia 
Government, That follows a convention 
clearly set out in the introduction to the
22. My own underlining.
23. My own underlining.
24. Hansard, House of Commons, Vol. 648, cols. 
1049-1050.
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White PaperCmnd, 1399^“* which the House 
debated in June#
Much in the same vein was a statement made by Mr*
R*A. Butler (the Home Secretary) on May 8, 1962. Mr.
?6Butler opined:
•..The British Government cannot by themselves 
introduce a new constitution Tor Southern 
Rhodesia, nor can they set aside the 1961 
Constitution. This would be contrary to the 
convention, which has operated Tor nearly 
Torty years, oT^ion-interTerence in the 
internal aTTairs oT Southern Rhodesia.
The length oT time Tor which Mr. Butler alleged 
the convention to have existed will be discussed later.
For the moment it is proposed to examine what is meant by 
the word "cannot" as used by Mr. Butler in the opening 
clause "... tlie British Government cannot". Speaking on 
March 2 7 , 1962, in tlie House oT Lords, oT a similar con­
vention relating to the Federation oT Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
28the Lord Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, said:
As a matter oT pure law, X entertain no doubt 
that the power oT the United Kingdom Parliament 
to legislate how it wishes Tor the Federation 
remains unfettered. However, Her Majesty1s 
Government would not breach the terms oT an
2 5 . It will be recalled that Cmnd. 1399 spoke oT non­
interference in those matters where the local legis­
lature was competent to pass laws; the spokesman here, 
while reFerring to, and purporting to adopt the 
position established in, the White Paper, had in Tact 
EXTENDED the convention oT non-interference except with 
consent, to matters in regard to which the local legis­
lature was incompetent; in this instance, the enactment 
oT a constitution to replace the 19 61 Constitution.
^6. Hansard, House oT Commons, Vol. 659? col. 237*
27* My own underlining.
28. Hansard, House oT Lords, Vol. 2 3 8 , col. 957*
understanding which has been clearly agreed 
with the Federal Government•
It will be noticed that the statement embodies two 
sentences. They must be clearly separated. The First 
is an exposition of the authority of the United Kingdom 
Parliament in regard to a convention adherence to which 
would limit that authority. The point made by the Lord 
Chancellor is that the authority of Parliament is such 
that the existence of a convention does not entail adherence 
to tlie latter to the extent that such adherence diminishes 
the authority of Parliament. In other words, as the 
second sentence of Lord Kilmuir1s statement makes clear, 
the only significance of a convention of this nature 
resides in the political good faith of the United Kingdom 
Government. Such a convention restricts only to the 
extent that the good faith of the Government allows itself 
to be inhibited by it. It does not depreciate the legal 
authority of Parliament.
The opinion of Lord Kilmuir has been endorsed by a 
subsequent Lord Chancellors Viscount Dilhorne. In the 
course of a debate on the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland in general, and of the convention of non­
interference in the Federation* s internal affairs in parti­
cular , Viscount Dilhorne, on December 19, 1962, said
As a matter of law, it is in my view clear 
beyond any doubt30 that the United Kingdom 
Parliament can, by the passage of an Act,
29. Hansard, House of Lords, Vol. 245, col. 1217*
30. My own underlining.
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revoke or amend the Order in Council which 
created the Federation .... there have been 
suggestions .... that we really are not 
Free, as a matter of law, to legislate on 
this matter. I must confess that 1 have 
never heard that seriously asserted on 
behalf of the Federation. 1 have never 
heard it suggested tliat, as a matter of pure 
law,31* the United Kingdom Parliament has not 
the power to legislate to provide for the 
secession of Nyasaland if it chooses to do so.
Having seen the effect in law of a restraining 
convention, it is proposed to identify the period in which 
the convention relating to Southern Rhodesia originated.
In debate at the Committee Stage of tlie Rhodesia and Nyasa­
land Bill (required for the dissolution of the Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland), the First Secretary, Mr. R.A.
32Butler made this statements
The Government take the line that there has 
been a 4o~year convention, since 19^3, with 
Southern Rhodesia that we should not inter­
vene in their constitutional matters•
This statement was, in the same debate, corrected
by the Attorney-General (Sir John Hobson) both in respect
of the period for which the convention was said to have
existed, and of the scope of the convention. The Attorney-
General made the correction in two statements. The first 
33read s
With respect to my right hon. friend the 
First Secretary, he was not quite accurate 
in saying that the convention had existed
31• The position might be different, not as a matter of 
pure law but as a matter of pure politics•
32• Hansard, House of Commons, Vol. 681, col# 412.
(July 16, 1963. )
33. Hansard, House of Commons, Vol. 681, col# 4l4#
(July 16, 1963. )
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for 40 years. Xt arises out of 40 years* 
history and it has coalesced or congealed 
into the formality of a convention much 
more recently. 34
After an interruption from a Member, the Attorney- 
35
General continueds
I think that my right hon. friend is right 
in saying that 40 years of history of 
Southern Rhodesia has brought about a situation 
which was first recognised in 196136 - namely, 
that as from 196137 we in this Parliament 
have recognised that the convention has put 
us in a situation in which it would not be 
right for this Parliament to legislate for 
matters which are within the competence of 
the Legislature of Soutliern Rhodesia 38 
without the consent of the Southern Rhodesian 
Parliament. 39
34. My own emphasis.
35* Hansard, House of Commons, Vol. 681, col. 415.
(July 16, 1 9 6 3.)
36. Almost certainly this is a reference to the opening 
statement in CMND. 1399 on the proposals for the 
1961 Constitution.
37* My own underlining.
This is much clearer than the ambiguous phrase in 
the White Paper (CMND. 1399) "since then (1923"•
38. The Attorney-General confines the first Secretary*s 
broad "constitutional matters’' to matters within 
the local legislature’s competence. (The underlining 
in Footnotes 38 and 39 is mine.)
39* This is the only known instance of a Government
spokesman referring to the consent of the Southern 
Rhodesia Parliament, as distinct from that of the 
Southern Rhodesia Government.
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Having now examined the status and scope of the 
convention, it is proposed to make one final point in 
regard to the latter: the convention, even in the realm
of political practice only, was by no means unconditionally 
binding in terms of political good faith. That this was 
so was made plain by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, in the House of Commons 
on March 8, 19&5t when speaking of his visit to Southern 
Rhodesia. He said:**0
41iX made it quite clear that so long as there 
was no unconstitutional action 4 2 this 
Government would respect the convention.
The position in constitutional law is the same•
After the "unconstitutional action" alluded to by Mr. 
Bottomley had actually materialized, an authority on
constitutional law, Professor S.A* de Smith, contributed
43his appraisal thus:
A convention may •••• lose binding force
— — mum muni' i» .■ i nffi i inna—' ——aawam mW Wminji—w  . »
because of a ma.1or change in circumstances. 44 
In W i '  the United Kingdom Government agreed 
that it would be contrary to convention for 
Parliament to legislate for Southern Rhodesia 
on any matter within the competence of the 
Southern Rhodesian Legislature without the 
consent of the Southern Rhodesian Government.
In 1965 the Government of Southern Rhodesia 
made a unilateral (and unlawful) declaration
40. Hansard, House of Commons, Vol. 708, col. 3®*
41. i.e. to the Government of Southern Rhodesia.
•
CM•3- The underlining is mine.
43. Constitutional and Administrative Law: S.A* de 
1971• Longman Group Ltd.: London. The passage 
taken from page 6 3 *
Smith
is
44* My own xmderlining.
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of the colony*s independence. The United 
Kingdom Parliament immediately re-asserted 
plenary legislative authority in relation 
to Southern Rhodesia. This could NOT 4-5 
reasonably be construed as a breach of 
convention? the survival of the convention 
presupposed the continuance of a constitutional
"**--11 r i- Mtnafti ■mu ii  in  ........a1111 i ■!... ~r -------1..... i  ir ir ti i r ■ t - t i r             *' ‘
relationship which the Government of Southern 
Rhodesia had repudiated. 46
It is only logical that since tlie consent to be 
obtained by the United Kingdom Government, in respect of 
that class of legislation expressed in the convention, 
was obtainable only from the Southern Rhodesia GOVERNMENT 
(thus making the latter an integral part of the very 
definition of the convention), it was sufficient for the 
destruction of the convention that tlie Southern Rhodesia 
GOVERNMENT had, through its Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence, attempted to proclaim Southern Rhodesia to 
be independent, and thus to be no longer in need of the 
convention, whose function of serving as a shield for her 
from the legal powers of the United Kingdom Parliament 
could have no conceivable meaning in respect of an "inde­
pendent" Southern Rhodesia. It is important that the 
demise of the convention should not be treated as a 
sanction or penalty against Southern Rhodesia. The con­
vention was destroyed because an integral part of its 
definition - the Southern Rhodesia GOVERNMENT - was no
45, My own emphasis.
46. My own underlining.
47• This could only have referred to a LEGAL 
Government.
longer in existence. The position would, have been
different if the consent in question was instead to be
48obtainable from the Southern Rhodesia USGISLATURE.
Xf the consent was required to be obtained from the 
Southern Rhodesia LEGISLATURE, then it would have been the 
latter, and not the Southern Rhodesia Government, that 
was an integral part of the definition of the convention. 
This then being the position, an illegal declaration of 
independence by the Southern Rhodesian GOVERNMENT would 
not of itself have been able to affect the definition of 
the convention in any way. In strict law, the absence 
of a Government does not destroy tlie powers of the Legis­
lature. If tlie Legislature of Southern Rhodesia had not 
subsequently supported U.D.I, (but in fact it did), and 
if the consent to legislate was to be obtained from the 
Southern Rhodesia LEGISLATURE, instead of, as was the case, 
from the Southern Rhodesia GOVERNMENT, then the legislation 
by the United Kingdom Parliament to re-assert its authority
48. This would have been the case if the English 
Attorney-General, Sir John Hobson, had been 
right when he spoke of the consent having to be 
obtained from the "Southern Rhodesian Parliament" 
(see footnote 39 of this Chapter). Even now, 
it is not absolutely certain that Sir John Hobson 
was wrong. Iiis statement (Hansard, House of 
Commons, Vol. 681, col. 4l5 - July 16, 1963) is 
considered inaccurate only because no other 
Government spokesman had ever expressed the view 
that the consent was to be obtained from the 
Southern Rhodesia Legislature.
after U.D.I, was in clear violation of the convention, 
and in that sense it would have been unconstitutional. 
But no court in the United Kingdom would have been able 
to declare the Act of Parliament void, the clear breach 
of the convention notwithstanding.
49Thus Professor de Smith writess
No form of judicial redress is obtainable 
purely for a breach of convention. And in 
the eyes of the courts, Parliament is com­
petent to legislate in unequivocal disregard 
of conventional limitations on the exercise 
of its powers.
(ii) WAS THE 1961 CONSTITUTION AN ACCURATE EXPRESSION
OF THE WHITE PAPER?
It has been asserted that the terms of the White
KA
Paper^ were different from the provisions of the 1961 
Constitution, so as to make the latter an act of political 
bad faith* The divergence is alleged to be caused in
the enactment of S. 111 which withdraws the sections
49* de Smith, op.cit., p. 49.
50. In this Chapter "the White Paper" refers to
CMND. 1399* It does not refer to CMND. 1400,
which contained the detailed provisions of 
the proposed constitution.
51. Rhodesia and Independence: by Kenneth Youngs
Dent and Sons, Ltd.; Londons 1969s pp. 53-56.
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specified therein^ from the amending power of the 
Southern Rhodesia Legislature, It is submitted, 
however, that the inconsistency only amounted to the 
incompetence of the Legislature to change its own 
components. The Legislature (as defined in S. 6 of 
the 1961 Constitution) comprised the Queen and the 
Legislative Assembly. The inclusion of S. 6 in S. 111 
meant that the Queen was secured against being excluded 
from the Legislature, and this provision was on all 
fours with the exclusionary proviso embodied in paragraph 
5 0 (a) (CMND. 1399) prohibiting local amendments which 
would affect "the position of the Sovereign and the 
Governor". Obviously the possible exclusion of the 
Queen from the Legislature would affect her position. 
However, insofar as this provision imposed a constitutional 
embargo on the enlargement of the Legislature by the 
Legislature (e.g. the addition to itself of a Second 
Chamber), it can be held to have exceeded the limit of 
the reservations made in the White Paper•
The remaining sections reserved in S. 111 are in 
strict conformity with the exception expressed in paragraph
52. Ss• 1, 2, 3, 5 ? 6 > 29 f 32, 42, 491 and S. 111 itself*
Ss. 1, 2, 39 59 relate to the power and remuneration 
of the Governor. S. 6 defines the composition of 
the Legislature. S. 29 governs the Assent to Bills•
S. 32 provides for the power to disallow a very limited 
range of laws. S. 42 controls the exercise of the 
executive authority. S. 49 relates to the prerogative 
of mercy. S. 111 withholds from the Legislature the 
power to amend itself as well as the other sections 
which it specifies. It reserves this amending 
authority to the Queen exercisable by Oz*der in Council.
50 of* tlie ¥h±te Paper* Section 29 related to tlie
Governor’s assent to Bills and thus came squarely
within the exception in the phrase "the position of the
53Sovereign and Governor ;" Section 32 empowered the 
Crown to disallow legislation in Southern Rhodesia which 
would he inconsistent with the United Kingdom’s position 
in right of Southern Rhodesia in regard to international 
obligations and with undertakings by the Government of 
Southern Rhodesia in respect of loans under the Colonial 
Stocks Act* This section was also within that part of 
the reserve power embodied in paragraph 5 0 (b) of the 
White Paper* Section 42, the ante-penultimate section 
specified in S. 111, related to the executive authority 
of Southern Rhodesia which it provided should rest in the 
Sovereign. This section was unquestionably connected 
with the position of the Sovereign and the Governor, and 
thus also within the exception envisaged in the reservation 
of United Kingdom authority expressed in paragraph 50(a)
53* CMND. 1399J paragraph 5°(a)*
The ttfhole of paragraph 50 read;
"Under the new proposals, Southern Rhodesia 
will be free to make amendments to any sections 
of the Constitution without reference to the 
United Kingdom, with the exception of amendments 
which would affect s
(a) the position of the Sovereign and 
the Governor;
(b) the right of the United Kingdom 
Government to safeguard the position 
regarding;
(i) international obligations?
(ii) undertakings given by the
Government of Southern Rhodesia 
in respect of loans under the 
Colonial Stock Acts•
of the White Paper. Finally, S. 49 was in respect 
of the prerogative of mercy. This was certainly 
within the exception withholding the competence of the 
Southern Rhodesia Legislature to amend. It is thus 
seen that apart from S. 6 the allegations of inconsistency 
between the pledge in the White Paper and its redemption 
in the 1961 Constitution are chimerical.
(iii) DETAILS OF PROVISIONS
(a) THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY
The Southern Rhodesia Constitution of 1923 
(constituted by Letters Patent on September 1, 1923)
reserved to the Crown the power to amend or revoke many
ek KK
sections embodied therein. The White Paper setting
out the proposed changes to that constitution promised
that the new constitution would "eliminate all the
reserved powers at present vested in the Government of
the United Kingdom, save for certain matters set out in 
56
paragraph 5® I" the most important power retained by the
United Kingdom and consequentially the most extensive
limitation to the authority of Southern Rhodesia was the
prohibition embedded in Ss.111 and 105 of the 1961 Consti- 
57tution^ imposed on the amending authority of Southern
54. S*61 of the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Letters 
Patent 1923*
55. CMND. 1399.
56. CMND. 1399, P. 3.
57. S.1 1961, No. 2314.
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Rhodesia. The most significant of the sections the 
power to amend which was denied to the territory was 
S. 42, read in conjunction with S. 2.
Section 42 provides 8
The executive authority of Southern Rhodesia 
is vested in Her Majesty and may be exercised 
on Her Majesty’s behalf by the Governor or 
such other persons as may be authorised in 
that behalf by the Governor or by any law of 
the Legislature.
S. 2 states s-
The Governor shall have sucli powers and duties 
as are conferred or imposed on him by or under 
this Constitution or any other law, and such 
other powers (not being powers to be exercised 
in his personal discretion) as Her Majesty may 
from time to time be pleased to assign to Xiim. 
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution 
and of any law by which any such powers or 
duties are conferred or imposed, the Governor 
shall do and execute all things that belong to 
his office according to such Instructions, if 
any, as Her Majesty may from time to time see 
fit to give him.
Provided that the question whether or not the 
Governor has in any matter conformed to or 
observed any such Instructions shall not be 
enquired into in any court.
It is observable of S.2 that there are three ways 
in which powers and duties may be vested in the Governors
1. Those conferred by or under the Constitution;
2. Those given by or under any other law;
3• Those transmitted by way of Royal Instructions,
It is further clear the Royal Instructions are 
subordinate to the first two sources of authority because 
the Governor can only obey Instructions ”Subject to the
173.
provisions of this Constitution and of any law by which
any such powers or duties are conferred or imposed."
This means that should the advice of the Governor’s Council
conflict with that contained in tlie Royal Instructions,
the Royal Instructions have to give way. This is because
S. 45''*^  provides that "as the case may require" the
Governor shall act in accordance with the advice of the
Governor’s Council or the appropriate Minister, except in
cases where the Governor is entitled to exercise a personal
discretion or where the Constitution otherwise prescribes.
S. 45 being a section in the Constitution is in terms of S.2
paramount over the Royal Instructions. In view of the
manifest subordination of the Royal Instructions it is
surprising to learn of the implicit significance attributed
59to them by an author in the following extracts
58. The relevant part of S. 45 reads;
"45• - (1) In the exercise of his functions, the 
Governor shall act in accordance with the advice of 
the Governor’s Council or the appropriate Minister, 
as the case may require, except where under this 
Constitution or any other law, he is required to act 
in accordance with the advice of any other person or 
authority;
Provided that the Governor shall act in accordance 
with his own discretion-
(a) in the exercise of the power of dissolving 
the Legislative Assembly conferred on him 
by subsection (2) of section 34; and
(b) in the appointment of Prime Minister in 
pursuance of subsection (1) of section 43,
but in such cases the Governor shall observe the 
constitutional conventions which apply to the 
exercise of similar powers by Her Majesty in the 
United Kingdom."
59* THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA 
1885-1965: CLAIRE PALLEY; O.U.P.; 1965: p. 719*
The Governor, who represents the Crown, 
has such powers and duties as Her Majesty 
may from time to time be pleased to assign 
him and, in exercising these powers, he is 
required to act in accordance with 
Instructions given him from time to time by 
Her Majesty. The retention of* these powers 
was apparently insisted on at the Southern 
Rhodesia Constitutional Conference in 
February 1961, by Mr* Sandys, who pointed 
out that, although the Governor normally 
acted on the advice of* the local Executive 
Council, the Sovereign retained power to 
give Instructions to Her Governor until 
such time as the country became fully inde­
pendent •
dOEven more insupportable is this later suggestions
Xt will also be possible in the event of* a 
fundamental constitutional crisis or action 
touching on Imperial interest for the 
Governor to be instructed not to accept the 
advice of his Executive Council* 61
In support of the assertion made immediately above,
Palley, in her footnote No. 3 on the same page, statess
Section 2 read with section 45(1) makes it 
clear that this would not be unconstitutional 
by the employment of the phrase 1 except where 
under this Constitution or any other law... 
he is required to act in accordance with the 
advice of any other person or authority1.
Xt is important to focus attention on the fact that 
S. 2 of the Constitution, in enumerating the sources of
the Governor * s authority, makes it plain that the term
"Royal Instructions" is not to be comprehended within the
60. PAIXEYs op.cit.s p. 7^0.
61. In this context the terms "Executive Council" and 
"governor's Council" can be used interchangeably 
because the former is a creature of convention and 
has no authority under the 1961 Constitution although 
the Prime Ministers and such Ministers as he selects 
for the Governor1s Council comprise the memberships
of the latter Council (S.44 of the 1961 Constitution).
terra "this Constitution or any other law". This is known 
to be the case because S. 2 on two occasions mentions the 
Royal Instructions (once expressly and once by implication) 
as a separate source of the Governor1s authority from the 
other two sources expressed in the term "this Constitution 
or any other law". The point being made by Px*of essor 
Palley in her quotation of the exception to the requirement 
that the Governor is to act on the advice of the Governor's 
Council is that the Royal Instructions come within that 
exception, namely, "except where under this Constitution 
or any other law..." the Governor is required to act on 
the advice of a person or authority other than the 
Governor's Council or the appropriate Minister. But the 
exception does NOT include the Royal Instructions because, 
as S. 2 of the Constitution makes clear*, the term "Royal 
Instructions" is outside the term "this Constitution or 
any other law". Therefore, the Royal Instructions, not 
coming within the expression "this Constitution or any 
other law", cannot constitute an exception to the 
Governor's obligations to act on the advice of his Council. 
Thus we see that the Royal Instructions can only be com­
plied with by the Governor if the Governor's Council does 
not offer contrary advice, or where the Governor's Council 
has not already advised in regard to the relevant issue*
To reinforce the proposition that the Governor 
cannot allow Royal Instructions to override his obligation 
to act on the advice of his Council merely by virtue of the
exception, which Palley points to in support of her 
argument, embodied in S. 45(1), it only requires 
attention to be drawn to the nature of the alternative 
authority with which the Governor is to comply in 
accordance with the exception. The exception speaks of 
the Governor's acting in accordance with the ADVICE of 
any other person or authority. Now, if the exception 
is meant to include Royal Instructions, is it not 
immediately incongruous that Her Majesty the Queen should 
be described as tendering ADVICE to her own representative, 
the Governor? Even if the arrangement of the sources 
of the Governor's authority made in S. 2 is not explicit 
enough to convince one that the Royal Instructions do not 
come within the term "this Constitution or any other law" 
and hence not within the exception expressed in S. 45(1), 
surely the intractable incongruity of describing Royal 
INSTRUCTIONS as a form of ADVICE should place beyond the 
reach of contradiction the proposition that the exception 
expressed in S. 45(1) to the obligation of the Governor 
to act on his Council's advice does not include the Royal 
Instructions he receives from the Queen because Her 
Majesty has never been known to tender ADVICE to hex'* 
Governors•
It is submitted that where the Crown desires to 
override contrary advice tendered to the Governor by his 
Council it should avail itself of the authority it enjoys 
in terms of S. 111, and make an Order in Council to amend
3*2 so as to provide for the paramountcy of the Royal 
Instructions over the other sources of the Governor's 
authority. In the absence of such legislation the Crown 
cannot, in terms of the 1961 Constitution, override the 
advice to the Governor tendered by his Council or the 
appropriate Minister.
Whatever may have been the intention of the 
United Kingdom Government in regard to the position of the 
Governor, such intention, if it is not supportable within 
the terms of the 1961 Constitution, cannot in any way 
affect the status of Southern Rhodesia•
In regard to the authority of the Governor,
62Professor Palley makes a final point. She observes:
Quite apart from any Royal Instructions, 
since the Governor is guardian of the 
Constitution, it would be his duty to 
exercise Crown reserve power where the 
preservation of the Constitution was at 
stake. Thus a Governor faced with * a 
coup d'etat under the forms of law' 
should refuse assent.
Quite apart from what "the preservation of the 
Constitution" is supposed to mean when none of its provisions 
are in danger of violation (as conceded by the illustration 
"a coup d'etat under the forms of law") it is mildly 
intriguing to speculate on how the Governor, who is created 
by, and whose powers are expressly defined in, the Constitution 
is able to summon to his aid a source of authority completely
62. Palleys op.cit,j p. 721,
unknown to the Constitution. That the Governor is a 
creature of the Constitution is made clear in S. 1(1) of 
the Constitution. Part of S. 1(1) reads:
There shall be a Governor in and over 
the Colony of Southern Rhodesia who shall 
be appointed by Hex'1 Majesty by Commission 
under Her Sign Manual and Signet and 
shall hold office during Her Majesty's 
pleasure *
Surely a creature cannot be treated as possessing 
endowments exceeding those which it has pleased its 
creator to bestow upon it, even if the extra attributes 
claimed for it are claimed in solicitous pursuit of the 
creator's salvation.
(b) THE AMENDING PROCEDURE
The Legislature of Southern Rhodesia was made 
competent to amend the provisions of the 1961 Constitution
witli the exception of S. 111 and the sections enunciated
therein. S. 111 reserved to the Crown power to amend, add 
to or revoke S. 111 itself as well as any of the sections
it contained. The exclusion of S. 111 and the Southern
Rhodesia Legislature was effected by S. 1(§0, which decreed:
Subject to compliance with the other provisions 
of this Constitution, a law of the Legislature 
may amend, add to or repeal any of the pro­
visions of this Constitution other than those
mentioned in Section 111:
Provided that no Act of the Legislature shall 
be deemed to amend, add to or repeal any pro­
vision of this Constitution unless it does so
in express terms. 63
63* 1961 Constitution, S. 103*
179.
54S . 111 provides:
Full power and authority is hereby reserved 
to Her Majesty by Order in Council to amend,
, add to or revoke the provisions of sections 1,
2 , 3 > 6 , 29 > 3 2 , 42, 49 and this section, and 
any Order in Council made by virtue of this 
section may vary or revoke any x^avious Order 
so made:
Provided that the power and authority hex'ein 
reserved to Her Majesty shall not be exercised 
Tor the xourpose of amending1 this section or 
adding to it a reference to any section of 
this Constitution not included in this Section 
on the appointed day.
Ordinary provisions of the Constitution could be
65amended in accordance with S. 106 s
No constitutional Bill shall be deemed to be 
passed by the Legislative Assembly unless at 
the final vote thereon in the Assembly it 
receives the affirmative votes of not less 
than two-thirds of the total membership of 
the Assembly.
Specially entrenched provisions, however, require
. 66 a more rigorous method of amendment, as S. 107 makes plain
- (1) For the purposes of this Constitution, 
all the provisions thereof enumerated in the 
Third Schedule shall be specially entrenched 
provisions of the Constitution together with 
any other provision which may hereafter be 
declared by any future amendment of the Consti­
tution to be such a provision.
(2 ) Any constitutional Bill which contains 
any provision for amending, adding to or 
repealing any specially entrenched provision 
of the Constitution and which is passed by 
the Legislative Assembly in accordance with the 
requirements of section 1 0 6, shall not, become 
law unless either -
64. 1961 Constitution, S. 111.
6 5 . 1961 Constitution, S. 106.
6 6 . 1961 Constitution, S. 107.
(a) such provision is approved in a referendum 
by a majority of those voting in each of the 
four principal racial groups of this Consti­
tution; or
(b) an Address is presented to the Governor 
praying him to submit the Bill to Her Majesty 
for assent in pursuance of section 1 0 9• 67
68The reserve power of the British Crown was thus
reduced drastically in the 1961 Constitution in that the
positive aspect of it relates only to the amendment or
revocation of S. 111 and the sections therein enumerated,
and the negative aspect consists in the power to refuse
assent to Bills to amend specially entrenched sections in
the absence of the referenda stipulated in S. 1 0 7(1 ) ( a).
This is unlike the Crown*s position established in the 1923
Constitution. Under that Constitution the Governor had
power to initiate legislation. This was embodied in S. 19 
69which reads
The Governor may transmit by message to the 
Legislative Council70 and the Legislative 
Assembly the draft of any Bill which it may
6 7 . S. 109 prescribes that where the Legislative Assembly 
passes a motion to present an Address to the Governor 
praying him to submit the Bill to Her Majesty for assent, 
the motion must be passed by not less than two-thirds of 
the total memberships of the House after the Governor has 
been instructed by the Crown that it consents to the 
motion being passed. Strictly, this does not mean that 
the motion, once passed, is binding on the Crown but in 
fact this is so because if the latter had been averse to 
the motion it would not have consented to its being passed
6 8 . I have not included the Disallowance Power which does not 
affect internal government save as regards legislation in 
relation to Southern Rhodesia Government Stock (see S. 32)
6 9 . S. 19, 1923 CONSTITUTION LETTERS PATENT (MADE ON SEPT. 1
1923: TOOK EFFECT FROM OCT. 1, 1 9 2 3).
70. Although provision for the creation of such a body was 
made in the Cons titution, the power was never 
invoked. Thus the Legislative Council never came into
existence•
appear to him desirable to introduce, and 
all such drafts shall be taken into 
consideration by the said Council and Assembly, 
as the case may be, in such convenient manner 
as shall be provided in that behalf by Rules 
of Procedure.
Under the 1923 Constitution the Governor had a 
right to refuse assent to Bills that was only qualified by 
subordination to the Constitution (none of whose provisions, 
however, attenuated this right) and the Royal Instructions. 
Thus the Governor in effect could in his discretion decline
71assent to a Bill unless the Crown instructed him otherwise*
The Governor could, unless contrary Instructions were given
72to him, have the Bill reserved instead of refusing assent.
In addition, the Governor had a list of legislation where
73reservation was declared to be mandatory* An item on
74
the list included constitutional amendments, readings
Any Law which may repeal, alter or amend, or 
is in any way repugnant to or inconsistent 
with such provisions of these Our Letters 
Patent, as may under these Our Letters Patent 
be repealed or altered by the Legislature?
The section enumerating the items of legislation
7 5where reservation was mandatory was declared unamendable.
71. S. 27, 1923 Constitution.
72. S. 27, 1923 Constitution.
73* S. 28, 1923 Constitution.
7^. S. 28(b), 1923 Constitution.
75• S• 26(2), 1023 Constitution.
The power of disallowance, so restricted under 
the 1961 Constitution, was absolute under the 1923 Consti­
tution. The relevant section in the 1923 Constitution
It shall be lawful Tor Us, Our, heirs and 
successors, to disallow any Law within one 
year from the date of* Governor’s assent 
thereto, and such disallowance, on being 
made known by the Governor by Speech or 
Message to the Legislative Council and the 
Legislative Assembly, or by Proclamation 
in the Gazette shall annul the Law from the 
day when the disallowance is so made known.
The section relating to the power of disallowance 
was not, however, unamendable by the Southern Rhodesia 
Legislature, although, being a constitutional amendment it 
would under S. 28(b) have had to have the Crown’s approval 
by way of reservation. The disallowance power under the 
1961 Constitution was, however, declared unamendable by th 
Southern Rhodesia Legislature since,the reservation power 
no longer extending to cover all constitutional amendments 
it would otherwise not have been adequately protected for 
th© paramount authority in London.
(c) THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL
Yet another novel feature emerging from the 1961
78Constitution was the Constitutional Council*
7 6 . S. 311 1923 Constitution.
77* The power to reserve Bills could be invoked as an
alternative to the racial referenda required as one 
of the conditions for the amendment of specially 
entrenched sections in the 1961 Constitution (s. 107)
78. Created and described in Chapter VII of the 1961 
Constitution (Ss. 73'~91 ) •
1,83.
(i) MEMBERSHIP
The Council was constituted of a Chairman and 
79eleven elected members# Membership was to include two
Europeans, two Africans, one Asian, one person of the
Coloured community, and two persons who shall be either an
advocate or attorney of the High Court of Southern Rhodesia
of not less than ten years1 standing. The Chairman1s
appointment was to be made by the Governor on the advice
of the Chief Justice after consultation with the puisne
judges, and his removal was to be effected in the kind of
80procedure employed to dismiss the Chief Justice. Ho
member of the Council was eligible to hold a second term of 
81office. The ordinary members of the Commission were
dismissible by the Governor only when the latter, upoh
believing them to have conducted themselves improperly as
members of the Council, had entrusted to a Commission of
Inquiry the investigation of his suspicion and received from
82such Commission confirmation of his belief.
(ii) FUNCTIONS
Intermediate between the final reading of a Bill 
and its presentation to the Governor for his assent the Speaker 
of the Legislative Assembly was required to submit an
79• S. 73» 19^1 Constitution,
80. S. 7kt 1961 Constitution.
81. Ss. 7^(3) and 75(2)
82. S. 79} 1961 Constitution.
authenticated copy of the Bill to the Constitutional
Council which, unless it applied for extension, had to
make a report to the Governor and the Speaker, within
thirty days, directing their attention to provisions in
the Bill, if any, that would contravene the Declaration
83of Rights if the former were enacted. Such an objection
can only be overridden by a motion requesting assent 
addressed to the Governor and passed by at least two-thirds 
of the total membership of the House. Otherwise, it could 
only be passed after’ six months from the date of its 
presentation to the Council, and such passage could be 
effected with an ordinary majority of those present and 
voting.
No Bill, however, need be presented to the
Council if before its translation to the latter the Prime
Minister certified in writing that it was so urgent that
84the public interest enjoined its immediate enactment.
The Council could also quash statutory instruments unless 
thex’e were subsequent confirmatory resolutions of the 
Assembly when the Council’s adverse reports were laid before
In relation to legislation of the Legislature 
prior to the Council's inception the latter could only make 
adverse reports to the Governor and Speaker who would have
83* S. 79, 19^1 Constitution.
84. S. 8 5 , 1961 Constitution.
8 5 . S. 86(4), 1061 Constitution.
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86to lay them before tXie Assembly#
(k) TIHS DECLARATION OF RIGHTS#87
The Chapter commences with the preambles
Whereas it is desirable to ensure that 
every person in Southern Rhodesia enjoys 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the individual, that is to say, the 
right, whatever his race, tribe, place of 
origin, political opinions, colour or 
creed, but subject to respect for the 
rights and freedoms of others and for the 
public interest, to each and all of the 
following, namely —
(a) life, liberty, security of the 
person, the enjoyment of property 
and the protection of the law;
(b) freedom of conscience, of expression, 
and of assembly and association; and
(c) respect for his private and family 
lif e,
the following provisions of this Chapter 
shall have effect for the purpose of affording 
protection to the aforesaid rights and 
freedoms subject to the limitations of that 
protection contained in those provisions•
It should be noticed that the Declaration of Rights 
was specially entrenched in terms of S. 107 of the 1961 
Constitution.
Section 57 embodied the right to life. The obvious 
exception to it was the imposition of the death sentence by 
a court of law. Reasonable force used in the following 
situations was a defence to the otherwise violation of the 
right;
86. S. 87, 1961 Constitution.
8 7 . Chapter VI (Ss. 57-72), 1961 Constitution.
(a) tlie defence of any person from violence 
or for the defence of property;
(b) the effecting of a lawful arrest or the 
prevention of the escape of a person 
lawfully detained;
(c) the suppression of a riot, insurrection 
or muting or the dispersal of an unlawful 
gathering;
(d) the prevention of the commission by the 
person of a criminal offence;
(e) death in a lawful act of war.
Section 58 ensures the rigXit to personal liberty
88except in cases of restriction and detention , as well
as the usual court orders•
The most significant subsections in the individual *s 
favour are (3 ) and (4 ) which reads
(3) Any person who is arrested or detained
shall be informed as soon as reasonably
practicable, in a language which he 
understands, of the reasons for his 
arrest or detention.
Any person who is arrested or detained-
(a) for the purpose of bringing him before 
a court in execution of the order of a 
court or an officer of a court; or
(b) upon reasonable suspicion of his having 
committed or being about to commit a 
criminal offence,
and who is not released shall be brought 
without undue delay before a court; and if any 
person arrested or detained as mentioned in 
paragraph (b) of this subsection is not tried 
within a reasonable time, then, without prejudice 
to any further proceedings which may be brought 
against him, he shall be released either uncon­
ditionally or upon reasonable conditions, includ­
ing in particular such conditions as are reasonably 
necessary to ensure that he appears at a later 
date for trial or for proceedings preliminary to 
trial.
88. S. 5 8 (1)(k), 1961 Constitution.
The right to personal liberty here did not 
amount to much. Xt could have been detracted from to 
any extent by law. The law attenuating it need not 
have been reasonable in any respect, What the right to 
liberty as here defined conferred was merely such liberty 
as the law chose to allow. Xt is submitted that the 
section was nothing more than a declaration against anarchy 
and not a declaration against arbitrary government because 
the latter had only to commend to the Legislature such 
legislation as would render criminal conduct which it 
thought undesirable. Xt is lamentable that no criterion 
was created to restrict the power of the Legislature to 
restrict the personal liberty of the individual.
Provision against slavery, servitude and forced 
labour was found in S. 59* It did not define what these 
were but carefully elaborated on what forced labour was not 
It was not labour imposed by a court order or a detention 
order if in the latter it is required in the interests of 
hygiene or education or rehabilitation. Nor is labour in 
the armed forces to be treated as prohibited by the section 
Labour necessitated by public emergencies was likewise 
excepted. Excluded was labour forming part of normal 
communal or other civic obligations. It is suggested that 
this section is fair.
Section 60 was important in that it prohibited 
inhuman treatment by the authorities. The section reads
1.88.
(1) No person shall be subjected to torture 
or to Inhuman or degrading punishment or 
other treatment.
(2) No treatment reasonably justifiable in 
the circumstances of the case to prevent 
the escape from custody of a person who 
has been lawfully detained shall be held to 
be in contravention of this section on the 
ground that it is degrading.
(3) Nothing contained in or done under the 
authority of any written law shall be held . 
to be inconsistent with or in contravention 
of this section to the extent that the law 
in question authorises the doing of anything 
by way of punishment which might lawfully 
have been so done in Southern Rhodesia 
immediately before the appointed day*
The section was adjudicated upon in the Privy
89Council in Runyowa v* R . • The appellant had been
sentenced to death for setting fire to a building in contra­
vention of S. 33A(1) of the Law and Order (Maintenance Act, 
i9 6 0 ). The death penalty was known in Southern Rhodesia
before the 1961 Constitution became operative. On S. 60
90the Board had this to observe:
The problem before their Lordships is that 
of construing the particular words of 
section 60 of the 1961 Constitution* No 
person is to be subjected (a) to torture,
b ) to inhuman or degrading punishment or
c) to inhuman or degrading treatment•
As a matter of construction their Lordships 
(in agreement with the judgements in tlie 
appellate division of the High Court of 
Southern Rhodesia in G-UNDU AND SAMBO1 s case) 
consider that the ban that is imposed is 
upon any such type or mode or description 
of punishment as is inhuman or degrading.
Since it is not suggested that the death 
penalty is of such a type or mode of des­
cription it follows that the argument advanced
8 9 . 1967 A.C. 2 6 .
90. 1967 A.C. 26, at pp. 47-50.
on behalf of th© appellant must fall.
So far as this conclusion needs any support 
it amply finds it in the provision contained 
in subsection (3 )• The result of that 
subsection seems clearly to be that nothing 
contained in any written law (e*g*, the Law 
and Order (Maintenance) Act) is to be held 
in contravention of section 60 to the extent 
that it authorises the doing of anything by 
way of punishment which might under any pro­
vision of any law passed by the legislature 
of Southern Rhodesia have been done by way 
of punishment in Southern Rhodesia immediately 
before the appointed day. The death penalty 
was one of the modes or types or descriptions 
of the punishments known in Southern Rhodesia 
before the appointed day (see S. 360 under 
the heading HPunishments1 in the Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Act), Furthermore, 
the words uthe doing of anything by way of 
punishment” would seem to denote a type or 
form or metXrod of punishment.
TXie provision contained in section 60 of the 
Constitution enables tine court to adjudicate as 
to whether some form or type or description of 
punishment newly devised after the appointed 
day 91 or not previously recognised is inhuman 
or degrading but it does not enable tXie court 
to declare an enactment imposing a punisXiment 
to be ultra vires on tXie ground that tXie court 
considers that the punislunent laid down by the 
enactment is inappropriate or excessive for 
the particular offence. Harsh tXiough a law 
may be which compels the passing of a mandatory 
death sentence (and may so compel even where 
aiding and abetting or assisting is by acts 
which, tliougli proximate to an offence, are 
relatively trivial), it can be remembered that 
there are provisions (e.g* section 364 of the 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act in Southern 
Rhodesia) which ensure that further consideration 
is given to a case,
It is not proposed to dissent from the conclusion 
arrived at by the Board. The criticism will be directed 
at the section itself• Subsection (3 ) by autliorising the
91. The day on which the 1961 Constitution became 
operative.
doing of anything that might have been done prior to the 
commencement of the 1961 Constitution prevented the section 
invalidating any mode of punishment or other treatment 
that was permissible before the section became operative. 
Therefore such forms of punishment and other treatment as 
existed before the “appointed day" were either to be 
treated as (i) conclusively not amounting to torture, or 
inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment! or
(ii) torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or other 
treatment permissible by law. Either interpretation would 
obviate contravention, by previous modes of punishment or 
other treatment, of S. 60.
The conclusion can be drawn by way of illustration. 
Xf after the commencement of the 1961 Constitution a law 
was to be passed prescribing that any one person guilty of 
murdering, by himself, ten persons or more, should have 
his left hand amputated, this law would be struck down 
because (a) it was not known before the commencement of the 
Constitution and (b) it was degrading punishment, This 
would be manifestly unjust because a mass murderer should 
not deserve the tender concern of tire section. On the 
other hand, if a law subsequent to the appointed day was to 
provide the death penalty for the theft of half a loaf of 
bread or more, the section would not serve to quash it be­
cause the death penalty was known to the law irrior to the 
appointed day.
It is submitted that the section ought to have 
made it clear that whether or not a punishment or other 
treatment was torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or
other treatment must be assessed in the light of the 
circumstances on which punishment or other treatment was 
based. Even if "torture" and "degrading punishment or 
other treatment" could not be properly ascertained by 
being measured against the circumstances, "inhuman punish­
ment or other treatment" certainly could. Xt would be 
inhuman to amputate a hand for petty theft but would it 
be so for mass murder? But as the section is drafted
it would make no difference, at least so the Board thought. 
Xt is noteworthy that S. 60 is not subject to modification
or suspension even during periods of public emergency,
92unlike some of the other rights in the Declaration.
The above is a highly selective conspectus on the
Declaration of Rights. Xt only attempts to direct
attention to some of its more controversial provisions.
TXie Declaration of Riglits was enforceable through
the High Court and ultimately to the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council. The court, however, x^ as not to exercise
its pothers under this subsection if it xiras satisfied that
adequate means of redress for the contravention alleged were
or had been available to the person concerned under any 
93other laxtf.
Xf the applicant could obtain a certificate from 
the Constitutional Council that stated that his case was a
92. S. 6 9 , 1961 Constitution.
93* S* 71(4), 1961 Constitution,
proper and suitable test case, then any sums regarded by
the court as having been reasonably incurred by him in
the litigation were to be refunded to him by the Consti-
94tutional Council out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
94. S• 71(6), 1961 Constitution.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN
(1 ) SOUTHERN RHODESIA ASKS FOR INDEPENDENCE
Southern Rhodesia first formally requested inde-
-j
pendence from the United Kingdom Government in March, 1963•
Xn that month the Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister had 
talks with the First Secretary of the United Kingdom 
Government in the course of which the Southern Rhodesia 
Prime Minister broached the matter of his country’s independ­
ence in the light of the impending, albeit yet unannounced, 
dissolution of the Central African Federation of which 
Southern Rhodesia formed a territorial unit, In a subse­
quent letter from Mr* Winston Field (the Southern Rhodesia 
Prime Minister) to Mr. R.A. Butler (the British First 
Secretary), the former stated his position:
At our interview this morning when you 
informed me of the British Government's 
decision taken as a result of the talks 
held this week in London, I raised the 
question of the full independence of 
Southern Rhodesia in the light of the 
situation as you described it. You in­
vited the Southern Rhodesia Government 
to attend later in the year in Rhodesia 
a Conference with the Governments concerned 
to determine the broad lines of a new 
association between Southern Rhodesia and 
Northern Rhodesia• I emphasised that the 
nature of the British Government's decision 
amounted to a recognition of Northern 
Rhodesia's right to secede from the Feder­
ation and, therefore, this raised the vital 
issue for Southern Rhodesia of its own 
independence. I have now carefully considered
1. CMND, 2000$ CMND. 2073*
2* CMND. 2000$ p. 3; CMND. 2073, p.3.
1tlie Southern Rhodesian attitude towards 
the Conference and I wish to state that 
the Southern Rhodesia Government will 
not attend a Conference unless we receive 
in writing from you an acceptable under- 
talcing that Southern Rhodesia will receive 
its independence concurrently with the 
date on which either Nortliern Rhodesia or 
Nyasaland is allowed to secede, whichever 
is the first.-*
You were kind enough to state that you 
thought this attitude was not unreasonable 
but that it would not be possible for you 
to give an immediate decision on Southern 
Rhodesia*s independence; and that you were 
ready to receive from my Government a 
formal application for this independence 
on the terms I have outlined,
X, therefore, submit in this letter a formal 
application, now that both Nyasaland and 
Northern Rhodesia have been given the right 
to secede from the Federation that Southern 
Rhodesia should be given its full independ- 
ence on the first date when either one or 
the other territory is allowed to secede or 
obtains its independence.
On April 9> 1963> the First Secretary replied to 
the Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister*s letter, a reply 
which was not directed to answering the main question of 
Mr. Field1s message* The latter, it will be recalled, had 
requested from the First Secretary an answer as to whether 
or not he was prepared to give the desired undertaking.
In his reply, Mr. Butler was caution itself. He acknow­
ledged Southern Rhodesia!s right to eventual independence 
when such an assurance was not sought, for the obvious 
reason that no one doubted that her non-independent status
3. The undei^lining is my own.
4. The underlining is my own.
was not to be an immutable condition. He went on to say
1 that Southern. Rhodesia, like the other territories, will
5proceed through the normal processes to independence.1 
This seems to indicate that if the "normal processes1 
could be completed before the dissolution of* the Federation, 
then independence would be granted upon dissolution. XT 
they could not be so completed, then independence would 
have to be withheld even after dissolution. Furthermore, 
it was Mr. Butler * s view that the secession of one of the
dthree constituent units would not dissolve the Federation, 
The latter opinion was expressed to explain to Mr. Field 
that his request to have independence granted upon the 
secession of either one of the other two territories 
(Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) was not susceptible of 
compliance because as the secession of only one of the 
constituent units could not legally affect Southern 
Rhodesia's continued membership of the non-independent 
Federation, independence could not be granted to a member 
of this non-independent entity. The short answer is that 
Southern Rhodesia could have terminated its membership by 
secession either prior to or concurrently with her inde­
pendence. Xt was therefore not an answer to Mr. Field's
application for the conferment of independence to reply the
7way Mr. Butler did:
Our legal advice is that it would not in any 
event be possible to make Southern Rhodesia 
an independent country in the full sense of
5. CMND. 2000, p. 4; CMND. 2073, p. 4.
6. CMND. 2000, p. 5; CMND. 2073, p. 5.
7. CMND. 2000, p. 4; CMND. 2073, pp. 4-5.
the word while remaining a member of the 
non-independent Federation* So long as 
slie remains a member oF the Federation, 
so long will the United Kingdom Parliament 
have power to legislate with regard to the 
Federation and so indirectly with regard 
to Southern Rhodesia.
In so Far as the excerpt just quoted suggests 
that the undertaking For which Mr. Field asked could not 
be given because oF a constitutional impediment, the point 
is Fatuous. IF Southern Rhodesia could not be granted 
independence within the Federation, then independence 
could only be given when she seceded. So unless there 
was an impediment to her secession (such an impediment 
would be ill-conceived iF the other units enjoyed the 
right) there was no legal impediment to her being granted 
independence, and assuming the moral impropriety oF ele­
vating her to independence with a minority government, 
the refusal on this ground would have nothing to do with 
the opinion embodied in the legal advice adverted to by 
Mr. Butler. The latter would have been more candid iF 
he had emphasised that the impediment was political.
Mr. Butler dropped a clear hint that the under-
8taking would not be given when he wrotes
In any case Her Majesty's Government, in 
accordance with normal precedent, would 
expect to convene a Conference to discuss 
Financial, deFence, constitutional and 
other matters, which always have to be 
settled beFore selF—governing dependencies 
are granted independence•
8. CMND. 2000, p.5; CMND. 20?3» P*5«
Mt. Butler1s reply, to the extent that it can 
be treated as an answer, appeared to assert that Southern 
Rhodesia could only expect independence concurrently with 
the secession of* the First oF either oF the two units to 
exercise the right, iF the issues relating to her inde­
pendence could be resolved as expeditiously as those 
relating either to the independence or secession oF the 
First oF the two other units to achieve the stated alterna­
tives. Because the United Kingdom could withhold consent 
to whatever solutions were proposed For the issues to be 
discussed, the acceptance or imposition oF a Conference 
would in Fact mean that the United Kingdom would be Free 
to delay the independence oF Southern Rhodesia and return 
a negative response to her request For independence at 
the point oF time she Favoured. Having thus very 
indirectly refused to give the undertaking, Mr. Butler 
explained that as he could not yet agree to Southern 
Rhodesia*s independence on the terms stipulated and as 
the country was already protected by the convention oF 
not being interFered with on matters within her Legis­
lature's competence, there was no other elevation oF status
9he could oFFer on behalF oF the United Kingdom. It may
be relevant to recall that the Southern Rhodesia Premier
had not asked For an intermediate constitutional status
For his country. It is thereFore confusing For Mr. Butler
10to say, gratuitously, "we do not see how it can be
9. CMND. 2000, p. 5; CMND. 2073, p. 3*
10. The status at that time oF the country•
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improved from your point of1 view pending' the granting of
11full independence*’1
(2) SOUTHERN RHODESIA PERSISTS IN ASKING- FOR
INDEPENDENCE
The Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mr*
Field, when replying to Mr. Butler’s reply to his first 
letter repeated his intention not to attend the Conference 
for the Dissolution of the Federation unless the under­
taking to confer independence on Southern Rhodesia at the 
requested moment of time was given in writing by Mr.
Butler• ^  Mr. Field’s letter was dated April 20, 19^3 - 
eleven days after Mr. Butler’s reply was given. Mr. Field 
also made it plain that since the only way of adding to 
his country’s status was the grant of full independence 
itself (a point conceded by Mr• Butler), it was not 
possible to envisage what could be meant when Mr. Butler 
had referred to the normal processes to independence which 
his country was alleged to be required to undergo. It 
is suggested that the point made by Mr. Field is valid as 
a matter of constitutional law.
Though further correspondence was exchanged the
positions of both parties remained unchanged, except that
in one of his subsequent letters Mr. Field relented on his
1 3threat not to attend the Dissolution Conference. He said
11. CMND. 2000, p. 5$ CMND. 2073, P* 5*
12. CMND. 2073, p. 8.
13. CMND. 2073, P. 17.
he was prepared to reconsider his decision. His words
14were as follows:
He feel it is our duty if at all possible 
to avoid continuing the uncertainty for 
both the Federal Government and its employees 
as well as for the people of Southern Rhodesia 
and therefore we are inclined to reconsider 
the matter of our attendance at the conference.
Mr. Field then invited Mr. Butler to Salisbury 
to discuss Southern Rhodesia^ independence. Xt was 
suggested that the First Secretary should arrive a few 
days before the Conference at tlie Victoria Falls.
1 5The invitation was declined thus:
You have invited me to meet you in Salisbury 
on 2 5th or 26th June. I feel that as 
Chairman I should travel direct to Victoria 
Falls without breaking my journey in Salis­
bury hut X would propose to arrive at the 
Falls on 26th June and would be glad to 
meet you there if that were convenient to 
you. You will remember that when we met 
in London we discussed possible amendments 
which might be made by your Government to 
the SoutXiern Rhodesia constitution which would 
result in broadening the basis of represent­
ation in the legislature and would take 
effect as soon as practicable. ¥e also dis­
cussed the future development of policy on 
non-discrimination. So far as we are 
concerned these matters remain for further 
discussion.
14. CMND. 2073, p. 1 7, para. 6 .
15. CMND. 2073, P. 19.
(3) MRa BUTLER1S ALLEGED PROMISE OF INDEPENDENCE
Xt has been subsequently asserted that on the
eve of the Victoria Falls Conference Mr. Butler gave a
categorical guarantee to Mr. Field that Southern Rhodesia
would receive its independence without difficulty if Mr.
Field would consent to attend the conference on the next
1 (5day. Mr* Kenneth Young in his book favours this account
Field - and Smith who was present as his 
deputy and Treasury Minister - claims that 
a categorical assurance was given him by 
Mr. Butler that, if he attended the 
Conference next day, Southern Rhodesia's 
independence would be 'dealt with immediately 
and would present no difficulties'. Butler 
denies this, and is supported by ¥elensky 
and the civil servants wlio, however, were 
not present at all the talks in bedrooms and 
sitting rooms.
Field says the assurance was given off the 
record during a private evening talk, but that 
he then sought out Smith so that he, too,
could hear Butler' s words....... He recalls
that when they left Butler's room, Smith 
turned at the door, wagged his finger and said: 
'Now Mr. First Secretary of State, don’t you 
go back on your word on this.
Smith has agreed that this account is correct• 
But he has gone further and told mes17 'Because 
these chaps were always far too clever to put 
their promises in writing I am, unfortunately, 
unable to produce a document which would confirm 
my allegation. However, it is a fact (as X 
have said on many occasions and indeed Winston 
Field concurs) that we were inveigled into 
going to the Falls Conference on promises of 
independence made by the British Government and, 
in particular’, a definite promise made by Butler. 
I am prepared to state quite categorically that
16, Rhodesia and Independence; by Kenneth Young; J.M. Dent 
and Sons, Ltd.; 19&9» first published in 19^7 by Eyre 
and Spottiswoode. The account is given in the 1969 
edition on pages 89-90*
17. i.e. Kenneth Young.
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I heard him say to ¥inston Field that if* 
we were prepared to co-operate in the 
dissolution of4 the Federation by attending 
the Falls Conference, he would give an 
undertaking that as soon as the Conference 
was successfully concluded the British 
Government would attend to our wishes for 
independence and that we would he given 
our independence at a date not later than 
the date of granting independence to the 
other two members of the Federation. 1 
know it is my word against his but at 
least 1 do have Winston Field to support me 
in what X have to say#1
This account has provoked refutation from Lord
13(as he now is) Butler in his memoirs s
Winston Field, who became a friend and whose 
untimely demission of office and later demise 
X much regret, for long refused to attend a 
conference# He wished, as a prior condition, 
to have a guarantee of the independence of 
Southern Rhodesia. But the same facts stared 
me in the face then as confronted the Labour 
government laters to give independence to an 
administration unprepared to open multiracial 
paths to government is contrary botli to British 
tradition and to Commonwealth unity. Field 
subsequently claimed that I had actually 
offered him independence before the Victoria 
Falls Conference opened, and the story is 
reproduced, with embellishments from Ian Smith, 
in XCenneth Young * s book RHODESIA AMD INDEPEND­
ENCE# The story is not accurate. X know per­
fectly well that X did not give the Southern 
Rhodesians an assurance of independence, and 
so does Sir Roy W e l e n s k y . O n  the contrary,
I ASKED^O for assurances in terms which the 
Rhodesian Prime Minister was unable to accept. 
In the end, and almost literally at the end, 
Winston Field agreed to come to the conference.
18. The Art of the Possible; Lord Butlerj Hamish 
Hamilton Ltd., 19715 p. 226.
19• Prime Minister of the Federation (i.e. the Central 
African Federation) at the time•
20. Lord Butler 1s own emphasis•
No correspondence was exchanged between the
British and Southern Rhodesia Governments subsequent to
21.
the Victoria Palls Conference until November, 1963.
(4) TAX/ICS IN LONDON: TJ.D.I. FIRST MENTIONED
In January, 1964, Mr. Field visited London and
whilst there, had private and confidential talks with
the British Prime Minister, Sir Alex Douglas-Home, and
22the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Duncan Sandys• The
purpose of Mr• Field1s visit was not official negotiation 
with the British Qovernment on his country* s independence.
The threat of a Unilateral Declaration of Inde­
pendence (U.D.I.) by Southern Rhodesia was first officially 
mentioned in negotiations between the two sides in a
letter (dated February, 22, 1964) from Mr. Sandys to Mr•
23Field, part of which read: ,
The Press here have been reporting from 
different sources, that Southern Rhodesia 
may be contemplating a unilateral declar­
ation of independence. I sincerely hope 
that these reports are without foundation.
For I cannot believe that those who may be 
thinking like this, have fully weighed the 
likely consequences•
........... The African Nationalists in
Southern Rhodesia would probably set up a 
Government in exile, which many countries 
would recognise.
21. So stated in CMND. 2807, p. 5*
22. CMND. 2807, P* 9*
23. CMND. 2807, pp. 11-12.
A unilateral declaration of independence by 
Southern Rhodesia would not of course, make 
Southern Rhodesia legally independent. To 
take such action would be outside the Con­
stitution which Southern Rhodesia Ministers 
are pledged to work. The British Government 
would, therefore, be bound to take the view 
that this had no legal or constitutional 
validity*
¥e would be profoundly unhappy to see 
Southern Rhodesia1s long-standing connection 
with the Sovereign and with Britain impaired 
let alone severed. But I trust that no 
decisions in Salisbury will be based on the 
assumption that it would be possible for The 
Queen to become the separate Sovereign of an 
independent Southern Rhodesia outside the 
Commonwealth. This would inevitably involve 
the Crown in acute controversy within the 
Commonwealth.......... *.............. .
1 noticed, however, that you stated recently 
in Salisbury that negotiations with the 
British Government were still proceeding and 
tlxat you wished to continue to negotiate* . • • . • 
¥e entirely share your view.
(5) SOUTHERN RHODESIA HAS A NEW PRIME MINISTERS
MR* I.D* SMITH
The above was the last important communication
between Mr. Field and Mr. Sandys because soon Mr* Field
would be replaced2** as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia
by Mr. Ian Smith. Mr. Field was superseded by Mr•Smith
who was the first Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia to
25have been born there• In his first official letter to
the British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Mr.
24. YOUNG, op.cit*;p. 105.
25. YOUNG, op.cit.jp.108.
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Smith expressed his adherence to the posture maintained 
by his predecessor in regard to independence for his 
country. He also persisted in the assertion that the 
1961 Constitution had won acceptance from the Southern 
Rhodesia electorate because of the latter*s assumption, 
fostered by his country*s government at the time, that 
the Constitution submitted to them for their approval was 
to be that which they would retain xtfhen indepDendence was 
granted to them upon the dissolution of the Federation of 
which their country then formed a part.
26Mr. Smith's own words were:
27These proposals were admittedly a compromise 
in the sense that, as always in such negoti­
ations, no section of the community was fully 
satisfied. Nevertheless, on assurances from 
Sir Edgar IVhitehead, the Prime Minister of the 
time, that when His Government had negotiated 
tfxe new Constitution they had done so in the 
belief that if the Federation were to break 
up, Southern Rhodesia would have complete inde­
pendence, it was accepted by a substantial 
majority of the electorate. Xf this belief 
was unfounded, which we now understand is your 
Government's contention, then it is strange 
that no formal steps were taken at the time to 
infoi*m the Government of Southern Rhodesia that 
the view held by the British Government was in 
direct conflict.
........ To accept such a Constitution was a
momentous step for the electorate of this
country to take ....  their acceptance of this
compromise places upon the British Government 
an obligation to grant Southern Rhodesia its 
independence as a logical sequel to the brealc—up 
of the Federation. 28
26. CMND. 2807, p. 1.5 .
27* i.e. proposals for changes in the 1923 Constitution 
to be embodied in the proposed 1961 Constitution.
28. The letter was written on May 6, 1964.
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In his reply, the British Prime Minister con- 
29tended*
You claim that there was some understanding: 
between the British Government and the 
Government of Southern Rhodesia that * if 
the Federation were to break up, Southern 
Rhodesia would have complete independence,1 
X must make it clear that there is no 
substance whatsoever in this claim, and that 
no such assurance was ever at any time asked 
for by the Government of Southern Rhodesia 
or given by the British Government,
Towards the end of your letter you ask me 
to explain why tire British Government is 
unable to grant independence to Southern 
Rhodesia, I can assure you that we do not 
base ourselves on the argument that * times 
and circumstances have changed1. Our reasons 
were set out clearly in the message sent by 
Mr. Sandys to Mr. Field on 7 December.30 Xn 
this he said: *The present difflculty arises 
from your desire to secure independence on 
the basis of a franchise which is incomparably 
more restrictive than that of any other British 
territory to which independence has hitherto 
been granted11.
THE DOWNING STREET TALKS BETWEEN THE BRITISH AM) SOUTHERN
(6) MR. IAN SMITH STATES HIS POSITION
In early September, 1964, Mr. Smith flew to London
to hold talks with the British Government on the issue of
his country*s independence. The first meeting was held
32on September 7* Mr• Smith began by reiterating his
29. CMND. 2807, PP. 15-16.
30. 1963 CMND. 2807, p. 6 , at p. 7 .
31• CMND. 2807, pp. 21-33.
32. CMND. 2807, p. 21.
206.
claim that Southern Rhodesia should be granted independ­
ence forthwith because her people had acquiesced in the 
1 9 6'i Constitution on the understanding that their 
country would in exchange receive its independence upon 
the dissolution of the Federation “without more ado".
The British Prime Minister (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) replied 
that independence could only be granted to the three 
territorial units if their respective peoples consented 
to the terms on which their freedom was to be given.
Even if there had been, as Mr. Smith alleged, "an implied 
contract" to grant Southern Rhodesia her independence on 
the 1961 Constitution - and there never was such a 
contract - the agreement of her people was a condition 
that could not be demolished in any circumstances. Mr.
Smith responded by stressing that his country had got to
have her independence, and that one way of achieving this
33was by way of a unilateral declaration to that effect.
Mr. Smith assured the British Prime Minister that the 1961 
Constitution enjoyed the support of the majority of the 
African population. He held up the "political inexperience" 
of the "average African" as militating against the suit­
ability of a referendum to ascertain the wishes of the 
people. He also referred to the pernicious effect of 
intimidation by Africans on Africans. Mr. Smith made it 
plain to the British Prime Minister and Commonwealth 
Secretary (who was also present) that his inclination was
33. CMND• 2807, P. 23.
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to have African opinion assessed through "the estab­
lished tribal system" where the Chiefs and Headmen 
spoke for an overwhelmingly preponderant part of the 
African population* three million out of three and a 
half million (presumably these figures were those 
obtaining in 1964). The views of Europeans, on the 
other hand, could be expressed by the electorate, which 
was predominantly European. Sir Alec Douglas-Home 
replied with scepticism regarding the reliability of 
trusting a meeting of Chiefs and Headmen with the task 
of canvassing African opinion. Pie countered with the 
suggestion of a referendum, possibly one conducted by 
the Chiefs and Headmen. Mr. Smith declined the proposal- 
on the ground that the complications thrown up by the 
independence issue would be too great a challenge to the 
comprehension of the rural African. Again, a referendum 
would insinuate the inadequacy of the Chiefs, leading to 
a debilitation of the tribal system which Mr. Smith felt 
essential to have sustained. He informed the British 
Ministers that the nationalist political parties (which 
adamantly rejected any form of independence not accompanied 
by majority rule) had through their tactics of intimi­
dation already eroded the status of the tribal system, an 
erosion Mr. Smith was determined to halt. The Commonwealth 
Secretary again affirmed his preference for a referendum,
Mr. Smith repeated the unacceptability of a referendum, 
explaining that although the rural African could claim 
competence to choose between two candidates in a parliamentary
election, it would he "unrealistic" to expect him "to 
express any rational view" about the concept of inde­
pendence which was "vastly more complex and sophisticated". 
(A possible answer to Mr. Smith’s distinction, in my 
opinion, may lie in the fact that in a parliamentary 
election the choice is NOT between two candidates but 
between two or more policies of government which cannot 
always be said to be free from complexities or secure 
from sophistry.) The Commonwealth Secretary then made 
the suggestion that the Africans, on the assumption that 
their comprehension was unequal to the complexity of the 
independence isstie, might at least be allowed to choose 
representatives by way of adult suffrage to represent 
them at a conference for the resolution of the diffi­
culties confronting independence. Mr. Smith said that
35"yet another conference" was "out of the question".
The idea was repugnant to "local opinion." (Presumably 
he meant, however incredibly, the opinion of the majority 
of the population of Southern Rhodesia.)
The discussion was adjourned until the afternoon.
34. CMND. 2807, p. 25.
35* Tbe conference held in 1961 to discuss a new
Constitution had throughout the negotiations (up 
to U.D.I.) been maintained by Mr. Smith (and 
indeed his predecessor) as the final conference 
before independence.
(7) PIS AGREEMENT PERSISTS OVER THE METHOD OF 
ASCERTAINING AFRICAN OPINION
Upon the resumption of the meeting, Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home repeated his lack of confidence in the 
ability of a meeting of Chiefs and Headmen to ascertain 
the views of the African population regarding the issue 
of independence. 1-Ie reiterated the greater reliability 
of the referendum. Mr. Smith again declined to concur 
in the correctness of this view. Even a referendum 
controlled by neutral observers did not appeal to Mr, Smith
Sir Alec Douglas-Home then moved on to admonish 
Mr. Smith on the consequences of a unilateral declaration 
of independence, but Mr. Smith riposted that such conse­
quences were less appalling than 1 the gradual extinction 
of civilised life in the country”. Mr. Smith dis­
counted the possibility of an alternative government in 
exile in the event of U.D.I.
3The discussion stood adjourned until the next day.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, as he had done the previous 
afternoon, commenced by expx’essing dissatisfaction with 
the indaba of Chiefs and Headmen urged by Mr. Smith. He 
went on to impress U£>on the latter that independence under 
the 1961 Constitution was agreeable to the British Govern­
ment if it was so desired by the "great majority” of
36. CMND. 2807, P. 29.
37. CMND. 2807, p. 30.
Southern Rhodesia*s peoples. Hr. Smith stated that he
could not at that moment offer a plan to test African
opinion. He envisaged no difficulties in the test of
European opinion which he said could be conducted through
38voting on both *A* and *B* rolls. The Commonwealth
Secretary saw no reason to question the adequacy of the 
test to ascertain European opinion.
In the course of that discussion Mr. Smith said 
that he discounted the necessity for a unilateral declar­
ation of independence (U.D.I.) .-^ The meeting then pro­
ceeded to discuss matters which it is not proposed to 
record here.
On the third day of their meeting (September 9*
1964) the British Prime Minister made it unequivocally 
understood that even if Mr. Smith could demonstrate to 
the British Government's satisfaction that the 1961 Consti­
tution was endorsed as an independence constitution by 
the people of Southern Rhodesia, such an achievement would 
still not bind the British Government to grant the country 
its independence. The Commonwealth Secretary - with a 
better claim to reason - stated that if the Africans 
favoured the present constitution (i.e. the 1961 Constitution) 
the British Government could hardly take exception to their 
choice»
38. The 'A' roll comprised votes with higher qualifications 
in Terms of education and financial status than those 
voters who comprise the 'B* roll. The 'A* roll voters 
could return 50 members of the Legislative Assembly 
whereas the 1B ' roll voters could only elect fifteen 
members. The total membership of the Assembly was 6 5 .
39* CMND. 2807, P* 32.
21 1 .
It emerged from the discussion that Mr. Smith 
would revert to his decision to adopt U.D.I. if the 
British Government was to withhold independence despite 
being satisfied that the Southern Rhodesia people
40
approved the provisions in the 1961 Constitution.
Without introducing anything new the meeting
41adjourned until the fourth day. This meeting was brief. 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home insisted that the joint communique 
should make it clear that the United Kingdom Government 
reserved her position over the whole field of discussion. 
The Commonwealth Secretary added that both parties should 
feel free to announce that they were as yet uncommitted 
on the best way to ascertain African opinion.
Mr. Smith accepted from Sir Alec a written state­
ment to the effect that the United Kingdom Government did 
not promise anyone that the 1961 Constitution would see 
Southern Rhodesia through to its independence if its 
electorate approved that Constitution.
(Q) THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE
Part of the joint communique issued on September
11, 1964 read s ^
The British Prime Minister said that the British 
Government must be satisfied that any basis on 
which it was proposed that independence should be 
granted was acceptable to the people of the 
country as a whole.
40. CMND. 2807, p. 35.
41. i.e. the meeting on the fourth day, September 10, 1964
CMND. 2807, p. 37.
42. CMND. 2807, p. 395 CMND. 2464, p. 1.
The Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia 
accepted that independence must he based 
on general consent and stated that he 
was convinced that the majority of the 
population supported his request fox1 
independence on the basis of the present 
Constitution and franchise. The British 
Prime Minister took note of this statement 
but said that the British Government had 
as yet no evidence that this was the case. 
The Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia 
x'ecognised that tlie British Government were 
entitled to be satisfied about this and said 
that he would consider how best it could be 
demonstiiated so that independence could be 
granted.
The British Prime Minister said that the 
British Government would take account of 
any views which might be freely expressed 
by the population on the issues involved; 
but he must make plain that the British 
Government reserved their position. 4-3
Mr. Smith returned to Salisbury and proposed to 
hold, on October 22, 1964, an indaba of Chiefs and Headmen. 
On October 14, he transmitted to the British Government 
an invitation to send observers to witness this event.
The British Government instructed their High Commissioner 
in Salisbury to convey the unacceptability of the proposed 
indaba as an adequate test of African opinion. The reply 
was made on October 15, and Zxanded to Mr. Smith the next 
day. (The British General Election on October 15, 1964 
returned a new government but the incoming Commonwealth 
Secretary in a message to Mr. Smith on October 19, confirmed 
the unacceptability of the proposed indaba. This was held 
from October 21-26, followed by a referendum participable
4-3. The underlining is my own.
by the electorate on November 5? both these tests 
returned affirmative results.
(9) TI-IE UNITED KINGDOM HAS A NEW PRIME MINISTER I 
MR. HAROLD WILSON
The new British Prime Minister, Mr* Harold Wilson, 
expounded the attitude of the new government to Mr. Smith 
in a letter on December 21, 1964. Part of this message
44stated?
You ask me to state that my Government is 
not opposed to granting independence on 
the basis of the 1961 Constitution; and 
to deny that we will only grant independence 
to an African majority Government * ¥<p are
prepared to grant independence on ANY*5 basis 
which we are satisfied is acceptable to the 
people of the country as a whole. You your­
self, as recorded in the communique issued 
after your talks in London in September, 
have accepted that the British Government 
are entitled to be satisfied on this score.
¥e are only prepared to grant independence 
on the basis of the present Constitution and 
franchise if it is demonstrated to our satis­
faction that the people of the country as a 
whole wish for independence on that basis.
Of distinctive importance is the last sentence in 
the message because it conceded to Mr. Smith what the 
previous Administration had constantly withheld? namely 
that the consent of the territory»s population should be 
both a necessary and sufficient condition to the cession 
of sovereignty to Southern Rhodesia. The previous 
Administration had stipulated that such consent represented
44. CMND. 2807, p. 49.
45. My own emphasis•
214.
no more than a condition precedent the satisfaction of 
which would not oblige the United Kingdom Government 
to grant independence without more, if more should have 
been required by that government. That this was their 
attitude is clearly perceptible from the closing sentence 
in the joint communique of Sir Alec Douglas-Home and
4*6Mr, Smiths
The British Prime Minister said that the 
British Government would take account of 
any views which might be freely expressed 
by the population on the issues involved; 
but he must make it plain that the British 
Government reserved their position.
In February-March, 196 5 , the Commonwealth Secre­
tary (Mr# Bottomley) and the Lord Chancellor (Lord 
Gardiner) visited Salisbury to discuss the issue of 
independence with the Southern Rhodesia Government. In 
a letter from the Commonwealth Secretary to Mr. Smith six 
months later (September, 1 9 6 5) the former revealed what 
he had explained to Mr. Smith were the principles regarding 
independence which the British Government was determined 
to defend. On the occasion of that visit the Commonwealth
Secretary had articulated the following principles as 
4-7irreducible s
46. CMND. 2464, p. 1.
4 7 . CMND# 2 8 0 7, p. 66.
215.
(i) the principle and intention of unimpeded 
progress to majority rule, already 
enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would 
have to he maintained and guaranteed.
(ii) There would also have to be guarantees 
against retrogressive amendment of the 
Constitution.
(iii) There would have to be immediate improvement 
in the political status of the African 
population.
(iv) There would have to be progress towards 
ending racial discrimination.
(v) The British Government would need to be 
satisfied that any basis proposed for 
independence was acceptable to the people 
of Rhodesia as a whole (on which you had 
acimowledged our right to be satisfied. 48
TALKS AT 10, DOWNING STREET, BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT 
AND THE SOUTHERN RHODESIA GOVERNMENT, BETWEEN 5th AND 11th 
OCTOBER, 1965 ^9 " —
(1°) MR. SMITH CLAIMS THAT BRITAIN HAD PROMISED ON TWO 
SEPARATE OCCASIONS TO GRANT SOUTHERN RHODESIA 
EARLY INDEPENDENCE
The Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister arrived in 
London on October 4, 19 6 5• Talks between Mr. Wilson and 
his colleagues on the one hand, and Mr. Smith and his 
colleagues on the other, began the next day. The dis­
cussions on the fix'st two days (5th-6th October) have not 
been published, but wlxat went on then was recapitulated at
48. After Southern Rhodesia had resorted to U.D.I., the
British Government, in 1966, added a sixth principles 
"It would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of 
race, there was no oppression of majority by minority 
or of minority by majority." (CMND. 31?1, P* 3#)
49. CMND. 28079 PP. 69-95.
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the meeting on October 7 9 of which the discussion has 
been published.
Mr. Smith led the discussion by pointing to his 
claim that the Southern Rhodesia Government of the time 
had been induced to attend the Victoria Palls Conference 
in June 1963 011 the pledge received from the British 
Government that their attendance would secure for their 
country independence not latex1 than the demise of the 
Central African Federation. The Southern Rhodesia hopes 
had been dashed and the situation in their countx'y was 
such that tlxeir goverjxment was no longer amenable to 
fur the 11 delay being imposed on their wish for full 
sovereignty.
He proceeded to sustain his case by attracting 
attention to another promise alleged to have been given by 
the British Government in 1961 when the latter desired 
Southern Rhodesia to accept the 1961 Constitution. The 
promise was that the 1961 Constitution was acceptable to 
the British Government as an independence constitution 
when the Federation lapsed.
Mr. Smith made an oblique reference to alleged 
deception on the part of the British Government relating 
to a blocking mechanism to protect certain sections of the 
proposed Independence Constitution. He stated that he 
was allowed to entertain the belief that the mechanism 
would relate only to the entrenched (sometimes known as 
specially entrenched) parts of the proposed Constitution,
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whereas the British Government had now decided to tell 
him that the mechanism as proposed was applicable to all 
constitutional amendments. This suggestion, Mr. Smith 
argued, would reduce the country's internal freedom 
because at the time ordinary amendments could be effected 
with a two-thirds majority in the Legislative Assembly.
(The two-thirds majority in the 1961 Constitution did not 
have a one-third block of African-elected M.P.s, which 
blocking third a revised 1961 Constitution was required 
by the British Government to have.) Mr. Smith expressed 
his suspicion that the purpose of the blocking third had 
nothing to do with the British Government's concern for 
security against easy amendments, but could be identified 
as a desire to increase African representation in the 
Legislative Assembly.
Mr. Smith was prepared to envisage the composition 
of the blocking third as comprising the 15 African 'B*
Roll members obtaining under the 1961 Constitution to be 
combined with a Senate exclusively constituted of 12 Chiefs. 
The 12 Chiefs together witii the 15 member's of the Lower 
House would provide a blocking third when both Houses voted 
together (27 Africans in a Parliament of 62 member's).
Finally, Mr. Smith was prepared to add a million 
more Africans to the 'B* Roll after independence.
50. CMND. 2807, p. 70.
The offer to concede a blocking third may 
seem fair at first sight, tout when one realizes that 
this could only be obtained if all the African elected 
members agreed to unite, and in addition succeeded in 
persuading half the Chiefs in the Senate (all of whom 
owe their chieftaincies to Government appointment, are 
paid by the Government, and are dismissible by the latter 
when it considers them unfit) to vote with them. The 
Chiefs were to lose their seats in the Senate when they 
ceased to be Chiefs. In short the Senate was unavoidably 
to be subservient to the Government. But if the number 
of Senators was to be subtracted from the blocking third, 
African representation in Parliament would be 15 members 
out of 62 - a figure inadequate to constitute a blocking 
third. J
Mr. Smith added a rhetorical flourish to his con­
clusion by comparing his country's possible need to resort 
to U.D.I. with Britain's decision to enter the war in 
September, 1939* The British Ministers did not find it 
necessary to offer a refutation to the suggested parallel.
The Commonwealth Secretary replied that the United 
Kingdom Government could not share Mr. Smith's confidence 
on the proposed Senate. That Government was satisfied 
that convincing safeguards would be necessary to ensure the 
unimpeded progress towards majority rule demanded by the 
first principle. FurtXiermore, after independence, even
ordinary Constitutional amendments would call for greater 
protection than that offered under the 1961 Constitution.
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The Commonwealth Secretary then engaged :Ln the question 
of racial discrimination. Some "dramatic forward move" 
was called Tor to reduce discrimination*Concessions were 
not forthcoming from Mr. Smith on this point.
(11) WAS APPROVAL BY THE MAJORITY 03? SOUTHERN RHODESIANS
insufficYe n t?
The Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, then spoke 
of the need to satisfy public opinion "not only in the 
Piouse of Commons but also in the rest of the Commonwealth 
and in many foreign countries, unless they could demonstrate 
that the final settlement was consistent with the five 
principles in which they had sought to summarise the basic 
conditions of Rhodesia independence".
Xt is suggested that this is an extension of what
Mr. Wilson had previously agreed would be sufficient for
the granting of independence. Earlier, in a message to
*51Mr. Smith, Mr. Wxlson had affirmed
we are prepared to grant independence on 
any basis which we are satisfied is 
acceptable to the people of the country 
as a whole.
Xt is clear from this that Mr. Wilson had considered 
acceptability to the people (the fifth principle) as not 
only a necessary condition to independence but also as one 
that Ttfas of itself sufficient. Mr. Wilson had now 
noticeably resiled from his position established earlier, by
51. CMND. 2807, P. k9•
demoting a necessary and sufficient condition into an 
only necessary one. The former sufficient condition 
was made into one of five conditions, the total fulfilment 
of which was required before independence would be granted,
(12) THE) PROPOSED METHOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
The discussion then moved on to the procedure 
for the amendment of the entrenched sections in the 19^1 
Constitution, i.e. the second principle (no retrogressive 
amendment). Mr. Smith said that after independence the 
method of approving an amendment by motion to the Queen 
would become defunct. The alternative, the four racial 
referenda, was cumbrous and inequitable. Xt was unjust 
because one per cent of the population (he gave the Asian 
group as an illustration) could frustrate an amendment 
favoured by the other ninety-nine per cent. The Senate 
had been proposed, Mr* Smith explained, to obviate this 
awkward method. In reply to Mr, Wilson1s inquiry on 
whether the Senate members would be elected, Mr. Smith 
informed him that they would all be Chiefs.^
In subsequent debate over the amendment procedure, 
the Commonwealth Secretary sought to clax*ify the British 
Government's attitude by stating that the latter intended 
to retain the racial referenda, and only proposed the 
blocking third as an extra safeguard to those sections that
52. CMND. 2807, p. 73*
were not entrenched and conseqxiently not protected by 
53the referenda.
The Prime Minister, Mr. Wilson, was less inflexible 
than his Commonwealth Secretary. He sympathised with 
the stricture Mr. Smith passed on the referenda, but 
suggested that the elimination of the latter was acceptable 
on the understanding that the members providing the blocking 
third should themselves be democratically elected. The 
Prime Minister appeared to imply that there should only be 
one amendment procedure common to all sections of the 
constitution whereas his Commonwealth Secretary who pre­
ceded him, and his Lord Chancellor who spoke immediately 
after him, both asserted the distinction between ordinary 
and entrenched sections in relation to the respective 
methods of their amendments. Lord Gardiner, the Lord 
Chancellor, suggested that for ordinary amendments a 
blocking thix'd of 26 1B* Roll seats ought to be offered by 
Mr. Smith. By implication the Lord Chancellor supported 
his colleague the Commonwealth Secretary in preferring the 
retention of the referenda where entrenched sections were 
concerned.
(13) THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL STATUS OF 
THE AFRICANS
Mr* T\Tilson then piloted the meeting to consider the 
third principle, which demanded an immediate improvement in
53. CMND* 2807, p. 7^.
the political status of the Africans, Mr. Smith replied 
that he was prepared in satisfaction of this condition to 
put an additional one million Afx^ican voters on the 'B1 
Roll, Mr. Wilson rejoined that this would not give them 
any extra seats in the Legislature, to which Mr. Smith 
said that in marginal ’A 1 Roll seats such Africans would 
he able to exercise through ci’oss-voting a maximum influence 
of 25 per cent.
(14) THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The foux’th principle was then examined, which called 
for the progressive elimination of racial discrimination.
Mr. {Smith pointed out that the Land Apportionment Act was 
there to protect the Africans from European exploitation.
The Commonwealth Secretai'y reminded him that the Land 
Apportionment Act had been criticised by the Constitutional 
Council, and adjui’ed Mx*. Smith to admit publicly that, in 
px'inciple at least, the x,epeal of that Act was desirable.^’
(15) HOW WAS AFRICAN OPINION TO BE ASCERTAINED?
Debate was then transferred to the fifth principle, 
stipulating fox’ acceptability by the people of the tex,x,itory 
of any constitution that was proposed as the basis of inde­
pendence. Mx*. Wilson commenced by reiterating the unreli­
ability of the indaba as a test of African opinion. Mr.
54. CMND. 2807, p. 76.
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Smith countered by asking Mr. Wilson to propose an 
alternative. Mr* Wilson confessed that he found it 
difficult to umderstand why, if the referenda were 
suitable for the amendment of entrenched provisions in 
the 1961 Constitution, the same procedure could not be 
contemplated in relation to the ascertainment of the 
wishes of the people as regards the acceptability to them 
of the Constitution as a whole.
Mr. Smith repeated that this process enabled one 
per cent of the population to frustrate changes. Mr. 
Harper, the Southern Rhodesia Minister of Internal Affairs, 
asserted that the very fact that under the Constitution 
an alternative to the referenda was provided was an indict­
ment of the latter1s workability.
The meeting was adjourned until the next day.
After a recapitulation of their respective positions, Mr. 
Smith made the extraordinary suggestion that the two sides 
might noitf discuss the implementation of U.D.I. so that the
Southern Rhodesia Government could "place themselves in the
55most favourable possible position to counter it. The
extent of their action would depend on tlxe extent of the 
action taken by the United Kingdom Government".""*^ Mr. 
Wilson dismissed the suggestion that illegal action was 
suitable for discussion. Nothing new was said in further
55• "it" referred to the action that would be taken by 
the United Kingdom in the event of U.D.X.
56. CMND. 2807, p. 87.
negotiation. Part of the joint communique Por this
57series oP meetings reads
The British Ministers have described the 
Constitutional principles which the British 
Government would regard as the essential 
basis on which they could recommend to 
Parliament the grant oP sovereign independ­
ence to Rhodesia; and the Rhodesian 
Ministers have indicated the reasons Tor 
which they Peel unable to accept those 
principles in the measure required by the 
British Government. Despite intensive 
discussion, no means have been Pound op 
reconciling the opposing vieitfs• 5°
Further1 correspondence between Mr. Wilson and Mr. 
Smith aPter the latter1s return to Salisbury resulted in 
the arrival in that city oP Mi". Wilson on October 25, 19^5*
The next day discussions between the two sides began in 
earnest•
MEETINGS IN SALISBURY BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND SOUTHERN 
RHOPESIA^^GOVBnMENTS ON OCTOBER 26th AND 29th, '19^T~3'9
(16) THE PRELUDE TO U.P.I. - UNILATERAL DECLARATION 
OF INDEPENDENCE
Mr. Smith led the discussion (on October 26) by 
inPorming the British Ministers that he was not averse to 
the idea oP a Treaty between the two countries provided 
this guaranteed nothing more than the entrenched sections 
in the 1961 Constitution. The guarantee should not extend 
beyond the protection given to the entrenched sections. In 
short, the Treaty should be treated as being conPined to
57. CMND. 2807, p. 90.
58. The underlining is my own.
59. CMND. 2807, pp. 102-132.
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meeting the second principle of the British Government 
of preventing retrogressive amendment. He strongly 
reiterated that the sections in the Constitution that were 
not entrenched could not be considered for tiiis protection 
nor for security beyond the present requirement for a two- 
thirds majority in the Legislative Assembly to effect 
their amendment.
6 0Mr. Wilson complained that the restriction of 
the scope of the Treaty to the entrenched sections would 
mean that the number of *B' Roll seats would not be safe­
guarded and would be exposed to the danger of being reduced 
to only one seat by the Southern Rhodesia Government. Thus 
the Treaty as envisaged by Mr* Smith could not even 
wholly satisfy the requirement against retrogressive amend­
ment .
Mr. Smith's retort to this point is expressed in
61these words in the records:
Mr. Smith said that the power to take this 
action was already vested in the Rhodesian 
Government under the 1961 Constitution; and 
they could not contemplate their existing
powers being reduced ......... They could
only delay progress to majority rule by this 
means, because the Constitution ensured that 
the African majority would eventually prevail 
on the 'A' Roll. It was impossible to say 
how long this would take.
 ..............   The Rhodesian Government
must therefore retain their powers in this 
field, since, if it appeared at a future 
election that an African Government was 
probable and the Rhodesian Government felt, 
in the light of developments in the countries
60. CMND• 2807, p. 105.
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to the north of Rhodesia, that this would 
still be premature^ ,  they must have the 
power to delay such a majority by, for 
example a reduction in the *B 1 Roll seats.
In the last resort, this would be their 
only means of preserving their civilisation.
In the course of the discussion, Mr. Smith further 
suggested that as Africans took over the 'A* Roll seats 
the number of fB* Roll seats ought to be proportionately 
reduced. He said that the division of the electorate 
into two Rolls was an artificial arrangement to bring 
Africans to the voting rolls, and that 0nce they began 
gathering influence on the 'A* Roll, the artificiality of 
the two Roll system should be gradually eliminated.
Mr. Wilson criticised the suggestion as hostile 
to African representation. The measure, he insisted, was 
inimical to African enfranchisement in that although it 
would not reduce the actual number of Africans in the 
Legislative Assembly, it would give the Africans fewer 
members tlaan they would otherwise have been entitled to.
(17) IRRESOLVABLE) DISAGREEMENT OYER THE ASCERTAINMENT 
OF MAJORITY OPINION ~
The discussion then took place on the fifth 
principle (the principle of acceptability). Mr. Smitli 
ventured the opinion that compliance with this condition
62. The -underlining is my own: the opinion held by Mr.
Smith blatantly insinuates that the Southern Rhodesian 
Government must be endowed with the power to reverse 
the will of the country1s electorate. The Government 
of Southern Rhodesia was thus demanding insurance, in 
the case of an imminent electoral defeat, that would 
enable them to maintain themselves in office by the 
simple expedient of reducing the number of 1B 1 Roll 
seats which total fifteen in a Legislative Assembly 
of sixty-five seats.
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might take the form of* consulting the principal African 
Nationalist leaders, the Africans on the Constitutional 
Council, those Africans in the Parliamentary Opposition, 
and the Chiefs and Europeans. Mr. Smith suggested that 
the opinions of the last two groups could he taken for 
granted.
Mr. Wilson favoured this idea as a possibility. 
Mr. Smith invited Mr. Wilson to obtain the views of the 
leaders of the African Nationalists on the proposals made 
by the Southern Rhodesia Government (which were basically 
that the Constitution of 1961 should in most respects be 
retained)•
Throughout the course of this meeting Mr. X\Filson 
expressed his anxiety regarding the security of those 
sections of the Constitution that were not entrenched.
The second principle threw up many difficulties. First, 
the two sides could not agree on what was the manner in 
which the entrenched sections were to be protected after 
independence. Second, the two governments could not 
agree on whether or not the non-entrenched sections were 
to have security additional to the two-thirds majority 
in the Legislative Assembly that was already required to 
change them.
6 3The next meeting was on October 29th, 1965*
The long interval was to enable Mr. Wilson to consult
63. CMND. 2807, p. 111.
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extra-governmental opinion in Southern Rhodesia. Mr.
Wilson reported that the leaders of tlxe African 
Nationalists were united in their opposition to the 
granting of independence before majority rule. He said 
lie had impressed upon these leaders two important facts.*
First, he stressed to them that they could not expect 
British military intervention in the event of a unilateral 
declaration of independence. Second, they could not 
count on majority rule in the immediate future, nor was 
it possible to have them apprised of what precise period 
would elapse before such rule could materialise because 
the intervening period would to a large extent be dependent 
on African co-operation in multi-racial constitutional 
arrangements•
Mr. Wilson then proposed to Mr. Smith that the
two Governments should work out constitutional arrangements
based on a modified 1961 Constitution, and that these
arrangements should then, in compliance with the principle
of acceptability, be submitted to a referendum comprising
preferably all adult taxpayers in the territory. Mr.
Wilson suggested that a Royal Commission (with a Southern
Rhodesia Chairman and Majority) should be asked to suggest
arrangements for the concurrence of the two Governments,
and for subsequent submission to the proposed referendum.
In pursuance of its task, the Commission would be entitled
evidence.
to canvass opinion in the country as well as take formal/
He said that the Commission should not take more than two 
months to finish its work, and that therefore its creation
229.
would not entail the unnecessary delay which he under­
stood the Southern Rhodesia Government as anxious to 
avoid.
Mr. Smith replied by casting doubt on the ability 
of the proposed Commission to formulate a solution 
acceptable to both Governments.
Mr. Wilson again warned Mr. Smith of the dire 
repercussions of economic war in the event of U,D.1. when 
the latter, in response to his proposals, remained per­
suaded of the view that U.D.I, was still the best solution.'
At the conclusion of the meeting (the morning
session) the two parties gave their tentative approval to
the following formulation of the terms of reference for
6 5the proposed Royal Commissions ^
To recommend such amendments to the 19 61 
Rhodesia Constitution as will provide 
the basis on which Rhodesia may proceed 
to independence as rapidly as possible in 
a manner which will give effect to the 
principles enuxxciated by the British 
Government in their statement of 9th 
October 1 9 6 5? and will be acceptable to 
the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
Xn short, the Royal Commission should only submit 
such suggestions as would not only satisfy the two Govern­
ments but also the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. 
It is proposed to inquire into what the phrase ”people as a 
whole” means in relation to the territory. Does it mean
64. CMND. 2807, p. 113.
63. CMND. 2807, p. 116.
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the ma jority or even the ovex'whelming majority of the 
people irrespective of race? Or does it signify the 
SEPARATE consent of the constituent races? The 1961 
Constitution would seem to imply that the latter is the 
case in view of its provision for the four racial 
referenda. Mr. Smith, though he did not say so explicitly, 
appeared to reject both alternatives. The racial referenda 
were anathema because he alleged they were ctunbx'ous. So 
to him consent of the people could not have meant consent - 
unanimous consent - of the different races comprising 
the territory’s population. But the alternative, which 
is the majority opinion of the people irrespective of race, 
was similarly taboo to him. It would have been more 
honest of him to have publicly declared that because it 
was the opinion of the Europeans that they were the 
collective trustees of civilisation, it was imperative 
that they, and they alone, should decide the fate of the
country. Such an attitude, irrespective of its moral
merits, would at least have spared Mr. Smith and his
Government from having to contrive a meaning for the
phrase ’’majority of the people as a whole” that signified 
neither the opinion of the majority irrespective of race, 
nor the unanimous concurrence of the different constituent 
races of the territory (unanimity being taken in the sense 
that all the different races demonstrate by majorities 
that they favour a certain arrangement). My interpretation 
of the phrase is that ’the majority opinion of the people 
as a whole” must mean the separately ascertained consent of 
all the constituent races• This is especially so where
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“the people1 is qualified by the plirase "as a whole"*
Had the phrase simply been "the majority of the people" 
this would have meant that one race with an absolute 
majority would have been able to dictate to the other 
constituent races*
Between the session in the morning (which continued 
into the evening) and that at night, the Chief Justice 
of Southern Rhodesia gave Mr. Wilson a piece of paper 
containing Mr. Smith's proposals for a modified 1961 
Constitution. The proposals were succinct and read as 
follows:^
1, Independence on the 1961 Constitution.
Creation of House of Chiefs of 12.
2, Two-thirds majority of House of Chiefs 
voting with our Parliament have full power 
to alter any entrenched clauses.
3, Commission: Sir Hugh Beadles Chairman.
1 U.K. Choice.
1 Rhodesia choice.
Mr. Wilson to sign that he will grant inde­
pendence if Commission finds that this is 
acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a 
whole•
Mr. Wilson did not immediately display his response.
The meeting, broken off in the afternoon (October
672 9 , 1 9 6 5) , resumed at 9*10 p.m. Xt was destined to be
the last formal discussion between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith
before U.D.I. Mr. Smith commenced (and what he said was
66. CMND. 2807, p. 116.
67o CMND. 2807, p. 11?.
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68clarified by Mr. Harper ) by stating that he wished to 
restrict the function of the Commission to the assessment 
of the opinion of the people as a whole. He could not 
agree with Mr. Wilson that the Commission should be 
given the duty of devising a solution acceptable to both 
sides as well as to the people. He said it would be 
better for the two Governments to agree on an arrangement 
and ask the Commission to test its acceptability to the 
people. It emerged from the discussion that Mr, Wilson 
was not averse to this suggestion although he said it 
would be better for the Commission to submit an interim 
report regaz'ding the method or methods which it was pro­
posing for the ascertainment of Southern Rhodesia opinion.
Mr• Wilson further made it clear that he had not jettisoned 
his proposal that the Commission should have wider duties. 
Both leaders agreed (although Mr, Smith was subsequently
to deny this) that the report of the Commission would
69have to be unanimous to command conviction.
The point of intractability surfaced when it came
to the formulation of a solution acceptable to both
governments, Mr. Lardner-Burke (Southern RXiodesia Minister
of Justice and of Law and Order) gave it as his view that
to envisage agreement by the two sides on an arrangement
70was nwholly unrealistic M• Mr, Smith reiterated that the
68. Southern Rhodesia Minister of Internal Affairs and 
also of the Public Service.
69. CMND. 2807, p. 12 1.
70. CMND. 2807, p. 121.
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position of his government remained as it was during his 
discussions in London earlier on in the year. Mr. Wilson 
rejoined by affirming his adherence to the five British 
principles.
In the course of further discussion Mr. Wilson 
promised to seek the views of his Cabinet in London regard­
ing the narrow function which the Southern Rhodesia
government suggested the proposed Royal Commission should 
71have.
Upon the two sides agreeing to the Commonwealth 
Secretary and the British Attorney-General remaining in 
the country to resolve, or at least identify, the diffi­
culties and differences between the two parties, the
meeting adjourned. The two British Ministers remained
for another two days of discussions before a joint 
72'memorandum' ' was presented to the two governments on the 
positions established by these subsequent discussions.
As regards ordinary constitutional amendments the 
Southern Rhodesia Government were adamant that no 
additional safeguard ought to be given to what was already 
stipulated in the Constitution, i.e. a two-thirds
majority of the total membership of the Legislative
Assembly. The British demand of a "blocking third" was
found unacceptable.
71- CMND. 2807, p. 129.
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On the question of the entrenched sections the 
Southern Rhodesia government was prepared to concede a 
"blocking third" provided that this did not mean the 
addition of any more directly elected Africans for the 
purpose. They suggested a House of 12 Chiefs. The 
British Ministers were unable to find in the House of 
Chiefs that degree of assurance which, if that proposal 
was to replace the racial referenda, that House was re­
quired to offer. The British Ministers countered with 
the suggestion that a more reassuring substitute for the 
racial referenda would be a referendum of all adult tax­
payers . They had an alternative to this, which was that 
an amendment to an entrenched section could only be 
effected by a three-quarters majority, with the 1B 1 Roll 
seats augmented to a "blocking quarter". A fixed time 
stiould then elapse before the Bill became law. This was 
to allow the validity of the Bill to be challenged on 
either of two groundss (a) that the Bill discriminated 
or had the effect of discriminating unjustly between the 
races| (b) that it failed to pay proper respect to the 
rights and freedoms of the individual. The issue would 
be adjudicated on by the High Court, and the parties would 
have the right to appeal to the Privy Council. The Southern 
Rhodesia Ministers said they were willing to consider 
the alternative proposal of the "blocking quarter" subject 
to two riders. First, the blocking quarter was to be 
created by the addition of two Chiefs to the fifteen !B*
Roll seats. Second, the grounds of appeal should be 
confined to unjust discrimination between the races.
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The Southern Rhodesia Government expressed them­
selves determined that the scope of entrenchment should 
not extend beyond its present compass of sections. They 
would, as a concession, be prepared to entrench the 1B’
Roll seats provided the latter could be reduced propor­
tionately to the loss of ’A* Roll seats to non-Europeans.
The British Ministers wanted the unconditional entrenchment 
of the 1 A* and ' B ’ Roll seats. The British Ministers 
thought that a better idea was to abolish one ’B ’ Roll 
seat only after two 'A’ Roll seats had been xvon by non- 
Europeans . However, the proposal would create difficulties 
in the event of subsequent electoral reverses.
Surprisingly, the British Ministers were amenable 
to the Southern Rhodesia Government’s proposal for the 
extension of the ’B’ Roll franchise to "qualified indigenous 
adult taxpayers" px*ovided the qualification was acceptable 
to the British Government. I express astonishment because 
the increase in the 'B1 Roll franchise would not of itself 
give the Africans any more seats.
In subsequent correspondence, Mr. Smith denied
that he had given his agreement to the report of the
73Commission having to be unanimous. It was obvious that
the British Government could not accede to a majority report 
in view of the Southern Rhodesia majority in the Commission’s 
composition.
73. CMND, 2807, p. 139.
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On the eve of* U.D.I. (November 10, 196 5 ) Mr.
Wilson, in a message to Mr. Smith,’ put this question to
7 4the latter, which "was never answered?
If the United Kingdom Government undertook 
to commend to Parliament - whose sovereign 
rights must be reserved - a unanimous report 
by the Royal Commission to the effect that 
the 1961 constitution was acceptable to the 
people of Rhodesia as a whole as a basis for 
independence, would the Rhodesian Government 
give a corresponding undertaking that if the 
Royal Commission submitted a unanimous'5 
report to the effect that the 1961 Constitution 
was not acceptable to the people of Rhodesia 
as a whole as a basis for independence they 
would abandon their claim in this respect 
and would agree that a Royal Commission should 
then proceed to devise a new constitution for 
Rhodesia which would give effect to the 
principles enunciated by the United Kingdom 
Government in their statement of 9 October, 
1 9 6 5^  > and would be acceptable to the people 
of Rhodesia as a whole as a basis for 
independence?
(18) U.D.I. PROCLAIMED
On the morning of November 11, 1965? Southern 
Rhodesia or, strictly, those who purported to speak on 
her behalf, proclaimed U.D.I. This was how the Procla-
r y  ry
mation resounded?
74. CMND. 280?, P. 143.
75* Mr. Wilson appeared to assume that the alternative 
conclusions he envisaged for the Royal Commission 
would be unanimous• He failed to tell Mr• Smith 
what was to happen if the Commissions conclusion was 
unacceptable because it was not unanimously arrived at.
7 6 , i.e. the famous five principles•
77. Young, op.cit., p. 286.
Whereas in the course of human affairs 
history laas shown that it may become 
necessary for a people to resolve the 
political affiliations which have connected 
them with another people and to assume 
amongst other nations the separate and 
equal status to which they are entitled
•.... Therefore, We The Government of
Rhodesia, in humble submission to Almighty 
God who controls the destinies of nations, 
conscious that the people of Rhodesia have 
always shown unswerving loyalty and devotion 
to Her Majesty the Queen and earnestly 
praying that we and the people of Rhodesia 
will not be hindered in our determination 
to continue exercising our undoubted right 
to demonstrate the same loyalty and devotion, 
and seeking to promote the common good so 
that the dignity and freedom of all men may 
be assured, Do, By This Proclamation, adopt, 
enast and give to the people of Rhodesia the 
Constitution?^ annexed hereto*
God Save The Queen.
(19) WHY DID THE SERIES OF NEGOTIATIONS RESULT IN U.D.I* ?
It is important to note that although the arguments 
were protracted in time they were simple in substance.
The manoeuvres of the United Kingdom Government pointed 
to their invincible reluctance to grant independence before 
they could be satisfied of the definite prospect of 
eventual African majority rule, i.e. rule by the majority 
of the people of Southern Rhodesia, in Southern Rhodesia.
It is pertinent to stress that the United Kingdom did not 
insist on independence being given only when there is 
majority rule. On the other hand, the Government of 
Southern Rhodesia, whicli was in the hands of a minority race 
in the population, did not conceal that their endeavours
78. i.e. the M1 9 6 5" Constitution.
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were to ensure that majority rule was to he deferred 
indefinitely. Their claim was that the majority should 
not be allowed to govern because they were not yet com­
petent successfully to undertake so important and 
responsible a task as the government of the country.
The conflict was thus essentially one of 
political philosophies. The United Kingdom believed in 
the justice of majority rule, even if this was to be 
achieved progressively only, and not immediately. The 
Southern Rhodesia Government wished to carry on entrusting 
the Government of the country to members of the European 
community. The exclusion of Africans from effective 
political power was not ostensibly on grounds of colour, 
but the qualifications for voting which the Southern 
Rhodesia Government were prepared to contemplate and, 
even more restrictively, to practise, were such as would 
inevitably bring about this result.
When the Southern Rhodesia Government found that 
the views of the two Governments were irreconcilable, they 
sought to satisfy their aspiration of perpetuating 
European control in the country by a Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence, thus precipitating a constitutional 
breakdown, as yet unresolved, perhaps unresolvable, of 
worldwide political significance and - what is more relevant 
for the purposes of this study of considerable legal
239.
79interest•
The constitutional response of1 the United Kingdom, 
in conjunction with the other legal aspects of the 
Unilateral Declaration of* Independence, will he the 
subject of the two Chapters immediately following.
79* The Ministers of the Southern Rhodesia Government 
who made the incontestably illegal Declaration 
were, of course, dismissed by the Governor on the 
Instructions of the Queen. This course was the 
obvious immediate response of the lawful authorities 
who had to forestall a possible, spurious claim of 
United Kingdom condonation by those supporting the 
rebellion. The rebelling Cabinet, however, 
ignored their dismissal by the Governor, and purported 
to carry on under the "1965" Constitution.
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CHAPTER 7 
THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
We left Southern Rhodesia in the last Chapter with
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Because the
1961 Constitution which, until that Declaration, was in
effective operation governing the affairs of Southern
Rhodesia, had not made provision for independence to be
assumed in such a manner, the question agitated by this
event was whether the new form of government was valid in
law. In the nature of things, the United Kingdom maintained
that such a unilateral severance was constitutionally 
1nugatory. With a predictably equal determination the new 
government in Southern Rhodesia (which chose to call the 
country “Rhodesia") had claimed independence in terms of 
their "1965 Constitution"^.
(i) REACTIONS TO U.D.I.
On November 16, 1 9 6 5? the United Kingdom passed
the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1 9 6 5* It began with a declar-
3ation of Southern Rhodesia's status. S.1 provides %
It is hereby declared that Southern Rhodesia 
continues to be part of Her Majesty's dominions, 
and that the Government and Parliament of the 
United Kingdom have responsibility and juris­
diction as heretofore for and in respect of it.
1. It passed the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1 9 6 3s 1965 Chapter 
?6. Under the authority of this Act the Southern Rhodesia 
Constitution Order, 1965 was enacteds 1965 S.l 1952.
2. This Constitution was proclaimed on the date of U.D.I. 
and "ratified and confirmed" by the "Parliament of 
Rhodesia" in 1966 in The Constitution (Ratification) Act.
3• S.l, Southern Rhodesia Act, 1 9 6 5.
The Act then empowered the Queen™in-Council to 
do various things in relation to Southern Rhodesia. This
4was done in S.2, which provides?
2.-(1 ) Her Majesty may by Order in Council 
make such provision in relation to Southern 
Rhodesia, or persons or things in any way 
belonging to or connected with Southern 
Rhodesia, as appears to Her to be necessary 
or expedient in consequence of any unconsti­
tutional action taken therein.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality 
of subsection (1 ) of this section an Order
in Council thereunder may make such provision - 
(a) for suspending, amending, revoking 
or adding to any of the provisions 
of the Constitution of Southern 
Rhodesia 1961j 
to for modifying, extending or sus­
pending the operation of any 
enactment or instrument in relation 
to Southern Rhodesia, or persons 
or things in any way belonging to 
or connected with Southern Rhodesia;
(c) for imposing prohibitions, restrictions 
or obligations in respect of trans­
actions relating to Southern Rhodesia 
or any such persons or things,
as appears to Her Majesty to be necessary or 
expedient as aforesaid5 and any provision made 
by or under such an Order may apply to things 
done or omitted outside as well as within the 
United Kingdom or other country or territory 
to which the Order extends•
(3) An Order in Council under this section 
may make or authorise the making of such inci­
dental supplemental and consequential provisions 
as appear to Her Majesty to be expedient for the 
purposes of the Order, and any provision made by 
or under such an Order may be made to have effect 
from any date not earliex' than 1 1 th November 19 6 5 .
4. S.2., Southern Rhodesia Act, 1 9 6 5. (Only four 
out of five of its subsections will be 
reproduced here•)
(4) An Order in Council under this 
section may be revolced or varied by a 
subsequent Order in Council thereunder.
Under the a^^thority of the Act the Southern
Rhodesia Constitution Order {19 6 5 ) was made. S* 2 •
declares the invalidity of* any constitution other than
such as may be authorised by a United Kingdom Act of
6Parliament. Xt readss
2.-(1 ) It is hereby declared for the 
avoidance of doubt that any instrument 
made or other act done in purported 
promulgation of any Constitution for 
Southern Rhodesia except as authorised by 
Act of Parliament is void and of no effect•
(2) This section shall come into 
operation forthwith and shall then be 
deemed to have had effect from 11th November
1 965 e
The Order then went on to deprive the Legislature 
7of Southern Rhodesia of all authority and vested legisla­
tive authority in tine Queen-in-Council« This was effected
by SO* wliich prescribeds
3 (l) So long as this section is in oper­
ation -
(a) no laws may be made by the Legis­
lature of Southern Rhodesia, no 
business may be transacted by the 
Legislative Assembly and no steps 
may be taken by any person or 
authority for the purposes of or 
otherwise in relation to the consti­
tution or reconstitution of the 
Legislative Assembly or the election 
of any person to be a member thereof; 
and Chapters II and III of the Consti­
tution shall have effect subject to the
5 • 196.5 S • 1. 1952. (Made on November 16 , 1965 • )
6. S.2., 1 9 6 5. S.l. 1 9 5 2.
7. i.e. the Legislature under the 1961 Constitution. It 
should foe noticed that the Judiciary in Southern 
Rhodesia remained unaffected by the Act and Order.
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foregoing provisions of this paragraph;
(b) a Secretary of* State may, by order in 
writing under his hand, at any time 
prorogue the Legislative Assembly; and
(c) Her Majesty in Council may make laws 
for the peace, order and good government 
of Southern Rhodesia, including laws 
having extra-territorial operation.
(2) Orders in Council made under subsection
(l)(c) of this section may confer powers 
(including the power to make laws) and impose 
duties upon persons and authoi'ities as well 
outside as within Southern Rhodesia.
(3 ) References in the Constitution^ or in 
any other law in force in Southern Rhodesia to 
a law of the Legislature of Southern Rhodesia 
or to an Act of that Legislature shall be 
construed as including references to an Order 
in Council made under subsection (1 ) (c) of this 
section.
(4) Orders in Council made under subsection
(1 ) (c) of this section shall, for tlie purposes 
of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, be 
statutory instruments within the meaning of 
that Act and shall be laid before Parliament 
after being made.
(5 ) This section shall come into operation 
forthwith and shall then be deemed to have 
had effect from 11th November 1 9 6 5*
The Order further deprived the rebelling Southern 
Rhodesia Ministers of their executive authority (i.e. the 
right to advise the Governor, etc.), and vested it in a
Secretary of State of the United Kingdom. It proceeded to
1 9do this by S.4, which prescribeds
4.-(1) So long as this section is in operation -
(a) the executive authority of Southern 
Rhodesia may be exercised on Her 
Majesty’s behalf by a Secretary of 
State;
8, i.e. the 1961 Constitution.
9. S.4, 1965. S.l. 1952.
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(b) sections 43? 44, 45 and 46 of 
the Constitution shall not have 
effect|
(c) subject to the provisions of any 
Order in Council made under section 
3(1)(c) of this Order and to any 
instructions that may be given to 
the Governor by Her Majesty through 
a Secretary of State, the Governor 
shall act in his discretion in the 
exercise of any function which? if 
this Order had not been made, he 
would be required by the Constitution 
to exercise in accordance with the 
advice of the Governor’s Council or 
any Mini s t er;
(d) a Secretary of State may exercise 
any function that is vested by the 
Constitution or any other law in 
force in Southern Rhodesia in a 
Minister or a Deputy Minister or a 
Parliamentary Secretary; and
(e) without prejudice to any other pro­
vision of this Order, a Secretary 
of State may exercise any function 
that is vested by the Constitution
or any other law in force in Southern 
Eihodesia in any officer or authority 
of the Government of Southern Rhodesia 
(not being a court of law) or (whether 
or not he exercises that function 
himself) prohibit or restrict the 
exercise of that function by that 
officer or authority.
(2) Where, in pursuance of subsection (1)(d) 
or subsection (1 ) (e) of this section, a 
Secretary of State exercises any function that 
is vested by the Constitution or any other law 
in force in Southern Rhodesia in a Minister,
a Deputy Minister, a Parliamentary Secretary or 
any other officer or authority of the Government 
of Southern Rliodesia, he shall be exempt from 
any requirement imposed on that Minister, Deputy 
Minister, Parliamentary Secretary or other 
officer or authority to consult with, or to 
seek or act in accordance with the advice of, 
any other person or authority.
(3 ) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other 
law, any function that is vested by this section 
in a Secretary of State may be exercised by him 
by order in writing under his hand or in such
o tlier manner as he considers appropriate.
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(4) References in this section to an 
officer of the Government of Southern 
Rhodesia shall he construed as including: 
references to the Governor,
This was the LEGAL response of the United Kingdom 
Government. The latter, however, notwithstanding the 
fierce austerity of its language, failed to enforce the 
assertions in the Act and Order. Xt will be explained by 
the present writer in a later Chapter how there cannot be 
validity without efficacy. Therefore it is submitted 
that the Act and Order were not valid.
The Governor of Southern Rhodesia under the 19*51
Constitution was instructed by the Queen to dismiss the
rebelling government. The message the Governor issued
11in response to hxs Instructions read thus?
The Government have made an unconstitutional 
declaration of independence,
I have received the following message from 
I-Ier Majesty* s Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations:
*X have it in command from Her Majesty 
to inform you that it is Her Majesty*© 
pleasure that, in the event of an unconsti­
tutional declaration of independence,
Mr• Ian Smith and tlie other persons 
holding office as Ministers of the 
Government of Southern Rhodesia or as 
deputy Ministers cease to hold office,
X am commanded by Her Majesty to 
instruct you in that event to convey 
Her Majesty*s pleasure in this matter 
to Mr. Smith and otherwise to publish 
it in such manner as you may deem fit.*
X11 accordance with these instructions X have 
informed Mr. Smith and his colleagues that 
they no longer hold office. I call 011 the 
citizens of Rhodesia to refrain from all acts 
which further the objectives of the illegal
11. The message was reproduced in Lord Reid* s judgment 
in Modzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke: /J968/ 3 All- E.R. 
56 1, at p. 5 6 7. The message was issued on the day 
of U.D.X.
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authorities. Subject to that, it is 
the duty of all citizens to maintain law 
and order in the country and to carry on 
with their normal tasks. This applies 
equally to the judiciary, the armed 
services, the police, and the public 
service.
The message of the Governor was, however, ignored 
by the rebelling government of Southern Rhodesia• The 
territory* s abiogenetic parturition occurred with the 
declaration of Independence reinforced with the new Con­
stitution, the «19 6 5" Constitution. This "Constitution1*, 
proclaimed at the date of U.D.I., was "ratified" by the 
"Parliament of Rhodesia" in what expressed itself to be 
the Constitution (Ratification) Act, 1966 . The "19 6 5" 
Constitution was set out in the Schedule to the 1966 Act. 
The new Constitution proceeded to declarb the annulment of 
the 1961 Constitution and its own succession as the apex of 
authority in Southern Rhodesia. (Both the 1966 Act and 
the Constitution .ratified therewith referred to the terri­
tory as "Rhodesia1* - deleting the word "Southern" which was 
embodied in the 1961 Constitution.) S.2 of the new
Constitution read:
(1 ) The Constitution of Southern Rhodesia,
1961, granted to Rhodesia on the 6th 
December, 1961, under the Southern Rhodesia 
(Constitution) Order in Council, 19 6 1 , and 
the provisions of the said Order (hereinafter 
referred to as the old Constitution) are 
hereby declared to be of no force or effect 
in Rhodesia immediately before the appointed 
day and shall at such time be deemed to be 
repealed and revoked by this Constitution 
and no longer operative in and for Rhodesia.
zhi.
(2 ) The new Constitution as set forth 
herein (hereinafter referred to as this 
Constitution) shall come into operation 
immediately on the expiration of the day 
preceding the appointed day and shall 
thereafter in Rhodesia have the full force 
and effect of law.
(3 ) For the purposes of this Constitution 
the * appointed day1 means the day on which 
this Constitution is published in the 
Gazette. 12
A novel feature introduced by the nextf Constitution
is that "Parliament" is not synonymous with "Legislature"
13in Southern Rhodesia. S.12 defined the Legislature thus
The Legislature of Rhodesia shall consist 
of the Officer Administering the Government^ 
as the representative of Her Majesty's and 
a Par3.iament.
The legislative body in Southern Rhodesia was thus, 
under the 1965 Constitution, the Legislature, and not the 
Parliament, of Rhodesia.
Both the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia had 
thus asserted their diametrically opposed views of the 
legal position consequent on U.D.I, Who was to resolve 
this monumental confrontation? Inevitably the laws of the 
new government would be impugned on the grounds of their
12. i.e. November 11, 1 9 6 5, the date of U.D.I.
13• In view of the present dispute over the status of
Southern Rhodesia, the terms "Rhodesia" and "Soiithern
Rhodesia" will be used interchangeably througliout 
this thesis.
1^ . The new constitutional Head of State in the country,
although formally lie purported to represent the
Queen.
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alleged illegitimacy. Such a challenge would elevate
the issue to the very constitutional status of the new,
usurping government itself. And where else would laws
be impugned but before the courts of the realm? The
expected constitutional apocalypse emerged from the case
1 5of Modzimbamuto v. Lardnex1-Burke.
(ii) THE LITIGATION IN THE GENERAL DIVISION OF 
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA
On November 5» 19&5 (U.D.I. was on the 11th), the
Governor, on the advice of Inis Ministers, had issued a
Proclamation of a State of Emergency. Regulations were
promulgated under it in pursuance of the p>owers contained
16in S.3 of 'the Emergency Powers Act (Southern Rhodesia).
The period of Emergency was to expire after three months 
unless before then a fresh Proclamation was made. When the
15• This juristically enriching case was litigated 
first in the General Division of the High Court 
of Southern Rhodesia - 1966 R.L.R. 756 j then 
in the Appellate Division of the High Court - 
1^68 (2) S.A. 284, 457 and finally before the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council - £\9
1 A.C. 645. Because there was a second applicant 
besides Mrs. Madzimbamuto, the case is also 
cited as Baron v. Ayre in the Rhodesia High Court, 
although not in the Privy Council judgment because 
Baron did not appeal to that tribunal.
Chapter 33» Southern Rhodesia.
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expiry date arrived in February the country had already 
undergone the constitutional climacteric of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Under the pro­
visions of* the document asserting itself* to be the 111965 
Constitution" the office of Governor was abolished, and 
was superseded by that of* the Officer Administering the 
Government who, among other things, was empowered, as the 
Governor had once been authorised, to publish a Proclam­
ation of Emergency. Such a Proclamation was in fact
17 18made in February by the said Officer who in May issued
another Proclamation to extend yet again the period of
Emergency. The first applicant * s husband (Daniel
Madzimbamuto) was, previously to U.D.I., legally detained,
/ v 19as was the second applicant (Baron), Their detentions
were purportedly renewed under powers exercisable after 
the purported Proclamations of Emergency in February and 
May, 1966. The applicants challenged the authority of the 
Officer Administering the Government to issue such Proc­
lamations , thus inevitably impugning the validity of the
17• ■ February 4, 19 6 6.
18. May 3 > 1966.
19* Since this case substantively concerns tXae legality 
of the "1 9 6 5” Constitution and since both 
applicants contested the latter*s validity, 
reference's to tXie first applicant sXiould, unless 
otlxerwise stated, be taken to include the second 
applicant. Tlie second applicant, liowever, did not 
talce his case to tlie Judicial Committee of the 
Pr ivy Connoil.
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"1965” Constitution from whence the said Officer's 
authority purported to emanate. Tlie respondent in the 
litigation was Desmond Lardner-Burke, the Minister for 
Law and Justice, and hence the person responsible for 
the detentions under the Emergency Powers Act.
The case was heard at first instance by the 
General Division of the High Court of Southern Rhodesia, 
constituted in this instance by Lewis and Goldin, JJ.
The case for the first applicant was presented by Mr.
S.W. Kentridge. Mr. Kentridge commenced by pressing the 
point that under the Emergency Powers Act (he chose to 
disregard the purported amendment in March, 1966, which 
had substituted "Officer Administering the Government" 
for "Governor") only the Governor could proclaim a state 
of emergency, and he could only do this after an empower­
ing resolution by the Legislative Assembly. (Mr.
Kentridge again disregarded the purported amendment in 
March, 1966, which had thrust aside the term "Legislative 
Assembly" in the Emergency Powers Act, for the insertion 
of the term "Parliament", the latter term being defined 
with reference to the "I9 6 5" Constitution.) Counsel 
recognised that his client could only succeed by the 
successful impugnment of the "1965" Constitution. He 
pointed to the fact that the "1965" Constitution had not 
been the product of the amendment procedure laid down 
under the 1961 Constitution, from which, counsel argued, 
the High Court derived its authority. The implication 
which was the gist of counsel's submission, was that because
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the court owed its power and existence to the 1961
Constitution it was only competent to adjudicate on and
recognise such laws as were able to sustain their
validity when tested by the criteria established for this
20purpose by the said Constitution. Counsel urged that
the court should be steadfast in upholding its source of 
authority, and resist deflection from duty by public 
opinion or by the constraints of force.
Mr. Kentridge anticipated tlie respondent’s asser­
tion that the condition known as state necessity existed 
in the country to validate the detentions irrespective of
the validity of the ”1 9 6 5" Constitution, by repudiating
21this condition as unknown to the territory’s laws.
Since the doctrine of state necessity is alleged by those
who resort to it to have emanated from Grotius, it is
proposed here to give the relevant extract from his Boole
— De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Bk. 1, Ch. XV, Sect. XV, -
which readss
1. We have spoken of him who possesses, 
or has possessed, the right of governing.
It remains to speak of the usurper of 
power, not after he has acquired a right 
through long possession or contract, but 
while the basis of possession remains 
unlawful. Now while such a usurper is in 
possession, the acts of government which he 
performs may have a binding force, arising 
not from a right possessed by him, for no 
such right exists, but from the fact that 
one to whom the sovereignty actually belongs, 
whether people, king, or senate, would 
prefer that measures promulgated by him 
should meanwhile have the force of law, in
20. 1966 R.I/.R. 7 5 6 , p. 759.
21. 1966 R.L.R. 756, p. 759.
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order to avoid tlie utter confusion which 
would result from the subversion of laws 
and suppression of the cotirts*
Reverting now to the presentation of the case by- 
Mr, Kentridge, the latter claimed that when Grotius 
expatiated on the imperative need to obey the usurper in 
preference to inhabiting in chaos, the author was writing 
of* the situation in international law, and was in any case 
only exhorting citizens concerning their response in such 
a contingency. Counsel was anxious to insist that
22Grotius never meant to give direction to the courts*
Counsel refuted the relevance of the term ”de
facto” and f,de jure” governments to a court of municipal
jurisdiction* He was insistent that such terms were
only appropriate in the context of litigation in foreign
tribunals when the status of governments foreign to those
23tribunals was in issue*..
Counsel further contended that the usurping 
government was illegal because the Secretary of State for
2 hCommonwealth Affarrs had certified to that effect*
Counsel pressed on to examine the concatenation 
of cases in the United States of America heard after the 
Civil War where recognition was given to certain acts per­
formed in the secessionist states during the course of the 
25conflict, ^ The cases were litigated in the Supreme Court
2 2. I.966 R.L.R. 756, p. 760.
23* 1966 R.T,R. p. 7 5 6 , at p. 760.
24, 1966 R.L.R. p. 7 5 6 , at p, 761*
25* 1966 R.T.R* p. 755, at p. 762,
of the United States. He endeavoured to wrest these 
authorities into a separate category from that into wlaich 
the present case settled.. The first distinction offered 
by Counsel rested on the alleged sovereignty of the indi­
vidual secessionist states as compax,ed with the status of 
Southern Rhodesia as a British Colony. The contention 
of counsel which attributed sovereignty to the component 
states of the United States federation does not find 
support in constitutional theory. The fact that states 
in the U,S.A, enjoy power in certain defined functions of 
government does not confer sovereignty on them but merely 
invests them with a measure of autonomy with which the 
Federal Government, in the absence of constitutional amend­
ment, cannot interfere. The powers of the Federal and 
State Governments are defined in the Constitution of the 
United States. Tlie distribution of power is made by this 
Paramount Instrument of Government. The existence of a 
claim to power which defies the apportionment dictated by 
this Instrument is a direct denial of the ultimacy of the 
latter, and therefore unconstitutional in terms of the 
latter. The normal inviolability of the powers assigned 
to the constituent territorial units of the United States 
does not entitle any of those units to defy the authority 
of the very Instrument that has vested that inviolability 
in them, and should any of the said units attempt such 
defiance its action cannot be more constitutional than that 
taken by a colony defying the jurisdiction of the imperial 
authority. If both actions are rebellious and illegal it
2$k.
is wrong of counsel to have suggested that the position of 
the seceding states of the U.S.A. in the Civil War was dis­
tinguishable from that of Southern Rhodesia after U.D.X.
The second basis of distinction formulated by 
counsel related to the fact that the cases in the U.S.
Supreme Court were heard after the Civil War where the 
parties to the litigation were not seeking to qtiestion the 
authority of the Federal Constitution and where a decision 
of the court either way would not have undermined the 
court’s acknowledgement of the supremacy of the Constitution, 
or conceded the claims of the secessionist states to dis­
sociation from the Federation. If the cases had been 
heard, went on counsel, during the Civil War the recognition 
of acts performed within the secessionist states and in 
conformity only with the rules of government obtaining in 
those states, would no doubt have been withheld because of
the detriment such recognition would inflict on the cause
26of constitutionality.
Counsel was careful to stress that the acts recog­
nised by the U.S. Supreme Court were acts performed in the 
private sector. No administrative measures of the 
secessionist states were granted validity, even ex post
facto. So, counsel reasoned, the U.S. cases could not
27assist the respondent. '
26. 1966 R.L.R. 7 5 6 , at p* 762, Counsel did not mention
the detriment expressly, but that must have been the 
only tenable basis for his submission that acts during 
the conflict were to be upheld after the conflict but 
that similar acts were not to be recognised during the 
conflict.
27. 1966 R.I/.R. 756, p. 762.
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28The respondent's case was argued by Mr. Rathouse.
He chose as his proposition of law the theory that when a 
legal order lost its efficacy its validity vanished with 
the latter. When a new order assumed the efficacy 
surrendered by the old, that new order succeeded to the 
letter's paramountcy. The facts of the situation, counsel
proceeded, attested to the efficacy and hence validity of 
the " 1 9 6 5” Constitution.^
Mr. Rathouse then adopted the alternative sub­
mission that even if the government of Mr. Smith was 
unlawful the necessity for the preservation of peace and 
the maintenance of law and order required that purported
30laws directed to these ends should be accorded validity.
He interpreted the succession of cases in the U.S. Supreme 
Court after the Civil War to which opposing counsel had 
referred and from which the latter had sought to distinguish 
the position in Southern Rhodesia, as authority for the 
proposition that all acts of a usurping government, includ­
ing acts performed under its authority, are valid insofar
31as these do not infringe the just rights of citizens. As
the acts of the Smith Government were directed to the
preservation of the citizens' rights against sabotage and
subversion, they ought to be validated on the authority of
32the cases, counsel concluded.
28.. 1966 R.L.R. 756, p. 767.
29. 1966 R.L.R. 756, p. 767.
3 0 . 1966 R.L.R. 756, p. 770.
31. 1966 R.L.R, 756, p. 770.
32. 1966 R.L.R, 756, p. 772.
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The Solicitor-General, also Tor the respondent,
asserted that opposing counsel were wrong to test the
validity oT the ’* 19^5” Constitution by the lodestone oT
the amendment procedure enjoined by the 1961 Constitution,
because where the latter was overthrown, its canons oT
legitimacy were inappropriate criteria oT constitution- 
33ality.
The point made by the Solicitor-General was
dissented from by Mr* Kentridge* A; part oT the latter*s
reply, taken Trom the report oT the case, will now be 
3hquotedt
To disregard the principle oT legitimacy is 
to Tollow the edict oT whoever happens to 
be in power. The court has not accepted 
oTTice under the 1965 Constitution, and 
should not apply laws made under it. The 
authorities relied on by respondents are 
philosophic or political and, in some cases, 
a mere discussion oT expediency. To adopt 
the Kelsen approach is to take a political 
decision. The other writers are critical 
oT Kelsen. The court can only reconsider 
its position iT it Tinds that its orders 
will not be carried out 5 as long as it sits 
under, and applies the laws as deTined in 
the 1961 Constitution, it must assume it 
will be obeyed.......... Grotius never con­
templated a situation where a court was 
sitting in mediae res to decide what the law 
is. He was dealing with when a citizen is 
entitled to make wax' on his ruler. However 
compelling the reality oT the situation, it 
cannot receive support Trom the court. The 
Tact that many citizens observe the laws oT 
the present Government is no indication oT 
their legality. They may be doing so Tor many
Q  h*   "■■■■■ -■—  — ■■■■■*   rr       ■ 11 111 .m«.i i.M-ir— mi.iirrr-iirniiaKr-i
reasons•30 ........In the present case, the
33. 1966 R.L.R. 7565 p. 772.
3k, 1966 R.L.R. 7 5 6 , pp. 773^.
35« The underlining is mine. Counsel thus makes emphatic
his divergence Trom Kelsen*s thesis in regard to
eTficacy being the sole criterion oT validity.
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court.......derives its jurisdiction
from the Queen, owes its allegiance to 
the Queen and must recognize the Queen 
as sovereign and as possessing her lawful 
prerogatives........ What is done to
first applicants husband and second 
applicant is against the Constitution.• • . ..
As the court derives from the Queen*, 
before it can recognize Mr. D u p o n t a s  
head of the lawful Government, the Queen 
must recognize him. Otherwise, the court 
cannot. If the court does not say this,
it ceases to be Her Majesty's court.. .
There is no doctrine imported into our law 
that a court must call something lawful 
which is against its constitution........
The law is clear. The court must uphold it*
Even enjoining the court to maintain law 
and order, the Queen or the Governor cannot 
change the law. It might result in the 
Government appointing judges who were pre­
pared to uphold the 1965 Constitution, but 
this would not lead to chaos.
37Mr. May, for the second applicant, in his reply 
maintained that unless a rebellion amounted to a successful 
revolution, the court would have to regard the old order 
as effective. According to Mr. May the rebellion had yet 
to prove itself successful in the territory. It is note­
worthy that whereas Mr. May was prepared to acknowledge the 
validity of Kelsen* s Thesis (counsel merely asserted that 
the facts were not such as to attract its application, thus 
conceding its validity in the right circumstances), Mr. 
Kentridge (for the first applicant and thus on the same 
side as Mr• May) had rejected the Thesis as utterly 
philosophical.
3 6 . The Officer Administering the Government under the 
"1 9 6 5" Constitution.
37. 1966 R.L.R. 756, pp. 77^-5-
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The case was heard in June and July (talcing 
seven days in all) and the judgments were delivered in 
September (1966 ) . The first judgment was given by Mr. 
Justice Lewis.
(a) JUDGMENT OF LEWIS, J.38
His Lordship delineated the Tactual situation
39arising on and after U.D.I. in the following synopsis s
............o..the Declaration of
Independence occurred on the 11th 
November, 19 6 5» terms of which the 
Prime Minister and the members of his 
Cabinet purported to declare this 
country an independent sovereign state 
and to give to the country what I shall 
call 1 the 1965 Constitution1 in place of 
the existing 1961 Constitution. Since 
then, there can be no doubt that the 
factual position is that the Prime Minister 
and the members of his Cabinet, although 
dismissed by the Queen, have continued to 
exercise the powers which they formerly 
exercised prior to the Declaration of 
Independence, notwithstanding their dis­
missal . Again, as a matter of fact, it 
is clear that the Governor, although still 
resident in this country, has not exercised 
his powers as such and that the third res­
pondent^ in the application of Leo Baron 
had purported to exercise the Governor1s 
powers as 1 the Officer Administering the 
Government1 in terms of the 1965 Consti-- 
tution. Finally, the members of the Legis­
lative Assembly elected under the terms of 
the 1961 Constitution, have continued to 
function under the style of the Parliament 
of Rhodesia in terms of the 19^5 Constitution, 
and such Parliament has, sine© the Declar­
ation of Independence, purported to ratify 
the 1965 Constitution.
38. 1966 R.L.R, 756, pp. 775-849.
39. 1966 R.L.R. 756, pp. 777-78.
40. Mr. Clifford Dupont who held the office of »tOfficer 
Administering the Governmentu in the H1965,f 
Constitution.
The position as expounded by the learned judge 
is, as a matter of fact, and it purports to be nothing 
more, unassailable. It is incontestable that the 
Cabinet's dismissal from office did not result in their 
demission of the powers which they had formerly wielded.
Nor was it ever contended that the Governor under the 1961 
Constitution was still effectively seised of the powers 
he had prior to U.D.I. been able to exercise. A further 
event to which the learned judge had addressed his brief 
survey was the purported self-nurtured metamorphosic 
renascence of the Legislative Assembly into the "Parliament 
of Rhodesia". This institution was in future to embody 
and exercise the country1s legislative role•
After recapitulating the submissions of the 
opposing counsel, the learned judge focussed significance 
on the concession made by the respondents1 counsel that 
the Declaration of Independence of November 11, 19 6 5, was 
illegal• Counsel made evident his intention not to reply 
on the Declaration itself as proof of the acquisition of 
independence, but rested his claim to that status on the 
contended subsequent possession of effective control by the 
usurping government and the successful extrusion of the 
old order as established by the 1961 Constitution. The de 
jure status thus achieved, counsel had insisted, must, 
however, be retroactivated to the date of the Declaration 
even though on the latter date the demise of the old order 
had yet to be demonstrably accomplished.
His Lordship then stated the importance of
deciding the status of Southexm Rhodesia prior to U ,D . I.
He adopted the description of the country's status as 
offered by Professor de Smith in his book The New Common­
wealth and Its Constitutions, part of the judge's quotation
4treading thus;
The United Kingdom Government has publicly 
recognized the existence of a convention 
that Parliament cannot properly legislate 
on any matter within the competence of the 
Southern Rhodesia Legislature ^ , including 
the amendment of the Constitution, without 
the consent of the Southern Rhodesia Govern-
ment.........  .......... there is no doubt
that the United Kingdom is constitutionally 
bound (in the absence of a fundamental change 
of clrcumstance s*4 3 ) by the”limitations that
it has expressly accepted,-  —  -- The
Southern Rhodesia Legislature, moreover, is 
unique among the Legislative bodies of 
'dependent' territories in having full power 
to make laws with extraterritorial effect.
The practical effect of the redistribution 
of fedex*al powers upon the dissolution of the 
Federation might well be to leave Southern 
Rhodesia in a constitutional position not 
significantly different from that of a 
Dominion in, say", TpTS '^. In purely consti­
tutional terms a grant of independence at that 
point would not greatly enhance the control 
exercisable by Southern Rhodesia over its 
domestic affairs»
His Lordship expressed himself to have understood 
that the passage immediately px'eceding meant unavoidably 
that legal sovereignty could be acquired by Southern Rhodesia
. 1966 R.L.R. 756, pp. 781-2.
42, At the Conference in 1961 relating to the formulation of 
the 1961 Constitution, the Government of Southern 
Rhodesia had requested that the Convention should be ex­
tended to embrace even matters NOT within the competence 
of the Southern Rhodesia Legislature regarding the govern­
ment of the territory, but the Commonwealth Secretary at 
the time evaded commitment on this point,
43* I have emphasised this important but sometimes forgotten 
rider.
44. The underlining is my own.
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only through an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament 
pursuant to that end. He also made mention that counsel 
for the rebel ministers refrained from protesting the 
efficacy of the attempted ratification of the ,f1965,t 
Constitution by the "1963 Parliament11, a forbearance with 
the wisdom of which his Lordship made clear his association.
The learned judge proceeded to examine the res­
pondents* first contention which they founded on Kelsen1s 
Theory^ and related writings, (Their alternative sub­
mission was based on what is known as the Doctrine of State 
Necessity.) His Lordship, however, made bold to maintain 
that Kelsen*s Theory, which postulated that once the old 
order was overthrown, validity was to be vested in the new, 
could not be appealed to in territord.es which had yet to 
win their independence. It is submitted that, although 
his Lordship did not explicitly say so, the reason why 
Kelsen*s Theory could not assist rebellions within this 
class of territories is simply because, ex hypothesi, such 
territories cannot have legal orders of their own. A 
dependent territory does not, by definition, have a legal 
order, of its own, because if it did it would no longer be 
dependent. Its system of government, being a subordinate 
phenomenon, forms only a part of the legal order of the 
mother country. Therefore, if a power were to overthrow 
the local and subordinate fox*m of government, such overthrow 
would not destroy the legal order of which the relevant
43• The general principles of this theory are 
examined in Chapter 1.
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dependency*s system of government would only form a part.
In short, a mere dependency does not possess the kind of 
complete constitutional structure within itself, as con­
templated by Kelsen, as will entitle those who usurp its 
internal subordinate government to claim that they have 
overthrown an entire legal order such that a new legal 
order is necessarily established. This suggested basis 
of distinguishing dependent from independent territories 
in regard to the applicability of Kelsen’s Theory must 
have been uppermost in his Lordship1s mind when, in relation 
to dependent territories, he said that the Theory 1 can only 
apply where the revolution had not only succeeded internally
but has a3.so had the effect of successfully untying the
46
apron-strings of sovereignty of the mother state,"
His Lordship had, with reference to the situation 
hn
above, said earlier s *
In this connexion, it is pertinent to remark 
that those who point to the examples of other 
recent revolutions in other parts of Africa, 
such as Zanzibar, Ghana and Nigeria, which 
have succeeded internally, and seek to equate 
them with the situation in this country, on 
the basis that those countries, too have 
* illegal regimes’ in power, fall into the error 
of overlooking the fundamental difference that 
those countries were already independent 
sovereign states before those revolutions 
occurred. Hence, in each of those countries, 
as in Pakistan, the change of its Constitution 
or form of government by means of revolution was 
entirely its own affair, and the successful 
overthrow of the old order brought with it lawful 
status to the new regime internally and recog­
nition of the new regime by other countries
int erna t i onally.
46, 1966 R.L.K. 756, P<* 790° The emphasis is my own®
47. 1966 R.L.R. 756, p. 790.
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His Lordship then adverted to the constitutional 
position in Southern Rhodesia after the usurping government 
had acquired internal control without, however, also 
severing all her ties with the mother country, i.e., the
48United Kingdom. Significance was attributed by him to
his observation that Southern Rhodesia had historically 
been administratively detached from the domain of the 
Colonial Office. The United Kingdom had never assumed 
physical dominance over the territory nor had she ever 
been responsible for the direct administration of the 
territory. He laid stress on the convention by which the 
United Kingdom had bound itself to obtain the consent of 
the government of the territory before legislating on 
matters within the legislative competence of the territory, 
but his meticulous approach also led him to note with 
approval Professor de Smith's crucial qualification to the 
convention which was that the convention was to abate upon 
a fundamental change of circumstances, a proviso his 
Lordship had no hesitation in finding had been activated 
by the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. He decided 
that this act entitled "Britain, legally to reassert its 
sovereignty over this country in regard to its internal 
affairs.
The learned judge then directed his appreciation of 
the constitutional cataclysm to the essence of the controversy 
which, to him, was whether or not the territory had succeeded
48. 1966 R.L.R. 756, p. 793.
49. 1966 R.L.R. 756, p. 794.
in its attempted umbilical severance from the United 
Kingdom, because upon the resolution of1 this issue hinged 
the applicability of4 Kelsen* s Theory of the Grundnorm to 
the situation obtaining in the territory®
50His Lordship adopted the following diagnosis:
In my view, it cannot be suggested that there 
was also an ONUS5  ^ upon Great Britain to 
assert its sovereignty by means of armed force 
directed against this country, and it cannot be 
said that the failure to do so amounts to a 
tacit recognition of the success of the revo­
lution and an abandonment of its sovereignty 
over •bhe country.3^ That theiThasbeen such 
a reassertion of Britain’s sovereignty over 
this country is clearly shewn by the passing 
of the British Act of Parliament, the Southern 
Rhodesia Act of 19^5 (Chapter 7 6 ), on the 16th 
November, 19 6 5 ® It is also clear that the 
British Government has taken measures to endeavour 
to put an end to the revolution* Sanctions 
have been imposed upon this country and the 
success or failure of these measures is still 
in doubt at the present time.........The court
cannot decide as a fact that the revolution has 
succeeded or that .it must succeed on that 
evi d enceT^J
Quite apart from this, however, and even if 
this court were to assume that the economic 
measures taken by the British Government in an 
endeavour to put an end to the revolution are 
doomed to failure, it cannot also assume that 
the British Government would in that event abandon 
the struggle. The present world situation is 
vastly different from what it was at the time 
when the American War of Independence was fought• 
There, the American Colonists, with the assistance 
of Britain’s enemy at that time, France, succeeded 
in defeating the British on American soil by force
50. 1966 R.L.R. 756, p. 79*5-0
51o The emphasis is that of his Lordship. His use of the
word "also” in relation to "onus" was due to his having 
mentioned that Britain had the RIGHT to assert her 
sovereignty in the event of U.D.I.
52. The underlining is mine.
53. The emphasis is mine.
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of arms and Britain acknowledged her defeat.
There was no international organization to 
concern itself in the struggle. In the 
present situation, however, it could not be 
doubted that Britain would have the potential 
ability to put an end to the revolution; even 
if she had to resort to invoking the assistance 
of the United Nations for that purpose. In my 
opinion, it cannot be said that the 1965 Con­
stitution or that the present Government is a 
lawful government until such time as the tie 
of sovereignty vested in Britain has been 
finally and successfully severedT3*^
Another basis adduced by his Lordship for rejecting 
the contended de jure status of the ”19 6 5" Constitution 
was that it had purported to adopt the Queen as the Queen 
of Rhodesia, and thus as local Head of State. This part 
of the "Constitution” was automatically void because the 
Queen had neither consented to the title nor agreed to be 
represented by an Officer Administering the Government. 
Since a document as fundamental as a country * s constitution 
could not be severable the ” 19 6 5’* Constitution capsized 
because its provision for the Head of State was void and of 
no effect.
Having thus accomplished the demolition of the 
asseveration that the ” 19651 Constitution was competent to 
validate itself through the adoption of Kelsen1s Theory of 
the Grundnorm, the learned judge translated his scrutiny to 
respondents’ counsel’s alternative submission that the 
Doctrine of State Necessity enjoined the ascription of 
validity to the acts of a usurping government which were 
directed to the maintenance of law and order and designed
54. The emphasis is mine.
55. 1966 R.L.R. 736, p* 798.
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for the general good of the populace over whom it had 
control• (it is important to bear in mind that the 
learned judge throughout his judgment identified one with 
the othex', or at least did not distinguish between, laws 
of a de facto government and laws emanating from the 
operation of the Doctrine of State Necessity•) The learned 
judge then posed tlie question, consequent on his rejection 
of the de jure status of the ”1 9 6 5” Constitution, whether 
he was constrained to reject all the purported laws of the 
usurping government. Iiis all-important reply, which 
sounded the death knell of the applicants1 case, was utterly 
unequivocals
I have,, already given my reasons for being 
unable to hold that the 1965 Constitution 
is the legal Constitution of this country, 
and there is no need to repeat them. If 
it is an inevitable consequence of that 
decision, as the applicants contend, that 
I cannot recognize anything done by the 
present Government, then it means I can no 
longer function as judge of this court. I 
am, however, instructed by the Governor, 
by wliom I was appointed to my office as a 
judge on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen, 
to maintain law and order and to carry on 
with my normal task subject to the refraining 
from ’all acts which would further the 
objective of the illegal authorities’. In 
tlie context of this instruction, the last 
phrase must mean all acts which would directly 
and deliberately aid the revolution. The 
civil servants are similarly instructed to 
carry out their normal tasks. They, too, 
would find it impossible to comply with this 
instruction unless they recognized and obeyed 
the laws passed by the Rhodesia Parliament and 
administrative actions carried out by the 
present Executive, for the purposes of the 
preservation of place and good government and 
the maintenance of law and order.
56. 1966 R.L.R. 756, pp. 810-11.
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In this unique situation, therefore, the 
only way in which this court can continue 
to function as a court consistently with 
the Governor's instruction and consistently 
with its duty to the State is to invoke the 
maxim ' SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX'57, which 
is, in effect, a doctrine of State necessity,
and to recognize such laws and such adminis­
trative actions as are designed for the pur­
poses just mentionecC ~
His Lordship appealed to the venerable authority
of Grotius as propounded in the latter's De Jure Belli ac
Pacis for support of the Doctrine of State Necessity whicli
he had just added to the wealth of Southern Rhodesian
constitutional practice. An excerpt from his quotation
59from Grotius is as follows s
¥e have spoken of him who possesses, or has 
possessed, the right of governing® It 
remains to speak of the usurper of power, 
not after he has acquired a right through 
long possession or contract, but while the 
basis of possession remains unlawful. Now 
while such a usurper is in possession, the 
acts of government which he performs may 
have a binding force, arising not from a 
right possessed by him, for no such right 
exists, but from the fact that the one to 
whom the sovereignty actually belongs, 
whether people, or king, or senate, would 
prefer^Q that measures promulgated by him 
should meanwhile have the force of law, in 
order to avoid the uitter confusion which 
would resuilt from the subversion of laws and 
suppression of the courts, ^
The expression created by Grotius stating that the 
Sovereign "would prefer" that the usurper1s laws be obeyed 
to the chaos that would follow disobedience to such laws, is
57. The emphasis is his Lordship’s.
58. My own emphasis.
59. 1966 R.L.R. 756, p. 8 1 3.
60. My own emphasis.
61. My own emphasis.
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known, as the "implied mandate" which the learned judge
regards as coterminous with the doctrine of necessity.
This concept was devastated by Coccejus in his book
"A Commentary on Grotius* *De Jure Belli ac Pacis *", and
the brilliant intellectual onslaught was quoted by the
learned judge (although, he sought to distinguish it Trom
62the case before the court) thuss
For, Firstly* that conjecture oF a wish has 
nowhere been proved nor, secondly, can it 
adduce any reason For allowing the power 
to enact binding measures. Indeed, thirdly, 
the measures oF the usurper have meanwhile 
the Force oF law, even though a contrary 
wish both oF the king and oF the people were 
to have been established. And, Fourthly, 
this Follows From the nature oF possession, 
which involves the power to govern. But, 
FiFthly, on this Fiction the usurper would 
act in pursuance oF a tacit mandate, and to 
this extent would act lawFully, inasmuch as 
then the person would consent, who has the 
power to Forbid.
To this Formidable assault the learned judge re-
6 8turned a Flaccid reply*
Whether or not Coccejus be correct in that 
respect, that part oF the oxoinion oF Grotius 
which he criticizes does not depend upon a 
mere Fiction in the present case, because on 
a proper construction oF the Governor *s in­
structions^ to which I have already referred, 
it appears that the wish oF the sovereign is 
expressed in similar terms in the present 
situation For the preservation oF tlie country. ^
62. 1966 R.L.R. 756, p. 819.
63. 1966 R.L.R. 736, p. 819.
64. The Governor had given a general instruction to
everyone to continue doing his duty, but in such a 
way as not to promote the rebellion.
65* My own emphasis.
2 69.
One may be excused for being just a little 
intrigued as to why the learned judge should have seen 
fit to give greater weight to the Governor1s message than 
to the omnipotent authority of an Act of Parliament - the 
Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965 and its derivative Order in 
Council. How could the Governor's wish, even if it was 
meant in the way the learned judge maintained it signified, 
have survived the explicit and imperative language of the 
Southern Rhodesia Order which prohibited obedience to the 
"laws" of the usurping government? One is quite disquieted 
that the judge should have treated the Governor’s message 
as "the wisli of the sovereign" when the interpretation 
his Lordship gave it contradicted an Order in Council 
which Order, one would have thought, would have been the 
authentic voice of the sovereign. (By "sovereign" is of 
course meant the sovereign power as distinct from the 
office of the monarch.) The "implied mandate" doctrine 
has the simple but fatal flaw in that it purports to per­
sist in the face of an express prohibition to do that 
which the "mandate" enjoins. It is a mockery of language 
to suggest that it is logically possible to imply a mandate 
to perform those acts and assume that power which the 
Sovereign has forbidden in the clearest and most forceful 
language. Again, as Coccejus has so effectively pointed 
out, the implied mandate would mean that the rebel govern­
ment was acting with the authority of the lawful sovereign 
and ipso facto would cease to be a rebel government.
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d 6His Lordship concluded that the extension of
the state of emergency by the usurping government was
"predominantly actuated" by the necessity to maintain law
and order and £>rovide good government, and tlie validity
of the extension, founded as it was on the propriety of
the preponderant purpose of good and stable government,
could not be impugned by the "mere fact that there was
6?also an additional and subordinate motive*" So long
as the emergency regulations satisfied the dominant purpose 
in their design, and mode of enforcement they were to be 
upheld as qualifying for the protection of the doctrine 
of necessity. He therefore found the detentions valid 
because the emergency regulations were found to have been 
designed to uphold the rule of law.
Before concluding the summary of the learned 
judge’s decision it is proposed to recur to one limitation, 
which it is submitted is illogical, which his Lordship 
sought to impose on the powers exercised by the usurping 
government under the doctrine of necessity. Of the 
measures taken by the usurping government to combat the 
economic sanctions wielded against the country, his Lord­
ship had observed:^
Provided such measures could validly have 
been taken by the lawful Government prior 
to the 11th November, "T9 6 5 6 9 , in terms of 
the 1961 Constitution, and provided they 
involve no unlawful interference with the
6 6 . 1966 R.L.R. 756, pp. 8^2-3.
6 7 • namely, the survival of the usurping government•
6 8. 1966 R.L.R. 756, p. 839.
6 9 . My own emphasis.
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rights of* citizens under that Constitution,
this court will not interfere.
It is not immediately obvious why the doctrine of 
necessity, which not only empowers but enjoins the per­
formance of such acts as would sustain stable government 
and pi"omote good administration, should have its operation 
reduced to the scope of the 19 61 Constitution. Would his 
Lordship have us defend the striking down of an essential 
measure for the safety and success of the state on the 
ground that the measure was not one which a government 
under the 1961 Constitution was entitled to enact? Why 
is validity to be mandatorily attributable to essential 
measures performable under the 1961 Constitution, but 
inflexibly denied to measures no less essential not so 
performable? If the security and success of the state 
are potent enough to disregard tlie dictates of the British 
Parliament, why are the said imperatives of necessity to 
be restricted to such acts as were performable under the 
1961 Constitution, which is only an authority clearly sub­
ordinate to the said Parliament? Unfortunately, through­
out his elaborate judgment, no pointer has been offered 
by his Lordship in clarification of the possible foundation 
for such a restriction.
Perhaps Lewis J. was confusing the powers of a 
de facto government with a government functioning under the 
aegis of the doctrine of necessity, assuming the validity of 
these concepts. A de facto government is always illegal in 
the sense that it is not de jure. On the other hand, a
2?2.
government run under the authority of the doctrine of 
necessity need not, but can sometimes be, an illegal 
government, because the activation of this source of 
authority, being foiinded upon the imperatives directed 
to national survival, cannot logically discriminate 
against an illegal government because the imperative 
of national survival does not disappear with legal 
authority. The express postulate of the doctrine of 
necessity, asserting as it does that the survival of the 
state is the supreme law, demolishes the significance of 
the status of those in a position to ensure this survival. 
The task of ensuring survival is not to be abandoned merely 
because it cannot but be entrusted to the care of those 
whose hands have been imbrued with the taint of illegality. 
The only limit to those exercising power under the doctrine 
of necessity, irrespective of their legitimacy, is therefore 
NOT that to which the previous, legal, government was 
subject, but that which does not exceed tlie enactment of 
measures necessary for the security and success of the 
state over which they have control. Whether something is 
necessary or not is a pure question of fact that has to be 
ascertained with reference to the prevailing circumstances. 
For reasons of speed, familiarity and efficiency this 
question of whether a measure is necessary or not ought to 
be left to the judgment and good faith of those who wield 
the executive aiithority, once the judiciary has pronounced 
that the situation is so desperate that only the flexibility 
and comprehensive compass of a doctrine of necessity can
2?3.
restore to it a measure of order and security.
A government the status of which is de facto 
should not have its authority to act confined to doing 
wXiat is necessary for the preservation of the state.
It lias us^^rped the position of the de jure government 
and arguably succeeds only to the power formerly wielded 
by tiie government it has displaced. But this government 
until it becomes de jure, and because until then it has 
merely succeeded to, by having usurped, the authority 
(and to nothing beyond) of the ousted de jure government, 
should not be allowed to do what the latter government 
could not have done. If this limit is removed there will 
cease to be any distinction between a de jure and a de 
facto government. The distinction was appreciated by 
Beadle, C.J., when this case went to the Appellate Division 
of the High Court. The distinction is made on grounds 
of logic. No useful authority can be found to help draw
the distinction suggested.
(b) JUDGMENT OF GOLDIN. J.7°
Goldin, J., commented his judgment with a review 
of the events and factual consequences to date. He re­
duced his survey to eight points. As his first, he 
recited the Governor’s message (published on the day of 
U.D.I. - November 11, 1965)» part of which reads ^
70. 1966 R.L.R. 756, pp. 8^9-81.
71. 1966 R.L.R. 756, p. 8 5 3.
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  ....... I have dinf'orraed Mr, Smith and his
colleagues that they no longer hold office.
I call on tlie citizens of Rhodesia to refrain
from all acts xtfhich would further the object-
ives of the illegal authorities. Subject to
that, it is the duty of all citizens to main­
tain law and order in the country and to carry
on with theix’ normal tasks. This applies
equally to the judiciary, the police, and the
His Lordship1s second point referred to the 
Governor*s de facto displacement from the duties and 
powers vested in him under the 19^ 1 Constitution, The 
third point directed notice to the obedience, again owed 
de facto, rendered by the armed forces and the civil 
service to the purported government that professed to rule 
under the 1119^5" Constitution, The Executive and Legis­
lature of the 1961 Constitution purported to alchemize 
themselves into the cabinet and Parliament of the "19&5f 
Constitution. This was his Lordship's foux’th observation. 
The fifth point which cauglxt his Lordship's attention was 
that the usux^ping government was enjoying effective control 
of Southern Rhodesia. Sixthly, the learned judge noted, 
the adminis tint ion was not recognised, either de juxte or 
de facto, by a single foreign Government. The next point 
adverted to by his Lordship was that although the United 
Kingdom Government had pledged itself to the restoration 
of "constitutional government"' , it had confined its 
attempts to economic embargo against the country, assisted 
by various members of the United Nations. His final 
remark in this conspectus was that the United Kingdom Parlia-
72. My own emphasis•
73• The quotes on the phrase were made by the learned 
judge.
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ment had passed the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965? designed 
to impeach the pretensions of the usurping government by- 
denying to the latter all semblance of authority to rule, 
and that the United Kingdom Government had exercised the 
plenary powers which the Act had vested in it. But the 
learned judge did not omit mention of the fact that such 
measures as had been enacted by Order-in-Council under the 
Act as purported to apply to Southern Rhodesia had not 
been enforced within the territory*
After a preliminary critique on tlie circumstances 
accompanying the applicants* detention, his Lordship indi­
cated that the first question was whether or not the " 1 9 6 5*'
. 7 4
Constitution had superseded the 1961 Constitution.
His Lordship recapitulated counsel's submissions
for the parties, wliich need not be repeated here. It will
be recalled that counsel for the respondents liad chosen to
sustain the theory propounded by Kelsen and accepted by
certain other jurists that an usurping government becomes a
lawful government as soon as it has effective control of
the state whose government it has eyicted from power, in
short, that effective governing is synonymous with lawful
government. The inapplicability of this doctrine to the
situation obtaining in Southern Rhodesia was demonstrated
with forceful clarity by tlxe learned judge in the following
7 3extract from his decisions
7^. 1966 R.L.R, 756, p. 8 3 4 .
75. 1966 R.L.R. 756, pp. 862-4.
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The facts, however, do not justify the 
conclusion that, because the present 
government is the only effective government 
within Rhodesia and created the 1965 Con­
stitution, in terms of which it governs, 
tlxe 1961 Constitution has ceased to exist 
on the basis mentioned above.76 Southern 
Rhodesia enjoyed virtually complete self- 
government under the 1961 Constitution and 
the effective control exercised by the 
present govexTLment is no greater than the 
powers conferred by the 1961 Constitution 
upon a lawful govei’iunent and administration.
At this stage, Her Majesty or Her Majesty's 
Government of the United Kingdom nave neithex’ 
abandoned their respective rights and powers 
under’ the 1961 Constitution, and it caxxixot 
be said that the government of the United 
Kingdom is not capable of overthrowing or 
rendering ineffective the present x’egime. *•*.., 
There is certainly no evidence that outside 
the bor’ders of this country, in the sphere 
of international relations, the Bx',itislx 
Government and Her Majesty have ceased to 
exercise effectively their* rights and powers 
conferred upon them by the 1961 Constitution.
In other* words, although this Government has 
effective control within Rhodesia, it only 
claims to be or declares that Rhodesia is an 
independent State, but outside it3 border’s it 
is neither accepted xxor treated as such. On 
the oontrary» in tlxe sphere of international 
relations Rhodesia retains the status and 
powers conferred upon it bythe T9^T^Consti- 
tutionT^T....... The latter aspect is of
particular relevance in deciding whether the 
1961 Constitution has ceased to exist. In the 
case of P a k i s t a n * ^  the sovereignty of the State 
was not in issue but only the form and compos­
ition of its government. But in this case
7 6 . i.e. on the basis of the theories of Kelsen and 
concurring jurists.
77* i.e., because Southern Rhodesia did not acquii’e a wider
area of control than that which it had enjoyed prior to 
U.D.I., it could not point convincingly to an elevation 
of its constitutional status. A government could not 
claim to represent a sovereign state if the power it 
effectively exercised was no more than that of a sub­
ordinate self-governing territory.
7 8 . My own emphasis.
79* In 1958 the military in Pakistan overthrew the civilian 
government, and the Supreme Court of Pakistan recognised 
the military x’egime as the new lawful government of the 
country in Dosso1s case.
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Rhodesia could only be considered to have 
become a sovereign independent state when 
the 1965 Constitution has replaced the 1961 
Constitution, which involves holding that
the latter has ceased to exist..... ..♦the
outcome of the struggle has still to be
awaited^ ..........the doctrines....... by
which a successful revolution can successfully 
replace an existing lawful constitution have 
no application in the circumstances and upon
the facts......... 1 hold the 1965 Constitution
has not lawfully replaced the 1961 Constitution 
and that the 1961 Constitution has not been 
annulled or ceased to be the lawful consti­
tution of this country. This court therefore 
derives its origin from and was lawfully 
constituted under the 1961 Constitution, and 
tire .judges thereof continue to hold office and 
are bound by the oaths taken by them in terms 
of the i'9^ 1 Constitution. 81
The learned judge then turned to respondents’ 
counsel's alternative submission, which was that a refusal 
by the court to face reality, i.e. the de facto control 
of the territory by the usurping government, would inflict
82chaos on and introduce a legal vacuum in the body politic. 
Counsel propounded that laws passed by a government in de 
facto control should be given effect where such laws ave 
directed to the preservation of peace and designed to 
promote the good government of the country. It xiras an 
averment of constitutional jurisprudence that earned his 
Lordship’s concurrence, which was expressed in the following
- 83words i
..... the px'esent government has displaced the
lawful authority and, having established itself 
in the eustomary seats of power, exercises all 
the functions of legislation and administration
80. My own emphasis.
81. My own empha sis.
82. 1966 R.L.R. 756, p. 864.
8 3 . 1966 R.L.R. 756, pp. 8 6 3-7 .
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..... There can be no doubt that, in these
circumstances, the alternative before this 
court is either to cease to function or to 
give effect to all or to certain adminis­
trative and legislative measures performed by 
and emanating from the Government constituted 
under the 1965 Constitution. There is no 
substance in the submission that by refusing 
to give effect to measures of this government, 
those responsible for the 1965 Constitution 
and who hold office by virtue of that Consti­
tution, would by order of court revert to what 
has been described as ’constitutional Govern­
ment’. These persons undoubtedly know, and 
it was never contended by respondents to the 
contrary, that what is described as ’the 
assumption of independence’ had no basis of 
legality and those who ’gave’ the 19^5 Consti­
tution had no right or power at law to do so.
Their conduct was based on decisions and cir­
cumstances which in their opinion provided 
economic or political justification despite the 
absence of legality. But whatever their 
motives, it would be completely unrealistic to 
even assume that the present situation can be
altered by a decision of this court.  In my
view, after careful consideration of the 
unprecedented situation in which this court 
finds itself, X am satisfied that the court can 
and should give effect to at least certain 
legislative measures, and administrative acts, 
performed by virtue of power exercised under the 
1963 Constitution. I base my conclusion on the 
doctrine of public policy, the application of the 
which is required, justified and rendered 
unavoidable in these circumstances» by necessity.
When absolute necessity requires the court to 
function, and it can only function by giving 
effect to the legislative and adrainistrative acts 
referred to above, then this doctrine can and 
should be invoked. The courts have not hesitated 
to apply the doctrine of public policy whenever 
the facts justified its application, because 
public policy does vary with situations and demands
84. The emphasis is mine. The doctrine is indistinguish­
able from, even if it was intended to treat it as
something other than, the doctrine of state necessity.
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of public interest. It fluctuates with the 
circumstances of the time and it depends on 
the welfare of the community at any given 
time. 85
A point of fundamental significance that demands 
attention is that Mr. Justice Goldin, unlike Mr. Justice 
Lewis, does NOT restrict the acts performable by the 
usurping government to those performable by a government 
under the 19 6 1 Constitution. Xt is submitted that the 
approach of Mr. Justice Goldin is preferable in that it 
does not impose on the doctrine a limitation of power which 
is difficult to explain because in proposing that limitation 
Mr. Justice Lewis failed to offer any basis for it.
Finally, Mr. Justice Goldin was confronted with 
the problem, also encountered by his brother Lewis, of 
whether to offer validity to acts necessary for the 
security and good government of the state but also charac­
terised by a propensity to aid the rebellion. His answer, 
which coincided with that given by his Brother Judge, was 
that it would be wrong to strike down a measure of good 
government merely because it would also entrench the 
rebellion. Xt is suggested that the learned judge would 
not have hesitated to strike down a law which was designed 
solely to ingrain the rebellion but which had the wholly 
adventitious effect of contx'ibuting to the welfare of the 
people. I-Iis Lordship’s opinion in respect of this diffi-
O/T
culty was expressed in these lines{
8 5 . My own emphasis.
86. 1966 R.L.R. 756, p. 874.
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But X do not think the problem can be 
resolved by laying down as a principle 
that measures or the exercise of functions 
■which * aid the rebellion1 must not be 
given effect for that reason alone. The
preservation of peace and order can be said
to have that result... In my view, the 
administrative and legislative measures 
required for the maintenance of peace and 
order must be treated as effective and 
enforceable, regardless as to whether in 
doing so the unlawfully constituted Govern­
ment benefits or not. 87
His Lordship then concluded that the Emergency
regulations were required fox' the security of the state,
and that it followed that the applicants’ detention must
be sustained. Like his Brother Lewis, the learned judge
maintained that the onus of demonstrating, by way of
establishing a prima facie case, that the detention was
unconnected with the maintenance of law and order lay on
the applicants. The applicants in this case Xiad failed
to discharge that burden. There was thus no need for
the court to call upon the respondents to refute what
would have been a prima facie case had the applicants
succeeded in persuading the court that the orders for
their detention were based on grounds other than concern
88for the peace and security of the state.
87. My own emphasis.
88. 1966 R.L.R. 756, p. 8 7 8.
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(iii) MADglMBAMUTO V. LARPNER-BUKKTC BEFORE THK APPELLATE 
DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA 89
The appeal by the applicants to the Appellate 
Division of the High Court was heard in January, February 
and October, 1967 y end judgment was delivered on January 
299 1 9 6 8.^ The members of the court who heard the
appeal were Beadle, C.J., Quenet, J.P. , Macdonald, J.A., 
Jarvis, A.J.A., and Fieldsend,A#J.A. Because the five 
judgments manifest much intricacy of argumentation it is 
proposed to provide very brief synopses of what they 
express before proceeding to the detailed examination of 
each judgment.
/ \ 91\a/ Summary of Beadle, C.J.'s judgment.
The learned Chief Justice began with the 
presupposition that the concept of legal sovereignty was 
divisible. He maintained that the internal autonomy 
Southern Rhodesia enjoyed by virtue of the extensive powers 
of self-government conferred under the 1961 Constitution 
entitled her to be internally sovereign, namely sovereign 
with regard to her internal affairs. However, because 
Southern Rhodesia's external affairs were under the charge 
of the United Kingdom, the latter was the territory's
8 9 . 1968 (2) S.A. 284.
90. 1968 (2) S.A. 284.
91. '1968 (2) S.A. 284, pp. 290-361 .
92external sovereign. The subjects of Southern Rhodesia, 
so the Chief Justice reasoned, owed allegiance to 
Southern Rhodesia by virtue of the letter’s internal 
sovereignty, hut owed to the United Kingdom a residual 
allegiance because the latter was Southern Rhodesia’s 
external sovereign. The Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence created a dilemma for the citizens of Southern 
Rhodesia in that it created a conflict between two sover­
eigns . But the learned Chief Justice entertained no
doubt that such a confrontation of authority should be
93resolved in favour of the internal sovereign. He was
92. The British Nationality Act, 1948, had created
Southern Rhodesia citizenship despite the fact that 
her constitution at the time - the 1923 Constitution - 
was a subordinate constitutional document, being 
granted under Tetters Patent which expressly referred 
to the territory as a Crown Colony. That it is 
obvious that the conferment of citizenship is not a 
conferment of independence is ilTustrated by the 
fact that althonigh. Malayan Union-citizenship was 
conferred on peoiDle in the short-lived Malayan Union 
(1946-1948) in 1946, it is beyond all argument that 
this did not mean that the Malayan Union became 
independent in any sense of the word.
93* Even granting the Chief Justice the validity of the 
concept of divided sovereignty, is not his Lordship 
guilty of a grave error of identification in that, 
in assessing the constitutional position before U.D.I., 
he identified the internal sovereign as the Southern 
Rhodesia Government and Legislative Assembly, and not, 
as it is submitted it undoubtedly was, the 1961 
Constitution? The Chief Justice spoke of allegiance 
being owed to Southern Rhodesia, but what does 
"Southern Rhodesia” signify? Allegiance could not be 
owed to a mere geographical entity; therefore, his 
term "Southern Rhodesia” could only, assuming but not 
accexrbing liis concept of divided sovereignty, have 
referred to the internal sovereign in Southern Rhodesia, 
namely, tlae 1961 Constitution. Since the 1961 Consti­
tution was never in conflict with the authority of the 
United Kingdom, the conflict of sovereignty envisaged 
by the Chief Justice, it jjjust be assumed, was an over­
sight of a logical impossibility, induced by his having 
mistaken the identity of his internal sovereign.
283.
thus convinced that the event of U.D.I. made inevitable 
the total allegiance of Southern Rhodesia citizens to the 
territory of Southern Rhodesia.
The Chief Justice also held that tlae 1961 Consti­
tution was no longer functioning, but nor had the 111965” 
Constitution yet been able to establish itself. The 
usurping government, being unable to trace its validity to 
any constitution, was tlrus only a de facto government in 
the sense that it enjoyed a control over Southern Rhodesia 
that seemed likely to continue, although that control was 
not one that could be described as having been firmly 
established. Because the usurping government was only a 
de facto government, the Chief Justice continued, it could 
only do what a legal government under the 1961 Constitution 
could have done. The Chief Justice must have implied 
that for the usurping government to do anything beyond the 
ambit of the 1961 Constitution, it had to wait until the 
*'1965" Constitution acquired de jure status.
The Chief Justice, in regard to the authority of 
the court, said that the court no longer sat under the 1961 
Constitution, but did so only by virtue of the fact that 
the de facto government was prepared to enforce its orders.
Finally, the Chief Justice, although finding that 
the Minister of Law and Justice had authority to exercise 
the powers of detention under the Emergency Powers Act, 
found that the regulation under which the applicants had 
been detained was technically void because it had failed to
284®
provide for the attention of the Minister. The appli­
cant’s success was necessarily ephemeral because he was 
immediately detained again after a fresh regulation had 
been made to comply with the provisions of the Emergency 
Poivers Act.
94Summary of the judgment of Quenet, J.P•
In regard to the authority of the court the learned 
Judge President said that the court had been created under 
the 1961 Constitution and its authority had not been 
impugned by the usurping government. Since its birth was 
unquestionably legal, and since it had never been put to 
death, the result was that it still survived.
Adverting to the issue of sovereignty, the Judge 
President adopted the concept of divided sovereignty which, 
as has been seen, was also favoured by the Chief Justice.
The Judge President resolved the conflict of sovereignties 
consequent on TJ.D.X. in favour of the internal sovereign 
bebause tlie latter had an effective government to the laws 
of which citizens of Southern Rhodesia wa«- bound to render 
homage.
Although the Judge President stated that for the 
purposes of the litigation in question it was not necessary 
to decide whether or not the usurping government was a de 
jure government, he did proceed to pronounce on the question 
(such a pronouncement being thus necessarily rendered an
94. 1968 (2 ) S.A. 284, pp. 361-376.
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obiter dictum), and concluded that the government and 
the "1965" Constitution were both de jure - the linkage 
of their fortunes is not surprising because one could 
hardly liave been de jure without the other being equally 
so. The Judge President decided that xvhether a de 
facto government ipso facto became a de jure government, 
or whether it had to wait until it was unchallengeably 
established before it could become a de jure government, 
did not matter in the instant case because the usurping 
government was able to satisfy either of the two alterna­
tive criteria.
He, like the Chief Justice, awarded the applicants 
a pyrrhic victory because of the same technical invalidity 
of the regulation under which the applicants were detained.
9 ‘oSummary of the judgment of Macdonald, J.A. ^
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The learned judge said that prior to U.D*1. the 
citizens of Rhodesia owed a territorial allegiance to the 
semi-independent state of Rhodesia, and ox^ ed an extra­
territorial allegiance to the United Kingdom (described by
95 Vthe judge as "the State of Britain" ). U.D.I. created a
conflict between these two allegiances, and in such a 
combat the territorial sovereign was to enjoy the right to 
its citizens1 allegiance as against the extra-territorial 
sovereign. The learned judge propounded that allegiance to
95* 1968 (2) S.A. 284, pp. 376-416. 
96. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, p. 4o4f .
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the territorial sovereign meant obedience to the laws of 
the effective government in the territory. He regarded 
as synonymous the terms "de facto government" and 
"government for the time being", and went on to expound 
that as fax1 as a municipal court was concerned a govern­
ment de facto was a government de jure* The 1965 Consti­
tution was the territory’s de facto constitution and 
therefore as far as its municipal court was concerned, the 
d^ jure constitution. All its laws must therefore be 
obeyed»
The judge allowed the appeal on the technical 
ground favoured by his colleagues.
97Summary of the judgment of Jarvis, A.J.A.
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The learned judge found that the usurping govern­
ment was in effective control in Southern Rhodesia and 
that this control seemed likely to continue. However, 
he created a paradox by maintaining that the source of 
the court’s authority was still the 1961 Constitution.
For the sake of good government, he was prepared to allow 
validity to anything done by the usurping government that 
could also have been done by the previous legal government. 
His judgment is to be noted for its studious avoidance of 
the terms "de jure" and "de facto" in relation to the 
status of the usurping government. Also eschewed by him 
were the concepts of divided sovereignty and divided 
allegiance of which his preceding brother judges were so 
enamoured.
97* 1968 (2 ) s.A. 284, pp. 416-422.
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He allowed the appeal on the technicality adopted 
by his colleagues.
98Summary of the judgment of Fieldsend, A.J.A.
The usurping government, pronounced the learned 
jnidge, was neither a de facto nor a de jure government 
because it had only usurped two of the three branches of 
governmento The usurpation could not be complete until 
the judicial function had also been usurped and, that 
not yet being the case, the lawful constitution in the 
country was still the 'l961 Constitution. However, because 
there was no lawful government under the 1961 Constitution? 
certain acts of the usurping government, which were directed 
to the ordinary orderly running of the country, could be 
validated under the doctrine of state necessity, provided 
that these acts did not violate the rights of the citizens 
@s enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, and did not violate 
any rule of public policy, as, for instance, the rule 
against the entrenchment of the usurping government.
The learned judge did not limit the action of the usurping 
government to those which could have been carried out by 
the previous, legal government.
He allowed the appeal on two grounds t on the 
technicality favoured by the remainder of the court as 
the sole ground of allowing the appeal? and on the ground 
that the detention was not allowable under the doctrine of
98. 1968 (2) S.A. 284:* pp. 422-444.
288.
state necessity because it was not required for the 
ordinary orderly running of the state, and it also vio­
lated the just rights of the citizens under the 1$61 
Constitution.
Having given the five judgments in summary, it is 
proposed to examine them in a little more detail. The 
judgments will be examined in the order in which they 
were delivered.
JUDGMENT OF BBADIF. C.J.
The learned Chief Justice began with a sximmary of 
99the grounds of appeal. Appellants had first contended
that the court of first instance erred in regarding the 
Smit'h government as a de facto government. Secondly, 
appellants maintained that even if the government was 
correctly classified as a de facto government, the attri­
bution of legality to its legislative and administrative 
acts was erroneous. Finally, even if the court appealed 
from did ixot err in conferring validity on certain laws 
and measures of the usurping government, it was at faxilt 
in specifically giving validity to the following three 
measurest
(1) the proclamation of a state of emergency by the 
third respondent on 4th February, 1966 (Proclamation 3 of 
1966, published in Government Notice 57 of 1966) ?
99* 1968 (2) S.A. 284, p. 294.
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(2) the making of the Emergency Powers (Maintenance
of Laxv and Order) Regulations 1966 (published in Government 
Notice 71 of 1966)?
1 00(3 ) the continued detention of the appellants in 
terms of such regulations.
The Chief Justice observed that the facts xvere 
to be considered as they stood at the time of the Xiearing 
of the appeal and not as at the time of the hearing at
, . 101fxrst instance,
The Chief Justice initiated his substantive judg­
ment by descanting on the status acquired by Southern
Rhodesia under the 1961 Constitution. His remarks of
102runportance xver©|
The "White Paper (Command 1400), which set out 
what would be the detailed provisions of the 
constitution, made it plain that Rhodesia was 
to be given complete internal self-government..
.... .A proper interioretation of the terms of 
the 1961 Constitution xvill show that they con­
form to xvhat xvas offered the people of Rhodesia 
in the ¥hite Papers (Command 1399 and 1400)•
103He then cited txvo sections in the 1961 Constitution 
which he asserted were designed to confer internal self- 
government of the kind described by him in the quotation.
1.00* Subsequent to the hearing of the second applicant’s
appeal the latter was released and xvhen the hearing
continued he amended his appeal to request for a 
DECLARATION that his detention by the respondent 
xvas unlawful (page 291 of the Chief Justice’s decision).
101. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, p. 295*
102. 1968 (2 ) S.A. 284, pp. 296-7.
103* SS. 105 and 111 of the 1961 Constitution.
29 o.
The two sections will here be quoted to draw attention to 
a flaw in the drafting of one of them which deprives the 
other of its entrenched effect.
Section 105 reads
Subject to compliance with the other pro­
visions of this Constitution, a law of the 
Legislature may amend, add to or repeal 
any of the provisions of this Constitution 
other than those mentioned in Section 111s
Provided that no Act of the Legislature 
shall be deemed to amend, add to or repeal 
any provision of this Constitution unless 
it does so in express terms.
Section 111 reads
Full power and authority is hereby reserved 
to Her Majesty by Order in Council to amend, 
add to or revoke the provisions of sections 
1,2,3,5,6,29,32,42,49, and this section, and 
any Order in Council made by virtue of this 
section may vary or revoke any previous Order - 
so mades
Provided that the power and authority herein 
reserved to Her Majesty shall not be exercised 
for the purpose of amending this section or 
adding to it a reference to any section of 
this Constitution not included in this section 
on the appointed day.
104The learned Chief Justice then moved on to comment s
Since the sections referred to in section 111 
and incorporated by reference in section 105 
could not be amended by the Legislature, some 
provision had to be made for their amendment, 
should such amendment ever be necessary; and 
this explains the reason for section 1 1 1, which 
provides the machinery for amending these sections•
Although it is not proposed to gainsay the interpret­
ation given to the sections by the learned Chief Justice, 
attention ought to have been directed by him to the loophole
104. 1968 (2) S.A, 284, p. 299.
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In S.105 which would have enabled the Southern Rhodesia 
Legislature to remove the powers of the United Kingdom 
altogether - a removal, however, which would have enjoyed 
the merit of not being a bootstraps exercise, or an 
exercise in circularity. It is to be noticed that S.105 
itself could be amended by the Legislature of Southern 
Rhodesia. There was no prohibition of any kind on the 
amendment of S.1 0 5, provided the correct procedure was 
followed. S•105 could have been completely rewritten.
It is therefore submitted tlxat the deletion of two phrases 
from, and the addition of one phrase to, S. 105 by amendment 
through the local Legislature (with the consent of the 
people in the four specified racial referenda) would render
S.111 itself subject to local amendment. The two phrases 
to be deleted would have beent
(1) "Subjecfe to compliance with the other provisions 
of this Constitution", and
(2 ) "other than those mentioned in Section 111".
The phrase that would have had to be inserted at the 
beginning of the section is s
"Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution".
The amended S.105 would then have reads
"Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution a 
law of the Legislature may amend, add to or repeal any of the 
provisions of tliis Constitution 1
Provided that no Act of the Legislature shall be 
deemed to amend, add to or repeal any provision of this 
Constitution unless it does so in express terms."
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The local Legislature could then have repealed
5.111 of the Constitution under the authority vested in
it under the amended and expanded S.105. Having abolished
5.111 the local Legislature could have amended the 
sections embodied in the said S.111 at will. The assertion 
may sound excessive, but if the thesis suggested above is 
correct, need there have been a Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence? Could not the local Legislature have 
terminated the United Kingdom’s sovereignty in the very 
terms and upon the very authority of the 1961 Constitution 
itself, which was directly derived from, and therefore 
enjoyed the authority of, a British Act of Parliament (the 
Southern Rhodesia Act, 19^1, under the authority of which 
the 1961 Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order-in-Council, 
which embodied the 1961 Constitution, was made)? TXie 
Chief Justice might well be astonislied to learn tlaat his 
review of the powers given to Southern Rliodesia under the 
1961 Constitution was less favourable to his country than 
it ought to liave been.
TXie CXiief Justice tlien proceeded to examine tlie
power conferred on the local Legislature by the 1961 Consti-
105tution of enacting laws with extra-territorial effect, J 
He described this authority as "Another adjunct of self- 
government". He treated this investiture of power as
placing Southern Rhodesia 0x1 a constitutional pedestal above
1 0 5. 1968 (2 ) S.A. 284, p, 299.
1 0 6. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, p. 2 9 9 .
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that of the Dominions before the Statute of Westminster,
1931j because the Dominions did not enjoy that item of 
authority until the Statute®
His Lordship was careful to mention the convention
acknowledged by Britain in CMND• 1399 to the effect that
Britain would not legislate on those matters within the
1 07competence of the local Legislature® lie surmised thus %
Xt may be said, therefore, that before the 
Declaration of Independence Southern 
Rhodesia had for all practical purposes 
complete internal independence•
Another point of significance stressed by the Chief
Justice was the authority vested in Southern Rhodesia to
create her own citizenship in company with other countries
which were independent states. His Lordship expressed the
view that this fact of association was evidence that
regarded Southern Rhodesia as just another inde-
109Dominion for the purposes of the Act*
His Lordship concludeds110
The effect of the 1961 Constitution was to 
give Southern Rhodesia a measure of self- 
government almost amounting to, but just 
falling short of, full independence. Full 
independence required a further Act of the 
United Kingdom Parliament, applying the 
provisions of the Statute of Westminster to 
Southern Rhodesia.
The learned Chief Justice eventually turned his
111attention to the status of the usurping government. He
1 0 7. 1968 (2 ) S 8A* 284, p* 299.
108, 1968 (2 ) S.A. 284, P. 299.
1090 The Briti.sh Nationality Act, 1948
110. 1968 (2 ) S.A.L.R. 284, p. 300 e
111. 1968 (2 ) S.A.L.R. 284, pe 309.
Britain
pendent
2 94.
at once dismissed the suggested decisiven.ess of the
Certificate of the Secretary of State maintaining that
Southern Mhodesia was not recognised by the United Kingdom
as either having a de facto or de jure government other
than the United Kingdom Government. lie, correctly, stated
that such Certificates were only relevant to a domestic
court considering the status of a foreign government and
hence its laws* Such Certificates could have no bearing
on a domestic court attempting to decide on the validity
112of domestic laws. The reason why such Certificates
are accepted by domestic courts in regard to questions 
concerning fox'eign sovereigns is that the latter is invari­
ably treated as questions of fact, so that the acceptance 
of such Certificates, and thus the acceptance of the 
authority of the executive arm of government, by the 
courts does not constitute an infringement of the judicial 
power. Conversely, such Certificates cannot be of any 
relevance to a domestic court adjudicating on an issue con­
cerning its own laws, because to accept such Cex'tificates 
in such a context would be tantamount to allowing the 
Executive to dictate to the Judiciary what the law of the 
land should be interpreted to be. This would be a clear
violation of the judicial prerogative because tlie interpret—
113ation of the domestic law belongs, not to the executive,
112. These were not his actual words but a synopsis of 
what he said.
113» The term ’’domestic'/, need cause no controversy5 it has 
the same meaning as "local” and "municipal", used in 
distinction to "international" or "foreign".
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tout to the judiciary.,
Alternatively, the Chief4 Justice said that the 
Certificate, even if, contrary to his opinion, it were 
conclusive of the usurping government's status, was not 
preclusive of the court's power toeing exercised to give
114validity to the laws made toy that government. As
authority for this proposition he quoted from the judgment
of Lord Wilfoerforce in the case of Carl Zeiss Stiftung v .
1 1 5Rayner and Keeler Ltd. ^ The excerpt from Lord 
Wilberforce's judgment chosen by the Chief Justice of
rj ^
Southern Rhodesia was s
Merely because in the class of case, of 
which Luther v. Sagor is an example, non­
recognition of a 'government' entails 
non-recognition of its laws, or some of 
them, it does not follow that in a 
different situation this is so, nor tXiat 
recognition of a law entails recognition 
of the law—maker as a government with 
sovereign power. The primary effect and 
intention of non-recognition by the 
executive is that the non-recognised 
'government1 has no standing to represent 
the state concerned whether in public or 
in private matters. Whether this entails 
non-recognition of its so-called laws, or 
Acts, is a matter for the Courts to pronounce 
on, having due regard to the situation as 
regards sovereignty in the territory wlrere 
the 'laws' are enacted and, no doubt, to 
any relevant consideration of public policy.
The Chief Justice triumphantly pointed to this 
obiter dictum as authority for the proposition that a court 
was not bound not to recognise the laws of a non-recognised 
government,
114. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, pp. 311-13.
11-5. 1967 A.C. 8 5 3 , 961.
116. 1968 (2i); S.A. 284, p. 312. The underlining is
that of Beadle, C,J.
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The Chief Justice ttfas thus stating that the 
Certificates regaxding the status of foreign governments 
were inappropriate to an examination of domestic law by 
a domestic court. Alternatively, if the Certificate of 
the Secretary of State could apply to the usurping govern­
ment in Southern Rhodesia, there was Lord Wilberforce1s 
obiter dictum to say that this did not entail also the 
non-recognition of its laws.
His Lordship then advanced towards the question of
l"evolutionary situations, and examined judicial decisions
in certain Commonwealth countries where the courts had
117been seised of a similar predicament• The learned
Chief Justice professed himself fox’tified by two decisions 
in courts of other Commonwealth countries in saying that a 
domestic court was competent to examine the legality of
. insits own government.
He embarked on the inquiry into the meaning of the
tei’ms f,de jure government" and "de facto government", and
without either the reinforcement of precedent or the support
of detailed explanation, he maintained that the meaning
these terms bore in international law, and their relevance to
the latter, were both to be adopted by municipal law. lie
119illuminated his assertion thusi
1 1 7. 1968 (2 ) S.A.L.R. 284, 313-26.
118. The two decisions are from Pakistan and Uganda, res­
pectively STATE v. POSSO (195®) 2 Pakistan Supreme Court 
Reports 180, and UGANDA v. COMMISSIONER OR PRISONS, EX 
PARTE MATOVU (1 9 6 6J E.A. 5147“
119. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, p. 314.
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Both expressions are ones which, are generally 
used more in international than municipal law, 
but 1 can see no reason why an international 
law definition should not he used by a municipal 
court, because it would seem that, if a govern­
ment conformed to an accepted international law 
definition of either a de jure or a de facto 
government, then a fortiori it should be recog­
nised as such by a municipal court.
The Chief Justice then quoted Herbert Morrison's 
definition of the terms "de jure government" and "de facto 
government" in the context of issuing Certificates accord­
ing or refusing recognition to foreign governments. On 
March 21, 1931, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
made a statement in the House of Commons, part of which 
read as followss
...•it is international law which defines the 
conditions under which a government should be 
recognised de jure or de facto, and it is a 
matter of judgment in each particular case 
whether a regime fulfils the conditions. The 
conditions under international law for the 
recognition of a new regime as the de facto 
government of a state are that the new rdgime 
has in fact effective control over most of the 
state's territory and that this control, seems 
likely to continue. The conditions for the 
recognition of a new rdgime as the de jure 
government of a state are that tlxe new rdgime 
should not merely have effective control over 
most of the state's territory, but that it 
should, in fact, be firmly established. His 
Majesty's Government consider that recognition 
should be accorded when the conditions specified 
by international law are, in fact, fulfilled 
and that recognition should not be given when 
these conditions are not fulfilled. The recog­
nition of a government de jure or de facto 
should not depend on whether the character of 
the regime is such as to command His Majesty's 
Government * s approval•
120. HANSARD, Vol. 485, col• 2410, (House of Commons•) 
Herbert Morrison was then Foreign Secretary.
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From this extract of Herbert Morrison's statement
the Chief Justice chose the following excerpt with his own
121empliasis, as indicated;
The conditions under international law for 
the recognition of a new regime as the de 
facto government of a state are that the 
new regime has in fact effective control 
over most of the state's territory and that 
this control seems likely to continue * The 
conditions for the x*e cognition of a new 
regime as the de jure government of a state 
are that the new regime should not merely 
have effective control over most of the 
state's territory, but that it should, in 
fact, be firmly established.
122The learned Chief Justice then pronounced;
Xf in the instant case the stage is reached 
when it can be said with reasonable certainty 
that the revolution has succeeded; then in 
the eyes of international law123 Rhodesia 
will have become a de jure independent sovereign 
state, its Grundnorm will have changed^ ^  and 
its new constitution will have become the lawful 
constitution.
No one doubts that a successful revolution, in 
international law, confers legitimacy on the incoming 
Government. But in municipal law what possible right has 
a domestic court to pronounce on the validity or invalidity 
of a government in control? Xt is not the function of a 
court of municipal jurisdiction to confer or refuse legiti­
macy to a government enjoying effective control of that 
municipality, Xts status cannot be a matter for domestic 
litigation but its standing, whether legitimate or illegitimate
121. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, p. 3 1 5.
122. 1968 (2) S.A.L.R. 284, p. 3 1 5,
123. My own emphasis.
124. It is wrong to speal*. of a "change" in the Grundnorm 
when a dependent territory ascends to independent 
stattis because prior to independence the dependent 
territory cannot claim a Grundnorm of its own. The 
translation of the territory to the higher status 
should be defined as the acquisition of a Grundnorm,
contd.....
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must simply be a fundamental, indeed the fundamental, 
i:>resupposition of law in the municipality for no other 
reason than that if the question were municipally liti- 
gable there could be no tribunal entitled to adjudicate.
The Chief Justice then approached what was the
125kernel of his decisions
The attitude of this Court towards the revo­
lution is undoubtedly one of the facts which 
must be taken into account in determining, 
first, whether or not the present Government 
is in ’effective control’, and, second, what 
the likelihood is of it remaining in such 
control. X think this is the proper place 
which the attitude of this Court occupies in
these proceedings......  As the territory
has been so governed for the past two years 
by the present Government, X consider it must 
now be accepted that the present Government 
’is in fact in effective control over the 
state’s territory* and therefore satisfies the 
first part of the definltion126 3 whicli applies 
both to a de facto and a de jure government,
I reach this conclusion after paying due regard 
to the attitude of this Court towards the revo­
lution and to the part it has played during the 
past two years. 127
I turn now to deal with the second part of the 
definition, that is, the likelihood of the 
present Government continuing in such effective 
c o n t r o l I  will consider first what 
bearing the fact that the Court has not ’joined
Footnote 124 continued..•
Xt is illogical to speak of X ’s Grundnorrn wlien X does 
not even possess a legal order from which alone a 
Grundnorrn can find its role. The point is important 
and will be pursued in the Critique in the nest Chapter,
125, 1968 (2 ) S.A. 284, pp. 320-26,
126, My own emphasis,
127* This is difficult to distinguish from the pluenomenon 
of ”joining the revolution” from which the Chief 
Justice was labouring to dissociate the High Court,
the revolution* has in deciding this 
question. If the fact that this Court has 
not ’joined the revolution1 seems likely 
to prevent the present Government from con­
tinuing in effective control, then this fact 
might well prove decisive in deciding its 
status. If, on the other hand, this fact 
is not likely to have any bearing on this 
issue, then it will be an irrelevant consider- 
atxon............os....... As a quo s t xon of
fact.... I find that the attitude of this
Court is not a significant f a c t o r 1 2 8  in determ­
ining the likelihood of the present Government 
continuing in effective control of the Govern­
ment of the territory.......oPerhaps the most
pertinent evidence of all, hoxvever, is the 
fact that more than two years have elapsed 
since the Declaration of Independence; and, 
as I have said, the present Government is 
still in effective control. It is here that 
events speak eloquently. Nothing succeeds like 
success; and this is particularly true of revo­
lutions .129 The longer the present Government 
remains effectively in control, so much more 
likely is it that it will continue indefinitely 
to remain in such control........ On the evidence
I come without hesitation to the conclusion that 
to-day it ’seems’ likely that the present 
Government will continue in control, because I 
cannot see that any other possibility ’seems’ 
at all likely.
Does the evidence, however, justify a more 
positive finding; a finding that on a balance 
of probabilities it ’is' likely to remain in 
control, so likely as to justify holding that 
it can now be said that the present Government 
is ’firmly established' 3 0  The evidence goes 
vex^y nearly as far as to justify such a finding; 
but predicting accurately the future here is
not an easy task..  At this stage, there-
fore, I am hesitant about accepting the opinion 
evidence of the respondents' experts that events 
will necessarily turn out the way they p-redict.
128. My own emphasis.
129. My own emphasis.
130» When Herbert Morrison made his distinction between de
facto and de jure governments concerning the practice
of the British Government in respect of the recognition 
of foreign governments, little did lie realize that his 
mental exertion would one day be exalted to an imprimatur 
of legality for a rebelling British dependency by Her 
Majesty's Chief Justice in that dependency.
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They may well do so, but X do not think 
there is sufficient evidence before me 
at the moment to hold that they WXIX^I
do so........... X sum up on this question
of status, therefore, by finding that 
the 'status1 of the present Government is 
that of a de facto government, in the 
sense that it is in fact in effective 
control over the State's territory, and 
that this control 'seems' likely to continue.
I do not find on the evidence before me 
that at this stage it can be said to be so 
'firmly established1 as to justify a finding 
that its status is yet that of a de jure 
government; because, as X have said, X find 
that the evidence on what * is’ likely to 
happen in the future is not yet sufficiently 
conclusive.
Not a little jurisprudential commotion is fomented 
by the knowledge that the learned Chief Justice has not 
thought it precarious to recline on a statement by a 
British Foreign Secretary - Herbert Morrison - for exclusive 
supiDort of his ratio decidendi. He analysed the words 
of the Foreign Secretary with the patient excogitation 
usually reserved for Acts of Parliament, and acknowledged 
to those words a decisiveness of authority in a context 
for which they were never meant. The Foi’eign Secretary 
had merely been enlightening the Members of the House of 
Commons on the circumstances in which His Majesty's Govern­
ment would accord the right type of recognition to foreign 
governments, The statement was never intended to be 
definitive of judicial pronouncements on the validity of 
domestic legislation. Having reached the conclusion that 
the usurping government could not be resisted in its claim
131. The emphasis is that of the Chief Justice.
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to de facto status ? the learned Chief1 Justice proceeded
to explore the measure of1 obedience to which that status
entitled the government. His inquiry satisfied him of 
132this views
The present Government has effectively 
usurped all the governmental powers under 
the old Grundnorrn, but has not yet succeeded 
in setting up a new Grundnorrn’*33 in its 
place* As a result of this effective 
usurpation it can do anything wliich the 
Government it usurped could have done; but 
until the present Government has achieved 
the status of a de jure Government, and the
revolutionary Grundnorrn becomes tlae new
Grundnorrn, it must govern in terms of the
old Grundnorrn  ...There is, X know, no
precedent for this principle, but this is 
because the problem facing this Court ..... 
is an unprecedented one........
Having decided on the powers of a de facto govern­
ment , his Lordship turned to the validity of the Proclam­
ation and the regulation under which the appellants1
134detention was continued. He found the relevant regulation 
void because it did not provide for the individual attention
to the extension of the several detainees' confinement that
the empowering Act required - the regulation invalidated 
had purported to extend detentions automatically without 
further consideration of the Minister concerned. On this
1 3 2. 1968 (2 ) S.A. 2 8 4 , p. 3 5 1.
133* Is there then no Grundnorrn in the interregnum? Is
this logically possible? Does this not mean that 
the Chief Justice was denying that laws had an ulti­
mate source of authority? But other than this it is 
proposed to concur with the limitation he imposed on 
the powers of the de facto government, if he had been
commenting as a jurist, hence only descriptively, and
not as a judge, who speaks necessarily prescrip)tively.
1968 (2) S.A. 284, 359.
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technical ground, the aiDj>eal was upheld. But the ease 
with which the regulation was amended ensured that the 
victory was pyrrhic.
DECISION 03? QU35NET
The essence of the learned judge's decision was 
that the authority vested in Southern Rhodesia by the 
1961 Constitution was such as bestowed internal 
sovereignty on that territory, consequentially only re­
quiring of the said territory an allegiance to the 
external sovereignty of the United Kingdom. The Declar­
ation of Independence had precipitated a choice of 
sovereigns in that the latter 110 longer harmonised, His 
Lordship thought that sovereignty should be resolved in
favour of the government enjoying effective control, the
136de facto government* He formulated the proposition
that a de facto government was either automatically a de 
jure government (citing Kelsen) or eligible for de jure 
status after a period of stability (relying on Bryce)
In respect of the investiture of de facto status
on the Smith Government his Lordship offered this expo-
sition,1?8
One must,,..,.in each case examine the 
limitations upon independence and decide 
whether or not they are inconsistent with 
the existence of internal sovereignty.
In terms of the 1961 Constitution the
135. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, pp. 361-760
136. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, pp. 366-7.
137. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, pp. 368-90
138. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, pp. 366-80
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legislature was given power to make laws 
for the peace, order and good government 
of Southern Rhodesia.**., the power to 
legislate included the making of laws 
having extra-territorial operation.......
Section 1 of the British Nationality Act,
1948 envisaged the creation of Southern 
Rhodesian citizenship. I am in no doubt 
the limitations upon sovereignty arising 
from the provisions of Section 1X1 did not 
prevent the ox^eration of internal sovereignty 
.... Before the Declaration of Independence
the duty of allegiance owed by Southern 
Rhodesians was divided it was owed in part 
to the United Kingdom and in part to 
Southern Rhodesia....conflict,.. now exists
between the present Government and the 
Government of the United Kingdom.... where
allegiance was owed to an external and an 
internal sovereign, internal sovereignty was
the more important......because without such
an authority peace and order in a community 
would disappear....In the two years following 
the Declaration of Independence the present 
Government has established itself as the 
country1s paramount authority. In the field 
of positive or national law it is the sole law­
maker ..... . It maintains the courts and is in 
exclusive control of the country’s adminis­
tration and of its national forces......  There
can be no doubt that since 11th November, 196 5 ? 
it has been the country’s effective de facto 
government•
On his attribution of de jure status to Mr. Smith’s
1 39government his Loi'dship siistained his decision thus s
 ....... some indicate that lawfulness is
the sine qua non of effectiveness, others that 
a testing time must ela]?se before a de jure
position is reached. Uheaton....... puts the
matter in this way:
’Sovereignty is acquired by a State, 
either at the origin of the civil society 
of which it is composed, or when it 
separates itself from the coimnunity of 
which it previously formed a part,l4o and 
on which it was dependent.
139. 1968 (2) S.A.b.R. 284, pp. 3 6 8-9 .
140. My own emphasis.
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This principle applies as well to internal 
as to external sovereignty. But an 
important distinction is to be noticed, in 
this respect, between these two species of 
sovereignty. 141 The internal sovereignty
of a State ......  does not require the
recognition of other States..... The existence
of the State de facto is sufficient....  to
establish its sovereignty de jure. It is a 
State because it exists*1
142This view accords with Kelsen's theory as
applied in the Pakistani and Ugandan cases....
It is a view which avoids the paradoxical con­
clusion that, even though the laws of a de facto 
Government have binding force the source of 
those laws, that is to say, the de facto govern­
ment, might itself be unlawful,  .......... ?
..... The other point of view is expressed by
Bryce; 143
•Sovereignty de facto, when it has lasted 
for a certain time’l l  and shown itself 
stable, ripens into Sovereignty de jure.1
On either approach   the present Government
has achieved internal de jure statusT 14-5
Since the learned judge concluded that the usurping 
government was endowed with de jure status (the inexorable 
corollary being that the f'1965n Constitution was likewise 
soldered onto the de jure pedestal) there could be no conse­
quence but that all its laws were entitled to enforcement by
141. My own emphasis.
142. My own emphasis. This is a correct rendering of
ICelsen’s Theory in my submission.
143. My own emphasis.
144. Hence the effectiveness must pass the test of
temporal endurance which is not specified as 
required by Kelsen.
145. My own emphasis. The point about internal and
external sovereignty is important and will be
examined in the Critique in the following Chapter.
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and obedience from the court. The only issue outstanding
therefore was the validity of the regulations published
under the authority of the Emergency Powers Act (the right
of the government to exercise the powers therein being
assured to it by its de jure status) were valid, and in
particular regulation 47(3) under which the appellants had
their initially valid detentions continued. In this
regard he was content to concur with the learned Chief
146Justice in striking down the regulation.
As a matter of incidental import it is proposed 
to probe the connotations of the terms de jure and de 
facto government. ¥hen a government is displaced by a 
rebellion the evicted sovereign is commonly classified as 
de jure and the successful (at least for the time being) 
party of rebellion becomes the de facto government. The 
former is the depository of legitimacy and the latter the 
repository of actual contx'ol. But when the latter 
attains to de jure status what is the status of the former? 
Assuming that the logical conclusion is that the ousted 
de jure government is then to be stripped of its de jure 
status, are there then not two meanings to the term, the 
first being that of an ousted legal government, and the 
second that of a usurping government which through endurance 
finally achieves the status of a legal government? The 
former meaning asserts the status of a legal government 
without control of the territory in question, whereas the
146. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, p. 374.
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latter defines the position of a legal government with 
control of the territory concerned. Should there not 
he a distinction between a government with both legality 
and power, and one with only the attribute of legality?
It is suggested that the term should be restricted to 
allusion to a government that is both legal and efficacious, 
and that a legal ousted government should be known as an 
ex de jure government, such that where a legal government 
has been unseated and the usurping government has yet to 
demonstrate the endurance of its effectiveness there is 
to be NO de jure government, but only a de facto and an 
ex jure government. The subsequent success of either 
will then decide which is to succeed to the title of de 
jure government. This will have the merit of demanding 
from the de facto government evidence of its continued 
ability to govern and dispel the spectre of an evanescent 
regime, and of penalising the ex de jure government for a 
protracted lapse of control, thus discouraging the 
proliferation of governments in exile which, while not 
having the means of effective government, often harass 
those who have successfully secured stability and are only 
concerned to strengthen and continue that stability.
There is no reason why prolonged failure to recapture the 
seat of power by an ousted or ex de jure government should 
not delete the latter from the dictionary of constitutional
14?jurisprudence. 1
147. The confusion has been mentioned at this stage
30 as to enable it to be understood that the terms 
are not being used consistently by the judiciary.
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148DECISION OF MACDONALD. J.A.
With no disrespect to tlie erudition of the learned 
judge it can be maintained without fear of its being 
regarded as an unwarranted disparagement, that his judg­
ment , though lacking nothing in length, was not opulent 
in legal theory* All lie said was that Southern Rhodesia 
had the right as a semi-independent country to the internal 
allegiance of her subjects, necessitating that she concede 
only the external allegiance of her xjeople to the United 
Kingdom in the letter’s capacity as the country's external 
sovereign. The Declaration of Independence forced on the 
people of Southern Rhodesia the choice between two competing 
sovereigns, a choice that had to be resolved in favour of 
the internal sovereign because the latter enjoyed de facto 
control of the territory. For the purposes of municipal 
law, the learned judge asserted, a de facto government was 
synonymous with one that was de jure. If the Government 
led by Mr. Smith was de jure the 1965 Constitution was de 
jure* Since the Queen had declined the Headship of the 
country, Southern Rhodesia was a de facto republic. He 
disallowed the regulation in question on the technical 
ground favoured by the other judges of the court. It is 
not x^oposed to offer analysis in regal'd to the learned 
judge's marathon dissection on the laws of treason and
allegiance. The essence of his decision appears in the
1 kofollowing extract:
1.48. 1968 (2 ) S.A. 284, pp. 376-416. 
149, 1968 (2 ) S.A. 284, pp. 384-5 .
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1 5 1.
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153.
There are a number of reasons for the 
unanimous acceptance by English jurists 
of a duty to obey the laws of a sovereign 
power established within the state by 
revolution s
(i) First and foremost among these is 
the fundamental concept that allegiance
is due in return for a c t u a j l50 protection.
TXie corollary of this is that allegiance is 
not due to a sovereign power xdiich, while 
claiming the theoretical right to xirotect, 
fails to afford protection.
(ii) Secondly, and most importantly, there 
is the need in the interests of the state 
and its people to ensure the continuity of 
the law and avoid the anarchy which would 
result from a legal vacuum.
(iii) A third reason, refreshingly free 
from cant and kyioocrisy, is the appreciation 
by jurists that, because governments without 
exception have an extra-legal origin, courts 
exercising jurisdiction within a state must, 
if they are to function at all, obey the laws 
of the Government 'for the time beingf.15l
If a court of law anywhere in the world were 
to insist that only the laws of a government 
with a legal origin152 may be obeyed and 
enforced, it would not be able to function 
because there is no such government. The 
feature which distinguishes one government 
from another is not that some Xiave an extra- 
legal and other's a legal origin but simply 
the variation in the length of time separating 
all existing governments from their extx'a-legal 
origin. Although the government 'for the time 
being1153 within a state shares with all other 
governments the taint of extra-legal origin 
it has the obvious merit of being the only 
effective law-making and law-enforcing body 
within the state. To refuse to obey tlie laws 
of sucXi a government is to talce not a legal 
but a revolutionary, or a countery-revolutionary 
stand.
TXie learned judge's own emphasis.
The leai'ned judge's own emphasise
The emphasis is that of the learned judge.
His TordsXiip's emphasis.
3.10.
It will be recalled that the learned judge had 
earlier spoken of a conflict between two allegiances owed 
to two sovereigns. It may be pertinent to remark on 
the fact that even if Southern Rhodesia could have been 
regarded as an internal sovereign, such a status could 
only have been conceded by virtue of the 1961 Constitution. 
Throughout his elaborate judgment nowhere did the learned 
judge deny that whatever status his country enjoyed immedi­
ately prior to XJ.D.I. was owed to the provisions of the 
1961 Constitution. Now if the 1961 Constitution (and the 
1923 Constitution before it) had conferred internal 
sovereignty on Southern Rhodesia, that sovereignty could 
axiomatically be enjoyed only on the terms on which it 
was conferred. Far from there being a "conflict" between 
two rival sovereigns upon U.D.I., the "internal sovereign" 
had logically ceased to exist as a constitution^phenomenon 
on that occasion for the simple reason that it was no 
longer constituted in the terms in which it was created*
If the "internal sovereignty" of Southern! Rhodesia was 
defined as X it is plain that Y, whatever it may be, is 
not the same tiling, If there was thus no "internal 
sovereign" there could not have been that "conflict" to 
the purported resolution of which the learned judge had 
dedicated such minuteness of elaboration. Even if it 
is suggested that the 1961 Constitution did nothing so 
exalted as to confer internal sovereignty on Southern 
Rhodesia, but had merely given expression to it, the Smith 
Government would still be denied succour from it because if 
the 1961 Constitution expressed, and declared, that
3*11 .
"internal sovereignty" could only be X, then a purported 
internal sovereignty otherwise expressed or declared is 
necessarily other than X and therefore not the internal 
sovereign. So, it is immaterial that the 1961 Consti­
tution might have been only declaratory, and not consti­
tutive, of that internal sovereignty of Southern Rhodesia 
by which the learned judge had set such great store.
DECISION OF JARVIS, A.J.A.15^
The learned judge introduced his decision with a 
concise appraisal of the events to which the issue before
1 K K
the court owed its existence. Part of the survey reads ^
The appax-ent object of the 1965 Constitution 
was to establish Southern Rhodesia as an 
independent sovereign state within the British 
Commonwealth, with the Queen as its head. The 
unlawful act of repudiating the 1961 Consti­
tution, the Declaration of Independence, the 
pui'ported substitution (which collectively may 
be said to have constituted an act of usurpation), 
and the lack of enforcement of the legislative 
measures taken by the United Kingdom, have, In 
combination, bx,ought about a state of affairs in 
which Southern Rhodesia, as a matter of strict 
law, is without an effective, lawful government, 
although this Court, duly constituted for the 
purposes of the 196 I Constitution, has continued 
to sit inmediis rebus without intexrf erence.
Like Beadle, C.J., before him, the learned judge 
found that the usurping government was in effective control 
of the countxiy, and that such control appeai'ed likely to be 
maintained.
154. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, pp. 416-22.
155. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, p. 417.
156. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, p. 418 (c).
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At this juncture it is proposed to focus
attention on a very important point made by the learned
judge. He asserted, in contradistinction to the attitude
of his three Brothex" Judges before him, that the court
derived its authority from the 1961 Constitution, and not
157the 1965 Constitution. He made this acknowledgement
a proposition of law although he was not unprepared to 
admit, as a proposition of fact, that the tenure of office 
by the judges was made precarious by the de facto power 
wielded by the Smith government. The learned judge's 
posture is significant because the de facto power of the 
usurping government, in his view, did not impair the 
status of the court as an organ of the 1961 Constitution, 
unless and until the government removed those judges who 
did not acknowledge the validity of the 1119 6 3" Constitution.
1 *58The present Government has submitted to 
the jurisdiction of this Court in the 
knowledge that the original source of that 
jurisdiction is the 1961 Constitution. Had 
this Court derived its jurisdiction from 
the 1965 Constitution, it would have been 
prevented fx,om giving decision in this case 
by reason of the provisions of Section 142 
of that Constitution, which prohibits ANY^59 
court from enquiz'ing into the validity of 
ANYTHING^O done under the provisions of that 
Constitution. At the same time it must, I 
think, be acknowledged that as a matter of 
fact (but not of l a w  61 the tenure of office 
of the Judges of this Coux,t since the Declar­
ation of Indexxendence has become, in a sense,
157» 1968 (2) S.A.L.R. 284, p. 419.
1 5 8* My own emphasis*
159* The leaiuxed judge's own emphasis.
160. His Lordship's emphasis,
161. My own emxxhasis.
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162 . .PRECARIOUS by reason of the provisions
of section 128(4)(b) of the 19&5 Consti­
tution, which the present Government has 
the power to enforce. Subject to this 
acknowledgment, 1 consider that the source 
of the jurisdiction of this Court is still 
the 1961 Constitution and that the present^„ 
Government has not usurped its functions.
Having found that the court functioned under the 
1961 Constitution, the learned judge reached the conclusion 
earlier arrived at by Beadle, C.J., that the Smith Govern­
ment, being the only effective government within the 
country (he did not use the term *'de facto”), was entitled 
to do such thing’s as were performable under the 1961
164Constitution. His own words were?
If, therefore, the powers of internal 
autonomy already granted to the territory 
by the 1961 Constitution are exercised 
by the only body in the territory at 
present capable of functioning as a 
government, then,it seems to me, that the 
quality of law and legality may legiti­
mately be attached to both the legislative 
and administrative acts of that body so 
long as they conform with the Declaration 
of Rights in the 1961 Constitution and d.o 
not go beyond anything a lawful government 
under that Constitution could have done.
I consider, therefore, that legal effect 
can be given to such legislative measures 
and administrative acts of the present 
Government as would have been lawful in 
the case of a lawful government governing 
under the 1961 Constitution,
He agreed with the learned Chief Justice as to the 
validity of the Proclamation and the invalidity of the 
regulation under which the appellants were detained,
162. His Lordship’s emphasis. S. 128(4)(b) provided for the 
dismissal of those judges who should refuse allegiance 
to the new ”1 9 6 5” Constitution,
1 6 3. My own emphasis.
164. 1968 (2) S.A.L.R. 284, pp. 421-2.
165. 1968 (2) S.A.L.R. 284, p. 422,
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His Lordship had granted the SmitXi Government 
limited recognition because of ”the social need to pre­
serve peace, order and good government"
Xt is not clear? unfortunately, whether the 
learned judge attributed the restricted recognition of 
the Smith government to the fact that it enjoyed de facto 
status or to the applicability of the doctrine of state 
necessity. He placed express reliance on neither concept.
DECISION OF FIELDSEND, A.J.A. 167
As I appreciate the problems that arise in 
these appeals, the decision must turn upon 
the answers to two principal questionss 
one involves the very source of authority 
of the Court itself, and the other concerns 
the powers and duties of the Court, depending 
upon what is found to be the source of its 
authority. 168
Such was the manner in which the learned judge 
introduced his judgment.
His assessment of the constitutional position was
169succa.nct, as can be discerned from the extract followings
The position can best be summarised by saying 
that effective executive and legislative 
machinery under the 1961 Constitution is 
completely in abeyance 7^0, and that executive 
and legislative control is firmly in the hands 
of the usurping authorities, who are ordering 
the day-to-day affairs of the country and have
been two years.........Although the present
authorities have not invoked section 128(4) to 
compel any Judge to take the prescribed oath on
1 6 6. 1968 (2 ) S•A.L.R« 284, P* 421(d ).
167. 1968 (2 ) S.A.L.R. 284, PP<. 422-44.
1 6 8. 1968 (2 ) S.A.L.R. 284, p. 422.
1 6 9. 196S (2 ) & • A . L . R . 284, p. 42 5 .
l?0 . My own emphasis.
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pain of loss of office without compensation, 
they can have been in no doubt that the 
Court 171 has not accepted the 19^5 Constitution 
as the valid constitution of the country.
The learned judge then went on to hold that the
usurping government was decidedly not de facto because it
had only been able to usurp txtfo of the three constituents
of the sovereign authority, namely that it had not acquired
control of, or compelled acquiescence from, the Judiciary
even though it had taken over the Legislature and the
Executive. Since the government was not de facto the
British Treason Act of 1495 (initially English only) which
excused obedience to a de facto sovereign could not avail
172the present usurping government.
His Lordship then made a valuable contribution to
constitutional jurisprudence by questioning the right of
a domestic court to decide on the status of its government. 
1 73He observeds
Whatever may be the position in the case of 
a court in the United Kingdom, it is my firm 
conviction that a court created in terms of 
a written constitution had no jurisdiction 
to recognise, either as a de jure or de facto 
government, any government other than that 
constitutionally appointed under that consti­
tution. If it were to do so it would only 
be declaring that it was incompetent to give 
a decision because its raison d1&tre had dis­
appeared. This would be an absurdity and is 
the strongest possible argument to show that 
the inquiry we were invited to embark upon is
171* It is not clear whether the learned judge was referring*
to the majority of all the judges of the High Court, or
to only the particular panel of judges sitting on the 
appeal concerned. The undei^lining of the word is mine.
172. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, pp. 427-8.
173. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, p. 4-31.
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174beyond the Court1s competence* A court
cannot sit to decide under what system of 
government it is exercising jurisdiction*
It must accept its reason for existence as 
stemming1 from its original, constitution as 
an unchallengeable fact. Xt was common 
cause that there had been no constitutional 
abrogation or replacement of the '1961 Consti­
tution or of the court created by it, and so 
far as this Court is concerned, if it continues 
to sit, as it has, that concludes the matter* 
There is no room in the proceedings of a 
domestic tribunal for the application of broad 
theoretical jurispxmdential principles in order 
to determine whether a government exists in 
its territory de facto or de jure, or whether 
certain norms receive general obedience in its 
territory, and are therefore to be enforced*
The learned judge then propounded the doctrine of
state necessity which entitles certain measures of an
illegal government to be enforced by the courts provided
they are necessary for the welfare of the community, but
his Lordship concluded that the regulation in question
was not required for the ordinary orderly running of the
state and that therefore it could not have the doctrine
17 6invoked in its favour*
The learned judge described the doctrine of state
necessity in what must constitute the essence of his 
1 77decision:
•••...it seems that the only proper conclusion 
is that natural justice, in the form of a 
controlled common sense, dictates that, for the 
welfare of the mass of people innocently caught 
up in these events, validity must be accorded to 
some acts of the usurping authorities, provided
174. My own empha sis*
173* The underlining is mine and his Lordship must have 
meant that word in the sense of '•legal".
176. 1968 (2 ) S.A. 284, p. 443.
177. 1968 (2 ) s.A. 284, pp. 439-440.
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that no consideration of public policy to
the contrary has to prevail. Xt is unnecessai'y,
and Indeed undesirable, to attempt to define
precisely the 1.mits within which this validity
xvill be accorded. 178 The basis being broadly 
necessity, the decision is one which must be 
arrived at in the light of the circumstances of 
each case.
In a general way one can say with justification 
that administrative acts and legislation directed 
to and reasonably required for the ordinary 
orderly running oX the country should be accorded 
validity, provided that they do not defeat the 
just rights of citizens under the 1961 Consti­
tution, and are not actually intended to aid and 
do not have the natural and probable consequence 
of directly aiding the usurpation. If there is 
any doubt as to whether the acts fall within the 
main category then the act will not be upheld, 
nor will it be upheld if there is a possibility 
that thereby the just rights of citizens will be 
defeated or the usurpation directly aided.
Applying the doctrine which he expounded above, 
Fieldsend, A.J.A., concluded that the continuation of the 
applicants* detention without the consideration of the 
Minister concerned was a very serious infringement of per­
sonal liberty which the respondents had failed to satisfy 
the court was necessary for the ordinary orderly running of 
the country. The respondents had failed to do so because 
they had made no attempt to justify their act with reference 
to the criterion of necessity insisted on by the learned
judge. This failure was fatal to the validity of the 
179regulation.
The regulation was also void because it was ultra
180vires the empowering Act.
178. The emphasis is mine.
179. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, p. 443.
180. 1968 (2 ) S.A. 284, p. 443,
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Xt is proposed to end this synopsis of* the liti­
gation in the Appellate Division of the High Court with a
181quotation., whose logic is difficult to resist , from
182the judgment of Fieldsend, A.J.A.s
Once it is acce£>ted, as, in my view, it 
must be, that this Court is sitting as a 
court of the 19^1 Constitution, it follows 
that, in determining what the law is on 
any given topic, it must be bound by that 
Constitution. There can, in my view, in 
the present circumstances, be no half-way 
house in regard to the Courts s either they 
derive their authority from the 19I3I Con­
stitution or from the 1965 Constitution. 183 
If they derive their authority from the 
1965 Constitution they must be bound by it 
entirely, even to tlie extent of being pre­
cluded fsem inquiring into its validity 
(sec. 142^®^)j if they derive their authority 
from the 1961 Constitution then they must be 
bound by that. A court which derives its 
existence and jurisdiction from a written
constitution cannot give effect to anything
which is not law when judged by that consti'
abandon a stable anchorage and to set sail 
into uncharted and, indeed, unchartable seas. 
The law to be administered by a municipal 
court is not an abstract concept, determined 
by general and theoretical jurisprudential 
principles? it is something concrete determined
solely by the set of norms prescribed by the
181. However, in the Critique in the following Chapter, 
an attempt will be made to review this passage 
critically, in regard to its relationship with the 
doctrine of necessity as propounded by Fieldsend, A.J.A.
182. 1968 (2) S.A. 204, p. 432.
183« The underlining is mine. Is not his doctrine of
necessity precisely the kind of half-way house which 
he pronounces to be constitutionally inconceivable?
184. This section was from the ,f 19&5U Constitution*
135. It is remarkable how the learned judge in the face
of this very stx^ ong statement by himself could have 
accepted a doctrine of necessity.
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legal order upon which the court 
considering the case is fornded.
(iv) MAPSIMBAMUTO1S CASE BEFORE THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE 
OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL 187
The Judicial Committee enjoyed appellate authority
in respect of Southern Rhodesia in regard to violations of
the Declaration of Rights as expounded in the 1961 Consti- 
188ttrtion. Tinder the 1119 6 5" Constitution, however, the
Judicial Committee had no right whatsoever to hear any
appeals from the High Court of "Rhodesia", which court was
189declared to be the final tribunal in the land.
Consistently with their postulate that the " 1 9 6 5" 
Constitution was the only lawful constitution in and over 
Rhodesia, the Minister of I/aw and Justice for Rhodesia
declined to be a party to the appeal by the appellants to the
Judicial Committee. The "respondents", who would have been 
the Rhodesian Minister for Law and Justice and the Officer 
Administering the Government, were, their refusal to appear
186. Again, this uncompromising posture should have pre­
cluded his own subsequent acceptance of the doctrine 
of necessity in the judgment. The incongruity must 
have escaped the learned judge as he made 110 attempt 
to reconcile his absolute observance of the 1961 
Constitution with his resolute exposition of the 
doctrine of necessity which he so forcefully chamxoioned.
187. /T9697 1 A •C. 645. Leave to appeal was given by the 
Privy Council although it had been refused by the 
Appellate Division of the High Courts 1968 (2 ) S.A. 457.
188. Constitution of Southern Rhodesia (1961) - 1961 S.1.
2314 - S. 7 1 (5 ).
189. S. 65 of the "1 9 6 5" Constitution.
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before the Judicial Committee notwithstanding,
1 90"represented" by amxcr curiEie.
The appeal to the Privy Council was taken by the 
first applicant, but not by the second. This was not an 
appeal against the express decision of the Appellate 
Division of the High Cou*rt but against its implied approval 
of the fresli detention order that was made against the 
first apixlicant * s husband after the High Court had taught 
the Smith government lioxtf it could serve an intra vix'es 
ordex'® The appeal was in law against the implicit opinion 
of the High Court that a fresh detention order which was
191not an automatic continuation of the old, would be valid®
The applicant's counsel submitted that no such fresh de­
tention order could be valid because the government which 
issued it was wholly illegal, and was neither de facto nor 
de jure® Also, the doctrine of state necessity was alleged 
to be inapiolicable to the circumstances.
The members of the Board who sat on the appeal 
were Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-Y-G-es t, Lord Pearce, 
Lord Wilberforce, and Lord Pearson. Lord Reid delivered 
the majority judgment allowing the appeal, but Lord Pearce 
dissented, and he would have dismissed the appeal®
1.90* These were J.G® Le Quesne, Q.C®, Andrew Bateson 
and Stuart McKinnon®
"*91 • ^9697 1 A.C. 645, P» 648(a ) and (b ). It is not
immediately obvious how one could appeal against a 
FAVOURABLE decision. The appellant's case had been 
upheld by the Appellate Division of the High Court,
321 .
1 92JUDGMENT OF THE MAJORITY ^
In his majority decision Lord Reid posed three
questions the answers to which he thought were decisive
193of the appeal. These weres
(l) What was the legal effect in Southern 
Rhodesia of the Southern Rhodesia Act,
1965? and the Order in Council^ 9 *• which 
accompanied it? (2 ) Can the usurping 
government now in control in Southern 
Rhodesia be regarded for any purpose as a 
lawful government? (3 ) If not, to what 
extent, if at all, are the courts of 
Southern Rhodesia entitled to recognise or 
give effect to its legislative or adminis­
trative acts?
His Lordship then advanced to answer the first 
question. He maintained that conventions of the British 
Constitution, with particular reference to the British 
Convention not to legislate for Southern Rhodesia 011 matters 
within the legislative competence of the latter, could not 
derogate from the legal power of Parliament. He also 
adopted tlie stance that U.D.I. might have released the 
United Kingdom Government from the obligation of non-inter­
ference embodied in the convention. He was adamant that 
the 1961 Constitution made no grant of limited sovereignty 
to Southern Rhodesia, even assuming it was possible for the 
United Kingdom Parliament ever to make such a cession of 
power. Also, there was nothing in the 1961 Constitution 
to suggest that certain powers had been ceded as sovereign
192. /T9697 1 A.C. 6k$, pp. 710-731.
193* /J969/ 1 A.C. 6k$s p. 721.
19^. The important provisions of both the Act and the
Order are reproduced at the beginning of this
Chapter.
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authority whereas the remaining: sovereign powers were
to be reserved to the United Kingdom. This being the
case, the 1965 Southern Rhodesia Act and the subsequent
Order-in-~Council, emanating as they did from an absolute
195sovereign, had lull legal effect in Southern Rhodesxa.
His answer to the second question was negative.
T96Hxs words weres
“With regard to the question whether the 
usurping government can now be regarded 
as a lawful government much was said 
about de facto and de jure governments)
Those are conceptions of international 
law and in their Lordships1 view are quite 
inappropriate in dealing with the legal 
position of a usurper within the territory 
of which lie has acquired control. 197
He agreed with the results reached by the courts
in Pakistan and Uganda to the effect that where a government
has effectively displaced a former lawful government, the
domestic court had the right to recognise the successful
usurper as the nextf legitimate government of the country.
However, he sought to distinguish those decisions by 
198arguings
It would be very different if there had been 
still two rivals contending for power. If 
the legitimate G-overnment had been driven out 
but was trying to regain control it would be 
inqpossible to hold that the usurper who is in 
control is the lawful ruler, because that would 
mean that by striving to assert its lawful 
right tlie ousted legitimate government was 
opposing the lawful ruler.
1i95. Z'19697 1 A.C. 645, pp. 7 2 2-3 . 
196o /T9697 1 A.C. 645, P. 723. 
197* My own emphasis.
198, /196£7 1 A.C. 645, P. 725»
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Subsequent to this extract, Lord Reid (for the 
majority) made a startling error of fact by claiming 
that the majority of the judges in the Appellate Division 
of the High Court of Southern Rhodesia still regarded 
themselves to be sitting under the lawful sovereign. Xn 
fact the majority of those judges (Beadle, C.J., Quenet 
J.P. , and Macdonald J.A.) had made it unmistakable that 
tlaey did not sit as judges of the lawful sovereign.
Lord Reid concluded that the usurping government
in Southern Rhodesia could not be regarded as a lawful 
199government.
His Lordship then addressed his attention to the 
third question of whether validity can be given to any 
of the legislative or administrative acts of the usurping 
government. Pie decided that the doctrine of state neces­
sity could not avail such acts. He rejected the relevance 
of this doctrine to the issue in these words
It may be that there is a general principle, 
depending on implied mandate from the lawful 
Sovereign, which recognises the need to pre­
serve law and order in territory controlled 
by a usurper. But it is unnecessary to decide 
that question because no such principle could 
override the legal right of the Parliament of 
the United Kingdom to make such laws as it may 
think proper for territory under the Sovereignty 
of Her Majesty in the Parliament of the "United 
Kingdom. Parliament did pass the Southern 
Rhodesia Act, 1 9 6 5? and thereby authorise the 
Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in 
Council, 1 9 6 5. There is no legal vacuum in 
Southern Rhodesia. Apart from the provisions
199. /J9697 1 A.C. 645, p. 7 2 5G. 
200« Z79697 1 A.C, 645, p. 7 2 9.
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of4 this legislation and its effect upon 
subseqLient 1 enactments1 the whole of* the 
existing law remains in force. But it is 
necessary to determine what, on a true 
construction, is the legal effect of this 
legislation.
The provisions of the Order in Council are 
dx'astic and unqualified. ¥ith regard to 
the making of laws for Southern Rhodesia 
section 3(l)(£0 provides that no laws may 
be made by the Legislature of Southern 
Rhodesia and no business may be transacted 
by the Legislative Assembly* then section 
3(1 )(c) authorises Her Majesty in Council 
to make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of Southern Rhodesia 2 and section 
6 declares that any law made in contra­
vention of any prohibition imposed by the 
Order is void and of no effect. This can 
only mean that the power to make laws is 
transferred to Her Majesty in Council with 
the result that no purported law made by any 
person or body in Southern Rhodesia can have 
any legal effect, no matter how necessary 
that purported law may be for the purpose of 
preserving law and order or for any other 
purpose. 201 It is for Her Majesty in 
Council to judge whether any new law is re­
quired and to enact such new laws as may be 
thought necessary or desirable.
His Lordship thus found the relevant regulation 
void and allowed the appeal.
202THE DISSENTING DECISION OF LORD PEARCE
Lord Pearce concurred with the first tx^ o answers 
of the majority judgment delivered by Lord Reid. He did 
not deny that the 19^5 Southern Rhodesia Act and the 
Order-in-Council thereof were validly passed, nor that th 
usurping government could not even be accorded de facto
2010 My own emphasis.
202. /T9627 1 A.C. 645, PP. 731-45.
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POrt
status.'’ He denied, however, that the Act and Order™
in-Council had prevented the validation of certain of 
the usurping government's measures through the operation 
of the doctrine of state necessity. He expressed himself 
to be in agreement with Fieldsend, A«J • A ., in the Appellate 
Division of the High Court. However, he went on to say, 
alternatively, that the doctrine of state necessity was 
to prevail even If it was irreconcilable with the Act and
20Order--in-Council. He expressed the latter opinion thus s
There is no indication in the Order in 
Council that it intended to exclude the 
doctrine of necessity or implied mandate 
by enjoining (inconsistently with the 
Governor’s directive)^05 continuing 
disobedience to every act or command which 
had not the backing of lawful authority.
Even had it done so,206 I feel some doubt 
as to how far this is a possible conception 
when over a prolonged period no stejjs are 
taken by the Sovereign himself to do any 
acts of government and the result would pro­
duce a pure and continuous chaos or vacuum.
Earlier, Lord Pearce gave his appraisal of the
207situation in these wordst
The practical factual situation in Rhodesia 
is this. The judges lawfully appointed 
under the 1961 Constitution and representing 
its judicial power, Xaave been entrusted by 
both sides with the duty of cojrtinuing to sit.
They have continued to sit as judges under the
203® "The de facto status of sovereignty cannot be conceded 
to a rebel government as against the true Sovereign 
in the letter's courts of law." (/19697 1 A.C. 6k5,
p. 7 3 2 .)
204. /T9 6 9 7 1 A.C. 645, p. 7 4 5.
205. It is difficult to appreciate why the noble lord 
thought it necessary that an Order™in-Council should 
be consistent with the Governor's general message. 
Surely it is the converse that is logically necessary.
206o My empha sis.
207. /T9627 1 A.C. 645, P. 737.
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1961 Constitution although the country 
is in the control of an illegal government 
which does not acknowledge any right of 
appeal to their Lordships1 Board. This 
is an uneasy compromise which has been 
adopted by ‘both sides from, no doubt, a 
consideration of many factors. The primary 
reason, one presumes, is the reasonable and 
humane desire of preserving law and order 
and avoiding chaos which would work great 
hardship on the citizens of all races and 
which would incidentally damage that part 
of the realm to the detriment of whoever 
is ultimately successful. 208
Lord Pearce distilled what he conceived to be tlie
209essence of the doctrine of necessity thuss
I accept the existence of the principle that 
acts done by those actually in control 
without lawful validity may be recognised 
as valid or acted upon by the courts, with 
certain limitations namely (a) so far as 
they are directed to and reasonably required 
for ordinary orderly running of the State, 
and (b) so far as they do not impair the 
rights of citizens under the lawful (1 9 6 1) 
Constitution, and (c) so far as they are not 
intended to and do not in fact directly help 
the usurpation and do not run contrary to 
the policy of the lawful Sovereign. 210 This 
last, i * eT^  (c), is tantamount to a test of 
public policy,
Xn this view of the matter I agree with the 
judgment of Fieldsend A.J.A.
208. My own emiohasis.
209. Z19697 1 A.C. 6k$, p. 7 3 2 .
210. The underlining is mine. Here Lord Peame
appears to have infringed the canons of logic 
because he is prepared to impute to the lawful 
Sovereign an intention that contradicts, and 
presumably is to be treated as overriding, the 
express dictate of the lawful Sovereign, as 
unequivocally underlined in the 1965 Act and 
Order in Council, that the laws of the usurping
government were to be void and of no effect.
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Lord Peax'ce purported to derive his authority
for the existence of the doctrine of state necessity from
the series of cases brought before the Supreme Court of
the United States of America, in the aftermath of the
Civil ¥ar, in which the latter made legal history by
propounding the proposition that acts necessary to the
maintenance of law and order as well as those relating to
domestic and commercial transactions, notwithstanding the
f a c t  o f  t h e i r  b e i n g  p e r f o r m e d  i n  a t e r r i t o r y  Linder t h e
control of an unlawful government, are to be treated as
valid in laws provided such acts are not designed to, and
211
do not in operation, entrench the unlawful government,
Xt is proposed to cite only one of the several 
extracts Lord Pearce quoted from this series of American 
cases* One of Lord Pearce’s quotes, taken from Horn v .
t i t ^ 213Lockhart , reads?
211* Lord Pearce accepted the doctrine as propounded 
through this series of decisions but, as will be 
shown in the Critique in the next Chapter, signally 
failed to accept the extreme narrowness with which 
the doctrine was applied to factual situations.
Most of the U.S. judges, whilst eloquently preaching 
the doctrine, in fact rejected its applicability 
to the circumstances involved before them. This 
most pertinent fact was not mentioned by Lord 
Pearce.
212. (1873) 84 U.S. 570, 580. This case in fact decided
AGAINST the applicability of the doctrine on the 
facts. This was not mentioned to Lord Pearce.
2 1 3 . /J962/ 1 A.C. 6k5 , p p . 733-4.
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•.•..We admit that the acts of the several 
States in their individual capacities, and 
of their different departments, of government, 
executive, judicial, and legislative, during 
the war, so far as they did not Impair or 
tend to impair the supremacy of the national 
authority, or the just rights of citizens 
under the Constitution, are, in general, to 
be treated as valid and binding. The existence 
of a state of insurrection and war did not 
loosen the bonds of society, or do away with
civil ____ governments, or the regular administration
of the laws. ~lfT4 Order was to be preserved, 
police regulations maintained, 5 crime prose-
cuted, property protected, contracts enforced, 
marriages celebrated, estates settled-, and the 
transfer and descent of property regulated 
precisely as in time of peace. No one that we 
are aware of seriously questions the validity 
of judicial or legislative acts in the 
insurrectionary States touc|xing these and 
kindred subjects, where they were not hostile 
in their purpose or made of enforcement to the 
authority of the National Government, and did 
npt impair the rights of citizens under the 
Constitution, ..* .~2T<5
It was suggested by counsel for the appellant that 
the American cases were inappropriate to the xoresent 
litigation because they were decisions given AFTER the 
rebelling States in the Union had been subdued, whereas 
in the instant litigation the court was asked to give a 
decision DURING the course of the Rhodesian rebellion.
214o The underlining is mine.
215. The under1ining is mine.
This is the analogy most apt to the detention of 
the appellant’s husband - Daniel Madzimbamuto•
21 6. My own under lining.
This was how Lord Pearce dismissed the suggested 
217distinctions
X do not accept the argument that because 
the cases all took place APTEE^ the 
rebellion,had Tailed, and were therefore 
concerned only with retrospective acknowledg­
ment of unlawful acts? their principle cannot 
be applied DURING*^ 9 a rebellion., IT acts 
are entitled to some retrospective validity, 
there seems no reason in principle xtfhy tliey 
should not be entitled to some contemporaneous 
validity* It is when one comes to assess the 
question oT public policy that there is a 
wide diTTerence between the retrospective 
and contemporaneous* For during a rebellion 
it may be harmful to grant any validity to 
an uni awful act, whereas, when the rebellion 
has Tailed, such recognition may be innocuousD 2 2 o
Purporting to apply the doctrine of necessity to 
the case in hand, Lord Pearce found that the Proclamation 
of a state of emergency and the detention order in regard 
to Daniel Madzimbamuto were valid in that they complied 
with what lie thought to be the criteria enjoined by the
217. 1. A,C. 6k$, p. 733.
218, This emphasis is that of Lord Pearce,
219. The emphasis is that of Lord Pearce,
220, The underlining is mine*
It is disturbing to find that Lord Pearce should 
be false to his own admonitory dictum, in that 
he was prepared to allow greater latitude to a 
government in current rebellion (in allowing it to 
detain citizens) than that which the judges of 
the United States Supreme Court were prepared to 
allow to a government whose rebellion had already 
been quelled (in that in I-Iorn v* Lockhart even an 
investment in bonds issued by the Confederate 
Government, and authorised for investment by the 
rebelling State where the investment was made, 
was held void).
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221, 2,2.2, 
doctrine., ' lie would have dismissed the appeal*
(v.) THE REACTION OF THE RHODESIAN JUDICIARY
TO THE DECISX
OF THE PRIVY
ON OF THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE
COTJNCIX/
The reaction of the Rhodesian Judiciary to the
decision of the Privy Council in Madzimbamuto1s case was
made categorically known in the case of R. v. Ndhlovu and 
223Others heard before the Appellate Division of the
"High Court of Rhodesia". Before we examine Ndhlovu!s 
case, however , it is proposed to analyse a series of
/ \22kdecisions (Dhlamini and Others v „ Cartel-1, N.Q. and Another)
which were given before the hearing of the Madzimbamuto
22 5case before the Privy Council. This series of decisions
all concerned one case being litigated at three stages:
the substantive case? the refusal of leave for the case
to proceed to the Privy Council; and the rejection by the
"High Court of Rhodesia" of the commutation granted by the
Queen to the men condemned to death* The substantive 
226 227decision asserted ~ that the Prerogative of Mercy formerly
221. Zj9697 1 A.C. 645, p. 7ZH  E~F.
222. /T9697 1 A.C. 645, p. 7^5 F.
223. 1968 (4) S.A. 515.
224. 1968 (2 ) S * A. 445, z^ 64 and 467.
2 25. This series of decisions was, however, not mentioned by 
either counsel or the judges in the Madzimbamuto case 
before the Privy Council.
226. 1968 (2) S.A. 445.
227* The word "asserted" in contradistinction to the 
otherwise invariable word "decided" is used here 
advisedly because, the constitutional position being 
uncertain, the authority of the court itself is in 
question#
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exercisable by the Governor-in~Council under the 1961 
Constitution (S. 49 thereof) was now in fact exercisable 
by the Executive Council as constituted under the "1965” 
Constitution on whose advice the Officer Administering the 
Government, who technically grants the pardon on the 
Queen1s behalf, must act in the matter (S. 53 of the "1965" 
Constitution).
In the second decision of the case the convicted
men applied for a declaratory order to the effect that
they could appeal to the Privy Council against the decision
on the substantive question mentioned above the Appellate
Division of the High Court, under S. 71(5) of the 1961 
228Constitution. They also asked for a temporary interdict
(extending the one they already had) to enable them to 
appeal to the Privy Council. The Appellate Division, 
speaking through Beadle, C.J. (Quenet, J . P. , arid Macdonald,
228. A similar application in the Madzimbamuto case 
had been rejected earlier by the Appellate 
Divisions one of the five judges refusing leave 
to appeal (Fieldsend A.J.A.) founded his refusal 
on the narrow ground that the matter was not 
within S. 71(5) through which alone appeal to the 
Privy Council could be lodged under the 1961 
Constitution. The remainder of the court (Beadle, 
C. J. , Quenet, J .P. , and MacDonald, J . A. , and Jax'vis , 
A.J.A., additionally to the narrow ground mentioned, 
also founded their refusal on the controversial 
ground that any decision of the Privy Council would 
be a mere brutum fulmen (1968 (2 ) S.A. 457, at pp. 
462F, 462H, 464A, and 464b).
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J.A., concurring), dismissed the first application on
the same grounds as the application for leave to appeal
229had been refused in the Madzimbamuto case."' The second,
alternative, application for an extension of the temporary 
interdict was refused in prose that bespoke of a resignation 
to reality
In ordinary circumstances, a Court xvill, 
as a matter of course, grant an interdict 
staying the cai'rying out of a death 
sentence where the appellant wishes to 
appeal, and the prospect of the appellant 
succeeding in that appeal is not a matter 
which is likely to weigh much xvith the 
Court. The circumstances in this case, 
however, are not ordinax'y and the issue 
here is not what chance the applicants have 
of succeeding in their appeal to tlie Privy
Council - assuming the Privy Council were
to hear the appeal - but what benefit they 
will derive if they are successful in their 
appeals. It is explicit in the judgment 
of this Court231 in the application for a 
declaration under sub-section (5 ) of section 
71 of the 1961 Constitution that it is satis­
fied that no judgment of the Judicial 
Committee of tXie Privy Council would be of
any value inside this territory. If that
were not so, the pi'esent applicants would have 
been entitled to the declaration asked for 
in the earlier application.232 .........After
the most careful consideration......... I am
finally satisfied that an appeal to the Privy 
Council would be of no value to them because, 
notwithstanding any judgment the Ihrivy Council 
might give, it would be wholly ineffective in 
this country as it would not prevent the execution
2 2 9. 1968 (2 ) S.A. 457.
2 3 0. 1968 (2 ) S.A. 464, pp. 465-6.
231 * The refusal of leave to appeal in the Madzimbamuto
case s 1968 (2) S.A. 457-
232, The application for a declaration order that they
had a right of appeal to the Privy Council..
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of the applicants, if the present Government 
in the exercise of its prerogative decided
they should be executed. ......   In these
circumstances, to give the applicants the 
order for which they ask would only raise 
their hopes when there is no cause for hope.
Far from being an order for the benefit of 
the applicants, such an order by increasing
the delay would only be an act of gratuitous
cruelty. ™23"3
2 34In the third decision of the case (the final 
stage) the commutation granted to the condemned men by 
the Queen was refused recognition on the ground that the 
prerogative of mercy had been removed from the Crown in 
right of the United Kingdom to the Crown in right of 
Southern Rhodesia under S. 49 of the 1961 Constitution 
whose enactment, although by Order in Council, was in fact 
authorised under an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom
- the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1961. The Chief Justice
asserted that the prerogative of mercy enjoyed by the 
Crown in right of the United Kingdom over Southern Rhodesia 
had thus, in 1961, been superseded by statute, and could 
no longer be exercised in 1968.^“^
233. The emphasis is mine.
234. 1968 (2 ) S.A. 467.
235* 1968 (2 ) S.A. 467, P* 468A. It is intriguing that 
the learned Chief Justice should, at this very 
late stage of his judicial pronouncements, suddenly 
become so sentimentally sanctimonious about the 
power and efficacy of a United Kingdom Act of Parli­
ament. A less disingenuous approach would have been 
a declaration that the commutation was invalid be­
cause the United Kingdom Government lacked the naked 
power to have it enforcedt this would have achieved a 
loarity of powerless resignation, with which the 
Appellate Division*s earlier refusals to allow appeals 
to the Privy Council was informed, for all the court * s 
decisions.
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It is now proposed to examine the case of R . v.
2 36Ndhlovu and Others. ^ The accused were convicted under
a section which had been introduced as an amendment to 
the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act (Southern Rhodesia)*
The section was inserted by Act 30 1967° The accused
contended that the amendment was void because the Legis­
lature of Southern Rhodesia had been dissolved under S. 3 
of the Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council.
The contention would have had to be upheld if the Privy 
Council's decision in the Madzimbamuto case was binding 
on the High Court of Southern Rhodesia, because the Board 
had decided that the Order in Council had full legal effect 
in Southern Rhodesia. But their Lordships of the Appellate 
Division held that they were not so bound. Beadle, C.J.'s 
decision not to regard the Privy Council's decision as
binding is made clear in the following excerpt from his 
237judgment 3
A Judge can only carry on serving now in 
the situation in which he finds himself.
In that situation he is compelled to make 
the prediction whether the Bx'itish Govern­
ment will succeed in regaining control of 
tZie Government of Rhodesia. In present 
circumstances he can only predict that the 
British Government will not succeed in 
doing so. This being so, there is no escape 
from the view that the 1$>6l Constitution has 
now been annulled by the efficacy of the 
change, and from tliis it follows that the 
Courts must now take cognisance of the fact 
that the present Government is the only lawful 
Government of Rhodesia and that the 1965
236. 1968 (4) S.A. 515.
237. 1968 (2 ) S.A. 315, P» 335.
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Constitution is the only lawful Consti­
tution. 2 38
Quenet, J.P. , had nothing of substance to add to
what he had said earlier in the substantive decision on
Madzimbamuto*s case. In the latter he had already held
that the usurping government was the country’s de jure
government. He could not logically have further enhanced
its status in the instant decision, and he wisely did not
attempt to do so. Essentially, he only reiterated the
239position he had adopted in the earlier case.
The third and last judge in the case - Macdonald, 
J.A., besides a few rhetorical flourishes which need not 
engage our attention, in substance affirmed what he had 
pronounced in the substantive decision of the Madz imb amut o
case s tliat the usurping government was the country’s de
, 240 jure government.
This decision concluded the important series of
judicial pronouncements upon the legal consequences of the
constitutional breakdown precipitated by the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence in Southern Rhodesia.
238. Beadle, C.J. now regarded the usux'ping government as 
the de juxTe government in Rhodesia. In the 
Madzimbamuto case (1968 (2 ) S.A. 284) he had regarded 
it merely as a de facto government.
239. 1968 (4) S.A. 515, PP. 542-3.
240. 1968 (4) S.A. 515? P. 554A.
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CHAPTER 8 
A CRITIQUE OF THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
(1.) LORD PEARCE * S DISSENT' * M>ltm.Hlul*—^HHn,W—imiWMWi«u|nirl>ri,#1M^niw gnilf wuiw«BWB<aW
OP all the judgments pertaining to the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence by the usurping Government in
Southern Rhodesia, that of Lord Pearce in the Privy
1
Council in Madzimbamuto v . Lardner-Burke- is the most
interesting. It is Tor this reason that this Critique
begins with a commentary on his judgment. There are two
issues on which it is proposed to join issue with the
learned and noble lords the importance he appeared to
2attribute to the Governor1s message in elevating it to a 
source of1 authority Tor the acts oT the usurping government; 
and his exposition oT that series oT cases in the United 
States Supreme Court precipitated by, but litigated only 
in the aTtermath oT, the American Civil War (April 12 , 1861-
April 26, I8 65).
Lord Pearce used the Governor’s message as the 
keystone oT his assertion that the acts oT the usurping 
Government, insofar as these were directed to the preservation 
oT the fabric oT society in Southern Rhodesia, were APPROVED^
1- /J9627 1 A.C. 645, pp. 731-745.
2. The message which the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs,
issued on the day oT U.D.I. and which he substantially 
repeated three days later. Sir Humphrey was the 
lawful Governor under the 1961 Constitution®
3* My emphasis. See 1 A.C. 645, p. 737 F.
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by the lawful Government, i.e. the Government of the United 
Kingdom. Let us examine the two messages of the Governor 
both of which were quoted by Lord Pearce.
4The first read;
5
I call on the citizens of Rhodesia to 
refrain from all acts which would further 
the objectives of tlxe illegal authorities.
Subject to that, it is the duty of all 
citizens to maintain law and order in this 
country and to carry on with their normal ^
tasks. This applies equally to the judiciary , 
the armed services, the police and the public 
service•
7The second read;
I have been asked by Mr. Smith to resign 
my office as Governor. I hold my office at 
the pleasure of Her Majesty the Queen, and 
I will only resign if asked by Her Majesty 
to do so. Her Majesty has asked me to con­
tinue in office and 1 therefore remain your 
legal Governor and THE LAWFULLY CONSTITUTED 
AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA. It is my sincere 
liope that lawfully constituted Government 
will be restored in this country at the 
earliest possible moment, and in the meantime 
I stress the necessity for all people to 
remain calm and to assist the armed services 
and the police to continue to maintain law 
and order.
The significance of these two messages (regax'ded as
one message because of their similax'ity) was expounded by
9Lord Pearce thus;
4. This message was issued from Government House on 
November 11, 19^5*
5• It was careless of the Governor not to have given
Southern Rhodesia its proper, legal name and, equally 
inadvertently no doubt, called it under the name 
preferred by the usurping Government.
6. My emphasis.
7. Quoted by Lord Pearce on p. 738B of his judgment.
8. Lord Pearce xtfrote these words in italics.
9. 1 A *c. 6k5, p. 739.
I do not think one should countenance the 
argument that the message has no force in 
law. 'When a government in a crisis of 
dire peril and difficulty gives a directive 
to its distressed and anxious citizens 
through its lawful Governor (claiming, as 
above, to be 1 the lawfully constituted authority 
in Rhodesia1) it speaks x\rith a voice that 
must be relied on by them as the voice of 
authority. And when for years, though able 
to speak, it has not sought to correct or 
countermand its message, it can be taken that 
there was no mistake in the message and that 
it still stands.
lord Pearce asserted that the Governor1 s message 
must stand as the voice of the lawful Government because 
the latter had never corrected or countermanded it. With 
respect, could the reason for this not have been that, in 
vieitf of the provisions of tlie Southern Rhodesia Act, 1 9 6 5? 
and tXie Soutliern Rhodesia Order (1965) , an express correction 
to, or limitation of, tXie Governor’s message by the United 
ICingdom Government was considered logically superfluous?
Was not the latter entitled to assume tlrat wlaen it spolce 
witlx the voice of an Act of Parliament no one would doubt 
the identity of that voice, nor be misled into suggesting 
that the voice of its loyal Colonial Governor was more 
authentic or resonant than its own? Tlie United ICingdom 
Government and Parliament would not be a little suricrised 
to learn that they, ”though able to speak”, Irad ”for years" 
left their loyal Governor’s message as the Xceystone of 
Southern RXiodesia’s constitutional structure, and that tXie 
Governor's message, because it liad exXiorted the judiciary to 
carry on with its normal tasks, "must be relied on” as "the 
voice1 of autXiority” that prescribed obedience to the laws of
339-
10a government deriving its authority from a Constitution,
the establishment of which was expressly prohibited by an
11Order in Council , under the authority of* an Act of 
Parliament. Even if1, in the unprecedented circumstances, 
the Governor's message, in open violation of* his executive 
function, was to be treated as a law, surely it was not 
such a law that could prevail over an Act of Parliament 
passed by a government the autXiority of wliicli it was tlie 
undisputed intention of tlie loyal Governor to defend, as 
was made abundantly clear in the message itself. It cannot 
be doubted that the Governor himself would have been amazed 
if he were to learn that the issue of the validity of the 
usurping Government's laws and acts should have been 
resolved with reference to the content of his message, and 
not that of the Sovereign whose servant, in his message, 
he was careful to stress that he was. The combined effect 
of the Act and Order was to render all Acts of the usurping 
Government illegal. The Governor's message was an exhort­
ation to all citizens in Southern Rhodesia to do what was 
legal. There is therefore no conceivable discrepancy 
between the two directives. When the Governor asked the 
people to pursue their normal tasks he could not, in a 
message prompted by a profession of loyalty, have enjoined on 
them a duty to ignore the wishes of the lawful authority -
10. The "1965" Constitution.
11. S.2(1), Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order (1 9 6 5  
No. 1952) providess "It is hereby declared for the 
avoidance of doubt that any instrument made or other 
act done in purported promulgation of any Constitution 
for Southern Rhodesia except as authorised by Act of 
Parliament is void and of no effect."
34o.
the United Kingdom Government. But even if, contrary
to what must have been the loyal Governor's obvious
intention, he had intended his message to be of pax'amount
authority, such an attitude would have been manifestly
untenable. The directive or message embodied in the Act
and Order was uncompromisingi it was thei’efore incorrect
for Lord Pearce to have imputed to the United Kingdom
Government a spirit of compromise in regard to t‘he usurping 
12government.
It is now proposed to turn to Lord Pearce's expos­
ition of the cases before the Supreme Court of the United
States which x^ ere supposed to have illustrated the
13principle of "necessity or implied mandate".
The first authority cited by Lord Pearce was
1 4Texas v. White. The dictum, and obiter dictum it xvas,
in that case was that acts which would normally come under 
XDrivate law, would be valid under an unlawful government 
if these same acts could have been done under a lawful 
government, Only acts in furtherance or support of 
rebellion xirould be invalid. Before the outbreak of the 
Civil War, bonds issued by the Government of Texas could 
only be issued to holders with the permission of the State
12. The expression used by Lord Pearce was "an uneasy 
comxoromise" - see p. 737C of his judgment.
13- Z^9697 1 A.C. 645, p. 733A.
14. 74 U.S. 700 (1868).
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Governor., In the course of the rebellion the rebel 
legislature of Texas repealed this law and allowed a 
military board to issue them. The defendant who had 
bought these bonds from the board in exchange for a 
supply of medicine was, after the War, sued for their 
return by the State of Texas which claimed that his 
possession of them was illegal because it did not have 
the consent of the lawful Governor. The defendant rip­
osted that the rebel government, in control of the state 
government at the time, had dispensed with this require­
ment. The Supreme Court, having said that the validity 
of certain acts by a rebel government could be conceded 
to the latter if they did not further the rebellion, was 
posed the question of whether a supply of medicine to the 
rebel military board was an act in furtherance of rebellion.
scCThe Court found that because the military board was 
up to further the rebellion, all its acts were void, and 
that the repeal of the requirement of the Governor's con­
sent to the transfer of bonds was to facilitate the work 
of the military board, and was consequently void. The 
fact that the defendant supplied medicine, which could 
have been used for civilians in hospitals, co.uld not 
expunge the illegality inherent in the military hoax'd that 
transferred the bonds to the defendant. The Supreme 
Court is thus seen to have offered very restricted scope 
to the operation of the doctrine of necessity, and to have 
given a very wide purview to the concept of furthering the 
rebellion. In quoting the wide dictum of this case, Lord 
Pearce did not appear to advert to its very narrow ratio
3k 2o
decidendi. If tlie supply of* much needed medicine was 
regarded as inadequately pressing to warrant its approval, 
would not a case of preventive detention have had even 
less likelihood of* success be:fore the Supreme Court?
.Reading the dictum without the ratio decidendi, as a mere 
perusal of Lord Pearce's judgment might lead to, one would 
form the impression that the doctrine was both extensive 
and established.
The second of these cases cited by Lord Pearce
(again only the obiter dictum was mentioned) was Horn v.
15
Lockhart. In this case an executor in a rebel state
had sold the property of an estate and had invested the 
money - in confederate currency ~ in Confederate Government 
bonds. After the War the legatees asked for an account, 
and distribution, of their money. The executor pleaded 
that a probate court of the then rebel state (Alabama) had 
approved of the investment. The Supreme Court of the 
United States16 again propounded the doctrine of necessity 
or implied mandate (neither expression was, however, used) 
in apparently wide terms, excepting the usual acts intended 
to, or having the effect of, furthering the rebellion.
The question before the court was whether an investment of 
Confederate money in Confederate bonds in a Confederate 
State was an act in furtherance of the rebellion. The 
Supreme Court replied in the aff ix^mative. It maintained
15. U.S. 570 (1873).
16. Unless otherwise indicated, the expression "Supreme 
Court" shall refer to the Supreme Court of the United 
States.
3^3 •
that this was a contribution to the resources of the 
Confederate government and therefore it was void as an 
act in furtherance of the rebellion. Consistently with 
this construction of the expression "furtherance of 
rebellion" a contract of sale between two Rhodesian tobacco 
companies would be void because the sale would result in 
revenue for the unlawful government. If the Supreme 
Court would have struck down a transaction of this nature, 
surely it would not have permitted preventive detention 
which would enable the illegal government to suppress 
opposition and to secure its survival? If this would have 
been the response of the Supreme Coprt which decided Horn v. 
Lockhart, as from its decision it can be surmised it would 
have, surely Lord Pearce should have said so, and then he 
could have extended the doctrine had he still decided to do 
so, but this time drawing attention to the fact that he 
was consciously extending the doctrine, and not merely 
adopting it in the narrow form in which it was regarded by 
the court from whose decision he seeks to extract support 
fox' his own thesis.
The third and last American decision to which Lord
Pearce resorted to support the existence of a doctrine of
1 7necessity or implied mandate was Baldy v. I-Iunter. In
this case the Supreme Court of the United States decided,
on the doctrine of necessity or implied mandate (again
18neither expression was used by the court ) to uphold an
17. 1?1 U.S. 388 (1893).
18. The names do not matter if the essence is the same.
However, in an earlier Chapter on Nigeria (Chapter 4)
it was suggested by tire present writer that the doctrine 
of necessity could not be a doctrine of implied mandate, 
rh© assertion was repeated in Chapter 6, in regard to the 
use of the expression by Grotius.
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investment of Confederate money in Confederate bonds by 
a guardian. To tlae ward’s claim fox' an account in legal 
tender after the War, the Supreme Coxirt held that the 
guardian could plead the investment of the money in 
Confederate bonds. This case is difficult to reconcile 
with the earlier Supreme Court decision of Horn v. Lockhart, 
which, paradoxically, the Supreme Court in Baldy v. Hunter 
cited with approval• But even Baldy v. Hunter is not 
authority for the proposition that it is not an act in 
furtherance of rebellion to detain citizens without trial.
The case made out by Lord Pearce from the American cases 
is therefore not as powerful as perusal of his judgment 
might suggest. It is submitted that Lord Pearce should 
have boldly in-’0claimed that the doctrine of necessity was, 
when invoked, a Grundnorm in itself, dedicated to the 
security and advancement of the state, irrespective of 
whether such advancement should also happen to result in 
a furtherance of rebellion. The kernel of the doctrine 
of necessity is the protection of the fabric of societ}^ 
not the restoration of the lawful sovereign.
(2) LORD REID (FOR THE MAJORITY)
The second judgment it is proposed to assess is
that of the majority of their Lordships in the Privy Council,
1 9delivered by Lord Reid, in Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke.
1-9. ZT9627 1 A.C. 643, PP. 710-731.
3h-5 .
Lord Reid, it will be recalled, loosed three questions the
answers to which he thought to be decisive of the case
20before the Boards
(1) Uhat was the legal effect in Southern 
Rhodesia of the Southern Rhodesia Act, 19659 
and the Order in Council which accompanied 
it? (2 ) Can the usurping government now 
in control in Southern Rhodesia be regarded 
for any purpose as a lawful government?
(3 ) Xf not, to what extent, if at all, are 
the courts of Southern Rhodesia entitled to 
recognise or give effect to its legislative 
or administrative acts?
Xn answering the first question, jLord Reid did not
21even once advert to the event of U.D.I, Xt must be
confessed that this fundamental omission is not a little 
perplexing. Xf Lord Reid had at least mentioned the fact 
of U.D.I. in his answer to the first question, and had only 
then proceeded to dismiss it as irrelevant, his action 
would still have been understandable. But it is doing 
less than justice to the case before him to have assessed 
the constitutional position in the light of facts which do 
not include the fact of U.D.I, and the consequent acts of the 
usurping government. The answer Lord Reid gave to his 
first question engraves the impression that he was speaking 
as if the government of Mr. Xan Smith were a legal government
20. 1}969J  1 A.C. 645, p. 721.
21. Except when mentioning it in passing in regard to 
its effect on the coiivention of non-interference 
undertaken by the United Kingdom Government in 1 9 6 1.
It is interesting to notice that Lord Reid only 
mentioned, in his answer to the first question, the 
effect U.D.I, had on the convention and not, and one 
would have thought this ought to have been tlie crux
of the matter, its effect on the authority of the United 
Kingdom Parliament to legislate for Southern Rhodesia.
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under the 1961 Constitution which constitution had not 
in any way been impugned, or even attemptedly impugned, 
that, in short, there had not even been an attempt at 
rebellion; that he was considering the position of the 
effect of the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1 9 6 5? and the 
accompanying Order in Council, in Southern Rhodesia as if 
no one had even attempted to impugn the 1961 Constitution, 
as distinct from saying that such an attempt xvns not rele­
vant to the effect of the Act and Order, in question, liben 
Lord Reid's first question is read without the answer he 
gave to it one assumes that the question in fact is; Uhat 
was the legal effect of the Act and Order in a Southern 
Rhodesia that had undergone U.D.I * and its conseqwiential 
events? But, on perusing Lord Reid's answer, one has to 
confine Lord Reid's question thus; What was the legal 
effect of the Act and Order in a Southern Rhodesia where 
there never was an attempted rebellion at all? Therefore, 
Lord Reid was able to feel free to answer his first question 
as if the only possible obstacle to the efficacy of the Act 
and Order was the convention expounded by the United King­
dom Government in 1961 that it would not legislate on 
matters within tlie competence of tlie Southern Rhodesia 
Legislature without the consent of the Southern Rhodesia
Government, the Act and Order not having received such 
22consent. This obstacle is ethereal indeed when measured
against what the obstacle ought to have been recognised as
2 2. /19697 1 A.C. 6k-5, pp. 722-3 .
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being, namely, the event of U.D.I. and its consequences,
Having, through an inexplicable, indeed unexplained,
criterion of assessment, identified the obstacle to the
efficacy of the Act and Order as tine convention rather
than the rebellion, Bord Reid was able to clear this
hurdle without excessive exertion. His removal of this
23obstacle was effected in the words followings
Xt is often said that it would b© unconsti­
tutional for the United Kingdom Parliament 
to do certain things, meaning that the moral, 
political and other reasons against doing 
them are so strong that most people would 
regard it as highly improper if Parliament 
did these things. But that does not mean 
that it is beyond the power of Parliament 
to do such tilings. Xf Parliament chose to 
do any of them the courts could not hold the 
Act of Parliament invalid. Xt may be that 
it would have been thought, before 1 9 6 5? 
that it would be unconstitutional to disregard 
this convention. But it may also be that the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence released 
the United Kingdom from any obligation to 
observe the convention. Their Lordships in 
declaring the law ax^ e not concerned with these 
mattera'T^f They are only concerned with the 
legal powers of Parliament.
The significance of the passage quoted lies in its 
implication, which is jurisprudentially precarious, that 
were it not for the existence of the convention there would 
have been no conceivable obstacle, not to say insuperable 
obstacle, to the efficacy or legality of the Southern
23« Z 1^ 627 1 6^5, P. 7^3*
2h» The underlining is mine. Ought their Lordshifjs at
least have concerned themselves with the matter of the
rebellion, having discussed and dismissed the legal
efficacy of the convention? Surely nin declaring the 
law'1 their Loz’dships ought to have concerned themselves 
with that matt ex' without which their Bordships would 
not have, had occasion to be aslced to declare the law.
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Rhodesia Act and Order, 1965, and this, notwithstanding 
the supervention of the event of U.D.I. Xt is sub­
mitted that the answer to the first question, resting as 
it did on the fundamental but fallacious assumption that 
the only conceivable obstacle to the efficacy of the Act 
and Order was the convention, is completely beside the 
point which, it is reiterated, was whether the Act and 
Order could enjoy efficacy in Southex’n Rhodesia, or legal 
effect over that territory, aft ex' the attempted assumption 
of power by the usurping government. Any answer that 
did not relate the legal effect of the Act and Order to 
the situation as affected by the event of U.D.I, to which 
the Act and Order were meant to be the specific legal 
response, would constitute a mere irrelevancy.
Xt is proposed to turn now to the second question 
posed by Lord Reid, the latter having answered his first 
by maintaining that the Act and Order had full legal effect 
in Southern Rhodesia. The second question was whether 
the usurping government of Mr, Ian Smith could be regarded 
for any purpose as a lawful government,, Lord Reid began 
by dismissing the concepts of de facto and de jure govern­
ments because such terms were not appropriate to a municipal 
court attempting to decide which was the lawful government 
in the territory where it sat because this would mean that 
the court would have to acknowledge two sovereigns within 
its own territory, namely the de facto and the de jure 
governments. A court sitting in a particular territory 
could and must decide there was only one lawful government
3 49.
25within that territory. Lord Reid, however, was prepared
to acknowledge the fact that lawful governments could owe
2 6their origins to revolutions. He proceeded to distin-
guish such cases from the position prevailing in Southern 
Rhodesia at the time. He cited two examples of where
lawful governments were introduced by revolutionsJ that of
2*7 28Pakistan in 1958 and that of Uganda in 1966* But in
accepting the judicial decisions that confirmed the lawful-
ness of these governments, his Lordship employed difficult 
29language s
Their Lordships would not accept all the 
reasoning in these judgments but they 
see no reason to disagree with the results.
The sentence is difficult because there was, in 
Posso and Matovu, only one theme or basis of reasonings
that a revolution that is efficacious is to be recognised by
the courts as introducing a lawful government. It is diffi­
cult to see how one could disagree with this and yet "see no
2^9 ^9697 1 A.C, 645, P. 724a and B.
26, Ibid, p. 724-5.
27, State v. Dosso (1958) 2 P.S.C.R. 180; now, after
fourteen years, overruled in Asma Jilani v. The
Government of the Punjab and Another £ P.L.D. 1972
S,C» 139® This decision not only overruled Posso
by saying that the Grundnorm was not changed by
the military revolution in 1958, but went so far 
as to imxily that there could only be one universal 
Grundnorm, and therefore none relating specifically 
to Pakistan alone, which was immutable! ibid, p. 182,
28, (1 9 6 6) E,A. 5^4, (Uganda v» Commi ssioner of Prisons,
Ex Parte Matovu,)
29, /T9 6 9 7 1 A.C. 645, p. 725C,
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reason to disagree with the results0" This difficulty is 
not helped by their Lordships * omission to clarify 
precisely what in those two decisions tliey were unable to 
agree with. Lord Reid distinguished these two cases on 
the ground that there the revolutionary governments had 
been well established whereas in Southern Rhodesia there 
were still two rivals contending for power, namely, the 
United Kingdom Government and the usurping government.
This process of reasoning led Lord Reid to answer his 
second question thuss"^
If the legitimate Government had been driven 
out but was trying to regain control it would 
be impossible to Ixold that the usurper wlio is 
in control is the lawful ruler, because that 
would mean that by striving to assert its 
lawful right the ousted legitimate Government 
was opposing the lawful ruler.
In their Lordships’ judgment that is the 
present position in Southern Rhodesia. The 
British Government acting fox1 the lawful 
Sovereign is taking steps to regain control 
and it is impossible to predict with certainty
whether or not it will succeed  Their
Lordshixos are therefore of opinion that the 
usurping Government now in conti'1 ol of Southern 
Rhodesia cannot be regarded as a lawful 
government.
The third question asked by Lord Reid, was whether 
and if so, to what extent, the courts in Southern Rhodesia 
were entitled to recognise the legislative or administrative 
acts of the usurping government. Since, to Lord Reid 
who had just pronounced the usurping government to be 
unlawful for all purposes, the doctrine of necessity was the
30. Ibid. p* 725.
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only conceivable way of validating the laws of an unlawful
government, Xxjrd Reid addressed himself to the applicability
31of this doctrine, deciding against it in these words?
It may be that there is a general 
principle, depending on implied mandate 
from the lawful Sovereign, which x'ecog- 
nises the need to preserve law and order 
in territory controlled by a usurper.
But it is unnecessary to decide that 
cxuestion because no such principle could 
override the legal right of the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom to make such laws 
as it may think proper for territory under 
the Sovereignty of Her Majesty in the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom. Parlia­
ment did pass the Southern Rhodesia Act,
19 6 5 * and thereby authorise the Southern 
Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council,
1$)65. There is no legal vacuum in Southern 
Rhodesia. Apart from the provisions of 
this legislation and its effect upon subse­
quent 1 enactments' the whole of the existing 
law remains in force. But it is necessary 
to determine what, on a true construction, 
is the legal effect of this legislation
The provisions of the Order in Council are 
dxmstic and unqualified. ¥ith regal’d to the 
making of laws for Southern Rhodesia section 
px’ovides that no laws may be made by 
the ^Legislature of Southern Rhodesia and no 
business may be transacted by the legislative 
Assembly? then section 30)(c) authorises 
Her Majesty in Council to make laxvs fox1 the 
peace, order and good government of Southexm. 
Rhodesia? and section 6 declares that any 
law made in contravention of any prohibition 
imposed by the Order is void and of no effect 
This can only mean that the power to make 
laws is transferred, to Her Majesty in Council 
with the result that no purported law made by 
person ox" body in Southexm. Rhodesia can
have any legal effect, no matter how necessary
that pux’ported law may be fox’ the purpose of
preserving law and order ox1 fox’ any other1
purpose.32 It is for Her Majesty in Council
31. Ibid. p. 729.
32. My own underlining.
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to judge whether any new law is inquired 
and to enact such new laws as may be 
thought necessary ax' desirable.
The central thesis of1 Lord Reid’s majority judg­
ment was that the lawful government in and over Southern 
Rhodesia was tlie United Kingdom Government and not that 
of the illegal regime. This was his answer to the second 
of his three questions. It is submitted that he should 
only have asked lximself one questions the second. The 
answers to the first and third were governed by that to 
the second. Once lie had decided that the United Kingdom 
Government was the lawful government of Southern Rhodesia 
because the usurping government was not yet so firmly 
established as to have no rival attempting to regain legal 
control, he had no choice but to decide that the Southern 
Rhodesia Act, 19^5> and the accompanying Order in Council, 
had full legal effect in Southern Rhodesia (his answer to 
the first of his three questions); nor was he left with 
any alternative but to decide, as between the Act and 
Order 011 the one hand, and the doctrine of necessity on 
the other, that the Act and Order left no legal vacuum in 
Southern Rhodesia such as would have made the operation of 
the doctrine of necessity possible.
Since it is seen that Lord Reid’s central thesis 
was that the usurping government was not lawful because it 
was not yet efficacious, it cannot but be immediately 
realized that for some not very conspicuous reason he was, 
in regard to the question of efficacy, partial to the lawful 
government, in that while he was inexorably insistent that
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the usurping government had. to he fx^ ee of the rivalx'y 
of the lawful government in order for the usurping 
government to acquire lawful status 5 he nevertheless 
saw no incongruity in heing so inimitably indulgent to­
wards the evicted lawful government that fax' from requiring 
the latter to sustain its lawful status by continuing to 
have no rivals, sxxch, fox1 instance, as usux'ping governments, 
he merely px'escribed that the lawfulness of the lawful 
government was to survive even though the latter had lost 
contx"ol of the territory in question, so long as such loss 
could not be demonstrated to the point of cex'tainty to be 
one that was irretrievable• This partiality calls for 
justification, no measure of which, however, is discernible 
in the judgment of the learned and noble lord.
(3) SOME ASPECTS OF THE JUDGMENTS OF BEADLE, C.J., AMD
Q.TONET, J.P., IN MADSXMBAMUTO v„ LARDNBR-BURKE 33
(i) The Theory of Divided Sovereignty
Both Beadle, C»JM  and Quenet, J.P. suppox'ted the 
notion of divided sovereignty. They maintained that be­
cause sovereignty could be divided, axxd because the 1961 
Constitution had conferred on Southern Rhodesia almost 
complete internal autonomy, sovereignty in regax'd to 
Southern Rhodesia before U.D.I. was apportioned in such a 
manner that the intexTnal sovereignty belonged to Southern 
Rhodesia whereas the extexuxal sovereignty belonged to the
33» Beadle, C.J.g 1968 
Quenet, J.P.s 19 68
S.A. 28k, 290-361,
S.A. 28k, 361-376.
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United Kingdom,, Quenet, J»P, , as well as Beadle, C.J. ,
cited as their authority for the proposition of the
divisibility of sovereignty the famous tome on international
3klaw by Oppenheim. Their Lordships, however, referred
to different pages of this work® Quenet, J.P. referred
to pages 118-1 1 9» which he did not quote, but an extract
35from which it is proposed to quote here*
Sovereignty is supreme authority, an 
authority which is independent of any 
other earthly authority® Sovereignty 
in the strict and narrowest sense of 
the term implies, therefore, independence 
all round, within and without tjie borders 
of the country.
A State in its normal appearance does 
possess independence all round, and 
therefore full sovereignty. Yet there 
are States in existence which certainly 
do not possess full sovereignty, and are 
therefore named not-full sovereign States 
...All of them possess supremo authority 
and independence with regard to a part of 
the functions of a State, whereas with 
regard to another part they ax'e under the 
authority of another State.
Beadle, C.J*, referred to page 122 of the work, 
from which he did not quote, but part of which it is pro­
posed to quote here
X11 view of the somewhat academic nature 
of the controversy37 surrounding this 
subject it seems preferable to cling to 
the facts of life and the practical, though
3^ o International Laws A Treatise by L. Oppenheim;
Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., Londons Eighth Edition 
(1955); Eighth Impression (1 9 6 7).
35* Oppenheim, op.cit., pp. 1180119.
3 6 . Oppenheim, op.cit., p. 122.
37* The controversy, namely, as to whether or not 
sovereignty is divisible.
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abnormal and POSSIBLY ITX0G1CAL, 38 
condition of affairs. As there can be no 
doubt about the fact that there are semi­
independent States in existence, it may 
xvell be maintained that sovereignty is 
divisible.
Three points will be raised in respect of the 
passage just quoted. The first is that Oppenheim ack­
nowledges that there XS a controversy as to sovereignty's 
divisibility, namely, that the position regarding divided 
sovereignty is by no means so well established as to be 
accepted without a respectable body of dissenting opinion. 
The second point is that Oppenheim is constrained to admit 
that the thesis of divided sovereignty is "possibly 
ILLOGICAL ". The third point is that the last sentence 
in the passage quoted immediately above is tautologous . It 
states that there is divided sovereignty because there are 
semi-independent states, but surely there can only be semi­
independent states if there is divided sovereignty. Also, 
there is a linguistic difficulty involved. If a territory 
is not independent it is by definition dependent. The 
expression "semi-independent" is just as logically nugatory 
as the phrase "semi-absolute" or "semi-perfect". It is 
therefore submitted that sovereignty is not divisible, and 
that Southern Rhodesia before U.D.I. was not a "semi­
independent" State.
3 8 . My own capitals, 
39* My own emphasis.
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(ii ) Acquiring a Grundnorm
In the previous Chapter - Chapter 6 - exception 
was taken by the present writer to the statement of 
Beadle, C.J., that if tlie rebellion of the usurping 
government proved successful, Southern Rhodesia would have 
"changed" its Grundnorm, The present writer had then 
objected that the learned Chief Justice ought to have used 
the wax'd "acquired", because Southern Rhodesia, being a 
dependent territory and therefore not having a Grundnorm 
of its own, could only "acquire" a Grundnorm, and not
4o"change" "its ‘Grundnorm1".
It is best to quote the passage wherein, Beadle,
C.J., made the assertion of a "change" of Grundnorm, and
thus implied that prior to U.D.I., Southern Rhodesia
41possessed a Grundnorm of its owns
It is as well to start tliis enquiry by 
examining the law dealing with the estab­
lishment of a new government by a revo- 
lutionary process. It may be accepted 
that a successful revolution which 
succeeds in replacing the old Grundnorm 
(or fundamental law) with a new one estab­
lishes the revolutionaries as a new 
LAWFUL^ government. ‘Success* here must 
be equated with the words ‘firmly established’ 
in the definition, because no revolution
can be said to have succeeded until the
revolutionary government is at least ‘firmly 
established‘. Using the word ’succeeded* 
in this sense the determining factor is 
whether or not it can be said with sufficient 
certainty that the revolution has succeeded.
If in the instant case the stage is reached
40. My own underlining.
41. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, p, 3 1 5.
42. Beadle, C,J., wrote this word in italics.
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when it can be said with reasonable 
certainty that the revolution has 
succeeded, then in the eyes of inter­
national law Rhodesia will Xiave become 
a de jure independent sovereign state, 
its 3^ ‘Grundnorm1 will have CHANGED 
and its new constitution will have become 
the lawful constitution.
The leax'ned Chief Justice, with unconscious irony, 
then immediately quoted extracts from the writings of 
Kelsen to support the proposition of law he had enunciated 
in the passage quoted directly above. The expression 
"unconscious irony" is used advisedly, because it is pre­
cisely Kelsen*s exposition of the Grundnorm that demolishes 
the Chief Justice’s implied proposition that Southern 
Rhodesia, under the 1961 Constitution and before U.D.I., 
possessed a Grundnorm of its own which would be "changed" 
if the rebellion of the usurping government proved 
successful. The Chief Justice did not even in the remotest 
fashion indicate the identity of the Rhodesian Grundnorm 
xvhlch the usurping government, if successful, would change. 
Since no inkling of an impression was offered it may be 
assumed that if ever there was a "Rhodesian Grundnorm" 
before U.D.X., it was, for the simple reason that no other 
in conceivable, the 1961 Constitution as authorised by the 
Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Act, 1961, passed by the 
United Kingdom Parliament. Now, because Kelsen*s Basic
4 ^Norm or Grundnorm is an ultimate norm , the 1961 Constitution 
would be repudiated by Kelsen as a Grundnorm, fox* no reason
43* My own underlining.
44, My own emphasis,
4-5. See Chapter 1 of this thesis.
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other than that its authority was not ultimate but 
derivative of an Act of* the United Kingdom Parliament. 
Beadle? C.J., was thus repudiated by the very authority 
to which he made such confident appeal.
(4) THIS CONTRADICTION IN THE JUDGMENT*^ OF FIELD SEND, A.J.A.
The contradiction in the learned judge's decision 
lies in his assertion that a court created in terms of a 
certain constitution could not give effect to what was not 
law when judged by the yardstick of that constitution, and 
his contention that the said constitution, in abnormal 
circumstances, had to be regarded by the court as having to 
give way to the doctrine of necessity. To illustrate this 
contradiction two passages from his judgment will be quoted. 
The first read:^
A court which derives its existence and 
jurisdiction from a written constitution 
cannot give effect to anything which is 
not law when judged by that constitution.
To hold otherwise is to abandon a stable 
anchorage and to set sail into uncharted 
and, indeed, unchartable seas. The law 
to be administered by a munioipa1 court 
is not an abstract concept, determined by 
general and theoretical jurisprudential 
principles; it is something concrete de­
termined solely by the set of norms"pre-" 
scribed by the legal order upon which the 
court considering the case is founded,
The passage above is to be contrasted with the learned 
judge’s volte-face committed in the statement following;^
46. 1968 (2 ) S.A. 284, pp. 422-444.
47. 1968 (2) S.A. 284, p. 432D, 33, P.
48. My own underlining.
49. Ibid, pp. 434-435« All the underlining in the 
passage here quoted is my own.
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Xt appears..oothat the normal law of
the land may, on occasions, have to
give way before necessity. This is
* » <■ » o so in the case of the 196'i Consti­
tution. . o . «particularly in a situation 
where the welfare of the state and its 
people might be at stake. In a proper 
case, X think it would be the Court1s 
duty to recognise such a situation and 
to act upon the principle SAUUS PQPUKI 
SUPREMA USX despite the express provisions 
of tlie Constitution. Any departure fx,om 
these expre.es iDX'ovisions must, however, 
be fully justified especially where 
personal liberty is at stake*
Once the prixiciple is admitted of necessity 
allowing a departure from the express 
provisions of the Constitution then the 
precise nature of the necessity and the 
extent of the departure must depend upon 
all the circumstances of the case*
Xt is not x^ ’oposed even to attemx^t a reconciliation 
of two statements, both so clear and rigid, that are 
diametrically opposed to each other. Xt remains only to 
note the failure of the learned judge to accommodate his 
two statements, each with the other* If the learned judge 
had been expressly asked to declare for either the 1961 
Constitution or the doctrine of necessity, it is suggested, 
he should have declared for the latter. If he had done 
so lie could not but acknowledge the doctx'ine’s authority 
as tliat of a Grundnorm, because neither the usurping govern­
ment nor the United Kingdom Government was x^-^pax’ed to 
authorise a doctrine of necessity. Therefore if the 
doctrine was to be invoked at all, it could have been 
appealed to only as a Grundnorm which, in view of Southei’n 
Rhodesia’s former dependent status, would have been the 
terx'itory1 s first Grimdnorm - authorising the iDei'formance
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and judicial recognition of* all acts necessary to 
preserve and promote the welfare of the territory and 
its people. The doctrine of necessity, in this situ­
ation, would have been the Rhodesian Grundnorm because 
all Rhodesian law would be traceable ultimately to its 
authority. The Rhodesian legal order would not have 
been able to go beyond the doctrine of necessity because 
it would have been the source of all legal authority 
within Rhodesia. This Grundnorm would have survived 
until there ceased to be conformity by and large with 
its prescriptions, in which case Kelsen would step in to 
declare that the new Grundnorm was the phenomenon as, for 
instance, a new efficacious constitution, that supplanted 
it.
(5) A COMMENTARY ON THE CRITIQUES OF SOME WRITERS WHO 
HAVE ANALYSED THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
(a ) Are courts to PRESUPPOSE the Grundnorm?
The first writer on xvhose critique it is proposed
*50to comment is A.J.E. Jaffey. Jaffey correctly began
by stating that because all courts were necessarily integral
parts of legal orders, no court could logically pronounce
on the validity of its own legal order because it could not
confer validity on its own source of authority. He then
correctly posed the issue with which the Rhodesian courts were 
51faced, sayings^
50. 11 The Rhodesian Constitutional Cases11; by A. J .E. Jaffey }
(1968) Rhodesian Law Journal 138.
51. Ibid. p. 142.
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W h a t  t h e n  w a s  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  a c o u r t  
w h i c h  a f t e r  t h e  c o m m e n c e m e n t  o f  t h e  
r e v o l u t i o n  w a s  c a l l e d  u p o n  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
t h e  l a w f u l n e s s  o f  t h e  1965 c o n s t i t u t i o n ; ,  
o r  a n o r m  u n d e r  it, s u c h  as a n  A c t  o f  
P a r l i a m e n t  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n ?  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  1 9 6 1  c o n s t i t u t i o n  it  w o u l d  
b e  a n u l l i t y j  i t  w o u l d  b e  l a w f u l  o n l y  i f  
t h e  1 9 6 5  c o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  p r e s u p p o s e d  t o  b e  
v a l i d 0 S o  t h e  c o u r t ’s d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o u g h t  
t o  d e p e n d  o n  w h e t h e r  i t  P R E S U P P O S E D - ^  t h e  
1 9 6 1  c o n s t i t u t i o n  ( o r  s t r i c t l y  s p e a k i n g ,  
t h e  G r u n d n o r m  f r o m  w h i c h  u n d e r  t h e  o l d  o r d e r  
t h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n  d e r i v e d  i t s  v a l i d i t y )  to 
b e  l a w f u l ,  o r  w h e t h e r  i t  P R E S U P P 0 S E D 3 3  t h e  
196.5 c o n s t i t u t i o n  t o  b e  l a w f u l .  W h i c h  
P R E S U P P O S I T I O N ^  i s  t h e  c o u r t  t o  m a k e ?
It is to be noted that Jaffey stressed that the 
constitutional identity of the court (that is, whether it 
belonged to the established legal order1 or to its 
challenger) was strictly a matter to be determined by the 
PRESUPPOSITION it made in regard to its Grundnorm. It is 
to be noted in the quotation below from the same writer 
that lie failed to detect the incongruity he was creating 
by also suggesting that the court had to make a DECLARATION 
that it sat under the 1965 Constitution, failing which it 
was somehow to be presumed to be sitting under the 1961 
Constitution. It is a difficult assertion that postulates 
that a court can only PRESUPPOSE its subordination to Grund­
norm X if it so DECLARES its subordination... Surely a court 
which DECLARES for Grundnorm X by definition no longer
merely PRESUPPOSES it. The passage from Jaffey containing
K r
this inconsistency reads?
5 2• My empha s i s •
33* My emphasis.
5 4• My empha sis.
55« Jaffey, op.cit,, xop, 144-145*
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..... we see that on 1ltli November 19^5
t h e  R h o d e s i a n  H i g h  C o u r t  w a s  t h e  c r e a t u r e  
of* t h e  19 61 c o n s t i t u t i o n  w h i c h ,  a s  l o n g  
a s  i t  r e m a i n e d  s u c h ,  c o u l d  n o t  u p h o l d  t h e  
v a l i d i t y  of* t h e  19 6 3  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o r  a n y  
m e a s u r e  m a d e  u n d e r  it. T h e  m e m b e r s  o f  
t h e  c o u r t  c o u l d  o n l y  h o l d  t h e  1 9 6 5  c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n  v a l i d  b y  a n  e x t r a - j u d i c i a l  p e r s o n a l  
d e c i s i o n  to  p r e s u p p o s e  i t s  v a l i d i t y ,  t h e r e b y  
b e c o m i n g  t h e  j u d i c i a r y  o f  t h e  1 9 6 5  c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n ,  c o m p l e t i n g  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  a n d  
b r i n g i n g  i n t o  e f f e c t i v e  o p e r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  
f i r s t  t i m e  t h e  l e g a l  o r d e r  w h i c h  t h e  r e v o ­
l u t i o n  s o u g h t  t o  e s t a b l i s h .  T h e  m e m b e r s  
o f  t h e  c o u r t  h o w e v e r  m a d e  n o  s u c h  e x t r a ­
j u d i c i a l  d e c i s i o n .  T h e  c o u r t  c o n t i n u e d  to 
s i t  w i t h o u t  a n y  D E C L A R A T I O N ^  t h a t  i t  h a d  
e l e c t e d  t o  b e c o m e  t h e  1 9 6 5  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
c o u r t .  T h e  a p p l i c a n t  i n  t h e  M a  d z  i m b  a m u t o  
c a s e  a s k e d  i n  e f f e c t  f o r  a d e c l a r a t i o n  t h a t  
a m e a s u r e  m a d e  u n d e r  t h e  1 9 6 5  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
a n d  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i t s e l f ,  w e r e  i n v a l i d ,  
a n d  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  a p p e a r e d  
as r e s p o n d e n t s  t o  c o n t e n d  t h a t  t h e  1 9 6 5  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  t h e  l a w f u l  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  
R h o d e s i a .  B y  s i t t i n g  t o  h e a r  t h e  c a s e  at 
a l l  t h e  c o u r t  w a s  a s s e r t i n g -57 o r  p r e s u p p o s i n g  
t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  1 961 c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a n d  
t h e  o n l y  d e c i s i o n  o p e n  to it, i t  i s  r e s p e c t ­
f u l l y  s u b m i t t e d ,  w a s  t h a t  a n y  m e a s u r e  n o t  
v a l i d  a c c o r d i n g  to t h e  1961 c o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  
n o t  v a l i d  a t  a l l .
It is unfair to the Rhodesian judiciary that it 
should at first be told that logic forbade it to declare 
for any Grundnorm because the very fact that it sat as a court
5 6 . My emphasis.
57• My underlining. It is not immediately obvious why 
Jaffey, after demonstrating with great clarity that 
110 court could assert the validity of, or confer 
validity on, its own legal order because it could not 
validate its own source of authority, should now 
insist that the Rhodesian court was, by remaining silent 
as to its source of authority, in fact to be presumed 
to ASSERT the validity of the 1961 Constitution. The 
writer accentuated his inconsistency by writing 
"asserting or presupposing" as if these two words, which 
were contradictory in the context in which they were 
used, were felicitously synonymous.
meant that it was sitting under a particular Grundnorm 
and that there was thus no point in its purporting to 
declare that Grundnorm valid, and tlien to be advised that 
if it should fail to declare for what purported to be 
the new Grundnorm, in fact to do precisely tlaat which 
was supposed to be forbidden, it would have to be regarded, 
through this failure to declare, as sitting under the old 
Grundnorm. It is submitted, however, that the impossible 
advice offered by Jaffey should be declined, and that the 
Grundnorm which the court presupposes is to be identified 
by directing one's attention to what the court does. If 
the court pronounces in favour of a law valid in regard to 
Grundnorm X but invalid in regard to what purports to be 
Grundnorm Y, then the court necessarily presupposes X to 
be its Grundnorm. In the Madzimbarnuto case at the 
Appellate Division of the High Court, the regulation under 
which Daniel Madzimbarnuto was detained was traceable to 
the Proclamation of a State of Emergency by the Officer 
Administering the Government - an office known to the 19^5 
Constitution but obviously incompatible with the 1961 
Constitution. It is true that the regulation was declared 
void by the court, but this invalidity was pronounced in 
such a way as to decide that the Officer Administering the 
Government possessed the authority to issue a Proclamation 
of State Emergency. Now, surely such a decision.^ would
58o If, and only if, it had decided that,and nothing 
more •
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logically only be capable of PRESUPPOSING55* the validity 
of the 1963 Constitution. Had the court PRESUPPOSED 
the validity of the 1961 Constitution it would not, 
because it could not, even have reached the stage of 
examining the terms of the relevant regLilation because 
the regulation, irrespective of its terms, would have been 
void as having been made when there had NOT been a Proc­
lamation of State Emergency known to, or authorised under, 
the 1961 Constitution since the '•Proclamation" under which 
the "regulation" was made was not issued by the Governor, 
as it had to be under the 1961 Constitution - as far as the 
latter constitution was concerned the "Officer Administering 
the Government" liad as much right to issue a Proclamation 
of State Emergency in Southern Rhodesia as a peasant in 
Ruritania would have had. The one fundamental fault made 
by the Rhodesian courts was that they assumed the right 
to decide between the competing validity of the two consti­
tutions. Had they not done so, they would have been instru­
mental in illustrating the constitutional phenomenon, no 
doubt beloved of Kelsen, of judicial presupposition* Thus 
we realize that the fault of the Rhodesian courts, far from 
being their failure to declare for the 1965 Constitution 
resulting in their imputed upholding of the 1 $>61 Constitution
59® This woLild have been the case if the judges had
merely declared that the Officer Administering the 
Government was authorised to issue a Proclamation 
of State Emergency, but the judges in fact went 
further, and thus exceeded their authority, by pur­
porting to assume the right to decide between the 
two constitutions.
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~ as Jaffey would contend to be the case, was, on the 
contrary, their having attempted to assume authority 
to decide between tlae validity of the two constitutions, 
thus exceeding their logical power merely to presuppose 
one or the other. It is true that tlie latter view was 
also expounded by Jaffey but he failed to pursue it, and 
in relation to the position of the Rhodesian courts, he 
must be held to have repudiated it by his insistence that 
the courts, had they wanted to presuppose the 1965 Consti­
tution, should have made a DECLARATION that they were 
sitting under that Constitution.
(B ) How do we decide which laws belong to which Grundnorm?
The next writer whose critique it is proposed to 
analyse is P.M. Brookfield.^ Brookfield appeared to 
assume that just because a law from a former legal order 
was applied by the courts the latter were necessarily up­
holding that legal order and deciding against its “revo­
lutionary competitor". He made the suggestion in the 
following p a s s a g e d
If it is accepted that there was no principle 
of law to compel the court to change from 
acceptance of the pre-revolutionary Grundnorm 
to acceptance of its revolutionary competitor, 
then, as long as the court accepted the former, 
the old order *by and large* remained effective 
in that in the eyes of the court the bulk of 
the law administered depended for its validity 
on the old Grundnorm,
60. "The Courts, Kelsen and the Rhodesian Revolution";
by P.M. Brookfield % (1969) 19 University of Toronto 
Law Journal 326,
61. Ibid. p. 345.
366.
Now, the old Grundnorm was the United. Kingdom 
Parliament from which the 1961 Constitution derived its 
authority. In the post-U.D.I. situation, how could 
"the bulk of the law administered" have "depended for its 
validity" on "the old Gnmdnorm" when the officials in­
volved in the machinery of government were all members of 
the usurping regime? The fact that these officials - 
which the 1961 Constitution decidedly did not recognise - 
were making use of laws which would have been valid under 
the 1961 Constitution had they been executed by officials 
authorised under that Constitution, did not mean that a 
recognition by the court of these laws as applied or exe­
cuted by tlaese unauthorised officials, was an acceptance 
by the court of the old Grundnorm, because such an accept­
ance or, strictly, obedience would have necessitated, the 
court to deny validity to these laws because although the 
latter were from the 1961 Constitution they were not 
operated by officials who alone under that Constitution 
were allowed to operate them. The court does not apply 
"a law of the 1961 Constitution" if it allows a provision 
in that Constitution to be made available to those whom 
the Constitution prescribes it should not avail because of 
their not being authorised thereunder. It was therefore 
incorrect of Brookfield to suggest that the old order re­
mained by and large effective because its laws were being 
recognised by the court, even though those laws were being 
operated by officials whom the old order would repudiate.
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Brookfield then proceeded to make a remarkable
suggestion that some measures of the usurping government
could be validated by reference to a provision in the
621961 Constitution* I-Ie expressed his view thus s
Where dicl the Rhodesian judges who, in the 
revolutionary period between 11 November 
1965 and 13 September 1968, held the Smith 
regime unlawful, find the principle which 
they variously enunciated by which to judge 
the validity of the revolutionary measures?
In fact the source seems to have been the 
common law, including in this context the 
writings of civilians of persuasive authority;, 
which they were authorised to administer under 
sY 36D"of the 1961 Constitution* 63
This unexpected interposition can best be refuted
by a quotation of S. 56D of the 1961 Constitution itself,
64which provided?
Subject to the provisions of any law for the 
time being in force in Southern Rhodesia 
relating to the ap>plication of customary law, 
the law to be administered by the High Court 
and by any courts in Southern Rhodesia subordi­
nate to the High Court shall be the law in 
force in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope 
on the tenth day of dune 1891, as modified by 
subsequent legislation^  having in Southern 
Rhodesia the force of law.
The expression "aa modified by subsequent legis­
lation” is emphasised above because the Emergency Powers 
Act passed in Southern Rhodesia in i960 which was the Act 
in question before the court, provided that the powers
62. Ibid. p. 346,
6 3• My under1ining.
64. S. 56D of the 1961 Constitutions S.I, 1961 No. 2314 
as amended by the Constitution Amendments Act, 1964 
(Southern Rhodesia).
65. My underlining.
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contained in it were to be exercisable only after a 
Proclamation of State Emergency bad been made by tbe 
Governor who, after the 1961 Constitution came into effect, 
was tbe Governor under that Constitution. Nothing in 
S. 56D of the 1961 Constitution would enable the Emergency 
Powers Act, i960, to be overridden because that Act toolc 
effect as subsequent legislation (i.e., subsequent to 
1891)* The court, by allowing the powers under that Act 
to be exercised when there x^ as no Proclamation in terms 
of the Act itself, was therefore not doing anything that 
could have been authorised under S. 56D of the 1961 Consti­
tution. The court was, in effect, clearly disregarding 
the said S. 56D and therefore defying the 1961 Constitution 
and the Grundnorm from which that Constitution was derived. 
It is difficult to understand liow Brookfield managed to 
present such an act of defiancb as an illustration of com­
pliance. Perhaps this was due to an error in defining 
what a law belonging to a legal order meant,
(C) Xs a judge a law unto himself?
A.M. Honor©, in his article ’’Reflections on
Revolutions”, was, in regard to a judge*s position in a
revolution, moved to observe
Should one not,...ask whether some principle 
of law independent of any particular system 
authorises a judge, simply by virtue of his 
office, and irrespective of the source of his 
jurisdliction, to recognize the revolutionary
66. "Reflections on Revolutions"; by A.M. Honor© s 1967 
(2 ). The Irish Jurist 268, pp. 275-6.
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regime? Of course this notion of an
inter-systematic or supra-systematic law 
sounds rather startling. It amounts to 
a resuscitation of ‘natural law’ or some 
such dinosaur;, and rubs against nearly 
two centuries of positivism, and (what is 
more important) constitutionalism, which 
is part of* the political ideology of which 
positivism is the legal reflection.
  ..is there anything inherently absurd
about treating the office of a judge as a 
source of legal authority independent of any 
particular constitution? The source of 
his appointment must, no doubt, be consti­
tutional. but cannot the effects of the 
appointment be supra-constltutional? 67
Honore asked “whether some principle of law......
authorises a judge...to recognize the revolutionary regime?" 
This principle of law was to be found outside both the old
and the new regimes. He saw nothing absurd in a judge
being detached from either regime. In fact the very 
conception of a legal order was anathema to him, for he
, * 1 68expostulateds '
.....it seems gratuitous to assume that 
all laws must belong to legal systems.
One does not have to be a natural lawyer 
to ask why laws cannot belong to persons -
to Moslems as such, to judges as such etc.
But, with respect, if there were no legal orders 
there would also be no revolutions against them. The 
article should, on the premises relied on by I-Ionore himself, 
have been introduced as "Reflections on the Logical 
Impossibility of Revolutions, owing to the non-existence 
of legal orders", and not, as it as in fact entitled,
6 7 . My underlining.
68. Ibid. p. 27 6. The underlining is mine.
370.
"Reflections on Revolution". Honore sought to discover 
a solution for revolutions but instead circumvented the 
issue by denying the existence of the very phenomenon 
to whose problems he had purported to address himself.
One does not prepare for floods or hurricanes by assuming 
their non-existence. If Honore were to retort that it 
was never his intention to suggest that there were no 
legal orders, but only that, within a particular territory, 
there could be SEVERAL sources of law or legal authority, 
one of which could be the judge, it may well be riposted 
that his — Honore;l's - thesis makes no provision whatsoever 
for the case where these various sources of authority 
should come into conflict with one another. Supposing the 
established legal order (not, on Honore's thesis, the 
exclusive source of legality as Kelsen would have it) were 
to conflict with the views of a particular judge. As far 
as Honore is concerned the judge, being an independent source 
of authority, could well choose to ignore the provisions 
of the legal order because although Honore would concede 
that the judge's appointment would have to be constitutional, 
that is, in conformity with the provision of the legal order 
in the territory, his powers were quite another matters 
these were exercisable in a manner that was "supra- 
constitutional" - Honore's own phrase. In short, Honore 
would insist that a judge appointed under legal order X 
would not lose his appointment even if the legal order X 
were to perish. His appointment would then presumably, 
however paradoxically, be sustained by an UNTRACEABLE power
to survive. If everything created under a legal order 
could, immediately after creation, assume en existence 
independexit of that legal order under which it was created 
(and if the judge tlould, why could not other legal x3he~ 
nomena, e.g., ministers, legislators, civil servants, and 
policemen), what "order" or "symmetry" or "harmony" or even 
MEANING, could a legal order have? What, then, would he 
the point of having a "legal order" at all? Such a phe­
nomenon would be unintelligible if it could not harmonise 
a multitude of conflicting sources of authority, none of 
which need submit to the remainder or to any other. It is 
precisely the pointlessness of having a legal order in 
these circumstances that forces the conclusion that, in 
postulating his phenomenon of the non-subordinate judge, 
Honore was necessarily advocating the abolition of the 
phenomenon of the legal order by depriving the latter of 
its essexrbial function, and thus its reason for existence. 
But in the absence of legal orders the concept of z,evolLition 
would be meaningless. In a territory where there were 
multitudinous legal phenomena none of which was supreme the 
concept of a "revolution" is absurd because one could not 
logically rebel if one were in no way subordinate, if, in 
short, there was nothing to rebel against. If there was 
not one supreme authority, within, which ALL legal phenomena 
were to be included and HARMONISED with reference to that 
authority's ultimacy, then, the conflict of legal phenomena 
would make CHAOS the Grundnorm. It is submitted that Honor 
by introducing a legal phenomenon outside the legal order,
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was making a contribution which, if not declined, would 
threaten harmony within particular territories because 
order is an essential attribute of harmony. Even if 
order is not to be identified with law, it cannot be 
denied that no philosoxohy of law so far propounded insists 
on chaos as its essential ingredient § in that sense order, 
if not the essence of law itself, is, undeniably, an indis­
pensable attribute of law - even natural law does not have 
chaos as an ingredient. Honorefs thesis, by repudiating 
the concept of the unified and thus harmonious legal order, 
and by thus introducing chaos, therefore destroys the 
concept of law itself, by destroying its essential attri­
bute - order.
(h) ¥ere the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, and the 
accompanying Order-in-Council the correct
constitutional response of the United Kingdom
Government to U.D.I.?
It is submitted that they undoubtedly were, and the 
question would not even have been posed had a certain writer
not suggested, in comxoany with Macdonald, J.A., that tXiey
writ 
70saw fit to submits
69were not. The er in question is Alan Uharam. Wharam
69. "Rhodesia and The Crown"j by Alan Wharams (1969) 
The Rhodesian Law Journal 21 .
70, Ibid. x3P • 36-37.
The underlining is mine.
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71In the view of Macdonald, J.A., the 
correct constitutional counterstroke would 
have been the dismissal of the ministers 
concerned, the appointment of other 
ministers in their place and the holding of 
a parliamentary election? and it is not 
difficult to think of other courses which 
could have been taken with equal propriety. 
What the Crown did, however, was to vest 
all legal powers in the persons of the 
Secretary of State and the Governor, leaving 
the country without any effective lawful 
administration. The Crown thereby created 
precisely the same situation as tliat created 
by James XX on 11th December, 16SS; on that 
occasion, the peel's and principal officers 
of the army established a government to 
maintain order....•••• In Rhodesia, in the 
absence of any legal administration, the 
actual government simply remained in officet 
the Crown did not even issue a writ of QUO 
WARRANTO to inquire by what authority the 
Rhodesian ministers were exercising their 
func t i on s.72 I know of no proposition of 
law under which a people can be deprived of 
its government merely because a group of 
ministers commit an unlawful act. The action 
of the Crown appears to have constituted a 
clear breach of the Coronation Oath and to 
have been in itself strong evidence of an 
intention to abdicate.
The passage quoted above is one of the most remark­
able pieces of legal writing that the present writer has 
encountered.
The first point to note is that if "the Crown" - 
presumably the United Kingdom Government was meant, or 
possibly even the Governor of Southern Rhodesia - had had the 
power not only to appoint an alternative Rhodesian Cabinet but
71.Wharam made it clear that it was a view that evoked his 
approval.
72. The reason why the Crown did not take such a stej) is
by no means altogether impalpable s the lawful Governor 
had only just dismissed the Rhodesian Ministers on 
instructions from the Crown, The Crown, if not Alan 
Wharam, knew quite clearly what it had done.
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also to force a general election, it would first have 
arrested the members of the rebelling Cabinet. The fact 
that it did not do so is overwhelming proof that it 
enjoyed no physical xoowers of coercion within the territory» 
So, Wharam’s support of Macdonald, J.A.*s suggestion wan 
founded othexutfise than logically. ¥harara went on to 
insist that it was "not difficult" for the Crown to think 
of "other courses" on parit3r of propriety with Macdonald, 
J.A.'s "constitutional counterstroke", It is not insig­
nificant, however, that although other courses were "not 
difficult" to think of, ¥haram himself did not offer us 
a single example of these "other courses" - no doubt because 
these were too simple and obvious to warrant either clari­
fication or illustration.
The second point of intex'est is 'v/haram's calm 
assertion that because the Crown had failed to ixx’ovide 
Southerns. Rhodesia with an effective lawful administration 
it rendered identical the situation in Southernx Rhodesia 
in 19^5 with that in Great Britain in 1688 when King James 
II fled the Realm. Pox' King James II it was a simple case 
of flight. He did not attempt to make any constitutional 
response. The United Kingdom Government, on the other hand, 
had immediately responded with legislation and the dismissal 
of the rebelling Cabinet. The United Kingdom Government 
introduced legislation only five days after U.D.I., at which 
stage it xvas by no means cleax* that the rebellion would 
inevitably succeed if the United Kingdom were just to rely on 
legislation and sanctions against the economy of the rebelling
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government. Wharam then proceeded to say that in the 
absence of a legal administration the "actual" government 
"simply" "remained in office", Xt might perhaps not be 
extravagant to ask how a dismissed cabinet could have 
REMAINED in office, and to have done so as a matter of 
course ("simply"), Xt would have been more accurate to 
say that the government of the country was effectively 
usurped by the illegal government - to have stressed the 
element of illegal force majeure, rather than to have 
suggested the possibility of the constitutionality of the 
rebelling Cabinet remaining in power.
The third point to be made is that Wharam regarded 
the lack of physical coercion, in regard to the rebelling 
Cabinet, on the part of the United Kingdom Government in 
that the latter failed to reinstate a lawful administration, 
as a deprivation of lawful government, inflicted on the 
people of Southern Rhodesia, by the United Kingdom Govern­
ment - "the Crown". The word "deprive" is inapt because 
the United Kingdom Government could hardly have confirmed 
the rebelling Cabinet in office. The letter’s dismissal 
followed by the United Kingdom’s inability to impose a 
lawful administration in the country should not be described 
as conduct depriving a people of its Government, but merely 
as .an unfortunate consequence of tlae rebellion of the 
Cabinet, The language of Wharam was completely misleading 
in that it suggested that the people in Southern Rhodesia 
were being penalised as a reprisal for the rebellion of the 
country’s Cabinet,
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The final point it is proposed to raise is 
Wharam’s absurd suggestion that what the Crown did consti­
tuted "a clear breach of* the Coronation Oath'1 and was 
"strong evidence" of an "intention to abdicate".
73The relevant part of the Coronation Oath reads s
To govern the people of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and 
the dominions thereto belonging, according 
to the statutes in Parliament agreed on 
and the laws and customs of the same •
Wharam did not specify of which part of the Coronation 
Oath the Crown was supposed to be in "clear breach". Per­
haps it was the opening words "to govern" and the absence 
of a lawful administration in Southern Rhodesia was a 
breach of the oath to govern. But the argument is patently 
fanciful•
(E) Is a written constitution exhaustive of a 
territory’s laws?
It will be remembered that Eieldsend, A.J.A., had 
said in the Appellate Division of the High Court that a 
court created by and deriving its authority from the 1961 
Constitution could not recognise the validity of any act 
which failed to conform with that Constitution, nor submit 
to the authority of an organ of government unknown to that 
Constitutioxx. This viexv has been excoriated in Volume 4
7-3 • Halsbury’s Taws (Third Edition) 5 Vol. 75 para. 
433, page 2 0 8 .
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(1 9 6 8) of* the Annual Survey of Commonwealth haw, by J.M.
7 itFimiis o On the opinion of that learned judge, Finnis
75finds this to says
Now there is no doubt that this approach 
must be very attractive to any lawyer» It 
has the appeal of logic and purity. The 
limits of positive rules of law ax^ e not 
transgressed; the courts get theix* authority 
from? and find theix1 place in, a system of 
positive norms and of institutions established 
by those norms. The system stands or falls 
as a whole. It is held together by the
Constitution..........  .Now the trouble with ^
constitutionalism is that it is self-defeating. 
Fields end, A.J'.A.’s maxim, ’A court which 
dex*ives its existence and jurisdiction from 
a written constitution cannot give effect to 
anything which is not law when judged by that 
constitution,* is unfortunately not a maxim 
which can be derived from, and applied in any 
particular instance simply by reference to the 
constitution alone. Usually a constitution 
will be quite silent on this sox*t of question.
(And why should the written or unwritten character 
of the constitution fundamentally affect the 
matter?) But even if a written constitution 
happened to contain a rule in the form of the 
maxim just quoted, there would remain the 
question whether a given court dei’ived its ex­
istence and jurisdiction from the written consti­
tution alones77 and that is a question which 
cannot be answered by the written constitution 
alone, whatever it may A S S E R T . 78 It might be 
objectedt ’Could not a constitution specifically 
provide that 110 rule or person shall be of, or 
have, any authority otherwise than by virtue of 
the constitution? 1 But there would then remain 
the question whether acceptance of one part of,
74. J.M. Finnis5 Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law 
(1968), Vol. 4, p. 1 0 9.
75. Ibid. p. 109,
76. My own emphasis.
77- Whex*e the judiciary is constituted by a written consti­
tution, which is not uncommon, and which was certainly 
the case under the 1961 Constitution, there cannot 
logically be any room left to accommodate such a query.
78. Finnis’s own emphasis.
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or acceptance or authority under, a 
constitution requires one to accept the 
whole constitution, including the part 
which demands that the whole 'be acceqoted.
Even if a constitution stipulates, so to 
speak, 'All from me or no tiling from me1, 
it cannot prevent anybody from raising the 
question whether he need accept THAT79 norm 
or statement - and even to raise the question 
shows that the answer logically cannot be 
determined by ANY^O positive rule of the 
system, including any rule asserting that 
the question is illegitimate.
It will be perceived that Finnis impugns the 
necessity of the court yielding exclusive obedience to a 
constitution from which the court, whose obedience is 
demanded, derives its authority. Finnis appears to ex­
pound the proposition that acceptance by the court of 
authority from the constitution, amounting as it does only 
to a partial recognition of the constitution, does not 
inexorably impel that court to a recognition of that consti­
tution in its totality, even when the latter demands total 
acceptance as a condition precedent to the vesting of 
authority in the court. In other words where the authority 
offered by the constitution is X minus Y (the latter repre­
senting the court's demanded subordination to the consti­
tution) Finnis would maintain that the court is entitled 
to accept more than what is being offered, namely X without 
Y being subtracted from it. X represents what the power 
of the court would have been had Y not appeax'ed in the con­
stitution to reduce it. Finnis’s error lies in the fact 
that he regards X as the authority given by the constitution 
to the court, and Y merely as a separate constitutional
79. Finnis’s own emphasis. 
8 0. Finni s's own emphasis.
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phenomenon assigned, by the constitution to limit the 
court's authority. In short, it regards X as the court's 
actual authority which need not be diminished, indeed 
cannot be diminished, by what the constitution designs for 
that end, Tire answer to this fallacy is that the consti­
tution does not seek to diminish or otherwise qualify the 
actual power of the court but merely imposes limitations 
upon what that power would have ‘been. To what arcane 
canon of construction can the court appeal to sustain its 
claim to what the constitution would have offered, as dis­
tinct from what the constitution has actually offered?
Finnis propounds that no constitution is free to say 'Take 
what X offer or take nothing from me at all*. But why is 
a constitution to be denied the right to insist on such a 
choice? Alternatively, and more pointedly, the court 
cannot choose (the notion of choice being introduced- by 
Finnis) because it is axiomatic that no creature of a con­
stitution can possess more atti’ibutes, including the power 
of clroosing or refusing choice, than those with which it 
is endowed or of which it is made. But Finnis may advance 
the objection that the persons who are to be the personnel 
of the court are not creatures of the constitution, and 
THEY need not, and cannot be made to, choose in the manner 
stipulated by the constitution. But the limited power of 
the court is exercisable only by the personnel of the court, 
and even then only in their capacity as such personnel. 
Therefore, the personnel of the court, in that capacity or 
when acting as such, are creatures of the constitution and
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as such are constitutionally incapable of questioning 
their limited power, since it is precisely because of 
their limited power not having included the power to 
pose such a question that if becomes impossible for them 
to pose the question - namely, whether they need accept 
the constitution in its totality. When those personnel 
are acting otherwise than as personnel of the court, i.e. 
when they are not acting as creatures of the constitution, 
they can have no possible locus standi to question the 
right of the constitution to provide for the subordination 
of tlie court when ex hypo the si the court itself has acceqcted, 
because it has not been endowed with tlie capacity to reject, 
its subordinate role in the legal system or body politic.
After having delivered himself of the onslaught 
on the decision of Fieldsend, A.J.A., Finnis then expended 
his expertise on supporting the famous distinction created 
by Professor H.L„A. Hart between Primary Rules of Law and 
Secondary Rules of Law, with the latter comprising, among 
other Ru3.es, the Rule of Recognition ~ a criterion against 
which purported laws are to be tested for their validity. 
Finnis offers this theory as a better a3.ternative to the 
reasoning adopted by Fieldsend, A.J.A. He expresses his
suppox’t fox'1 Professor Hart's proposition in the following
, 81 argument s
But why should it not be the case that, 
during and aftex1 a revolution, judges 
have a genuinely lawful authority to 
determine» in a lawyerlilce and principled
81. Annual Survey, op,clt», p. 112.
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fashion, what is, and what is to be, the 
principle or rule of reoogxxition on which 
a sriff iciently systematic body of rules 
of change^^ (I egi slat i onJean b e recon- 
structed. to deal with the necessities of 
the common tgnod?^3 Theyhave this 
authority because it was bestowed on them 
by law,“ •' and because nothing' need have 
occurred which, in a sound jurisprudence, 5^ 
need be deemed to have divested them of it.
To pick and choose among rules of recognition 
"does not divest them of that a u t h o r i t y fSS iiT 
common law jurisdictions a principled picking 
and choosing among substantive or primary 
rules of law - on the basis of equity, jjublic 
£3olicy, justice and the common good - is a 
recognised judicial function.
Xt is proposed to take exception to the assertion 
made by Finnis, immediately above, that for the courts "to 
pick and choose among rules of recognition does not divest 
them of that authority". Now, by "that authority" is meant, 
in Finnis1s own words, "authority to determine ....... the
principle of rule of recognition on which a sufficiently
82. "The rules of change" are another sub-division of 
Professor Hart’s Secondary Rules of Law.
8 3 . The emphasis is mine.
With respect to the Survey, this suggestion seems to 
be lumping together Professor Hart’s secondary rule 
of change with not only the concept of a de facto 
government but with, astounding in the light of its 
attack on the approach of Fieldsend, A.J.A., the 
doctrine of state necessity as well.
84. My underlining.
It may be asked, "what law"?
8 5 . An extraordinarily ethereal basis for a legal 
proposition. Could nothing more convincing have 
been offered? The underlining is my own.
86. My own emphasis.
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systematic body of rules of cliange (legislation) can be 
reconstructed’1, in other words, authority to introduce 
and enforce legislation otherwise than in conformity with 
the procedures px'eviously laid down to change or make laws.
Xt is significant at this stage not to permit the obscuring 
of the fact that nowhere in his thesis does Professor Hart 
assert that those entrusted with the implementation of the 
rules of recognition (presumptively the courts) ai"e ALSO 
to be entitled to alter or abolish or create the rules of 
change, i.e. the procedures accepted to govern the manner 
in which the existing law is to be changed. But even if 
one were to assume in Finnis1s favour, in contradiction to 
Professor Hart’s thesis, that the courts are entitled to 
implement the rules of change, this assumption would still 
NOT entitle the courts to change the law in a manner 
inconsonant with the procedures stipulated by the rules of 
change. Furthermore Finnis also endows the courts with 
tlie authority not only to implement the rules of recognition, 
but also to determine what they should prescribe. Again, 
it is vital to notice that Professor Hart does not suggest, 
however1 remotely, that the courts, or those vested with the 
duty of implementing the rules of recognition, are entitled 
to choose among, or to change, rules of recognition otherwise 
than in strict conformity with the rules of change which the 
courts are powerless to alter otherwise than as authorised 
by the latter rules themselves, if at all. T’fhere a revo­
lution or a revolutionary situation occurs the changes 
forcibly brought about are not made in accordance with the
.
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pre-existing miles of change and cannot be recognised by 
the pre-existing rules of recognition. The old system 
therefore breaks down, in terms of Professor Hart's thesis, 
and the legal order has to be constituted afresh. The 
thesis of primary and secondary rules does not, and was 
never intended to, provide a formula to the courts in 
mediis rebus to authorise them to decide what is law and 
what is not, nor to decide which purported government is 
the lawful government in the country.
The following extract from Professor Hart's book. 
The Concept of Taw, makes it clear that his thesis, especi­
ally with reference to the rules of recognition of which 
Finnis made such extensive use, is nothing more than a 
rationalisation of an effective legal order and cannot be 
construed as offering to the courts in a country embroiled
in a revolution a canon of judicial resioonse. The 
87extract readss
T h e  s i m p l e s t  f o r m  o f  r e m e d y  fox1 t h e  
U N  C E R T A I N T Y 8 8 o f  t h e  r e g i m e  o f  p r i m a r y  
r u l e s  is t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  w h a t  w e  
s h a l l  c a l l  a ' r u l e  o f  r e c o g n i t i o n ' .
This will specify some feature or 
features possession of which by a 
suggested rule is taken as a conclusive 
affirmative indication that it is a 
rule of the group to be supported by 
the social pressure it exerts. The 
existence of such a rule of recognition 
may take any of a huge variety of forms, 
simple or complex. It may, as in the 
early lav; of many societies, be no more
87, The Concept of Law, by H.L.A. Hart, 0,U,P. , 1<?61, 
pp. 92-93.
88, Professor Hart's emphasis.
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than that an authoritative list or text 
of the rules is to be found in a written 
document or carved on some public monument 
•**o xdiat is crucial is the acknowledgement 
of reference to the writing or inscription 
as AUTHORITATIVE89, i.e. the PROPER?0 way 
of disposing of doubts as to the existence 
of the rule.**, where more than one of such 
general characteristics are treated as 
identifying criteria, provision may be made 
for their possible conflict by their arrange­
ment in an order of superiority, as by the 
common subordination of custom or precedent 
to statute, the latter being a 1 superior 
source’ of law.
Just as Professor Hart contemplates a Paramount 
Rule of Recognition, so does he envisage a Paramount Rule 
of Change* It is submitted that Professor Hart’s Paramount 
Rules of Change and Recognition are together analogous 
to Professor Kelson’s Grundnorm, and that as a revolution 
can change either otlierwise than in oTcedience to the dic­
tates of the concept concerned, courts under the old order 
can turn to neither for assistance in a revolutionary 
situation®
(P) Is there any diffex^ence between Dias and Relsen?
The next thesis is propounded by Dias * The learned 
author supports the view that the Grundnorm is not applic­
able in all cases where laws are to be assessed for validity 
because in a revolutionary situation, where one Grundnorm 
has been overthrown, laws have to be tested against a
89* Professor Hart’s emphasis*
90® Professor Hart's emphasis®
91 * Obviously such provision must be made in accordance
with the rules of change and cannot logically be made 
by those entrusted with the mere implementation of 
the rules of recognition®
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criterion other than the Grundnorm, and this hon-Grundnorm
criterion is any legal yardstick which the courts choose
to adopt® The learned author presents his case against
92the all round applicability of the Grundnorm thus s
• *.* ®®the identification of 'laws' . In 
normal conditions propositions have the 
quality through some medium acknowledged 
by courts as capable of impressing them 
with that stamp* Such medium is the 
Grundnorm, or some subordinate medium 
derived from it® When there is as yet no 
accepted Grundnorm, as in the midst of a 
revolution, the courts may nonetheless 
accept as 'laws' propositions identified 
with reference to whatever criterion they 
choose; which is precisely what happened 
in the Grundnorm Case® 93
With respect to the learned author, Professor 
Kelsen defines the grundnorm as the source of validity of 
the laws of a legal system* If the courts adopt a cri­
terion of validity by which they inexorably abide, then 
by the very function which that criterion is created to 
perform, the said criterion becomes the new, if temporary, 
Grundnorm* It is surprising how those who criticize the 
usefulness of the Grundnorm usually propose the substitution 
of concepts disconcertingly difficult to distinguish from 
the concept they object to. It seems as a matter of 
juristic logic that there must always be a paramount 
authoritys whether it be called a Grundnorm, a distinctive 
quality, a supreme attribute, a paramount criterion, an
92® (1968) C • L • J . 2339 PP. 253-^.
93- The emphasis is mine* The "Grundnorm Case" is of 
course Madzimbamuto v * Lardner-Burke.
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ultimate source of authority, seems, as is submitted 
to be, decidedly unimportant, If authority is logically 
traceable to X (yet another variation?) then X is the 
supreme laws its substance is not changed by having it 
proclaimed unostentatiously as a rule to identify whether 
or not given phenomena are law. There is either law or 
there is no laws but where there is law (and this is re­
quired by the universally accex^ted conclusive presumption 
against the existence of a legal vacuum) there must be a 
source of authority, call it what one chooses.
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PART XV s CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUDING CRITIQUE
(1) THE ROLE OF THE JUDGES
It has been observed why the many attempts at 
defining the correct approach to be adopted by the judiciary 
in the midst of a constitutional imbroglio have ultimately 
proved to be untenable, owing to profound misconceptions re­
garding the constitutional nature of the judiciary in a 
legal order# All the judges in situations commonly denomi­
nated as "constitutional breakdowns" have, it is submitted, 
made the fundamental error of assuming that their jurisdiction 
within a legal order extended to their having authority to 
pronounce upon the validity of that legal order, of which 
they are but a constituent. It has been noticed that such 
a jurisdiction is logically indefensible owing to the simple
but crucial fact that because the judiciary, being a con-
1
stituent of the legal order , can only come into being AT 
THE MOMENT ¥HEN the legal order is established, it is conceptu­
ally inapt to suggest that the judiciary, being CONTEMPORANEOUS
1. The judiciary cannot, of course, be OUTSIDE the 
legal order# If judges can be outside the legal 
order so too can other members of society, in which 
case the term "legal order" becomes unintelligible, 
Furthermore, if judges were outside tlie legal order, 
what then would be the link between the judiciary and 
the legal order? Once it is accepted that within a 
particular territory there can only be ONE legal order, 
it becomes inconceivable that any phenomenon in that 
territory can have any legal attributes if that phenomenon 
should Xiappen to be OUTSIDE that legal order #
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with, since it is able only to exist WITHIN, the legal 
order, can, no matter how violently incongruously, also 
be ANTECEDENT to the legal order in that it - the 
judiciary - is able to exist prior to, and hence independ­
ently of, the establishment of the legal order and only 
THEN proceed to decide on the validity of the legal order#
In the light of this opinion all suggestions of judges 
being confronted, during a constitutional imbroglio, with 
a "dilemma" of having to "decide" which legal order to 
offer their "allegiance" to, of judges having to make "a 
personal choice" or "a political decision" whether to 
"remain loyal" or to "join the revolution", become juristic- 
ally unintelligible. If legal order X is in existence, 
then all those "judges" who ARE judges must belong to it 
and to no other legal order. (it is no gainsay to suggest 
that in a revolutionary situation there miglit not be a 
legal order» If there is no legal order in the territory 
concerned, there will not be any judges either.) The fact 
that some of these judges may personally prefer to belong 
to a past or potential legal order Y is juristically meaning­
less because what is by definition non-judicial can hardly 
be relevant to the purpose or function of the judiciary# 
Therefore, to call a personal, non-judicial, preference a 
judicial dilemma is a manifest error 0 Again, if legal 
order X is in existence there can be no question of the 
judges of that legal order "deciding." to owe "allegiance" 
either to another existing legal order (i.e. that of a 
foreign country) or to a past or potential legal order,
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because a creature of legal order X is constitutionally 
incapable of performing any act which that legal order 
does not empower. A judge is NOT a biological being who 
is vested with judicial authoritys he, or perhaps rather 
"it", is the judicial authority itself# His biological 
non—judicial will, as distinct from his judicial will, 
has no possible relevance to the judicial function# A 
"judge" who decides to "remain loyal" to a legal order 
that is no more is, therefore, NOT a judge, because the 
conduct known as "remaining loyal" is not a norm of the 
new legal order. If the "judge" who decides to "remain 
loyal" to the former legal order by either asserting its 
existence or "resigning" from his office, is not a judge, 
then what he does has no relevance to any analysis of the 
judicial function, in any constitutional situation# Con­
versely, a judge can never "join" a revolution because 
such a proposition involves the assertion that, within one 
legal order, there can be, in addition to that legal order, 
a normative item (the judge) that is outside that legal 
order initially, but which is nonetheless able, juristically, 
to insert itself into the legal order it has decided to 
"join"# It is submitted, however, that when a biologi.cal 
being passes from the cognition of one legal order as a 
judicial entity of that legal order to the cognition by 
another legal order as a judicial entity of the latter legal 
order, the process of transmutation should not be described 
as that of a judge "joining" a revolutionary legal order, 
but as that of the CREATION of a judicial entity by the legal 
order - established by successful revolution - which the
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"judge" lias "joined"# The "judge" cannot be a judge of 
the legal order he proposes to "join" because if he is
already a judge of that legal order he can hardly "join"
it. But if he is not a judge of the legal order he pro­
poses to "join" he is, as far as that legal order is con­
cerned - and within the relevant territory THIS legal 
order alone is the appropriate subject of juristic 
cognisance - NOT a judge within it# Therefore, the state­
ment that a "judge" has "joined" a revolutionary legal 
order is meaningless in terms of that legal order because 
no being is a judicial entity thereof unless he has been 
CREATED thereunder.
■When describing phenomena ixi relation to a specific 
legal order the use of terminology that enjoys no meaning 
within its four corners is inappropriate, and in the present 
context this entails that those acts of human volition that 
are biological only, should not be introduced into the ex­
position of the judicial phenomenon*
Having now surmounted a frequent and fundamental 
misconception we can now approach the remaining problems 
of the phenomenon known conventionally as "constitutional 
breakdown" with an enhanced measure of confidence.
(2) PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION
( a ) ” C ons t i t ut i ona1 Br e akdown1 *
The term ”Constitutional Breakdown" appears never 
to have been denned* despite its frequent use in the 
vocabulary of constitutional law0 Xt is proposed to 
exclude from the ambit of this term political upheaval or 
instability that is not of a kind that destroys the autliority 
of the national legal order. Hence a state of public 
emergency or even a condition of endemic ferment in respect 
of which the legal order is able to make provision does 
not constitute a constitutional breakdown because the 
constitution (which represents the source of law in 
the legal order)* being able to respond in the manner 
aforesaid* cannot* as a matter of logic* be described as 
having broken down. The constitution can only be des­
cribed as having broken down when there exist conditions 
or circumstances of so momentous a nature that its inability 
to make provision in relation thereto can only mean that 
it has ceased to function.
When a constitution breaks down it can either
leave a legal vacuum or be replaced by another constitution.
Xf it leaves a legal vacuum the situation by definition
becomes one into which legal discussion cannot enter. Xf
it is replaced by another constitution then the new const!-
2tution becomes the new source of law.
2, The constitution as the source of law for a legal order 
will be discussed later.
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It is constitixtionaliy irrelevant whether the 
constitutional breakdown is unavoidable (as in the case 
of the military coup in Nigeria in January, 1966) or 
deliberately brought about (as in the case of Sx'i Tanka, 
formerly Ceylon, when its ’’Constituent Assembly” - an
3
institution unknown to ANY 0! the country’s constitutions - 
purported to adopt the Republican Constitution of May,
1972? the method of introduction being one NOT authorised 
by the country’s previous Dominion Constitution of* 1$U6f 
so that the latter, being no longer in a position to make 
provision Tor the new situation, lapsed into a breakdown).
(b) 1 The Grundnorm1 and ’’The Constitution”
Xfhat is the Grundnorm of a legal order? Is it
the same as the constitution of that legal order or is it
different from it? Since the Grundnorm is a concept
propounded by Hans Kelsen, a quotation from him at this
It
point should not be out of place. Kelsen states?
If we ask why the constitution is valid, 
perhaps we come upon an older constitution. 
Ultimately we reach some constitution that 
is the first historically5 and that was laid
3. Namely, neither the 19^ -6 Constitution nor the prospective 
1972 Constitution.
General Theory of law and State ? Hans Kelsens translated 
by Anders Nedbergs (* 19^5T"Reissued (1961) by Russell 
and Russell (New York)? at page
5« It is important to note here that Kelsen does NOT mean
the country’s first constitution, but the earliest consti­
tution to which the authority of the present constitution 
can be traced. Therefore, if the present constitution has7 
emerged from a clean break of authority with all past 
constitutions, it will be this present constitution that 
represents the country’s historically first constitution.
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down by an individual usurper or by some 
kind of assembly„ The VALIDITY OF6 this 
first constitution is the last presuppos­
ition, the final postulate, upon which the 
validity of all the norms of our legal 
order depends ..... That the first consti­
tution is a binding legal norm is xxl1 e supposed, 
and the formulation of the presupposition 
is the basic norm of this legal order.
TXae passage above shows unmistakably that the 
Grundnorm is not to be identified with tlie first consti­
tution but witix the VALIDITY of that constitution. If 
the Grundnorm represents only one aspect of a constitution, 
what are the letter’s other aspebts? Before this question 
is answered, it is xxroxaosed that the xirord ’’constitution” 
should here be confined to the historically first consti­
tution. Kelson’s distinction between the historically 
first constitution and those constitutions that are not 
historically first merely makes the point that the Grund- 
norra resides in the former only, and never in the latter.
It is submitted, therefore, that in the interests of 
clarity the term "constitution” should be confined to a 
constitution that is ultimate, and that a constitution that 
is not ultimate, namely, one that does NOT contain the 
Grundnorm, should not be referred to as a constitution at all.
6. My emphasis to point out that the Grundnorm is merely
that constituent aspect of the constitution that repre­
sents the letter’s validity, AND NOTHING MORE0 In view 
of the confusion that x3©f©^anially plagues the Grundnorm, 
it is imperative to labour the point that the Grundnorm, 
"the last presupposition", "the final postulate”, is NOT 
the historically first constitution as a whole, but only 
the VALIDITY THEREOF« Also, the historically first 
constitution is conceptually different from OTHER 
constitutions - Kelsen makes this very clear.
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It is suggested, that a constitution, in the sense of the 
word indicated above, possesses T¥0 constituent aspects;
(1) Its validityo
(2) Its contento
01 what does a constitution's validity - the Grund— 
norm - consist? It consists of the hierarchical, norma­
tive rationalisation of the purely factual CONGRUENCE bet­
ween the CONTENT of the constitution, and the CONDUCT of 
7society in general0 The rationalisation aforesaid is 
essential to the existence of a legal order1 because it 
converts what is otherwise a mere factual congruence bet­
ween a congeries of propositions (the content of the 
constitution) and a congeries of conduct into a system of 
COMPLIANCE whereby the conduct is understood to COMPLY 
with the content of the constitution0 But what is the
content of the constitution? The content of the const!-
8tution consists of those propositions that ax-e initially 
present in the constitution, AND those propositions that 
have been introduced subsequently but in strict congruence
7. The term here is used to denote people inhabiting
a particular territory - all other possible connotations 
are disavowed.
8, The propositions are merely LINGUISTIC propositions 
or propositions PER SEs in themselves they have no 
non-linguistic property of any kind. This applies 
even if they are actually phrased in imperative 
language.
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9
with that, proposition which refers to the introduction
aforesaid such that the introduction can he rationalised,
or converted, into COMPLIANCE with the proposition that
10refers to the said introduction. However, where the
content of tlie constitution does not have a proposition
that refers to change, the content oP the constitution is
restricted to the propositions the constitution possesses 
11initially.
The point has now arrived when the question must
he askeds what is meant by "hierarchical, normative
1 2rationalisation" ? The expression means that where the
1 3content of* tlae constitution mentions a series of* bodies 
or persons in a hierarchical order, each such body or person 
being said to tell the person or body being placed immediately 
below it what to do and what not to do, AND this turns out to
9* The use of the non-imperative expression "refers to" is
deliberate because the content oP the constitution - i.e.
the propositions embodied therein - is NOT regulatory in 
any sense. The regulatox'y property comes from the consti­
tution's VALIDITYs it does not come Prom the constitution's 
CONTENT• Therefore, the proposition that NEPERS TO change 
is totally diPPerent Prom H.L.A. Hart's RULE op ciiange.
10. This is conventionally known as the procedure Por consti­
tutional amendment.
11. This would be the position oP an absolutely rigid consti­
tution that contains no amendment procedure whatsoever.
12. The expression is my own. However, the IDEA it embodies 
is, it is submitted, that oP Kelsen.
13* The use oP the non-regulatory "mentions" is again deliberate
and essential, IP consistency is to be maintained in the
assertion that the regulatory property can only come Prom
the VALIDITY op the constitution.
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be what is IN PACT being done (hence achieving congruence 
between content and conduct), this CONGRUENCE can be 
rationalised to signiPy that the body or person immedi­
ately below behaves congruently with what tine body or 
person immediately above tells him to do, BECAUSE Ine, the 
lower body or person, OUGHT to do what he has been thus 
told. The link, bePore rationalisation, between the CONTENT 
oP the Constitution and the CONDUCT oP society congruent 
therewith was merely one oP Pactual CONGRUENCE. The link, 
aPter rationalisation, becomes the OUGHT. BePore rationalis­
ation, iP A states that B is to travel to Y, and B in Pact 
does so, there is merely congruence between the statement 
oP A and the conduct oP B. APter rationalisation, B does
what A says BECAUSE B's conduct CONSTITUTES the OUGHT,
14because B COMPLIES with A fs statement. The hierarchy oP
1 *5normative rationalisation PLUS the congmience  ^ that is thus
1,4. The distinction between Congruence and Compliance is NOT 
the same as that made by H.L.A. Hart between "being 
obliged" and "having an obligation" (i-Iarts Concept oP Laws 
O.U.P.: 1961 : at pp. 80-81). The distinction proPPered 
by Hart, based as it is on attx*ibuting to the verb a 
meaning diPPerent Prom that oP the noun oP the same word, 
is oP highly elusive import.. Why should "being obliged" 
be devoid oP the element oP moral compulsion that Hart 
asserts is embodied in "obligation"? Is there any moral 
distinction between surrendering money to a gangster, and 
surrendering money to an opprobriously extortionate govern­
ment? The existence oP law should not depend up>on the 
absence oP moral revulsion in the rules oP law,
1 5. This is, oP course, the congruence between the non-
imperative content oP the constitution and the conduct oP 
society in general. The congruence need only be by and 
large, not absolute. Absolute congruence is only possible 
in ma thema tics.
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rationalised constitute the hierarchy of norms. But 
the hierarchy oP norms is NOT in itselP the entire legal 
order. The hierarchy oP norms is only PART oP the 
legal order. The legal order must have MATERIAL as well 
as NORMATIVE content. Therefore, it is only the hierarchy 
oP Norms PLUS the content oP the Constitution that comprise 
the legal order.^
Having reached this stage it ought to be askeds 
what is the diPPerence between the Constitution and the Legal 
Order? The answer is that there is absolutely NO difPer- 
ence between the two terms. The Constitution XS the 
Legal Order. Conventional constitutional terminology so 
frequently associates the term "Constitution" with a sort 
oP Pundamental legal DOCUMENT that it is difPicult to realize 
what a grave error this association oP ideas is. The 
DOCUMENT, conventionally rePerred to as the "Constitution " 
is nothing more than the LINGUISTIC expression oP the Legal 
Order. It is NOT a constituent phenomenon oP the Legal Order. 
Conceptually, there is no conceivable distinction between a
16. The present writer therePore dissents from Kelsen*s 
view that the hierarchy oP norms IS the legal order. 
Kelsen gives the legal order NORMATIVE content only? 
the present writer would give It both NORMATIVE and 
MATERIAL content. Furthermore, Kelsen*s OUGHT is only 
an imperative and does not include the action taken in 
response to it. But the present writer's OUGHT is 
CONGRUENT CONDUCT PLUS the rationalisation of that 
conduct? the present writer's OUGHT is therePore not a 
mere directive, but is RATIONALISED CONGRUENCE - 
CONGRUENT RESPONSE. The present writer's "OUGHT" is
thus seen to be a RATIONALISED "IS".
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Legal Order that has been LINGUISTICALLY manifested and 
one that has not been so manifested.
An essential question in this discussion is: what
is the "OUGHT" that converts congruence into compliance?
A learned writer has endeavoured to assert that the "OUGHT"
is merely a MORAL maxim. Thus the writer (Professor
17Graham Hughes) maintains!
18The prescriptions of the constitution 
are statements concerning ordered societal 
living. Assertions that we 0UGHT19 to 
comply with the constitution must be 
supported by argument drawn from social 
fact and moral principles. There is no 
other realm of meaning in which such state­
ments can operate, and the notion of the 
validity of basic norms must in the end 
either be devoid of meaning or be a moral 
maxim.
But if Professor Hughes is right, it will mean that
law IS morality. But Professor Hughes is NOT right. The
"OUGHT" in this context is not a moral obligation. Indeed,
20IT IS NOT AN OBLIGATION AT ALL. It is CONGRUENT RESPONSE.
It is a NON-IMPERATIVE. For example, B does what A says
simply because B RESPONDS to A*s statement. Whether B RESPONDS 
to A !s statement out of fear, agreement, moral approbation,
17• Validity and the Basic Norms in Essays in Honour of Hans
Kelsen (T97T) j California Laxtf Review, Inc*; at page 705•
18, "The prescriptions of the constitution" are, of course,
the constitution itself, "prescriptions" being the combin­
ation of the two constituent aspects of the constitution -
the VALIDITY and the CONTENT of the constitution.
19« The word is italicised by Hughes,
20, This is logically the case because the word "obligation"
cannot, without changing its meaning altogether, be purged 
of all moral or ethical content.
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malice, profit, ethical obligation, etc*, is not relevant 
to the functioning of the legal order. Compliance is 
therefore CONGRUENT RESPONSE. The hierarchy of normative 
rationalisation EXPLAINS the factual congruence between 
the content of the constitution and the conduct of society 
in general* The LINK between the two congruent phenomena 
is RESPONSE*21
Uith the utmost respect to Kelsen, without whom it
would not have been possible to present the view given above,
the concept whereby efficacy is INCLUDED in the phenomenon
of VALIDITY is better than his highly unsatisfactory attempt
to SEPARATE efficacy from validity* In his attempt to do
22this Kelsen asserts?
In the basic norm the fact of creation and 
the effectiveness are made the condition of 
the validity - ‘effectiveness1 in the sense 
that it has to be added to the fact of 
creation, so that neither the legal order 
as a whole, nor the individual legal norm 
shall lose their validity. A conditioxi 
cannot be identical with that which it con­
ditions. Thus, a man, in order to live, must
21. "Response", Professor Hughes will surely agx’ee, is 
absolutely free from all notions of ethics or mox'ality. 
The word "obligation" is inappropriate because it 
attaches a MOTIVE to the phenomenon of mere CONGRUENT 
RESPONSE. The expression "is obliged" also embodies
a MOTIVE (e.g. the intention to avoid unpleasant conse­
quences on the part of the person obliged), and it is 
therefore equally inappropriate in any exposition of 
the legal order. The "OUGHT", it is submitted, should, 
in the exposition of a legal order, be understood as a 
NON-IMPERATIVE. Congruent response, or compliance, does 
NOT result from an obligation of an}r lcind.
22. "Pure Theory of Law"? by Hans Kelsens translated by 
Max Knights University of California Presss 1970s 
at page 212.
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have been bornj but in order that he 
remain alive other conditions must also 
be fulfilled, for example, he must 
receive nutrition. If tlais condition 
is not fulfilled, he will lose lais life.
But life is neither identical witXi 
birth nor with being nourished.
With respect, the analogy of life is less than 
convincing. Why is the act of birth not a part of life?
Is it not somewhat less than logical to assert that the 
act of birth is a phenomenon EXTRANEOUS to life? Kelsen 
asserts that a condition cannot be identical with that
which it conditions. But this is logically only true where
it is possible, conceptually, for the condition to exist 
independently of that which is conditioned. Where that 
which is conditioned can have no existence except WITH that 
which conditions it, does it not follow that the condition 
is not a separate phenomenon from that which it "conditions", 
but that the condition is a CONDITION CONSTITUENT, or simply, 
a CONSTITUENT of that which is "conditioned"? Birth is 
surely the starting point of life (in the context of Kelsen1s 
analogy and not, of course, in biology) and NOT something 
that merely CONDITIONS life. Similarly, the fact that
VALIDITY is impossible to conceive of without the element
of EFFICACY demonstrates that EFFICACY is a constituent of 
VALIDITY. In the view of the writer of this thesis the 
EFFICACY to which Kelsen refers is the CONGRUENCE which the 
present writer expounds. If the view of the present writer 
is accepted, it will not be necessary to expend such erudition 
on the "difference" between efficacy and validity. The 
present writer, of course, agrees that efficacy is not in
ij.01 .
itself validity. It is efficacy PLUS the liierar chical 
normative rationalisation tliereof, the result of whicli 
is CONGRUENT RESPONSE, that constitute validity.
Kelsen1 s error lies in his failure to appreciate
that COISFGRUENCE is not separate from, hut is a constituent
of, CONGRUENT RESPONSE. An error in the opposite direction
will he made if one is to assert tliat CONGRUENCE entirely
constitutes, or is identical with, CONGRUENT RESPONSE.
Such an error lias been made by Professor Alf Ross. Pro-
23fessor Ross insists?
The fundamental question is the question 
about the meaning of the statement that a 
legal norm ‘exists1, that is, tliat it is 
part of the law in force of a certain 
country. Kelsen rightly declares tliat 
this meaning is determined by the metliod 
through whicli its 'existence1 is demon­
strated, the statement verified. Now, 
according to Kelsen, tXie 'existence' of a 
norm is its 'validity'; and that a norm 
possesses validity means 'that the indi­
viduals ouglit to beliave as the norm 
stipulates'. This, however, is nothing that 
can be verified by experience. Kelsen 
admits tliat the empirical fact wliicli can 
be verified tXirougli observation and wliicXi 
is decisive for tlie 'validity' of a norm 
is the effectiveness of tlie legal order 
and notXiing else. He tries to save the 
idea of validity by saying that the existence 
of a norm is not identical with tire social ZL,
facts of effectiveness, but only CONDITIONED 
by tliese facts by wXiicXi tlie 'existence* can 
be verified. However, wlien these facts are 
the necessary and sufficient condition for 
the 'existence' of the norm, and when the 
metliod of verification is determining tlie 
meaning of tlie statement that a norm exists, 
then the existence of a norm is simply the
2 3 . Rosss (1957) California Law Review 564, at p. 567,
24. The word is italicised by Ross.
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effectiveness of the order to which, it 
belongs, and nothing else. The idea of 
'validity' is superfluous.
The present writer, while agreeing with Ross that 
the distinction made by Kelsen between effectiveness and 
validity is logically indefensible, is not prepared, 
however, to travel with Ross to the opposite extreme of 
asserting that EFFECTIVENESS IS VALIDITY. The present 
writer has shown that EFFECTIVENESS is merely that state 
of factual CONGRUENCE between the content of the Consti­
tution and the conduct of society in general. The 
present writer has also shown tliat in order for tliis state 
of mere factual congruence to become VALIDITY (i.e. 
CONGRUENT RESPONSE) tlie factual congruence must undergo 
tlie process of liierarcliical, normative rationalisation.
The fact that it is only the state of factual congruence 
wliich can be an empirical fact verifiable through physical 
observation does NOT mean tliat one is not entitled, through 
RATIONAL obsexwation, to connect the titfo masses of con­
gruent phenomena (i.e. the CONTENT of the Constitution and 
the CONDUCT of society in general) in order to give them 
MEANINGj and the ONLY way to connedt these two masses of 
congruent phenomena is to understand the conduct of society 
as a RESPONSE to the content of the Constitution. The 
idea of validity can only be "superfluous" if one is to 
understand the legal order to be nothing more than two 
masses of congruent phenomena that are totally devoid of 
ANY rational link.
We have seen that Kelsen speaks of the legal order
as prescriptive but regards the science of law as des­
criptive. Kelsen asserts, and the present writer agrees, 
that despite their different impox't BOTH the legal order 
and the science of law have to be understood in OUGHT 
propositions. Ross joins issue with this, and maintains 
that this means that there is NO difference between the 
legal order and the science of law that is used to under-
25stand the legal order. This is how Ross makes his point: ^
It is obvious that insofar as the possibility 
of a science of law is assumed, it is also 
assumed that it is possible objectively, on 
the basis of observable facts and according to 
a method of empirical verification, to state 
what the law of a certain country is relating 
to a certain question; e.g., whether any legal 
consequences are attached to a promise of 
marriage, or not. This, again, means that 
the propositions of the science of law are 
theoretical propositioxxs in the sense of logic ~ 
they are either true or false and (not being 
tautologies) concerned with reality. A13. this 
is admitted by Kelsen. Now, this further im­
plies that the propositions of legal science 
must be IS2° judgments - for what does 'reality* 
and 'truth' mean but that which can be stated 
in IS2’/' - judgments ? Or t when it is possible 
to state what the law of a country IS , 2 this 
statement must necessarily be in the form of an 
IS29 judgment•
But this is not admitted by Kelsen. According 
to him the propositions in which the science 
of law describes its object (the legal norms) 
are statements in which an 'ought', not an 'is'
25. Ross, op.cit•, p* 5 6 6.
26• The word is italicised by Ross•
27. The word is italicised by Ross•
28. Ross's emplxasis#
29® Ross's emphasis.
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is express©do These statements are by 
Kelsen called 1 rules of law’ (a very 
unhappy terminologyI) and possess exactly 
the same logical structure as the legal 
norms - they are hypothetical judgments 
that attach a specific legal consequence 
to a specific condition, e.g. if a man 
commits a murder, a certain punishment 
ought to be inflicted upon him. In this 
way the PROPOSITIONS OF THE SCIENCE OF 
LAW ARE LOGICALLY NOT DISCERNIBLE FROM 
THE LEGAL NORMS THEMSELVES.30 At the 
same time Kelsen is aware of the fact 
that the logical meaning of the propos­
itions of the science of law is quite 
different from that of the legal norms.
Therefore, he adds, without any justification 
in the logical analysis, that the OUGHT31 
propositions of the science of law are 
used in a purely descriptive sense, and 
he denies that they are judgments of value 
in any possible sense of this term.
With respect, the elaborate eruditiQn of Ross is
tarnished by his failure to appreciate the fundamental
distinction between the MEANING of X, and the LINGUISTIC
EXPRESSION of that MEANING. If the meaning of a phenomenon
is the OUGHT, how otherwise can LINGUISTIC expression be
given to it than by means of an OUGHT proposition? For
example, if A is the linguistic expression of B, and B is 
32
the ' OUGHT in the legal order, then, but in the linguistic 
medium only, A is an OUGHT proposition. But the linguistic 
medium that expresses B (which linguistic medium is A) is 
NOT to be confused with B itself• B itself is beyond the 
linguistic medium in that it can be expressed only, BUT NOT
30• The words have been italicised by Ross.
31• The word is italicised by Ross.
32. The definite article ’’the11 is used to distinguish
this "ought” of the legal order from OTHER "oughts”.
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CONSTITUTED, therein. MEANING is not a linguistic 
property, although language can be used to express it in 
linguistic form. The legal order is a MEANING, the 
science of law is a description of THAT meaning, a 
LINGUISTIC expression of that meaning. But since the 
MEANING is the OUGHT, is it not perfectly logical that the 
LINGUISTIC expression thereof should, and could be nothing 
other than, an OUGHT proposition? The critique of Ross 
on tliis point is therefore unsound.
(d) "Presupposition”
We have hitherto spoken of "presupposition" without 
elaboration. But the word is alleged to embody an ambi­
guity that is fux'ther suggested to be crucial to the mean­
ing of Kelsen*s Grundnorm, in that the latter is supposed 
to be tenable only if the ambiguity is resolved in favour 
of one of the two possible meanings of the word. This 
contention has been advanced by Professor Gralram Hughes.
The present writer, however, disagrees with Hughes and
maintains that the ambiguity suggested does not in fact
33exist, Hughes expresses his opinion thust
 .to talk of validity itself as a
presupposition is dangerously misleading.
In any particular legal community the 
particular basic procedures that people 
accept are, of course, not presupx^osed at 
all, but are, from the internal point of 
view, simply experienced and, from the 
external point of view, discovered by
33. Essays in Honour of Hans Kelsen, op.cit., p0 700.
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observation. It would, therefore, be 
correct to say that THE S T A T E M E N T 3 4  that 
a particular norm of the system is valid 
P R E S U P P O S E S 3 5  that there is a valid 
(generally accepted)3° basic norm, but 
it would be misleading to say that THE 
VALIDITY OF THE BASIC N O R M 3 7  resides in 
a presupposition. The difference here 
is crucial. To say that in speaking of 
the validity of a particular norm of the 
system, the validity of the basic norm 
is presupposed, leaves open the possi­
bility of an. independent criterion for 
verifying the validity of the basic norm.
But to say that the validity of the basic 
norm IS39 (consists of) a presupposition, 
apparently excludes it from the category 
of propositions that may be ver'if ied. It 
is in failing to make this necessary dis­
tinction that Kelson’s exposition leads to 
confusion.
Let us attempt to illustrate this APPARENT dis­
tinction, and show its illogicality. When we say "X’s 
dog", we presuppose X. But this does not mean that X is a 
mere presupposition as distinct from a tangible mortal. X 
here exists independently of the statement, But when we say
34. The words are italicised by Hughes•
35* The word is italicised by Hughes.
36. The identification of "valid" with "generally accepted" 
is obviously wrongs it fails to observe the distinction 
between mere factual congruence ("generally accepted"?) 
and aongruent RESPONSE (validity). Furthermore, it is 
wrong to speak of tlie Grundnorm as being generally 
ACCEPTED, because this means that the ACCEPTANCE is 
PRIOR to the Grundnorm, and that the latter is not ultimate
3 7 • The words are italicised by Hughes.
38. This "independent criterion" suggested by Hughes is, of 
course, the ACCEPTANCE of the Grundnorm by the peoples 
see footnote No.34 in this Chapter.
39* The word is italicised by Hughes.
"X is good", we presuppose "goodness”. But "goodness" 
is a mere presupposition and is intangible. "Goodness" 
here exists only in the presupposition.
Nevertheless, the illustration is unsound - because
the distinction is unsound. Irrespective of the nature
of that which is presupposed, BOTH statements contain a
PRESUPPOSITIONS in the first, the presupposition is X; in
40the second, the presupposition is "goodness". Whetlier
or not the presupposition is verifiable outside tlie four 
corners of the statement is something which the statement 
itself cannot' decide, and therefore IRRELEVANT to the 
statement. To suggest that a statement that presupposes 
is not the same as a statement that contains a presuppos­
ition is illogical. The distinction should NOT have been 
made between "a presupposition" and "that which presupposes" 
The distinction should have been made between "that which 
presupposes" and "that which IS presupxiosed". BOTH these 
meanings are not different from, but are contained WITHIN, 
the term "presupposition". But if the latter distinction 
is made, Kelsen cannot be accused of ambiguity becaLise lie 
has always made it perfectly plain that the Grundnorm does 
NOT presuiipose, but IS presupposed. Kelsen never flags in 
his emphasis that the Grundnorm is ultimate, and that it
40. This attempt to separate "presupposition" from 
"that which presupposes" is redolent of H.L.A.
I-Iart’s valiant but futile effort to separate 
"being obliged" from "having an obligation".
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therefore CANNOT presuppose anything. In the present 
writer's terminology, the Grundnorm is the CONGRUENT 
RESPONSE of society in general to the content of the 
Constitution. The Grundnorm is tlie MEANING of the legal 
order beyond which MEANING it is impossible to go. This 
MEANING presupposes nothing. It is presupposed by the 
factual congruence between the content of the Constitution
and the conduct of society in general®
¥e have examined the definitions of theoretical 
concepts. We shall now turn to the task of their appli­
cation to the situations comprehended in this Thesis.
(3) THE TASK OF APPLICATION
Constitutional breakdown in two countries has been 
examined in this Thesis. The situations in Nigeria and
Southern Rhodesia will now be analysed in turn.
(a) Nigeria
What is the Constitution of Nigeria? The Consti­
tution, as we have seen, consists of two aspects 1 the 
VALIDITY and the CONTENT. What is the content of the 
Constitution of Nigeria? If is that of which Decree No. 1, 
1966, is the LINGUISTIC expression. What is the validity 
of the Constitution of Nigeria? It comprises the hierarchy 
of normative rationalisation of the factual congruence bet­
ween the content of the Constitution and the conduct of 
Nigerian society in general. The CONTENT and VALIDITY
ko>9.
aforesaid is the Constitution of Nigeria® Alternatively, 
the CONTENT of* the Constitution can be called its MATERIAL 
content, and the VALIDITY of the Constitution the latter * s 
NORMATIVE content.
(b) (Southern) Rhodesia
What was the Constitution of (Southern) Rhodesia 
in that period with which the Thesis is concerned (i.e., 
specifically from U.D.I. to tlie end of the constitutional
litigation in R v. Ndhlovu)? The CONTENT of that Consti-
 ^ h i /tution was that of which the 1963 Constitution (as a
document) was the LINGUISTIC expression® The VALIDITY of 
that Constitution was the hierarchical, normative rationalis­
ation of the factual congruence between the content of the 
Constitution and the conduct of (Southern) Rhodesian society 
in general.
It is thus observed that once the concept of 
"Constitution" is purged of all extraneous elements (of 
ethics, morality, etc# ) the identifleafion of the Consti­
tution does not require monumental labour #
We have now seen what the Grundnorm is in relation 
to the Constitution. However, to illus trate how the term 
"Cfrundnorm" could be misunderstood, it is proposed to quote 
from the opinion of a learned writer ~ J,M. Eelcelaar.
h1. (Southern) Rhodesia is now governed under the 1969 
Constitution, but the period that concerns us - the 
breakdown - does not include the advent of this 
Constitution®
4io.
hzEekelaar writes g
Where, then, is the Rhodesian grundnorm 
to be found? There are no officials whose 
criteria of authority are fully accepted 
by the court. The answer seems to be 
that the ultimate criteria of validity remain 
the provisions of the 1961 Constitution, 
which continues to live on in a curiously 
disembodied state, ignored by the men with 
effective power and suspended in major res­
pects by the de jure authorities who are 
not, indeed, bound by it. And the very 
recognition of the 1961 Constitution com­
pelled the court, by reason of the subordinate 
nature of that Constitution 43, to accept 
the United Kingdom Government and Parliament 
as the ultimate, de jure law-making authorities. 
But since these autliorities were ineffective, 
the court was forced to regard those aspects 
of the Constitution implicitly or explicitly 
POINTING Tq44 thenA-5 as legitimate as being
42. (1967) 30 M.L.R. 1 5 6, pp. 174-175; "Splitting the 
Grundnorm" by J.M. Eekelaar. The learned writer was 
commenting after the Madzimbamuto decision was given 
by the General Division of the High Court, and 
before the case was heard in the Appellate Division 
of the said court. Except where otherwise indicated 
the emphasis in the passage quoted is mine.
43. It is inconsistent of Eekelaar to submit (a) that
the ULTIMATE criteria of validity remain the provision 
of the 1961 Constitution, and (b) that the 1961 Consti 
tution is of a SUBORDINATE nature, How, Eekelaar may 
well be asked, can that which is SUBORDINATE provide 
ULTIMATE criteria? This careless use of language is 
difficult to defend.
44. The emphasis is that of Eekelaar who gives tlie phrase 
in italics in his article.
45. "them" presumably refers to Eekelaar's understanding 
of the "de jure authorities" in the immediately 
previous sentence in the passage.
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46in a state of suspense. The court would 
not give effect to what might be called 
these 1 positive1^ 7 aspects of the Consti­
tution. But the other parts of that Consti-^g 
tution, which might be termed its 'negative' 
aspects, which defined the manner and extent 
of the use of governmental powers against the 
citizen but which did not in any way DEFINE^'9 
the governmental authority, could still be 
enforced and would be used to restrict the 
activities of the de facto authorities whether 
lawful or not. So the position seems to be 
reached that while a British enactment forbidding 
certain steps to be taken by the regime would 
not be enforced by the courts, a provision in 
the 1961 Constitution which made the same 
prohibition would be enforced, thus rendering 
tlie de facto authorities liable to an action 
if they proceeded. The only explanation there 
can be for this situation is that the former 
prohibition would owe its de jure status to 
some 'positive' aspect of the 1961 Constitution 
which referred to the British authority as tlie 
proper one to make the prohibition, but which 
was in suspense, whereas the latter prohibition 
does not depend 011 a secondary rule of recog­
nition pointing to an Ineffective authority but 
is itself part and parcel of the original 
grundnorm. The grundnorm is ~^ i^Tlt5^ r but since 
its 'positive' side is only suspended and not 
extinguished, its 'negative' side can still be 
enforced. This dissection of the grundnorm may 
take theorists by surprise but cannot be said to 
be illogical.
46. How could ANY provision of the 1961 Constitution have 
avoided "implicitly or explicitly" "POINTING TO" the 
"de jure law—making authorities"?
47. The emphasis is that of Eekelaar.
48. The emphasis is that of Eekelaar,
49. The emphasis is that of Eekelaar.
50. It has been shown that the Grundnorm is a QUALITY.
It is to pose the science of language an impossible 
task in asking it to SPLIT a QUALITY. A QUANTITY 
can be SPLIT; but a QUALITY can only be SHARED. 
Eekelaar confuses "splitting" with "sharing".
This QUALITY is, of course, CONGRUENT RESPONSE.
The short answer to this very lengthy passage
is that the Grundnorm is VALIDITY - a QUALITY. The
Grundnorm is not a bundle of valid rules of law that can
be split up merely by dividing the bundle. The Grundnorm
is NOT a numerical QUANTITY of legal rules that can be
split like a fascicle. Furthermore Eekelaar*s legal
*51rules - or "ultimate criteria of validity" (note the 
PLURAL) - appear to be not interrelated! how otherwise 
could an acknowledgment of some of them ("the negative 
aspects") have failed to point to the existence of tlie 
discarded remainder ("the positive aspects")?
(4) THE DOCTRINE OF STATE NECESSITY
In Chapter 4 the thesis was tentatively adumbrated
52of there being three species of the doctrine of necessity 
in regard to constitutional cataclysms. It was also noted, 
however, that each of these species was incompatible concep­
tually with the remaining two others, so that the validity 
of any one of them would necessarily invalidate the other 
two competing species. It was also stated that the present
51• The phrase is that of Eekelaar.
52. Throughout this thesis the teirms "doctrine of
necessity" and "doctrine of state necessity" are 
us ed as inter changeable terms. We are not at all 
concerned with the doctrine of necessity in PRIVATE 
law. Furthermore, the terms "OUGHT" and "OUGHT-NESS" 
are used interchangeably, There is no distinction 
between "OUGHT" and "OUGHT-NESS" because there is no 
distinction between X and the ESSENCE OF X.
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writer approved of one of the species in preference to 
the others notwithstanding the fact that the latter had 
enjoyed the accolade of judicial approbation* The 
present writer had endeavoured to give a fair rationalis­
ation of the two species from which he dissented, and 
it is hoped that this aforementioned exposition would not 
be regarded as indicative of his support for the two species 
thereof.
The three competing species will now be presented 
again briefly, in order to show that only one of them is 
tenable.
(i) Doctrine of State Necessity - Species No. 1.
THE IMPLIED NECESSITY PROVISION
This species of the doctrine states that where a 
country1s constitution fails in its express provisions to 
deal with certain situations that arise in the country, 
implied provisions will be understood to have been made in 
the constitution to cope with the situations that so arise, 
in order that the country, whose preservation the consti­
tution is presumed to maintain, may be secured against a 
breakdown in its administration.
The judicial decision that supports this species is
The Attorney-General of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim and 
53Others . Xn that case the accused had impugned the
authority of the Supreme Court of Cyprus to hear their case
53- Cyprus Taw Reports '195 *
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because, so they contended, that Court had not been con­
stituted under the provisions of the lawful Cyprus Consti­
tution of 1960. The Court had been created because both 
the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court had 
ceased to function owing to the withdrawal therefrom of 
the constitutionally prescribed quota of Turkish Cypriot 
judges. The new Supreme Court was staffed exclusively by 
Greek Cypriot judges. The Court was purportedly created 
by the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Law, 1964 (Law 33 of 1964). This Law was, however, not 
passed by the Legislature as defined in the i960 Constitution 
because it no longer possessed its xorescribed quota of 
Turkish Cypriot legislators. The Supreme Court had thus 
to discover some criterion of validity for the law which 
had purported to create it otherwise than in accordance 
with the express provisions of the i960 Constitution. In 
essence the doctrine of necessity permits and prescribes 
the performance of such acts by such organs of authority 
as the necessity of the situation warrants. The scope is 
wide but to narrow it would introduce the very danger it 
is designed to avoid, namely, the danger of being circum­
scribed and powerless in time of unforeseen national emerg­
encies .
This was how the first of the three judges in the 
case justified the conferment of validity on the said Law 33 
of 1964 through the doctrine of necessitys
54. Ibid. Vassiliades, J., p. 214.
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This Court now, in its all-important and 
responsible function of transforming 
legal theory into living law, applied to 
the facts of daily life for the preservation 
of the social order35, is faced with the 
question whether the legal doctrine of
necessity *,.... should or should not, be
read IN-56 the provisions of the written 
Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus•
Our unanimous view, and unhesitating answer 
to this question, is in the affirmative«
The use of the expression "read IN" in preference 
to "read INTO" is decisive of the point that the court 
explicitly intended the doctrine of necessity to function 
WITHIN the authority of the Constitution. By merely find­
ing the doctrine IN the Constitution the court was doing 
nothing more, in strict logic, than making a discovery 
that the Constitution, in an emergency for which its express 
terms had not made provision, had had the foresight and 
prudence to embody within itself a doctrine of necessity 
which, although only implicit, could, if this was necessary 
for the preservation of the state, in fact override its own 
express provisions.. By studiously avoiding the expression
55• My own underlining.
56* My own emphasis• The use of the word "in" in prefer­
ence to "into" is NOT an error, but .is a deliberate 
effort to assert that the doctrine of necessity, in 
the court’s view, is not something introduced, 
imported or injected into the Constitution, but is, on 
the contrary, a provision ALREADY PRESENT, albeit only 
implicitly, in the Constitution,, Hence it was logical 
for the court to use the word "in" because it was 
merely reading off something IN the Constitution, and 
not introducing an extraneous provision INTO it. The 
result is that what is done is done under the authority 
of, and not in contravention of, the Constitution - this 
authority is not the less real for being merely implicit 
and intrinsic. (This is a rationalisation of the 
court *s view,)
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"read INTO" the court had exhibited exemplary care in 
demonstrating that the doctrine of necessity was not 
something from outside that was forcibly pushed into the 
Constitution to override the clear intention of the latter, 
and thus to challenge the Constitution’s authority, but 
that the doctrine was something already IN the Constitution, 
and thus necessarily always a constituent of it, so that 
it would be illogical to say that its operation was other­
wise than in strict accordance with the Constitution. This 
species of the doctrine of necessity does not in its oper­
ation in any way affect the integrity of the Constitution, 
and thus leaves the authority of the latter intact.
It is proposed to dissent from this interpretation 
of the doctrine of necessity. ^  The very idea of a WRITTEN 
constitution, with a long list of provisions, spelt out with 
a high degree of explicitness and detail, intending neverthe­
less to harbour an implicit authorisation to be availed of in 
an emergency, to override the authority of the provisions it
57* That the court did not intend its interpretation of the 
doctrine of necessity to challenge the authority of the 
Constitution is made very clear also in the juidgment of 
the second judge - Triantafyllides, J., at page 234 of 
the judgment t
"In such a case such steps, provided that 
they are what is reasonably required in 
the circumstances, CANNOT be deemed as 
being repugnant to or inconsistent with 
the Constitution, because to hold otherwise
would amount to the absurd proposition that
the Constitution itself ordains tlie destruction 
of the State which it has been destined to 
serve *"
(Emphasis supplied.)
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had made in specific detail, is difficult to understand.
If a constitution had really intended to embody such a
doctrine it could have made just another express provision
to that effect. The insertion of an additional article
would not have been baulked at if the Constitution had
really intended to espouse such a doctrine to wreak havoc
on its list of express provisions. Xt is never the
function of the court artificially, and using questionable
logic, to prolong the life of an improvident Constitution.
Xf a Constitution cannot have secured to its express and
detailed provisions the necessary factual compliance, that
Constitution is not a reflection of real life, it cannot
govern those it designs to govern, and since its existence
lies in its function, and since it cannot function, it is
logicall3r extinct. If the court’s interpretation of the
doctrine is pushed to its logical conclusion, it means that
a constitution can have ALL its express provisions flouted,
and YET function with all its integrity by means of the
doctrine of necessity which it is presumed to Ziave implicitly
enshrined within itself. This interpretation is 
58untenable.
(ii) Doctrine of State Necessity - Species No»2.
THE THESIS OF CONDOMINIUM
This species of the doctrine states that the doctrine
of necessity (i.e. itself) is not part of the constitution of
58• My own interpretation will be given when we come to 
examine Species No.3 of the doctrine of necessity.
the country, but in situations which that constitution 
cannot cope with* it* the doctrine* joins* as it were* 
the constitution in a common endeavour to preserve the 
order and xirelfare of the country. The doctrine* although 
it is not in this case a part of the constitution* is 
nevertlieless not exclusive of the latter* s authority because 
the provisions of* the latter can only be overridden by the 
doctrine when it becomes necessary to do so. ¥here it 
is not necessary to override the entire constitution* those 
provisions overridden by the doctrine xtfill have their field 
of operation governed by the doctrine* whereas the remaining 
provisions will continue to function as provisions of the 
constitution. There is thus a precarious but real condominium 
constituted of the doctrine (where it is able to operate) 
and the constitution (in those areas where it is not neces­
sary for the doctrine to intervene).
The judicial decision that propounds this species
of the doctrine of necessity is Lakanmi and Ola v« Attorney- 
/ \ 59General (West). The facts of this case have been fully
set out in Chapter 3® A brief recapitulation will be given 
here. In January* 19669 the civilian administration in 
Nigeria instituted under the 1963 Constitution purported 
to surrender its authority* as distinct from being summarily 
ejected from it* to a military government which, in the
59® This case was decided in April* 1970? in the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria. The decision has been analysed in 
Chapters 3 and k, and it is proposed to analyse only 
one of'its aspects here. The case is as yet unreported 
but it is the judgment of the Supreme Court SC. 58/ 69,
9®
circumstances of an armed revolt by a section of the
Nigerian Army* was the only form of government capable
of continuing the administration of the country. The
military government, whose accession was not authorised
60 ,under the 1963 Constitution* issued a decree suspending 
certain provisions of that Constitution but allowed the 
remainder to continue to function. The appellants * 
after much confused legislation* found themselves ultimately 
in a position where a decree (Decree No# 4-5 * 1968) had pur­
ported not only to confiscate his property * but to render 
the confiscation beyond the purview of the courts. The 
appellants challenged this decree and inevitably also 
impugned the authority of that institution that had enacted 
it - the Federal Military Government• The Supreme Court 
held that the Federal Military Government was not the 
paramount authority in Nigeria, That Government had come 
to power under the authority of the doctrine of necessity.
It could remain in power for only so long as it was necessary 
fox' it to discharge its caretaker responsibilities. The 
doctrine of necessity* however* could only override such 
provisions of the 1963 Constitution as circumstances should 
warrant % the 19^3 Constitution was decidedly not superseded 
entirely* and continued to function* albeit in an attenuated 
form. This attenuated form, however * INCLUDED the power 
of judicial review over all legislation to test their 
validity against the yardstick of the unsuspended part of the 
1963 Constitution. Now* the Fundamental Rights embodied in
60, Decree No# 1, 19 6 6.
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that Constitution had been among the provisions allowed 
to continue under Decree No, 1, 1966, by reference to 
which decree the Supreme Court defined the powers of the 
Military Government (it was highly selective in the process). 
Since the Supreme Court had power to test Decree No, 4-5?
1968 (the decree of confiscation) against the Fundamental 
Rights Chapter in the Constitution, and since that decree 
clearly violated the appellants’ right against the confis­
cation of his property, the appeal was allowed. Thus we 
witness the doctrine of necessity being interpreted by the 
court to govern the country hand in hand, as it were, with
the 1963 Constitution. The part of the judgment propound-
61ing this harmonious partnership is t
Xt was evident that the Government thus 
formed®^ is an interim government which 
would UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION^3 of Nigeria 
and would only suspend certain sections 
AS THE NECESSITY ARISES. 64-
This view of the doctrine of necessity is indefens­
ible once it is realized that the supreme authority in a
state is a QUALITY and not a QUANTITY, It cannot be split 
or divided like a bottle of sweets. The view of the court 
means that even if only one provision of the 1963 Constitution 
were allowed to function, and the rest of the Constitution 
were abrogated, that Constitution would still be one of the
61. Lakanmi, op.cit,, p. 20.
62c The Federal Military Government,
63. My emphasis. Here the 196!) Constitution governs •
64. My emphasis. Here the doctrine of necessity
governs.
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two ultimate sources of authority in the country® It
must be asserted again that the Grundnorm in a Constitution —
its VALIDITY - cannot be split.
(iii) Doctrine of State Necessity - Species No»3 
NECESSITY AS A CONSTITUTION IN ITSELF
The present writer would prefer to define the
/C k
Doctrine of Necessity (the third species p ) as a consti­
tution in itself % the word "constitution" being understood
t'vJ>0
in its thr-ee constituent aspects, as has been earlier 
suggested to be its meaning.
The constitution which the doctrine of necessity 
by its operation contradicts and thus puts out of existence 
is logically replaced by the doctrine of necessity - the 
new constitution. But how, it may be asked, does the 
doctrine of necessity extinguish the life of the former 
constitution merely by the doctrine’s operation? The 
former constitution - like all constitutions as I understand 
the term - possessed a Grundnorm, its VALIDITY ASPECT, its 
’’ultimate ought-ness” . The doctrine of necessity, by 
operatic^ at all, necessarily denies and destroys the ulti­
ma cy of this ’’ultimate ought-ness ” because the OUGIiT-NESS 
of the doctrine is NOT in that hierarchy of "ought-ness” 
which terminates in, and is unified througji, the ’’ultimate 
ought-ness" of the former constitution. This upsets the
6 5. That explanation of it supported by the present 
writer.
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hierarchy of* "ought-ness"^ of* the former constitution 
because, within the same territory, indeed within the same 
field of operation, there now exists an "ought-ness" that 
displaces the "ought-ness" of the former constitution® The 
former constitution becomes the "former" constitution pre­
cisely because it is unable to function owing to its 
inability to resolve the intruding "ought-ness" into its 
own hierarchy of "ought-ness". Where two species of 
"ought-ness" conflict, the one that is able to rationalize 
the factual situation with its hierarchy of "ought-ness" 
is the new "hierarchy of ought-ness"® Now the doctrine of 
necessity prevents, in the Cyprus and Nigerian situations, 
the factual congruence with the respective contents of the
67i960 Cyprus Constitution and the 1963 Nigerian Constitution , 
which factual congruence respectively, their hierarchies of 
"ought-ness" require as material for their function of 
normative rationalisation® Failing this factual congruence, 
the respective hierarchies of "ought-ness" in the i960 
Cyprus Constitution and the 1963 Nigerian Constitution would 
collapse owing to the absence of the factual congruence re­
quired for their normative rationalisation. The doctrine of 
necessity would then have replaced the respective constitutions 
as the new constitutions of those countries® This does not, 
of course, mean that the two countries share a common
66® Or the hierarchy of CONGRUENT RESPONSE®
6 7. To illustrate the point, it is merely ASSUMED, but 
not asserted, that the doctrine did in fact operate 
in these two cases®
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constitution, or even identical constitutions because their 
CONTENTS would be different (the political and social 
exigencies being different), and tiie content is also a 
constituent aspect of a constitution.
Let us now return to the abstract. It has been 
submitted that the doctrine of necessity is itself a consti­
tution. How would its two constituent aspects be identi­
fied? The first aspect, the Grundnorm, the VALIDITY
ASPECT, "the ultimate ought-ness”, would be the fact that 
68any act within the territory not susceptible of normative 
rationalisation by that hierarchy of "ought-ness" that ends 
in the "ultimate ought-ness" that is the Grundnorm of the 
Doctrine of Necessity would be either an illegal or a non™ 
legal act.
The second aspect (the CONTENT) of the "doctrine of 
necessity" Constitution would be the measures (MINUS their 
VALIDITY) that are taken in response to the exigencies of 
time, place and circumstance®
The doctrine of necessity can expire like any other 
constitution. By the "doctrine of necessity" is meant here 
the OPERATION of the doctrine and not the IDEA^ of it. The 
doctrine expires when a new constitution with its own 
hierarchy of "ought-ness" disrupts and thus destroys the
68. This includes any non-act, state of affairs, etc.
69. The killing of a cat does not kill the IDEA of 
"cat".
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hierarchy of "ought-ness" of the "doctrine of* necessity"
constitution.
This species of the doctrine of necessity has no
judicial support, but it is favoured by the present writer
because it eliminates the anomaly of a source of law that
is "extra-constitutional*’. The confusion cx'eated by this
anomalous classification is gratuitous, and emanates from
the failure to pursue the implications of the doctrine of
necessity to their necessary, logical conclusion. A very
recent and translucent example of this failure to pursue
the implications of the doctrine of necessity is the
decision by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Asma Jilani v.
70The Government of the Punjab and Another.
The 1962 Constitution of Pakistan had given the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan power, inter alia, to enquire 
into the validity of detention orders. However, on March 
25? ^969? the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army pro­
claimed Martial Taw throughout Pakistan and purported to 
abrogate the 1962 Constitution. Certain of the provisions 
of the 1962 Constitution, among them the provisions estab­
lishing the judiciary, were, however, retained under the
terms of the Proclamation. The Commander-in-Chief also
71proclaimed himself President and Chief Martial Taw Adminis-
72trator. In Presidential Order No. 3 , 1969 > the President
70. P.I.D. 1972 B.C. 139.
71. This was done on March 315 ^9^9? with retroactive 
force to March 2 3 , 1969*
72. Jurisdiction of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order,
1969.
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General Yahya Khan - purported to terminate judicial 
review of martial law regulations. The appellant was 
detained under one of these regulations. Her appeal 
was heard AFTER the overthrow of President Taliya Khan.
The Supreme Court decided that as the Presidential 
Order No. 3? 1969f was in contravention of the 1962
Constitution, the Order was void. However, their 
Yordships reasoned, if the Order No. 3 made to avert
a major disaster its illegality could he CONDONED under 
the doctrine of necessity, and the Order would then be 
given effect to. But again the Court failed, as courts 
in other countries had failed before it, to reconcile the 
authority of the Constitution with an infringement of that 
authority by the application of the doctrine of necessity. 
(The doctrine was not, in fact, applied because the Court 
found that the Order as well as the Regulation under which 
the appellant had been detained were not such as could come 
under the appeal to salus populi suprema lex.) The decision 
-^n Asma Jilani is thus another illustration of the judicial 
misunderstanding of the doctrine of necessity.
73® Asma Jilani, op.cit., p. 207.
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(5) CONCLUSION i THE COURTS AND THE GRUNDNORM
It was mentioned in Chapter 7 that the courts 
could only PRESUPPOSE the Grundnorm, and that it was 
illogical to suggest that they could in any way confirm 
its having been established. The courts could no more 
approve or confirm a Grundnorm than a creature could 
choose or confirm its creator. The legitimacy of the 
courts themselves derives Prom the Grundnorm and just as 
they suppose their own legitimacy they must presuppose 
the Grundnorm - the legitimacy of the courts cannot exist 
without the fact of that existence necessarily presuppos­
ing the Grundnorm. The courts, in their conduct, can 
never "use", " apply”, "approve", or "follow" Kels en’s 
Theoryg they can only be the instruments by means of which 
Kelsen ILLUSTRATES his DESCRIPTIVE thesis. The judges 
cannot use Kelsens Kelsen uses them*
That Kelsen means his thesis to be DESCRIPTIVE,
and NOT suggestive, prescriptive or even advisory, in
relation to the conduct of judges, is made clear in this
74statement from hims'
It is the task of the science of law to 
represent the law of a community, i.e, the 
material produced by the legal authority 
in the law-making procedure, in the form 
of statements to the effect that "if such 
and such conditions are fulfilled, then 
such and such a sanction shall follow."
74. GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE r‘ HANS KELSEN : 
TRANSLATED BY ANDERS WEDBERGs (1945), REISSUED 
(1961) BY RUSSELL AND RUSSELL (NEW YORK), p. 45* 
The visual emphasis in the passage is mine.
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These statements, by means of itfhich the 
SCIENCE OF LAW represents law, MUST NOT 
BE CONFUSED WITH the norms created by 
the law-making authorities* It is 
preferable not to call these statements 
norms, hut legal rules. The legal norms 
enacted by the law creating authorities 
are prescriptive; the rules of law formu­
lated by the science of law are DESCRIPTIVE.
It is OF IMPORTANCE that the term 1legal 
rule', or 'rule of law* be employed here 
in a DESCRIPTIVE sense.
The passage above stresses as clearly as possible 
that although Kelsen*s Theory is ABOUT norms, the Theory 
is not ITSELF a norm, and the Theory is, therefore, never 
•'aiDplicable" in any court of law, which court has the 
function of applying, and can apply nothing else but, legal 
norms. It is this application of legal norms by the 
courts that Kelsen DESCRIBES. No court can logically 
cite Kelsen to support any of its decisions, because Kelsen 
himself says that the courts can only function in the con­
text of legal norms, and therefore a court which purports 
to rely on Kelsen*s Theory - which is NOT a legal norm - 
is in fact destroying the very import of the Theory, 
namely, its DESCRIPTIVENESS.
The questions "What Grundnorm ought a court to 
prefer?" cannot be understood in terms of any legal norm.
The issue which that question raises is outside the hierarchy 
of norms in a legal orders the issue WHAT to presuppose 
is outside the field of constitutional theory, if by "WHAT 
to presuppose" is meant that the court is free to pick and 
choose what Grundnorm it wants, or what Constitution it 
prefers. The issue "what to presuppose" is WITHIN the
428 .
domain of constitutional theory, if by that is meant that
the courts must have SOME source of authority, and that
that source of authority is the Grundnorm. The function
of legal theory is fulfilled once it has explained that
"a" Grundnorm must be identified; it is ultra vires legal
theory to go beyond that function to suggest or prescribe
the identity of the Grundnorm. The process of identifi-
7 5cation is essentials identity in itself  ^ is irrelevant.
Is it not, however, possible for the judges to 
presuppose an inefficacious "Grundnorm", a "wrong Grundnorm"? 
T.t is submitted that such a contingency is a logical 
impossibility. If the "judges" should purport to 
presuppose an inefficacious "Grundnorm", the people who 
purport to be the "judges'* are not judges at all. They 
can only be judges if they happen to presuppose what 
qualifies to be a Grundnorm. There cannot be any "judges" 
if there is no Grundnorm to confer validity on the appoint­
ment of the personnel who purport to be judges. If X, 
which the "judges" "presuppose", is NOT the Grundnorm, then 
X cannot create any judicial appointments, and tlie ''judges" 
will logically NOT be judges.
75® It is thus irrelevant to constitutional theory 
whether country A has Grundnorm X or Ys it is 
satisfied once country A lias a Grundnorm, be that 
X or Y . The same applies to the identity of 
country A*s Constitutions once country A has a 
Constitution it matters not what the identity of 
that Constitution is.
429.
Is the presupposition of the Grundnorm made by 
the judges a legal norm in itself? The answer is Yes.
If the presupposition were not a legal norm in itself,
i
the judges would not Tie competent constitutionally to make 
the presupposition because they would not be able to per­
form that which was not a legal norm. The normative 
legal order is a hierarchy of MEANING, a hierarchy of 
" ought -ness51, a hierarchy of norms. A judge is therefore
logically a MEANING, a legal norm. Since he is a legal
norm, and since all legal norms PR1DSUPP0SE the Grundnorm 
in that legal norms CANNOT exist without a Grundnorm, the 
judge - a legal norm - necessarily presupposes the Grundnorm.
k-30.
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